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ABSTRACT 
 
The study focuses on the rhetoric used during the drafting of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Namibia. The thesis will offer a framework for understanding 
negotiations in terms of distinct and coherent rhetoric. 
Primary sources for this thesis consist of five volumes of the Hansard of the 
Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements of the 
Windhoek Constituent Assembly. To understand the rhetoric under which the Namibian 
Constitution was drafted, the Hansard of the Standing Committee was analysed. By 
analysing the Hansard, one can begin to formulate a picture of the rhetoric that led to a 
new Constitution of the Republic of Namibia and begin to understand rhetoric in the 
Namibian context. 
In order to make valid assertions, one has to go beyond what was said in the 
Constituent Assembly and look at what the participants said elsewhere. The thesis is 
concerned here with their words, not with their thoughts. But there is a recognition that 
sometimes thoughts matter as much as words. No judgements are made on the merits 
of their arguments. The study simply intended to examine their rhetoric and how rhetoric 
impacted on the final outcome of the negotiations. 
The study revealed that, with very few exceptions, most of the debates of the 
Windhoek Constituent Assembly were initially built on argument and many of them were 
solved through practical reasoning. This can be explained in part by the attitude of the 
members and in part by the constraint of the process. 
The study also revealed that the informative role of deliberation helped the 
framers of the Namibian constitution to form a more complete set of preferences than 
they originally had or even forced them to change positions when they were exposed to 
the full consequences or incoherence of their original proposals. For another, when 
political actors needed to justify their proposals, they found that impartial arguments 
were not available or, if they were, they were too obviously tied to a particular interest to 
be convincing. 
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The appeal to fear strategy, as a means to enable delegates to better recognise 
the nature of the problems facing the political community and to begin thinking about 
potential solutions, was clearly at play at the Windhoek Constituent Assembly. 
Finally, the proceedings of the Windhoek Constituent Assembly which framed the 
Constitution show that many of the provisions of that instrument which are seemingly 
straightforward and artless rest in reality upon compromises, and are often laboured 
and tortuous. The outcome of constitution-making in Namibia was greatly influenced by 
the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments among the framers. 
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PREFACE 
 
I am intrigued by the question how speakers in legislatures win the approval and 
attention of fellow members through persuasive language. This was how the idea of 
writing something on the making of the Namibian Constitution was born. When I began 
researching this thesis, it never occurred to me that I collected enough materials on the 
Hansard of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal 
Arrangements than I had initially thought. 
Thesis is quite voluminous: being the actual research study itself and four 
appendices. Appendices includes:  
a) The Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for 
an Independent Namibia;  
b) List of the names of Members of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules 
and Orders and Internal Arrangements;  
c) The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia and  
d) Excerpts from the Hansard of the Windhoek Constituent Assembly’s Standing 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements.  
I wanted the readers of this thesis to get a glimpse of the nature of the debates as I saw 
them. Some sections in the thesis, specifically verbatim quotes attributed to others, 
contain grammatical errors. I have taken no effort to correct the record with respect to 
those as they are the exact utterances as reproduced from the Hansard. I hope that this 
arrangement will help the reader understand this study better. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mankind have a great aversion to intellectual labour; but even supposing knowledge 
to be easily attainable, more people would be content to be ignorant than would take 
even a little trouble to acquire it. 
Samuel Johnson, 1709 - 1784 
 
Background of study 
Namibia has a long history of colonial rule. After 75 years of South African 
colonial and later military occupation, Namibia, a former German colony (1884-
1915), attained its independence on 21 March 1990 (Diescho 1993: 8). The period 
since the Second World War has been marked, among other things, by a 
proliferation of formally negotiated constitutions, beginning with the nations 
rebuilding after the war, continuing through the period of independence from colonial 
rule and through the periods of democratisation, culminating in the establishment of 
new regimes after the collapse of communism (Covell 2003). Such nations include 
Namibia. 
The road to independence was long and bitter, culminating in 23 years of 
armed struggle. The guerrilla war for independence escalated sharply as South 
African government troops began raiding guerrilla bases in Angola, while the South 
West African People‘s Organisation (SWAPO) forces hit back in Namibia. In 1976, 
the United Nations (UN) condemned South Africa for illegal occupation of the 
territory. In 1977, the UN General Assembly recognised SWAPO as the sole 
legitimate representative of Namibia. In 1978, the UN called an international 
conference to resolve the conflict. South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster agreed 
to free elections to be supervised by the UN to determine the fate of Namibia. He 
then reneged. In 1979, Vorster, now president, again rejected a UN proposal to 
settle the dispute. Two years later a peace conference in Geneva also failed to win 
concessions from the South African government. Control of Walvis Bay, Namibia's 
only deep-water port, was a major point of contention. The United States (U.S.) 
supported South Africa's refusal to withdraw from Namibia unless Cuban troops 
pulled out of Angola. A commission was set up to monitor a cease-fire agreement in 
1984. In order to appease the international community, a multiracial government was 
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installed in Namibia by South Africa in 1985, but SWAPO's armed struggle continued 
because of lack of progress toward implementing UN Resolution 435 on 
independence for Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The 
centrepiece of Resolution 435 was a plan drafted by five Western countries, namely 
the U.S, Canada, Britain, France and West Germany after consultations with the 
South African government. This plan called for the withdrawal of all South African 
soldiers from Namibia within a period of seven months and for an UN-supervised 
election of a Constituent Assembly which was to draft an independence constitution. 
Other elements in the plan included a ceasefire between South African and SWAPO 
soldiers in Namibia, the repeal of racially discriminatory and repressive South African 
laws in the territory, freedom of speech and assembly, the return home of Namibians 
living in exile and the release of all political prisoners and detainees. In December 
1988, a U.S-mediated peace agreement linked the UN Resolution 435 was signed 
by South Africa, Cuba and Angola, setting a timetable for Namibian independence. 
At the same time, Cuba and Angola agreed to a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. The agreement established basic guidelines within which the country's 
political leaders can determine the exact nature of the constitution and decide on the 
democratic institutions to be established (Diescho 1993). In addition, the spirit of the 
pact carried over to the drafting of the constitution during the many sessions of the 
Constituent Assembly. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
began operations in April 1989. After a disastrous start in which South African forces 
massacred PLAN forces seeking to report to UNTAG to be confined to designated 
areas, UNTAG slowly gained control over the registration and electoral process in 
most areas. The 1989 election held under the auspices of the UN, gave SWAPO 57 
percent of the vote and 60 percent of the seats in the constituent assembly (the 
constituent assembly later became the first national assembly). SWAPO suggested 
that the Assembly adopt the 1982 Constitutional Principles as the starting point for 
discussion. This created a favourable climate for working together. As Geingob 
(2004) observes, ―The committee‘s work was made easier still as a result of a 
suggestion from Mr. Dirk Mudge of DTA. He recognized that SWAPO was in the 
majority, and suggested that SWAPO‘s draft constitution be adopted as a working 
draft, and discussions could take place around it on issues where different drafts 
were at variance with it‖ (126). With two-thirds majorities needed to draft and adopt a 
constitution, some measure of reconciliation was necessary to avoid deadlock. In 
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fact, SWAPO and the business community wanted a climate of national 
reconciliation in order to achieve a relatively peaceful initial independence period. As 
a result, a constitution emphasizing human, civil and property rights was adopted 
unanimously on 9 February 1990 and reconciliation became the dominant mood.  
As Forrest (1998) notes, during those sessions, SWAPO and the opposition 
parties perceived that the forces pulling them together toward democratic 
constitutionalism were greater than the centrifugal forces which often tear apart 
racially or ethnically divided societies. A spirit of accommodation prevailed that 
reflected the participants' determination to create a workable system of government 
in which all participants had a stake in the system's success.  
The Windhoek Constituent Assembly was particularly important in that not 
only was it concerned with determining the truth or falsity of events that took place in 
the past, but was also concerned with determining whether or not particular actions 
should or should not be taken in the future as it was concerned with how values were 
going to be dealt with in the present given the divergent views of the political parties 
at the time. Thus, as Geingob 2004 notes, events leading to the framing of Namibia‘s 
constitution had many variables, often conflicting, with different interests and parties 
trying to influence the clauses in the constitution that rule the machinery of 
government, the assignment of rights and the procedures for amending the 
constitution.  
A 72-member Constituent Assembly, consisting of members of several 
political parties, drafted a Constitution for the Republic of Namibia following elections 
held on a proportional basis. The actual drafting of the principles were done by the 
Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements 
representing all the parties in the constituent assembly and delegated the task of 
perfecting it to a team of South African legal experts: Arthur Chaskalson; Marinus 
Wiechers and Gerhard Erasmus. The three legal experts were invited to sit in the 
Constituent Assembly and Standing Committee meetings to get a feel of the political 
context of the discussions. They did not, however, participate in any discussions 
unless specific questions were directed to them. The report of the standing 
committee was then tabled to the whole Constituent Assembly for debate. On 9 
February 1990, the Constitution of Namibia was adopted without anyone opposing it. 
The constitution has been hailed as the most democratic in the history of Africa 
south of the Sahara (Cottrell 1991). ―In many ways, the contents of the Namibian 
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Constitution reflect the uniquely international character of the role of law, and 
organisations and decisions in the process that led to independence in a far more 
significant way than in any other state in the world...(This) was the result of a political 
compromise between, on the one hand, the seven political parties that gained seats 
in the Constituent Assembly, and between South Africa, the United Nations and the 
South West People‘s Organisation (SWAPO), on the other. That means that the 
outcome of the constitutional process is unlike what any of the participants wanted or 
anticipated. It is the result of a ―serious effort of debate and a give-and-take process 
whereby all the participants, as duly elected representatives of all the Namibian 
people, ended up with a document of which only they, and no one else, were the 
architects‖ (Diescho 1993: 8-9). 
 Sam Nujoma, the long time leader of SWAPO, became president. For the 
new government, the costs of reconciliation included retaining about 15,000 
unneeded white civil servants, deferring the landownership and mineral-company 
terms issues and offering de facto amnesty for all pre-independence acts of violence 
- including those of SWAPO against suspected spies and dissidents in Angola in the 
late 1980s.  
Every constitution combines into one body a declaration of political intent, a 
commitment to an ideology and an assertion of national purpose combined with a 
blueprint for political action expressed in legal terms. As such it reflects, in a capsule 
form, the national elite's view of the nation and the world. Like all national documents 
written by mere human beings, every constitution may be expected to contain a dose 
of erroneous interpretation of past experiences and of existing national and 
international realities. 
However much extra-political forces may influence particular constitution-
making situations or constitutional acts, ultimately both involve directly political 
expressions, involvements and choices. In that sense, the dynamics of constitution-
making have to do with questions of constitutional choice. Drafting a constitution is a 
complex, often controversial and highly consequential political process. Charged with 
drafting a constitution, constitutional assemblies or conventions follow a set of rules 
to reach agreement over controversial issues. For example, the drafting committee 
agreed that decision making should be ―talk-centric‖ rather than ―voting-centric‖. That 
is, outcomes should be determined by reasons rather than numbers. Such bodies 
resemble parliaments in terms of their institutional arrangements. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
5 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
 While legislative drafting has been the subject of a considerable literature, the 
drafting of constitutions or constitutional provisions has received little attention. It is 
often assumed that the drafting of constitutional provisions does not differ 
appreciably from legislative drafting. Although this assumption may be correct in 
many respects, the drafting of constitutional provisions presents a number of special 
problems, both substantive and formal, which require the application of some 
specialised techniques in their solution (Grad 1967). It is not the province of this 
study to enumerate what those problems are or how to resolve them. That is a study 
for future scholarship. 
Like the American debates, the Namibian Standing Committee took place 
behind closed doors and the proceedings were kept secret. The secrecy could be 
kept because the group of delegates was small at only 21 members and the 
Assembly itself lasted for only 80 days. On the other hand, the French debates were 
intensely public; there were more than a thousand delegates and the proceedings 
stretched out for more than two years.  
 
Research questions 
In the past, the Constitution has been studied mainly by students of 
constitutional and political history, of government and of law. They have been, 
naturally, interested primarily in such matters as the structure and powers of the 
government, checks and balances, separation of powers, guarantees of fundamental 
rights and freedoms and kindred subjects. This is new and it is different. 
My research focuses on the rhetoric used during the drafting of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia from November 1989 until January 1990. I 
will offer a framework for understanding negotiations in terms of several distinct and 
coherent rhetoric or sets of speech acts: Firstly, what reasons, grounds, justifications 
or explanations either in support of, or in opposition to, some claim or position were 
provided? The reasons invoked may be factual, logical or normative. Secondly, what 
tools of rhetorical construction of distributive bargaining were applied during the 
negotiations for Namibia‘s Constitution? With this question, I examine how conflicts 
were dealt with through the distribution of a number of non-controversial issues to 
resolve a conflict in favour of one party at the expense of the other. Thirdly, how did 
the rhetorical creation of common ground influence the outcome of negotiations for 
Namibia‘s Constitution? Here, I investigate how highly controversial issues were 
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resolved in favour of both parties. Finally, what compromises did the parties make 
during the constitution-making process? Here, I investigate how specific agreements 
were reached through classical exchanges of concessions.  
 
Significance of the study 
Literature on the drafting of the Constitution of Namibia is thin, mainly 
because the framers thought it best to keep the discussions of the Constituent 
Assembly secret.  There is not, to my knowledge, a single book or even an article 
that considers the rhetorical process of constitution-making on Namibia in its full 
generality, as a distinctive object of rhetoric analysis. I recognise that an enlarged 
concept of rhetoric is necessary if we are to comprehend the substantial and 
dynamic senses in which rhetoric functions to generate continuous validation of ways 
in which the Namibian community act together. This study is the first serious attempt 
to understand the process by analysing the actual rhetoric used by the participants. 
For that reason alone, the study is significant.  
A study of the proceedings of the Windhoek Constituent Assembly, which 
framed the Constitution, shows that many of the provisions of that instrument which 
are seemingly straightforward and artless rest in reality upon compromises, often 
laboured and tortuous. The drafting of the Namibian Constitution was a process of 
give and take involving a number of actors from across the political divide. Political 
leaders' rhetorics are important instances of public argumentation. During the recent 
past, members of the public have begun to call for the amendment of the constitution 
to re-introduce death penalty. While the constitution limits the term of office of the 
state president, in 1997 the constitution was amended to introduce a third-term for 
the first state president. These debates raised concern among certain sectors of the 
Namibian society. It is nearly impossible to understand the present debates about 
the Constitution if one does not understand the historical developments leading to 
the current discussions and problems. Such knowledge is useful not only for its 
practical benefits, but also because it forms a critical and analytical foundation for 
approaching many of the tasks that face people daily as they construct and respond 
to the discourse that shapes their experience of the world. As such, they merit 
scholarly attention. 
Negotiation is a dialogue intended to resolve disputes, to produce an 
agreement upon courses of action, to bargain for individual or collective advantage 
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or to craft outcomes to satisfy various interests. This study will help provide insight 
into problem-solving and decision-making as well as conflict management and 
resolution in any given situation. 
 
Limitations of the study 
A major limitation of this work has been the absence of audio recordings of 
the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Standing rules and Orders and 
Internal Arrangements. The research primarily relied on the Hansard. Thus, it was 
not entirely possible to discern the exact meaning of certain concepts used by some 
members of the drafting committee.  
Another limitation was that sometimes, titles of the delegates were wrong. For 
example, the Hansard identified a Mrs. Amathila and a Dr. Amathila, while in fact 
referring to Mr. Amathila. It is true that there was a Dr. Amathila or Mrs. Amathila, but 
not one who was a member of the committee. These shortcomings were corrected 
by verifying the actual identities of the members of the Standing Committee on 
Standing rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements against every volume of the 
Hansard. However, these limitations do not in any way limit the value of the 
research. 
 
Literature survey 
As stated elsewhere, it is hard to find literature on Namibian rhetoric. Two 
decades after its adoption, the Constitution of Namibia was an enigma to 
investigators largely because they had little source material - the government having 
refused to release the records of the standing committee. At the time of researching 
this work, I am the only known person to have been granted access to those 
materials by the speaker of the national assembly. Consequently, prior writers 
confronting the constitution were obliged to skip over it in a paragraph or sentence. I 
nonetheless found the following publications very useful: Kosie Pretorius‘ 
―Parliamentary potholes‖; Hage Geingob‘s “State Formation in Namibia: Promoting 
Democracy and Good Governance”; Joseph Diescho‘s “The Namibian constitution in 
perspective”; Jill Cottrell‘s “The Constitution of Namibia: An Overview”; Henry J. 
Richardson‘s “Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian 
Independence”; Sam Brooke‘s ―Constitution-making and immutable principles” and 
Marinus Wiechers‘ (1) ―Namibia: The 1982 Constitutional Principles and Their Legal 
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Significance” and (2) “Constitution-Making, Peace-Building, and National 
Reconciliation: Namibia‖. 
The University of Cape Town Libraries contains useful materials that I found 
very enriching. I read various publications including ―Rhetoric and Public Affairs‖, 
―The Quarterly Journal of Speech‖, ―Political Communication‖, ―Journal of 
Communication‖, ―Rhetorica‖, ―Philosophy and Rhetoric‖, ―Southern Communication 
Journal‖, ―Rhetoric Society Quarterly‖, ―Public Opinion Quarterly‖, ―Legislative 
Studies Quarterly‖ and ―Rhetoric Review‖. 
Elsewhere, a limited pool of authors has written extensively on constitution-
making. I am inspired by Jon Elster‘s comparative writings on the nature of the 
debates that took place in the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the 
Assemblée Constituante in Paris (Elster 1991). Elster argues that parties to an 
argument engage in sincere exchange of impartial reasons and valid principles with 
the aim of persuading one another (ibid.).  
I benefited enormously from the insightful work of Roger Fisher, William L. Ury 
and Bruce Patton (1991) on negotiations. They ask the question: Is the deal on the 
table better than what you would get by walking away? Their special contribution 
applies academic theory from a range of disciplines to real-world problems.  
But it is John W. Sewell and I. William Zartman (1984) who argues that no 
party negotiates unless the costs of not negotiating are higher than those of 
negotiating. Sewell and Zartman (1984) argue that negotiating does not necessarily 
mean that all parties want to reach an agreement either. Indeed, some parties 
participate simply to be able to stall any agreement. They argue that issues are 
negotiable only if one rejects the idea of the total conversion of one party to the 
views of the other. The issue therefore becomes how much change has to be made 
in the positions of both sides in order to get the parties to negotiate. They contend 
that there is a need to formulate the possibilities of a favourable outcome and to 
change the perception of non-negotiability. After all, negotiations are essentially 
reflections or ratifications of shifts in power between two parties (ibid.). 
 
Methodology 
Primary sources for this dissertation consist of five volumes of the Hansard of 
the Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements 
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of the Windhoek Constituent Assembly. The Hansard remains confidential but I was 
been given unprecedented access for this thesis. 
To understand the rhetoric under which the Namibian Constitution was 
negotiated and drafted, I analysed the Hansard of the Standing Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements for the period 8, 11 - 15 and 
18 - 19 December 1989 to 10, 15, 17 and 19 January 1990. The Standing 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and Internal Arrangements was 
responsible for drafting the Constitution for consideration by the constituent 
assembly. By analysing the Hansard of the Standing Committee, one can begin to 
formulate a picture of the rhetoric that led to a Constitution of the Republic of 
Namibia and begin to understand rhetoric in the Namibian context. For example, the 
discussion among the Windhoek Assembly delegates on whether or not Namibia 
should adopt a presidential system (like the U.S) as opposed to a parliamentary 
system (as found in Europe) revealed deep-rooted emotions during the drafting of 
Namibia‘s Constitution. Some delegates used threats to push through their points of 
view. Others threatened to ―go public‖ on the deliberations of the Drafting 
Committee. Emotional flooding poses obvious hazards to negotiators who need to be 
able to think clearly when faced with the complex, strategically demanding task of 
creating and claiming value. While compromise is commonplace among politicians 
representing organised interest groups, the fact that many politically-affected people 
are not party to these compromises means that political compromises are selective. 
It follows, then, that the public interest is anything and everything that can be 
secured by the mediation of conflicting claims for power. Compromise not only is a 
worthy, self-sufficient political ideal but the distinguishing and essential characteristic 
of democracy as a form of government. At the Windhoek Assembly, delegates, in 
some cases, abandoned their own positions in favour of those proposed by their 
opponents or merged the proposal of the opponents with their own. For example, 
SWAPO originally wanted an executive president, while the opposition parties 
wanted a ceremonial president with a an executive prime minister. In the end, the 
parties agreed to create two offices: an executive president and a prime minister with 
powers written in the constitution. These social interactions way at play during the 
drafting of the Namibian constitution. 
For this study, I considered constitutional issues from a socio-political 
perspective after many years of strictly juridical approaches. This approach permits a 
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fruitful study of the constitutional processes and specifically provides a better insight 
into its connection to the process of rhetoric analysis vis-à-vis democratic 
consolidation. The thesis, thus, has a significant interdisciplinary inclination drawing 
on the literatures of communication, political science and history. But its orientation is 
rhetorical. As stated elsewhere, the overriding purpose of this investigation is to 
explain how rhetoric is created in the interrelationships between the various 
utterances and their contexts of bargaining at the Windhoek Assembly. The 
rhetorical perspective not only directs the attention of the investigation, but also 
expresses the understanding of social reality. 
However anachronistic as it may seem, I closely make reference to the 
debates that took place at the Federal Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 and at the 
Assemblée Constituante in Paris 1789-91. Most of the African countries‘ 
constitutions were drafted outside the countries and by people comprising the 
citizens and representatives of the colonizing states. In Namibia, on the other hand, 
the constitution was drafted by Namibians in Namibia (Geingob 2004). Namibia thus 
stands out to be a case study comparable to France and the US for nations that 
drafted their own constitutions. Furthermore, the Federal Convention at Philadelphia 
and the Assemblée Constituante at Paris are significant because they took place at 
about the same time; had many intellectual ancestors in common and the orators 
used many of the same historical precedents in arguing for or against various 
institutional arrangements. More importantly, several of the issues on the agenda 
were similar to those argued at the Windhoek assembly – namely, bicameralism, 
executive and elections.  
In this thesis, I examine only those areas that constituted material or areas of 
dispute – where parties had different positions from each other. Areas of a general 
agreement – where there were no disagreements are excluded. In order to make 
informed analysis, however, I go beyond what was said in the Constituent Assembly 
and look at what the participants said elsewhere. I do not make judgements as to 
who made better arguments or had good proposals. I simply examine their 
arguments from a rhetorical perspective and how rhetoric impacted on the final 
outcome of the negotiations. I am concerned here with their words, not with their 
thoughts although I do recognise that sometimes thoughts matter as much as words. 
 
Theoretical framework 
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I will also use a multi-disciplinary brand of critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
that tries to triangulate social issues in terms of a combined study of discursive, 
cognitive and social dimensions of a problem (van Dijk 1993). Thus, in this case, I 
am interested not just in describing some interesting properties of rhetoric, but in 
order to explain them I need to relate them to such socio-cognitive representations 
as attitudes, norms, values and ideologies as well as to the socio-political context of 
the debate. What is most important to understand about rhetoric, however, is that it 
is not only a method for training effective rhetors as a discipline for advanced study. 
It is also a method for understanding on a theoretical as well as a practical level how 
humans use language to alter or shape our understanding of reality. It is this latter 
use that is often used in describing critical discourse analysis.  
Expressed in today's vocabulary, critical discourse analysis is nothing more 
than a deconstructive reading and interpretation of a problem. CDA will, thus, not 
provide absolute answers to a specific problem, but enable us to understand the 
conditions behind a specific problem and make us realise that the essence of that 
problem and its resolution lie in its assumptions - the very assumptions that enable 
the existence of that problem.  
 
Definitions 
In this thesis, I use certain key concepts in order to explain certain ideas. I use 
the word rhetoric with its classic meaning to describe the art of persuasive 
communication. By negotiation I mean any situation or process in which two or more 
parties to some possible consensual agreement seek to reach that agreement 
without the aid or intervention of an authoritative third party (Wetlaufer. 2005). An 
argument is a piece of discourse or writing in which someone tries to convince others 
(or himself) of the truth of a claim by citing reasons on its behalf (Govier 1987). 
Politics simply means an area of study concerned with developing a knowledge and 
understanding of government and society. 
Constitution is the fundamental law of a nation or state which establishes the 
character and basic principles of a government. I use Republic to mean a political 
system in which the supreme power lies in a body of citizens who can elect people to 
represent them.  
 
Thesis outline 
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In this Introduction, I provided the background of the study, established the 
research problem, sketched the significance of the study, provided an overview of a 
description of the content analytic method used to conduct the study and created the 
theoretical framework. I also provided conceptual definitions of the key variables of 
this study. 
The progression of chapters is deliberate: each chapter identifies a clear 
analytical perspective that is explored in the thesis. In Chapter 1, I will analyse the 
arguments, reasons and explanations offered by one party in favour of or against a 
particular position. The chapter investigates how negotiations require a bridge in 
order to overcome disagreements. In Chapter 2, I will provide a discussion on the 
rhetorical construction of distributive bargaining as arising from the research 
question. Specifically, I will discuss various characteristics including threats and use 
of pressure tactics in bargaining. The chapter moves from a general discussion of 
rhetorical argument to an analytical investigation of the nature of rhetorical 
bargaining. Chapter 3 will provide a discussion on the rhetorical creation of common 
ground by specifically looking at what the participants of the constituent assembly 
agreed on as constitutional matters which were of common interest. This chapter 
navigates rhetoric of compromise in relation to the interests of parties to a 
negotiation. In Chapter 4, I will discuss rhetoric with specific reference to how parties 
voluntarily submitted to the demands of the other party or passively acquiesced to 
the other as a way of compromise. This chapter examines how finding common 
ground is necessary in creating goodwill among negotiators in order to achieve 
desired outcomes. I will conclude the study by providing a summary. 
 
  
Un
iv
rsi
ty
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
13 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
BARGAINING 
 
I am a very poor guy. I own basically nothing on this world. But the one thing I have 
which has never been for sale, which never will be for sale, is my integrity and I take 
strong exception to some of the things that have been said by some of the 
honourable members about our performance when briefing these lawyers. 
Vekuii Rukoro, 1989 
 
Introduction 
The primary objective of this chapter is to suggest that argument might have 
been one of the registers through which negotiations at the Windhoek Assembly 
were conducted. Constitution-making and constitutional choices are vital aspects of 
democratic government: they are more than the arid preparation of constitutional 
documents. Rather, constitution-making involves the embodiment of the 
constitutional traditions of the body politic in appropriate binding rules of the game 
that properly reflect the polity model basis and socio-economic distribution of power. 
Negotiations can be understood in the full treatment of argument, which is described 
here as a coherent set of speech acts and conventions concerning their use. 
Argument is distinctive, at least in degree, from the other rhetorical regimes of 
argumentation such as deliberation, epideictic and forensic that might be brought to 
bear in the course of a negotiation. 
Let it suffice for now that constitutional choice involves utilising appropriate 
models that recognise the importance of institutions in the lives of humans, the 
significance of history and culture in shaping those institutions and rendering 
particular institutions effective or ineffective and identifying the empirical and 
behavioural dimensions of the constitutional process in each case. It is here that 
rhetoric comes into play. Argument, then, is a process that deals with beliefs and 
opinions (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1996). But whatever the scope of 
argument may be, significant effort has gone into identifying principles or norms that 
can be used to evaluate arguments (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1996). Such 
principles or norms can be used to call into question either action by individuals that 
constitute part of the process of argument or outcomes of the process, the 
conclusions that it leads to. While negotiation may sometimes be distinguished from 
bargaining, it is not uncommon for those terms to be used interchangeably (Lewicki 
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et al. 1994) and bargaining certainly tends to involve threats, deception and other 
sorts of tactics that would normally be excluded by principles of argumentation 
(Schelling 1980). These were not uncommon at the Windhoek Assembly.  
The association of argument with rational discussion is a well-established 
one. In the context on the Namibian constitution-making process, argument shall 
mean ―that element in our expressions which carries the power to convince people in 
rational discussion‖ (Naess 1966: 97). Sycara (1990: 203) claims that ―persuasive 
argumentation lies at the heart of negotiation and embodies the dynamics of 
negotiation.‖ There seems to be some tension between the uncritical inter-mixture of 
argument and negotiation, on the one hand, and Elster‘s emphatic distinction, on the 
other. Different approaches may arise because different authors focus on different 
aspects of bargaining and negotiation. Thus, for example, in establishing a formal 
model of argumentation-based reasoning and negotiation, Parsons et al. have their 
agents make proposals about agreements and trade-offs that are reminiscent of 
ideas emphasised in Fisher and Ury‘s popular negotiation handbook Getting to Yes, 
ideas such as ―focus on interests, not positions‖. This approach to bargaining, 
sometimes referred to as ―mutual gains bargaining‖, revisits earlier ideas of 
―integrative negotiation‖ (Walton and McKersie 1991). But it is doubtful whether all 
bargaining is or can become ―mutual-gains bargaining‖ (Schelling 1980). There 
remain some bargaining episodes that verge on ―limited war‖ (Aristotle 1960). 
Britton et al. characterise persuasive discourse as part of the transactional 
use of language that attempts to overcome potential resistance or opposition in order 
to effect some change in action, behaviour, attitude and belief through reason, 
argument and strategy (Rojot 1991). Elsewhere, they argue that the persuasive use 
of language amounts to a "deliberate assault," be it recognisable or disguised, "on 
other people's behaviour or attitudes or opinions" (Britton 1975: 98). Their 
characterisation clearly assumes that opposition or confrontation constitutes the 
basis or provides the motivation for persuasive discourse. It sees persuasive 
discourse as a necessary means of resolving or neutralising the perceived 
opposition or conflict and of bringing about "a change of heart" in audience.  
 
Emotions in negotiations 
The success of the persuasive efforts depends on the emotional dispositions 
of the audience. For people do not judge in the same way when they grieve and 
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rejoice or when they are friendly and hostile. Thus, the orator has to arouse emotions 
exactly because emotions have the power to modify human judgments. To a judge 
who is in a friendly mood, the person about whom he is going to judge seems not to 
do wrong or only in a small way. But to the judge who is in an angry mood, the same 
person will seem to do the opposite (Aristotle 1991). Many interpreters writing on the 
rhetorical emotions were misled by the role of the emotions in Aristotle's ethics. They 
suggested that the orator has to arouse the emotions in order to motivate the 
audience or to make them better persons (Aristotle 1991). 
That said, the art of negotiation lies in discerning and working out differences 
between the parties. At times the differences may provoke substantial conflict, 
leading to emotional outbursts and heated discussions. Some people find 
exhilaration in the adrenaline rush that occurs during such moments, but an equal or 
greater number react to conflict by dreading and avoiding it. These varying reactions 
suggest that emotions function both in positive and negative ways. Emotions differ 
from moods in that they are discrete (Russell and Feldman Barrett 1999), of 
relatively high intensity and short duration and intentional, that is, directed at an 
object, person or event. 
Prior research has mostly focused on the intrapersonal effects of affect in 
negotiation, that is, the influence of a negotiator‘s emotional state on his behaviour. 
For example, positive affect has been shown to increase concession making (Baron 
1990), stimulate creative problem solving (Isen et al. 1987), increase joint gains 
(Allred et al. 1997), increase preferences for cooperation (Baron et al. 1990), reduce 
the use of contentious tactics (Carnevale and Isen 1986) and increase the use of 
cooperative negotiation strategies (Forgas 1998). Conversely, negative affect has 
been shown to decrease initial offers (Baron et al. 1990), decrease joint gains (Allred 
et al. 1997), promote the rejection of ultimatum offers (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996), 
increase the use of competitive strategies (Forgas 1998) and decrease the desire to 
work together in the future (Allred et al. 1997). 
There is evidence that the manifestation of social interplay were largely 
present at the Windhoek Assembly. On the first day of substantive negotiations 
between the various parties at the Namibian Constituent Assembly on 8 December 
November 1989, suspicions ran high after a blistering campaign. Internal parties and 
SWAPO knew little about each and were suspicious of each other‘s real intentions. It 
did not take long to test these suspicions. In late 1989, the Administrator General 
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(AG) of the territory, Louis Pienaar had plans to privatise certain schools for the 
exclusive use of whites. Members of the Constituent Assembly (CA) reacted angrily 
and demanded an audience with him. The CA sent a bi-partisan delegation that 
included Aksie Christelike Nasionale (ACN) member, Kosie Pretorius. Following that 
meeting, a newspaper report alleged that: a) all the committee members, with the 
exception of Pretorius, expressed their unequivocal opposition to the move; b) when 
the committee met in the Tintenpalast, Pretorius told his fellow committee member 
that he was only going along to gather information and not to question the merits of 
the issue and c) that Pretorius repeated this when they met Pienaar in South West 
house and d) that at the conclusion of the meeting with the AG, Pretorius was 
requested to remain behind. Pretorius objected to the report and that someone within 
the committee had deliberately leaked the information to the newspaper. But he did 
confirm that the secretary of the administrator general called him back to sign for a 
parcel and that AG ―then spoke a few words to me.‖1 
The seriousness of the allegations had the potential to derail negotiations. 
Mudge, a white member of rival main opposition Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
(DTA) party, held the view that discussing a newspaper report was a waste of time.2 
This was clearly a diversion from the issues raised by Pretorius. Diversion 
techniques distract focus or divert attention away from key issues, usually by 
intensifying unrelated issues or trivial factors. Mudge‘s response falls in this 
category. He argued that he thought there was ―a large part of the white community 
who cannot support this move and they are waiting for direction from my side and 
from others‖.3 It was clear that he wanted to distance himself from any actions that 
would spoil the spirit of the negotiations for a new constitution. But more importantly, 
he wanted to disassociate himself from Pretorius: 
…I don‘t want to start a quarrel with Mr. Pretorius here, but as somebody who 
represents a large percentage of the white people; this whole thing was kept a 
secret. I was at no stage informed, consulted or in any way approached. I am 
hearing rumours, I had to rely on rumours, but the way this thing was done, 
makes it impossible for me to serve in a committee with Mr. Pretorius because 
we are going to clash on this issue now. There is no doubt about that. I am 
                                                 
1
 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Hansard of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and 
Internal Arrangements, 8 December 1989. 
2
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
3
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
Un
ive
rsi
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
17 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
going to have a problem with the church to which I belong, because even the 
way the church allowed themselves to be dragged into this thing, as a 
member of the Reformed Church I am not aware of any discussions.  I, as a 
member of the Church, was never consulted.  So, all I want to ask is, when 
we approach the AG, Mr. Pretorius must not insist on the right to be part of 
the delegation. He must not use us to make things easier for him now.4 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle tries to explicate the causes of anger, the state of mind of 
those who become angry, and those at whom people become angry. Emotions like 
anger are important to Aristotle‘s theory of rhetoric, although it is important to 
understand that there is a distinction between the emotional state of anger and angry 
rhetoric. Angry rhetoric, regardless of how it is performed publicly, tries to evoke 
anger in one‘s audience, as Aristotle himself demonstrates. Once evoked, anger has 
enormous implications, significantly altering both the spatial and temporal framework 
in which audiences see the world. Aristotle recognised that the pleasure of anger 
derives from the way people imagine how in the future their anger can be appeased. 
―A kind of pleasure follows from [dwelling on anger] and also because people dwell 
in their minds on retaliating; then the image [phantasia] that occurs creates pleasure‖ 
(1387b2). Emotions must not be discarded by logicians as inherently fallacious. 
However, it must also be used cautiously by rhetoricians in order to secure influence 
over an audience without infringing upon the veracity of one‘s assertions. 
Unfortunately, Aristotle offers little obvious advice in the Rhetoric about when it is 
morally advisable to employ angry rhetoric in public discourse, although he does 
suggest practical ways for a speaker to ―put his hearers . . . into the right frame of 
mind‖ with regard to certain issues and the speaker‘s persuasive intent (1378a15–
16). For Aristotle, the problem of angry rhetoric seems closely connected to ethos or 
the character of the speaker. However, once again he offers little specific advice 
about the role anger might play in constituting the ethos of the orator. 
During negotiations, where one negotiator believes that the other side cannot 
be trusted or tries to overreach, he or she may experience frustration or anger. In 
these instances, emotions can get out of hand and thwart agreement. Pretorius‘ 
conservative views did not serve him well during the drafting of Namibia‘s 
constitution. In the discussion of the draft proposal on a bill of human rights, 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
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Pretorius was in favour of a clause that allowed discrimination of the admission of 
pupils or recruitment of staff based on race, colour or creed. He believed very 
strongly that the principle clashed with the United Nations Declaration on the 
―Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief 
which will make it impossible for religious private schools not to discriminate on that 
basis.‖5 This view was strongly opposed by Barney Barnes, a coloured or ―mixed 
race‖ member of the DTA party because ―the purpose of drafting the constitution was 
precisely to eliminate discrimination. I would like us to avoid opening the 
perpetuation of the status quo or repeat history.‖6 Given the deep-seated feelings 
prevailing among the majority of people – having just come out of a repressive 
apartheid rule, Pretorius should have foreseen that his comments would bring to light 
attitudes which the Namibian people have waged an armed struggle for. 
Pretorius insisted that ―according to this United Nations document there must 
be freedom to religion, belief and worship and teaching, the right to train and appoint 
leaders.‖7 This statement seemed to confirm suspicion among some delegates – 
especially SWAPO members - that Pretorius was determined to perpetuate 
discrimination. This is clear from the remarks of Dr. Ngarikutuke Tjiriange who gently 
reminded the assembly members that Namibia was emerging from the nightmare of 
apartheid and it was therefore necessary to close ―all the loopholes that can be used 
to bring about that nightmare again…There is only one church that has been 
notorious and it is the Dutch Reformed Church, when it comes to the black 
people…‖8 His use of the metaphor ―nightmare‖ to describe past atrocities committed 
against the people of Namibia is striking. The most widely held view of the semantic 
status of metaphors is that they are a substitute for literal meaning. The very idea 
that some statements are metaphor seems to imply that there is always a literal 
meaning from which the metaphorical meaning is a departure and to which it could, 
ideally, be reduced again. 
Bitzer quite accurately reflected that the presence of rhetorical discourse 
indicates the presence of a rhetorical situation. While the existence of a rhetorical 
address is a reliable sign of the existence of situation, it does not follow that a 
situation exists only when the discourse exists. He argued that one can probably 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
6
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
7
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
8
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
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recall a specific time and place when there was opportunity to speak on some urgent 
matter, and after the opportunity was gone he created in private thought the speech 
he should have uttered earlier in the situation (Bitzer 1968). Bitzer defines rhetorical 
situation as a ―complex of persons, events, objects and relations presenting an 
actual or potential exigency which can be completely or partially removed if 
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action 
as to bring about the significant modification of the exigency‖ (1968: 2). An exigency 
which can be modified only by means other than discourse is not rhetorical. Thus, an 
exigency is not rhetorical when its modification requires merely one's own action or 
the application of a tool, but neither requires nor invites the assistance of discourse. 
An exigency is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when 
positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse. In any 
rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigency which functions as 
the organising principle: it specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to 
be effected. As Bitzer argues, the exigency may or may not be perceived clearly by 
the rhetor or other persons in the situation; it may be strong or weak depending upon 
the clarity of their perception and the degree of their interest in it (Bitzer, ibid). When 
it is perceived and when it is strong and important, then it constrains the thought and 
action of the perceiver who may respond rhetorically if he in a position to do so. 
Under these circumstances, Pretorius lost a window of opportunity to correct a 
perception that might have been created by his statements. Instead, he was 
consistent that he had ―very much respect and understanding for the honourable 
member‘s emotional approach of this question, but again I want to refer it to the 
committee, that it is a point of difference…‖9 To the relief of many at the assembly, 
Mudge believed that ―this is another way of keeping schools racially segregated.  
And please, Sir, I am Afrikaans-speaking white, you must have no doubt about that, I 
want my language to be protected….but not this way.‖10 As Aristotle would say, 
Mudge had considered the rhetorical situation with his treatment of the argument. 
Research generally has supported the proposition that source credibility is a 
very important element in the communication process, whether the goal of the 
communication effort is that of persuasion or the generation of understanding 
(Andersen and Clevenger 1963). That said, conventional wisdom suggests that 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 8 December 1989.  
10
 Ibid., 8 December 1989. 
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anger have no place in negotiations. Anger, according to Aristotle, is a man's longing 
for revenge when someone appears to slight him and when the slight appears 
undeserved. In order to arouse anger, the rhetorician must present this treatment as 
outrageous, appealing to his hearer's sense of his own worth, which has been 
violated. His rhetoric must show the respect that the man who slighted failed to show 
(Nichols 1987). It was unavoidable for anger to occur at Windhoek Assembly. 
Pendukeni Ithana, the only female member of the drafting committee, was not 
convinced by the arguments presented by Moses Katjiuongua of the National 
Patriotic Front (NPF) on the need of the second house because ―the arguments 
given are flimsy (emphasis added). I don‘t know if we are here to create bodies 
representing minorities. We should move away from bantustanisation or tribal 
authorities.‖11 This statement by Mrs. Ithana was set to anger Moses Katjiuongua. 
Opposition parties resented any reference to their association with the apartheid 
government of South Africa which has supported them against SWAPO in much the 
same way that SWAPO resented being called a terrorist organisation. It is worth 
noting that Katjiuongua was a minister in the South African-created government of 
national unity which ruled Namibia for four years until the period before the 
independence elections in 1989. Angry rhetoric, then, is designed in one fashion or 
another to make an audience angry (or angrier) and to have them direct this anger 
toward a particular agent, policy or idea. When a speaker faces an audience that 
ought to be angry the doctrine of justified anger would suggest that the speaker 
ought to use angry rhetoric. 
Barbara Gray advises that negotiators need to be able to stay centred in 
circumstances where emotions are likely to rise and respond effectively to the 
emotional outbursts while also not losing sight of the substance of the negotiation 
(2003). Katjiuongua‘s reaction to Ithana was precisely the situation that Gray had 
described. It is worth quoting him at length: 
If I can‘t convince somebody, I simply can‘t convince. There is nothing more I 
can do about that. So, I don‘t want to go into the merits or demerits of what 
has been said here, what is flimsy, what is tribal and so on. If I use the same 
language, I don‘t know where we are going to end up. If you think that my 
arguments are flimsy and yours are better, then there is no point in continuing 
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talking about this thing here…Then I think we stop the whole discussion about 
this issue and go back to the Assembly and the Assembly will have a look into 
that, those discussion points, and the public and everybody and then we will 
get a feedback what other people than ourselves think about these things. I 
think the position is very clear. The only portion I agree with my dear sister 
here is that we are here, the so-called minority parties, you either say you 
accept the inclusion of a second chamber or you say no and then we know 
where we stand with you. I don‘t think we should dilly-dally on that issue. With 
all due respect, I don‘t think I am here to accept something in principle that 
may or may not be included in a future constitution. We are here to have a 
second chamber included in the constitution. My experience, my training and 
so on is just beyond some of the arguments that are being put on the table 
here and I can‘t argue in the manner which is argued here - Bantustans, 
homelands and all these. I can use the same tribal language that is being 
used indirectly against me. I can say worse things, and with all due respect to 
the chairman, I don‘t want allow myself to be provoked, because I can use 
similar language. I don‘t think it will get this house anywhere. I think people 
discuss in a civilised manner, they disagree, they agree to disagree. I don‘t 
think there is a mid-way about that.12 
The speaker arousing anger must also claim that an injury has been done that calls 
for redress. Indeed, if the insult and revenge consume the angry man, the one who 
insulted remains in control. It is hard to tell whether Katjiuongua‘s initial remarks 
were so provocative to warrant Ithana‘s response to the extent that anger was 
aroused. In this context, Katjiuongua‘s anger appeared to jeopardise the ongoing 
negotiations. Because of this danger, there is a certain moral ambiguity in anger and 
revenge. Aristotle does recommend calming anger by such means as showing that 
no slight has occurred, that the slight was not done willingly or that the person who 
slighted is grieved for what he has done. In these cases, he assumes that there are 
circumstances in which anger and revenge are the appropriate reactions, while he 
shows that such circumstances do not exist in the case at hand. Katjiuongua did not 
live up to Aristotle‘s expectations. While he did not ―want allow myself to be provoked 
because I can use similar language‖, he nonetheless let it known that he was angry. 
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To his credit, Katjiuongua remained focused on his argument – that of establishing a 
second chamber of parliament. 
Much of the history of constitutional negotiations at the Windhoek Assembly 
can be described in terms of mistrust and a lack of understanding by each side with 
respect to the political needs of the other. Trust is a key underpinning of successful 
negotiations (Putnam 1994). If negotiators cannot trust each other, then every issue 
requires verification and each agreement necessitates iron-clad guarantees. Anger, 
expressed inappropriately, can destroy trust. This was true at the Windhoek 
Assembly when Hartmut Ruppel of SWAPO dictated corrections to one of the 
constitutional principles which he said he had discussed with senior members of the 
SWAPO caucus, Mudge of DTA and Rukoro of the Namibia National Front (NNF) 
who all allegedly agreed that the details in the instructions were correct. The 
document dealt with the establishment of the second house. It later transpired that 
some members of the drafting committee were not consulted. Among those not 
consulted was Moses Katjiuongua of the Namibia Patriotic Front (NPF) who said the 
document was not a reflection of what was discussed and approved. Therefore he 
had no understanding that a correction of that report was dictated to include the 
views of members outside the meeting. He said it was a total anomaly for a 
document to be discussed outside the ―meeting by the senior members of SWAPO 
and allegedly with Mr. Mudge and also Mr. Rukoro…‖13 Rhetoric, however, is not just 
the art of persuading people of whatever comes into one's mind but also the art of 
conveying a truth which cannot be stated literally. There was no denying of what 
Katjiuongua regarded as ―total anomaly‖ on the part of Ruppel‘s conduct. Rukoro 
weighed in that indeed Ruppel had consulted him but while they were on the 
aeroplane.  
He did tell me that he drafted that particular paragraph after consultations with 
senior members of the SWAPO-caucus and with Mr. Mudge and that he 
cleared it with both camps…14  
Rukoro said he had read the document and felt it was a fair reflection of the 
discussion that took place at the assembly. Mudge also confirmed Ruppel‘s phone 
call but said he did not agree with the draft that was read to him. He had told Ruppel 
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that ―I am not the boss around here…‖15 The suggestion that Ruppel deliberately 
conspired with or intended to sneak behind other members to include a new 
constitutional principle seems implausible and Katjiuongua‘s willingness to advance 
it seems to indicate that he was given to the sorts of misrepresentation and distortion 
typical of politicians. By Ruppel‘s own account, it was just a formulation which he had 
asked some members of the assembly to provide.  
I just want to record that I take an extremely dim view of what has been said 
about the way I was operating. I did what I did in good faith and in order to 
bring forward the proceedings of the committee. I did not consult anyone 
outside, I did report myself.16  
He wanted to compare notes which he had after the last meeting of this house, he 
said. As Ruppel implored his audience to look at the motive of his actions, the truths 
of his arguments were not threatened by emotions. The response of Barnes 
suggests, however, that the larger audience is not a universally coherent group. 
Barnes said he had made it ―very clear to this meeting that Mr. Mudge is part of the 
delegation of the DTA. That does not put Mr. Mudge in any particular special 
category that he should be consulted and the rest of our delegation should not be 
consulted‖.17 He thought ―we were past the stage where, with due respect, ethnicity 
plays a role in discussions‖.18 He said the incident had ―also caused an unnecessary 
wastage of precious time this morning by Mr. Ruppel taking the dim view on the 
reaction of my honourable colleague and member of this Constitutional Committee, 
Mr. Mudge‖.19 He equally took a ―dim view on the introduction of things by people on 
their own, trying to influence or slip things in. This leaves a great question mark on 
our honesty and ability to act in good faith‖.20 He believed that ―this is an act of bad 
faith. I will accommodate  you by not speaking further on this matter and trust that 
this will not occur again that members in their individual capacity decide to draft their 
own constitutions. I thank you.‖21 
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The chairman, Hage Geingob, sensed that the discussions were getting too 
emotional. He wanted to put on record that Ruppel should be recognised for having 
worked hard. Geingob said he also  
...want to be clear…the poor man was asked to go and brief these lawyers…I 
think he was decent enough to try to call people to talk to them. We are not 
being fair in not realising the nature of our instructions to this gentleman22.  
Rukoro requested that a day be set aside in order to discuss serious accusations 
that have been made on his and Ruppel‘s professional integrity. He said he was a 
very poor guy.  
I own basically nothing on this world. But the one thing I have which has never 
been for sale, which never will be for sale, is my integrity and I take strong 
exception to some of the things that have been said by some of the 
honourable members about our performance when briefing these lawyers.23  
There is no doubt that the charge of unprofessional conduct against Ruppel was, 
rhetorically, designed to meet Katjiuongua‘s political needs. Although the ad 
hominem, questioning of an arguer‘s position by citing a presumptive inconsistency 
within that position (Walton 1992), has a reputation for being fallacious and nothing 
more than an attack one‘s character, it should be considered relevant and important 
criticism in a critical discussion. According to Walton, this importance is primarily 
derived from the personalisation which occurs when an ad hominem is used 
because it concentrates its attack on the character of one‘s opponent. But rather 
than considering this personalisation as a negative aspect of discussion, Walton 
goes so far as to say that this is the most important single benefit of a successful 
critical discussion (ibid). 
The debate about rights and responsibilities was one of those debates which 
were racially-charged. Pretorius of ACN wanted to know why there was no provision 
―that with every right there is a corresponding responsibility.‖24 Katjiuongua of NPF 
responded that he had heard of these arguments from Pretorius  
...about four years ago – he is very consistent - sometimes I got the 
impression…that somehow he implied that blacks only want rights but didn‘t 
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want the responsibilities, so they must be told that if they want rights, there 
are corresponding responsibilities…25  
Katjiuongua‘s confidence in the power of veracity was based, at least in part, on the 
supposition that, as a matter of common sense, persons generally take the effort to 
speak clearly and distinctly as a reliable gauge of a speaker's effort to state the truth. 
The process of constitution-making is greatly influenced by the vision and self-
interest of various interest groups, parties and individuals participating in the 
process. Pretorius‘ arguments were consistent with his organisation‘s interests. But 
the frustration exhibited by the chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Hage 
Geingob, exposed the bare feelings of the majority of the members of the assembly 
when he admitted that the points raised by Pretorius were emotional for most 
Namibians. He said ―we are operating in a spirit of co-operation, brotherhood and 
also in a spirit of reconciliation…We will come to know one another and trust is 
developed, so that the fears of the unknown are also being removed.‖26 Within all 
types of political system - from autocratic through oligarchic to democratic - leaders 
rely on the spoken word to convince others of the benefits that arise from their 
leadership. The more democratic societies become, the greater the onus on leaders 
to convince potential followers that they and their policies can be trusted. Geingob 
suggested that perhaps Pretorius should be afforded an opportunity to consult with 
his members ―not that we are going to go back to apartheid. That is out. But allow 
him the chance to…explain to the others…‖27 At this point, Geingob must have felt 
that there was nothing remaining to be proved. He wished simply to sum up and to 
make that summation part of the public record of the assembly. Both here nor in the 
speeches which directly preceded and followed did he trouble himself with dark 
language or counterfeit modesty. Pretorius never raised the matter again. 
Like at Philadelphia, the nature of the presidency has been a highly contested 
issue at the Windhoek Assembly. There was general agreement between the 
framers of the Constitution at Windhoek that executive power should not be 
unchecked. There were, however, differing views on how these powers could be 
subjected to oversight. DTA members concentrated on arguing that Namibia should 
have a ceremonial presidency as opposed to the executive presidency which 
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SWAPO wanted. Delegates were faced with two options: electing a president directly 
– thereby giving the office holder to account to the electorate or a president elected 
by the national assembly accountable to it. SWAPO delegates were unwavering in 
their demands for a president elected directly by the people. The frustration by the 
Chairman, Hage Geingob, summed up the mood of all delegates:  
Yes, the chair, of course, is punished not to say what he wants to say…I 
remember that there was some kind of compromise reached to make us move 
on when the parties had set positions. One wanted an executive presidency, 
others wanted this…We were trying to hammer that out to come to 
conclusions…compromise. I am also reminded of what the Western countries 
do at Security Council level. When Africans will come with a very, very strong 
draft…then they will give them the impression that if we have to amend this, 
then we will be in a position to support this, and after the…third World 
countries had done that, they still come and veto. That is the impression I get 
here, but I hope I am wrong.28 
Later, Hage Geingob put the question again for delegates to pronounce themselves 
whether ―the president is going to be elected direct or indirectly. That is your decision 
to make.‖29 The goodwill generated over three months was now in jeopardy with the 
response by Barnes that ―we are not participating because we made our stand clear 
on the proposal of the election of the president.‖30 The response from Hidipo 
Hamutenya of SWAPO was straight forward,  
...with all respect to Honourable Barnes, to say that you are not participating 
because your proposal was not taken is out of order. We are going to come to 
the second house. Suppose we do not want to participate because we did not 
want it?31  
Nonetheless, in the spirit of give and take, SWAPO agreed to the provision of a two-
term presidency but remained unconvinced by the reasoning given to justify it. 
SWAPO members felt that limiting the terms was unnecessary and undesirable. 
First, dictating that a person cannot contest elections for the third term, and dictating 
that the citizens cannot vote for that person was tantamount to abridging the 
person‘s and voters‘ natural rights. Many of them also felt that elections themselves 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., 19 January 1990. 
29
 Ibid., 19 January 1990. 
30
 Ibid., 19 January 1990. 
31
 Ibid., 19 January 1990. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 o
wn
27 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
provided term limits. If citizens did not wish a person to continue in office, they could 
vote him/her out. Further, limiting terms denied the country access to an experienced 
office holder. Diffusion of the executive power of the president as a result of his/her 
sharing executive power with the cabinet, and limit on the number of terms the 
president can serve, helped alleviate the concerns of the opposition parties. Time will 
tell if such an arrangement is successful in protecting Namibia from the possibility of 
any dictatorial tendencies (Geingob 2004: 129-130). 
An understanding of the political expectations that each side brought with it to 
the negotiations may have helped to trace the sources of the political differences that 
have characterised much of the process by following the logic that lay behind the 
strategies adopted by the parties. In turn, parties might have suggested an 
alternative mode of thought that may have revealed the reality of the negotiating 
process in a way that reduced the gap in the parties' mutual expectations that 
derived from differing perceptions.  
 
Using threats in negotiations 
The argumentum ad baculum is defined by Walton as an ―appeal to threat of 
force or to fear…in a critical discussion‖ (Walton 1992). Walton spends considerable 
time discussing this definition and whether or not an ad baculum argument must 
include a threat or if fear alone can define the ad baculum. Let it suffice for now that 
arguments may be merely a statement of reasons fully stated or resting on grounds 
that are merely implied. They include the arguments we might ―make‖ as well as 
those others we might ―have‖ (O‘Keefe 1977)
 
excluding only those quarrels (Walton 
and Krabbe 1995)
 
and other forms of verbal aggressiveness (Infante and Rancer 
1996)
 
that do not involve the giving of reasons. A party might offer arguments 
relevant to the consequences of a failure to reach agreement, including arguments 
that might bear upon the seriousness of some warning or the credibility of some 
threat. When one threatens to fight if attacked, the threat is no more than a 
communication of one's own incentives, designed to impress on the other the 
automatic consequences of his act. Whether the delegates at the Windhoek 
Assembly appreciated this is hard to tell. Incidentally, if threats succeed in deterring, 
they benefit both parties. But more than communication is involved when one 
threatens an act that he would have no incentive to perform but that is designed to 
deter through its promise of mutual harm. This situation presented itself at the 
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Windhoek Assembly when Hartmut Ruppel suggested there may have been some 
un-readiness to move positions ―that if it was clear that there is no chance of 
reconciliation of different viewpoints, then that should be formulated and that should 
go back to the Assembly to be voted on.‖32 The extent to which argument could be 
applied was limited in that persuasion is itself limited. Another mode of reaching 
decision is through voting. SWAPO obviously had the numerical strength to call a 
question to a vote. The threat of a vote was used several times during the 
negotiations.  
As negotiations were stalling, SWAPO delegate Nico Bessinger reminded the 
committee of the opening remarks which were made in the Constituent Assembly by 
a member of the ACN in his maiden address in which the member said that ―they 
(whites) have accepted that the South West Africa that they have known shall never 
be.‖33 Bessinger said the majority party felt that at least rigidity had been removed 
and flexibility installed. He asked to be understanding so that SWAPO would need 
not to use its numerical strength in order to have its will prevail. Bessinger made an 
appeal: ―I will appeal to ACN to stick to that beautiful speech that they have opened 
the Constituent Assembly with.‖34 Rhetorical perspective takes into consideration 
that not all decision-making can be based on rational weighing and debating. There 
must be some space for emotional politics - a demonstration of emotionality by the 
speaker that enables the audience to imagine certain feelings, attitudes and 
evaluations (Aristotle 1991 and Covino and Jolliffe 1995). Whether or not Bessinger 
succeeded in appealing to the values described by Aristotle and others, his was a 
master piece of rhetorical act. 
Bargaining can only occur when at least one party takes initiative in proposing 
a bargain. A deterrent to initiative is the information it yields or may seem to yield, 
about one's eagerness. As mentioned earlier, one of the sticking points at the 
Windhoek Assembly was whether Namibia should adopt an executive presidency or 
a parliamentary head of state with an executive prime minister. SWAPO was strong 
on the executive presidency with a prime minister and the minority parties favoured a 
parliamentary head of state. Difference between the two preferences is significant: 
The semi-presidential system is a system of government in which a prime minister 
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and a president are both active participants in the day-to-day administration of the 
state. It differs from a parliamentary republic in that it has a popularly elected Head 
of State who is more than a purely ceremonial figurehead. It differs from the semi-
presidential system in that the cabinet, although named by the president, is 
responsible to the legislature, which may force the cabinet to resign through a motion 
of no confidence. How the powers are divided between president and prime minister 
can vary greatly between countries. 
It was evident that each party was not willing to move from their positions. 
Barnes of the DTA was firm on his party‘s stance  
...that although the terminology ‗ceremonial president‘ is used, we feel that the 
president must have certain powers. But we feel for our particular new start in 
sovereign independence, the fears, the uncertainties, that all those things can 
be accommodated in an executive prime minister with his cabinet. The fact 
remains, Sir, that on this point, we are not in dispute with each other.35  
He argued that perhaps it would be favourable to consider an exercise to first 
contribute to national reconciliation and nation-building that could benefit the entire 
independence process in sovereign independence. 
Barnes summed up that SWAPO‘s bottom line is an executive president, ―no 
matter what, the discussions should evolve around that situation. We have a problem 
that we cannot perhaps find a solution, and think this is where my honourable 
colleague, Mr. Mudge, made mention of how much give and take there is on both 
sides.‖36 As Jowett and O‘Donnell put it ―People are reluctant to change; thus, in 
order to convince them to do so, the persuader has to relate change to something in 
which the persuadee already believes‖ (Jowett and O'Donnell 1992: 22-23). The 
DTA had already mentioned the fact that the party was ―not firm on the concept of 
ceremonial president, we are not firm on the title and we feel that certain powers 
should be given to the president.‖37 What we stood for prior to the election result is 
already a small step in the spirit of give and take, he argued. Although it can never 
be known exactly what was on Barnes‘ mind at the time of his intervention, on 
balance the best guess is that the opposition parties feared the person who was 
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going to be president not the institution itself. This is coupled with a failure to 
persuade the majority of negotiators of the proposed point of view. 
Aristotle (1991) reminds us that persuasion is accomplished by character 
whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of 
credence. If the speaker appears to be credible, the audience will form the second 
order judgment that propositions put forward by the credible speaker are true or 
acceptable. But how does the speaker manage to appear as a credible person? He 
must display practical intelligence (phronêsis), a virtuous character and goodwill 
(Aristotle 1991). For, if he displayed none of them, the audience would doubt that he 
is able to give good advices at all. If he displays all of them, Aristotle concludes, it 
cannot rationally be doubted that his suggestions are credible. It must be stressed 
that the speaker must accomplish these effects by what he says. It is not necessary 
that he is actually virtuous. On the contrary, a pre-existing good character cannot be 
part of the technical means of persuasion. 
The work of the standing committee had been facilitated by three legal 
experts. However, political parties were free to seek legal advice outside the 
committee at their own expense. In a dramatic turn of events - two days before the 
conclusion of the negotiations of the constitution - Kosie Pretorius asked if his legal 
advisors could sit in during the discussions in order ―to save time.‖38 Pretorius was 
supported by Barney Barnes of the DTA who argued that  
...it could be to the advantage of us finishing this constitution possibly much 
faster than what we are doing now. There is the problem that delegations, 
after they have deliberated here for the day, have to go back to their legal 
advisors, discuss the whole process, even at times when we have to make a 
concession or something that we did not have the time to review. Your legal 
advisor, within striking distance, is not participating in any of the deliberations, 
it is only observer status he has and it is my considered opinion that it could 
be an advantage to speed up matters…39  
This proposal was shot down by Hartmut Ruppel of SWAPO who argued that legal 
advisors would ―just delay the discussions‖40 as preparations between the parties 
and their legal advisors should have been concluded before the meeting. His view 
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was shared by Nahas Angula who reminded the committee that it was the parties 
that agreed on the ―three legal advisors whose advice would be neutral and should 
be taken in good faith…‖41 He said political leaders should have political courage and 
will to make decisions on issues of a problematic nature. The matter was settled by 
Pretorius who said he didn‘t ―want the house to be divided, so if there is no 
consensus I withdraw my request.‖42 
 
Rhetoric of bargaining 
In the conduct of negotiations, argument may be brought to bear on a variety 
of different subjects. The parties may offer arguments, reasons or explanations 
related to the value of whatever is the subject of the negotiation and of possible 
exchange. In persuasion, the active role of the sender is characterised by deliberate 
intentions: persuasion does not occur by chance, but because of the sender‘s 
purposes. Jamieson (1985: 394) argues that ―intention is a kind of focussing device 
in the imaginative consciousness; it concentrates and thus it excludes; it is a 
selective device, selecting an image to be raised into consciousness from a range of 
alternatives. Without intention, nothing has prominence, therefore one has to intend 
when one imagines‖. 
At the Windhoek Assembly, no one had predicted that the negotiations were 
going to be easy, if anything but that. At stated elsewhere above, the discussion on 
the powers of the president constituted an area of material dispute. The distance 
between SWAPO and the minority parties was vast. Clearly so, each side was going 
to put arguments that affirmed their positions. Mudge of the DTA did not hide his 
party‘s ―fears and reservations about an executive president.‖43 He was especially 
worried about the powers of the president in relation to the powers of the prime 
minister. Mudge did not doubt SWAPO‘s right to appoint a president, a prime 
minister and ministers, but, he said he was concerned that cabinet did not have 
powers because he ―got the impression that they are just there to advise the 
president. We are used to a system of government where the ministers have power, 
where the prime minister has an important role to play…‖44 The truth is that there 
was never a prime minister in Namibia let alone a government for and by the people 
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of Namibia. Walton is therefore correct when he suggests that rhetoric can be used 
correctly or incorrectly to present a particular argument. 
While he was aware of the fallacies in Mudge‘s argument, Theo-Ben Gurirab 
chose not to address them but instead argued that SWAPO saw the president of the 
Republic as a father-figure and as a symbol of the authority of the nation. He 
dismissed the idea of an executive prime minister. He insisted SWAPO‘s demand for 
a "prime minister who would be appointed by the president, but who would 
administer the government affairs.‖45 This view was supported by Hidipo Hamutenya 
who proposed to further curb the powers of the president in relation to the judiciary 
and the legislature which had the power to remove the president from office if the 
president abuses his or her powers and responsibilities. Hamutenya strengthened 
his argument by referring to the American system which has the ―most effective 
checks and balances…‖46 
Mudge argued that the checks and balances should be brought into the 
system of government at the level of the executive, the legislative and judiciary 
where the separation of power should be. Mudge‘s views are informed by his 
experiences of how power is wielded in most of Africa particularly his private 
meetings  
...with members from the Zambian…and other governments…that ministers in 
many of those countries have the feeling that they are sort of just there - they 
are just glorified members of parliament…we feel checks and balances can 
only really work when all the power is not concentrated in the hand of one 
person.47  
He was hopeful ―it is just a matter of finding a solution to a problem which has been 
worrying us for a long time, the fear for dictatorship, the fear for concentrating power 
in the hands of one person…that we might end up with an undemocratic society…‖48 
Mudge‘s remarks should be seen in the context of Munz‘s argument that people can 
be persuaded of the truth of a statement when there is reasonable or rational 
grounds for the statement. In that case no further persuasion over and above the 
evidence or the rationality of the argument itself is required. When it cannot be 
shown to be true and even when it is believed to be false, nevertheless people can 
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be persuaded to give their assent by the employment of rhetoric (Munz 1990). There 
is no evidence at least from what Mudge said of the experiences in Zambia and 
other African countries. If anything, his fears affirmed what black people suspected 
all along that whites were not trustful of a black government. But the repeated appeal 
to fear by Mudge is cause for reasonable suspicion of the truthfulness of his 
argument. As Walton suggests, the ad baculum may be used as ―scaremongering‖ 
(1992). 
People respond more effectively to messages that explain proposed actions 
with reference to familiar experiences. Successful politicians are those who can 
develop their arguments with evidence taken from beliefs about the world around 
them. Hage Geingob cited the president of the United States of America as one such 
powerful person with a less powerful cabinet but with a strong congress with checks 
and balances. The citation is described by Brinton ―as a form of ithotic argument 
[which] involves the direct or indirect quotation of a source with the intention that 
identification of the opinion or attitude expressed with the source will influence 
hearers or readers toward acceptance‖ (1986: 245 - 258). He tried to reassure the 
minority parties that SWAPO‘s proposal was consistent with international practices 
that what SWAPO promised was not something out of the norm.  
SWAPO delegates knew what was at stake. They went out of their way to 
induce a sense of unity that would bring together former enemies to own the creation 
of a new nation. Central to classical rhetoric were the notions of ethos, logos and 
pathos. Aristotle argued that in addition to taking a stance that was morally worthy 
(ethos) and proofs to support argument (logos) the successful rhetorician should also 
be able to arouse the feelings (pathos). This could be done both through considering 
fundamental human experiences and arguments that appeal to the feelings. This is 
evident from Mose Tjitendero‘s reflection of the just ended November 1989 election 
that the victory was for the birth of democracy and that Namibia was beginning to 
mark a turning point in the politics of southern Africa and the world. He said one of 
the things that  
we will be proud of as founding fathers and mothers is that we are saying the 
term of office of the president would not be the conventional terms where the 
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person serves until he or she dies because tenure of office have been limited 
to a two five-year term.49  
The ability to articulate a compelling vision of a bright future is the sine qua non of 
charisma and greatness, two key outcomes for leaders. Though descriptions of 
charisma abound, there is consensus that charismatic leaders inspire followers "to 
perform above and beyond the call of duty" (House et al. 1991: 364 - 396) by 
appealing to their emotions and enduring motives rather than by controlling their 
access to material rewards and resources. Tjitendero‘s remarks should be 
understood in this context. 
Political leaders become persuasive when their statements interact with other 
linguistic features to argue for policies. Leaders make statements that will represent 
their own policies in a positive light and or will disparage those of opponents. Chilton 
(2004) says the purpose of political discourse involves, among other things, the 
promotion of representations, and a pervasive feature of representation is the 
evident need for political speakers to imbue their utterances with evidence, authority 
and truth, a process that we shall refer to in broad terms, in the context of political 
discourse, as ―legitimisation‖. Political speakers have to guard against the operation 
of their audience‘s ‗cheater detectors‘ and provide guarantees for the truth of their 
sayings. 
As the Constituent Assembly turned its attention to working out details about 
the nature of the legislature, some of the concerns of the members of the assembly 
were to bring about accountability and establish a system of checks and balances. 
However, at the same time, one could see that the reasoning behind non-SWAPO 
parties arguing for a bicameral parliament was informed not just by their desire to 
enhance accountability. They believed that under proportional representation, with 
the whole of Namibia as one constituency, SWAPO would continue to secure a 
majority in the National Assembly for years to come. Keeping Chilton in mind, 
Katjiuongua argued that the second chamber of parliament should not have the 
same method of election as national assembly and the country should be divided 
into provinces or regions organised in such a way that they are inter-racial and inter-
tribal.  Each province or region will be represented by one or two elected senators. 
His idea was that the second chamber would be the ―custodian of particular values, 
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concerns and realities and also the body that moderates against monocracy.‖50 He 
also wanted the chamber to have, for example, in one house  
...a preponderance of one party majority forever or for a very long time, that is 
the type of monocracy I am referring to, whatever type of form it might take, 
then you may have by definition the other body which will moderate that 
monotony and try to introduce another faction in the constitutional life of the 
nation, the decision-making process.51  
He pleaded strongly that the house, ―through my chairman, should consider seriously 
the necessity for us to begin with this…‖52 If Emrich et al. (2001) suggest that leaders 
who infuse their messages with image-based words will evoke a stronger emotional 
response among followers, increasing followers' willingness to embrace their visions 
and ultimately, to act, then Katjiuongua failed in his motivation for a bicameral 
parliament. However articulate Katjiuongua was; his rhetoric was uninspiring by all 
accounts. 
Katjiuongua raised the proposal of a bi-cameral parliament at least twice after 
the proposal failed the first time. He was asked by the assembly to come up with a 
rationale. The parties to a negotiation may offer arguments concerning the 
appropriateness of various points at which agreement could ultimately be reached, 
including such positions as mid-points and difference-splitting, round numbers, 
objective criteria and neutral principles. Katjiuongua‘s reasons and justification for 
the rationale for a second chamber deserve a closer reading. He argued that on a 
national level, Namibia needs national integration through institutions, thereby 
creating participation and liberating the people from fear or sectional loyalties. He 
saw the second house as a platform of discussion by the minority who might not 
necessarily be elected by numbers. Katjiuongua inevitably hoped to persuade. 
Typically, he wanted to convince others why a second chamber was necessary. 
While the success of his claims depended, in part, on the constellation of interests 
and resources held by various constituencies in the process, the way claims were 
articulated also affected whether he persuaded and moved the audiences to which 
he were addressed. Claims-making, then, is a rhetorical activity. But also, parties to 
a negotiation can misrepresent facts for self-serving purposes. Such 
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misrepresentations routinely occur when the parties make statements about their 
own preferences. Similar misrepresentations of fact take place in argumentative 
situations. Katjiuongua also argued that there were regional, economic and 
infrastructural diversities in society and in the supply of skills and expertise 
throughout the country that a method of decentralising the government will allow the 
coming into full play of all these factors. According to him, there was a feeling that 
the elected majority, without becoming ineffective as a government, must take into 
account the views of the political minorities of the day, the views that are relevant to 
national peace and stability, thus avoiding a ―tyranny of the majority‖. A memorable, 
well-crafted statement includes historical references that cultivate national memory 
and unity by building enthusiasm and commitment. Katjiuongua‘s use of terms such 
as ―tyranny‖, ―national peace‖ and ―stability‖ informs his desire to appeal to a larger 
audience. 
One of the sticking points at the Windhoek Assembly was the question of how 
the constitution was going to be amended. A number of different definitions have 
been given for the concept of constitutionalism, but one essential element of any 
definition is the idea of constitutionalism as government limited by the rule of law 
(McIlwain 1947). Hamutenya had argued that  
...it was sufficient to say that the constitution will be amended by a two-thirds 
majority and that it was not necessary to make provisions that certain things 
are sacrosanct and therefore cannot be amended.53  
This view was echoed by Tjitendero that it should not be a ―matter of Act or law that 
you say even if the circumstances have changed so drastically, we should not 
change or contemplate an amendment.‖54 He reasoned that like all documents 
recording man's hopes and plans, constitutions cannot be immune from the test of 
time, especially the challenge of unexpected environmental and technological 
changes and the different concepts and orientation of subsequent elites. Vekuii 
Rukoro did not share this view. He countered that the constitution  
should not be subject to the changing like majorities in parliament at any given 
point in time, and that is why, for instance…I propose that no amendment of 
the constitution that has the effect of removing the democratic and republic 
nature of the state should be entertained at all. But I am reasonable to 
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arguments, such as the one introduced by honourable member Dr. Tjitendero 
that things do change. Times do change and so on, and that maybe to bind 
oneself in this irrevocable manner for generations to come might be politically 
unhealthy.  But in that case I would then say, instead of a two-thirds, we 
should require a three-quarters majority as a compromise.55 
James Madison objected to the rule of law constitutionalism in The Federalist. 
Madison argued that frequent recourse to the amending process would undermine 
the stability of the government because it would imply that the Constitution was 
seriously defective (Griffin 1990). Madison noted that the Constitution would benefit 
from ―that veneration which time bestows on everything, and that this veneration 
would enhance the stability of government generally‖ (ibid. 1990: 200) Finn held a 
contrary view. He argued that ―on one hand, Constitutions are chains with which men 
bind themselves in their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in 
the day of their frenzy. On the other hand, we should keep in mind the dictum of 
constitutional lawyers, ascribed to Justice Robert Jackson: the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact. It must be possible to unbind oneself in an emergency. Society must 
not be confined too tightly‖ (Elster 1991). Katjiuongua‘s argument that constitutions 
should not be ―changed every time a political party wants change or when there is a 
change in political leadership‖56, are more in tune with Madison‘s views. But 
Katjiuongua advocated for ―a fairly rigid constitution…‖57 amended only when it is ―in 
the national interest…for the sole purpose of good government…‖58 He suggested 
the need to specify which rights should not be amended. 
The claim that political decision-making entails the application of reasoning in 
conditions of irreducible contingency chimes with the classical, Aristotelian, 
conception of political deliberation as concerned with the future advantage or harm 
of some course of action. Aristotle was well aware that in politics we have to come to 
decisions on the basis of claims that are at best probable rather than certain, to act 
when the grounds for acting are not as solid as we might like. In the bargaining 
process each party tries to maximise its gains and minimise its losses (Berkovitch 
1984). This creates the so-called bargaining problem, that is, whereas bargainers 
need to reach a settlement, they also prefer one that is most favourable to them. The 
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mixed-motive nature of bargaining is expressed in the fact that "if they had no 
incentive to cooperate, they would not bargain at all; if they had no incentive to 
compete, they would not need to bargain" (Bacharacb and Lawler 1981). Given this 
mixture of competitive and cooperative motivation, the problem lies in determining 
the exact outcome of any bargaining process, given the range of possible agreeable 
outcomes within the contract zone (Roth 1979). SWAPO, on the other hand, viewed 
the African experience in a different light. Problems of many African countries were 
not a result of executive presidencies, but of inadequate constitutional checks and 
balances. In the absence of checks and balances, trouble could come from wherever 
the executive power rested. SWAPO did not share the concern of non-SWAPO 
parties about executive presidency. It therefore argued strongly in favour of 
executive presidency, subject to appropriate constitutional checks and balances 
(Geingob 2004). 
Beside this practical pattern of thought, logical arguments have also played an 
important role in the Windhoek Assembly debates. The necessity for a speaker to 
address composite audiences is a feature of political that increases with success and 
responsibility. It is not always feasible to address these audiences individually. The 
ability to formulate statements that communicate distinct and perhaps even 
incompatible messages simultaneously to diverse audiences is therefore crucial to 
political success. Aristotle recognises distinctions among types of audiences and 
describes the types of emotions that are important in the persuasion of each (1991). 
James Andrews suggests that a speaker confronting a composite audience 
has two basic choices: either attempt to avoid offending anybody and end up saying 
nothing, or else simply to write off one or more audiences that there is little or no 
hope of persuading. While the latter is uninteresting, there is evidence that the latter 
has been employed by political leaders on significant occasions (Andrews 1983). 
Nevertheless, this strategy is primarily a way of avoiding the problem and can result 
in alienating audiences whose support the speaker needs. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) confront this issue in noting that the need of a persuasive to adapt to 
the presumptions of such an audience creates a special difficulty: A composite 
audience, such as a parliamentary assembly, will have to be regrouped as a single 
entity to make a decision, and it is extremely easy for the opponent of an incautious 
speaker to turn against him all the arguments he directed to different parts of the 
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audience, either by setting the arguments against each other so as to show their 
incompatibility or by presenting them to those they were not meant for. 
It was not anticipated that even the appointment of the Secretary to the 
Cabinet as a civil servant by the president will be a highly contested proposal. But it 
was. Katjiuongua thought the Secretary of the Cabinet should be a politician by 
virtue of his appointment and must therefore not enjoy the benefits of a civil servant. 
He suggested that the tenure of office of Cabinet Secretary be ―linked to that of the 
government of the day.‖59 Barney Barnes of the DTA did not have a problem with the 
Cabinet Secretary appointed by the president since the position requires trust but 
argued against the Secretary to the Cabinet being a civil servant. Hamutenya put 
forward counter-arguments that it does not follow that ―because he is appointed by 
the president he goes with the president that appointed him. There will be stability 
there in the same way as it applies to the judges."60  
Given the seemingly inevitable growth in the power of the new bureaucracy 
through administrative discretion and law, delegates to the Windhoek Assembly were 
concerned how power was going to be exercised and how cabinet was going to be 
composed. They were concerned that the bureaucracy would not be both 
representative and democratic in composition and ethos and of the kind of oversight 
that was going exercised over an unelected cabinet. Various options were given 
such as the system of the US where cabinet members come exclusively from outside 
and of France where ministers can come from both outside and inside of Parliament 
– a position which SWAPO wanted. Katjiuongua differed:  
Mr. Chairman, my position is that the president should appoint a cabinet 
under a prime minister which enjoys the confidence, majority of parliament, 
accountable to each and those members are members of parliament, no 
people from outside for the simple reason that this is going to be too 
expensive adding proxies to the cabinet. If you have a list of 72 members and 
you say people are elected as a party, not individuals, then out of those 72 
people, when you are putting up the list, you must also put up the list when 
you have the intention of forming a government that those people are capable 
of serving as a reservoir for appointments…61 
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Claims-makers' behaviour also depends on their perception of their audience-
perceptions which can be more or less accurate (Toulmin 1958). On the one hand, 
claims-makers may have occasion to address the converted-individuals belonging to 
or allied with their movement. So far as this is concerned, Katjiuongua was more 
successful in convincing members of other opposition parties of the correctness of 
the wisdom to appoint cabinet members only from the national assembly. At the 
other extreme, SWAPO members were resolutely hostile to the proposition by 
Katjiuongua. He was fully aware that regardless of how they were addressed, 
SWAPO members were unlikely to be receptive of his argument. In between were 
the audiences deemed persuadable, those who might respond to the right appeal 
such as Vekuii Rukoro. 
The bureaucracy‘s internal structuring may be as important for constitutional 
functioning as any theoretical or practicable legislative supremacy. That wonder of 
modern times is a prime example of the efficacy of a balance of social forces as a 
means to neutralisation as a political force. A similar representation of the pluralism 
of society in the vitals of the bureaucracy ensures its constitutional behaviour and 
political equilibrium. Like Katjiuongua, however, Hans-Erik Staby of the DTA was 
more concerned with the costs of a huge government prompting a strong response 
from Hamutenya of SWAPO,  
…the expenses of course we can use it when it suits us and run away from it 
when doesn‘t sit us. Mr. Staby was very sensitive to the arguments put on the 
second house, his submission that we cannot advocate a second house, you 
know there could be payment, you have no problem with that but when it 
comes to separating the cabinet from the assembly then you see the need for 
cost, the two don‘t go together. If you are concerned with cost then you should 
not make those proposals. If you make that proposal then you must also have 
lee ways on cost.62 
But it was Nahas Angula who provided arguments why ministers should be 
appointed from either inside or outside of parliament. Angula advanced three 
reasons: first was that the people elected during the election may not necessarily be 
cabinet material; secondly he argued that it is always desirable that the government 
should be broad-based, to be representative of all people and finally he argued  
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...it is in the best interest that the president is allowed to appoint people from 
wherever they are, whether they are elected or not elected, on the basis of 
their competences and the kind of talents they can bring to the administration 
of the government.63  
This discussion was not made easier by the fact that the president of SWAPO had 
already announced his cabinet before the constitution was approved. Indeed, some 
members of the cabinet designate were not members of the constituent assembly 
which was to be turned into a national assembly. Katjiuongua was quite aware of the 
situation and he let it known that  
...the fact that people have been already designated to positions…is the 
unfortunate part of the whole thing that we cannot talk objectively. It always 
looks like you are going to hurt somebody. That is a pity, but you can take 
your decision, I will oppose it and I reserve my right to talk about it elsewhere, 
but my position is clear there.64  
Mrs. Ithana appeared to read the attitude of opposition parties incorrectly when she 
said that ―…according to what I have been hearing and what I have been seeing we 
have reached consensus and according to our procedures…‖65 to which Katjiuongua 
quickly snarled a ―Minus me‖66 response. Ithana suggested that the procedures 
allowed Pretorius an opportunity to reserve his objection, perhaps Katjiuongua can 
be afforded the same courtesy: 
Katjiuongua: Yes, we can do so all the way, I will not agree to something 
here I cannot defend outside. I am sorry to say so, but that is the situation. 
Chairman: But there should be a decision now, otherwise we are wasting too 
much time because of commitments outside. So since we all have 
commitments, let‘s have reservations as we are doing with Mr. Pretorius. 
Katjiuongua: No, things I don‘t believe in myself I cannot defend outside. 
Chairman: Yes, but there are also many things we don‘t believe in, but we 
are compromising. 
Katjiuongua: I compromised a lot as well. 
Chairman: The best is that we have reservations and go to the assembly. 
Katjiuongua: Yes, no problem. 
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Chairman: Let‘s go to the assembly. Initially I thought we must avoid that but 
we are not going to have an end. We want people to know who thinks what. 
So members can go and explain, even if they are going to accept the 
constitution unanimously areas on which they have reservations so that we all 
know where we stand, so that our members can know.67 
The triumph of thoughtless spontaneity is the death of rhetorical ambition. Every 
speaker needs the tools of rhetoric to stiffen national resolve in difficult times. It is not 
a failure to understand and exercise this element of leadership; it is an advantage. 
There is evidence in choices of words such as ―defend‖ and ―compromising‖ that 
there are strong evaluations associated with political actions. This value system is 
described with the language of argumentation and so linguistic choices communicate 
that these leaders places a positive value on competitiveness. This value system 
reflects a general view of human and social relations that informs the use of 
language. And a good use of language must find a way to rephrase the national 
creed, describing an absolute human equality not always evident to the human eye. 
 
Conclusion 
With very few exceptions, most of the debates of the Windhoek Assembly 
were initially built on argument and many of them were solved through practical 
reasoning. This can be explained in part by the attitude of the members and in part 
by the constraint of the process. On the one hand, many members were sincerely 
seeking to reach integrative solutions. Most of them agreed that the very raison 
d‘être of the body of which they were members was to bypass the shortcomings of 
the past and they were inclined to try and overcome divisions based on 
misunderstandings, prejudice, ideologies or interests. This is by the way compatible 
with a strategic approach, which could argue that, since they were members of the 
constituent assembly, their self-esteem led them to try to avoid a failure and 
predisposed them to accept sincere attempts to build agreements. On the other 
hand, the process put them under pressure. The variety of their views and the 
unpredictable nature of many issues, made a logical approach very difficult in most 
instances.  
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For one thing, the informative role of deliberation helped the framers of the 
Namibian constitution to form a more complete set of preferences than they originally 
had or even forced them to change positions when they were exposed to the full 
consequences or incoherence of their original proposals. For another, when political 
actors needed to justify their proposals, they found that impartial arguments were not 
available or, if they were, they were too obviously tied to a particular interest to be 
convincing. In this situation, framers of the Namibian constitution had no other 
alternatives than to change the original proposal for another that took into account 
the views and interests of others. Such a use of impartial argumentation yielded 
more equitable outcomes than pure bargaining and increased the overall legitimacy 
of the process among political actors. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING 
 
It is a practice in any democratic country I know that when it comes to providing facilities, that 
there is a difference made between women and men for ablution facilities…That is 
discriminating on the basis of sex. But it is perfectly acceptable in terms of the norms of the 
democratic state. A woman who wants to go to a man‘s toilet and everything that goes with it, 
can go to a constitutional court in a future Namibia and enforce her right to do so...But 
certainly, hospitals discriminate on that basis. They have women wards and men wards. 
Hartmut Ruppel, 1989 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter attempts to examine how the rhetorical construction of 
distributive bargaining impacted on the negotiations for Namibia‘s constitution at the 
Windhoek Assembly. The image of distributive bargaining best fit situations which 
involves haggling over the bigger share of the price. The essential theoretical 
problem here is to determine why and under what conditions the two negotiating 
parties – SWAPO, on one hand and the opposition parties, on the other - will make 
concessions. The chapter will highlight the limits of distributive bargaining in the 
context of the negotiations of a new constitution for Namibia. While the previous 
chapter focused on bargaining where negotiating from position is less productive 
than negotiating from interest, here the interests of more parties are merged into one 
proposal that eventually becomes a function of discussion. The role of emotions in 
negotiations is central to this chapter. The chapter will reveal whether negotiation is 
more than simply a context for social interaction, which creates the conditions for 
effortful analysis and complex problem solving. The chapter will also investigate if it 
may be true that preparation and analysis in advance of a negotiation encounter 
improves one's chances for success. This theory highlights the integrative approach 
to bargaining, where rhetorical negotiation can be more than a way for one party to 
win at the cost of another, as participants seek to maximise their interests by also 
seeking to further the interests of other parties.  
 
Emotional bargaining  
Bargaining under the pressure of strong emotion can be one of the toughest 
challenges for a negotiator. When someone pushes your buttons, you‘ll want to push 
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back. A rush of feelings - including betrayal, anger, frustration, worry or 
embarrassment - can leave you wondering if you can pull yourself together well 
enough to carry on the negotiation. 
The framers of Namibia‘s constitution were faced with a daunting task of 
shaping the nation‘s future without disregarding the past in its totality. But the main 
question was how and the extent to which the preamble was to reflect the nation‘s 
past. A more widely-used strategy in negotiations infers one to learn about the 
opponent's situation, motivation and reservation value in order to increase the 
chance of obtaining a favourable agreement. The less the opponent knows about 
you the less chance they have to obtain a favourable agreement. Hans Erik-Staby of 
the DTA said that ―the preamble must be oriented at the future and not deal with the 
past.‖68 He noted that the preamble  
...must cover essentials only and not embark on emotional things (emphasis 
added), for which we obviously have understanding…there is a reference for 
instance to apartheid, racism and colonialism.69  
This is a very amusing statement as Preambles are by and large epideictic texts, 
laden with value-statements and calls for higher grounds. It may not have been 
expected that SWAPO who wanted a reference to apartheid included in the 
preamble to be told ―not to embark on emotional things.‖70 SWAPO won the elections 
precisely because they have fought on a platform to get rid of apartheid. The well-
intentioned remarks by Staby simply reflected his lack of knowledge about what 
SWAPO wanted. His ignorance was exposed even further when he said that his 
party, the DTA, agreed in essence, but  
...there are other practices which are equally repugnant. If one takes fascism 
for instance. If we mention one expressly, the question arises whether we do 
not condone the others.71  
Staby‘s remarks cannot be read in isolation but stem from his party‘s desire to break 
with the past. How does a party so very much associated with the apartheid ideology 
position itself better for a new era without completely negotiating itself out of power? 
The answer lies in the nature of rhetorical construction of distributive bargaining that 
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prevailed at the Windhoek Assembly. Hartmut Ruppel of SWAPO argued that the 
constitution should make a short reference ―to the past…we are not born in a 
vacuum, we are born as a nation and the background cannot just be disregarded 
completely.‖72 Conflict is a natural fact of life. Whether we focus on interactions 
between individuals or organisations, conflicts are omnipresent. Of the range of 
emotions that may arise in conflict, anger is perhaps the most prominent and 
pervasive (Allred 1999). Anger is closely related to fairness judgments (Averill 1982), 
which play an important role in deal making and dispute resolution. SWAPO was 
very much aware of the need to transform the Namibian nation from the one infused 
with colonialism to a new nation built on values of justice, the rule of law and 
democracy. Ruppel thus proposed to marry the two differences. It was clear that the 
political and ideological orientations of the two parties were far from each other. 
Social conflict is a broad term that encompasses different types of conflict situations, 
which may call for different modes of conflict resolution. In general, social conflict 
may be said to occur when two or more parties have (or perceive) a divergence of 
interests (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). At the Windhoek Assembly, this divergence of 
interests took on many guises, including political disagreements. As a result, 
conflicts varied tremendously in terms of the stakes, the likelihood and possible 
consequences of stalemate and the relationship between the parties.  
However, arguments or coding of arguments played a certain role within the 
assembly. First, the social norm built by the majority of the members fostered this 
deliberative approach: since voting was excluded, the members were encouraged to 
argue. Secondly, on some issues, they managed to forge a language which helped 
them solve incompatibilities through exchanges of arguments. The primacy of ethos 
as a persuasive appeal can be better understood against the backdrop of the 
Aristotelian concept of rhetoric as an art that deals with the probable or contingent. In 
the realm of uncertainty, opinions and educated guesses, the audience especially 
will attempt to perceive whether the speaker is credible and trustworthy. The better 
the speaker can impress the audience with his competence, good character and 
goodwill, the better he can convince the audience to accept not only his version of 
reality but, importantly, his proposals for dealing with it. On the other hand, if the 
audience feels he is untrustworthy, incompetent or mean-spirited, the rhetor will face 
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serious difficulty in persuading them to both his point of view and proposed courses 
of action. The Windhoek Assembly‘s discourses can be interpreted through this 
typology because it helps explain why and how the delegates sometimes solved their 
incompatibilities through arguments. Dirk Mudge of the DTA made it very clear that a  
...constitution is not written for one generation, it is written for generations to 
come…When anybody refers to apartheid and discrimination and colonialism, 
I really appreciate your strong feelings about it. But in two or three 
generations from now, I hope the people will not even know the word 
apartheid anymore…73  
Chaïm Perelman (1969) proposed that actors facing strong incompatibilities can 
employ rhetoric strategies in order to overcome their division by making practical 
arguments, which seek to resolve concrete problems. Of course, good character and 
credentials sway only the most fickle of thinkers. Classical orators used ethos not to 
convince, but to fasten the already established rightness of their cause in the minds 
of their listeners. It invites them to celebrate "their" success and optimism. This 
invitation establishes a connection between the subject and the listeners, a bond that 
allows the speaker to obtain the desired emotional response from the audience. 
Kosie Pretorius wanted to other negative ―isms‖ to be mentioned in the 
preamble. Chairman of the constituent assembly, Hage Geingob, felt it was not 
necessary to include all the negative ―isms‖. He argued rather that ―apartheid is a 
specific ideology under which we suffered…‖74 But Pretorius wanted communism 
included in the preamble because ―According to Dr. Crocker…communism and 
apartheid is the same.‖75 As Geingob (2004) later observed, the victims of apartheid 
saw this statement as an attempt to cloud the realities of apartheid, and denying its 
impact on the lives of the majority in Namibia. Tindale (2006) suggests that all 
theories of argumentation, and particularly those that are normative in force, stress 
the underlying reasonableness of the activity and ways in which this should be 
achieved and maintained. But he recognises a practical recognition that arguers 
have more in mind, even where they are concerned to maintain reasonableness. 
They may, for example, want to maintain that reasonableness on their own terms 
and achieve outcomes that are favourable to their own interests, and they will 
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measure success in this way. Theo-Ben Gurirab of SWAPO objected to the 
exclusion of the word apartheid in the preamble as  
…it would be injustice done to the future generations of Namibia if we were to, 
in our constitution which we are now charged to write, deny them their history, 
both the good of it and its negatives. All the good constitutions recall history, 
the circumstance under which they have been brought into being, and on that 
basis they project a better future.76  
Negotiators seemed to use the information about the other‘s emotion to inform their 
own negotiation strategy. It should be noted, however, that negotiating is a complex 
and cognitively taxing venture. Negotiators needed to keep in mind their own 
preferences and limits, and, at the same time, monitor the opponent‘s behaviour, try 
to locate their limits and combine all this information to design an optimal strategy. 
The question thus arises whether negotiators are motivated to mobilise their scarce 
cognitive resources to pay attention to, scrutinise and process the strategic 
information that is provided by the opponent‘s emotions. 
Lax and Sebenius (1992) argue that negotiation based on positions tend to 
devolve into contests of will. They are less successful by any measure. Incompatible 
positions may be backed by compatible interests and so negotiating on interests is 
more likely to produce fair, mutually beneficial outcomes without generating added 
hostility. In addition to separating interests from positions, it is helpful to generate a 
wide range of possible solutions before trying to come to a decision. It is also helpful 
for the parties to agree on the criteria by which possible solutions will be evaluated 
before actually setting down to evaluate the proposals. 
If a party can change the opponent's perception of what is a good deal and 
why it is important for the other party to conclude the negotiations, then the party has 
a greater chance to obtain a favourable agreement. Seen from this prism, speakers 
prefer to describe themselves in positive terms. The strategy is widely-used to 
present oneself in a positive light or at least to avoid a negative impression and in 
general to manage the impression on one‘s interlocutors. The same is of course true 
in most forms of public discourse, where making a good impression may even be 
more important than in informal everyday life conversations, for instance because of 
the more serious impact on a larger audience, as well as the political damage that 
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may be the result of a ‗wrong‘ presentation of Self. This is particularly important in 
politics, where a faux pas may cost votes at the next elections. The lessons from the 
discussion on the reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia provide useful insight why 
politicians want to present a positive self. In 1977, as Namibia began its movement 
towards independence, South Africa issued a proclamation which declared that 
Walvis Bay will cease to be administered as if it were part of the territory.  Beyond 
the historical and legal grounds for asserting control over Walvis Bay, South Africa 
had advanced its own various vital interests in maintaining the enclave. It was not by 
accident therefore that members of the constituent assembly had wanted to debate 
the territorial position of Namibia, including Walvis Bay. Among the first to take the 
floor was Dirk Mudge. His remarks were striking because he made an effort to 
associate himself with the position favoured by the majority. Ultimately, he wanted to 
be seen to be speaking for the people: 
Let us get absolute clarity on the question of the territory of Namibia. I am not 
hundred percent sure, for instance the DTA – and I am sure Mr. Katjiuongua 
mentioned it the other day – is also concerned about the southern border. We 
feel it must be the middle of the Orange River and I think we must get 
absolute clarity among ourselves on the issue of Walvis Bay and the islands 
on the coast. I don‘t think we should bump our heads against a legal situation. 
We must take that into consideration. All of us agree we want Walvis Bay, but 
we also have to consider the possibility of negotiations about certain areas. 
Can we just identify that as a point that will have to be properly investigated? I 
don‘t want to argue about it at this stage.77 
Moses Katjiuongua also used positive rhetoric to create a positive self when he said 
he agreed that a constitution is a long-time document,  
…I don‘t care so much about expressed will by the international community, 
but think as we ourselves understand it to be what is Namibia, I think we must 
try to put in the constitution everything that we think is Namibia. Maybe the 
only colleagues who have a point of difference here are the FCN who in their 
proposal say South West Africa as it exists today. That might exclude Walvis 
Bay and some other places. Maybe they can tell us what the problem is.78 
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But there was another negotiator on the other side, who also used authority to carry 
weight in distributive bargaining. SWAPO‘s spokesman on foreign affairs, Theo-Ben 
Gurirab, presented his party‘s uncompromising position:  
…whatever the future arrangement are going to be between Independent 
Namibia and South Africa, as Namibians we should define the territory of 
Namibia as being inclusive of Walvis Bay and the island and the southern 
border being the middle of the river. Resolution of the outstanding dispute, we 
will find ways to handle that - whether by negotiations or internationally in 
court.79  
Staby of the DTA was ―not entirely certain as to whether it would be correct to refer 
to Walvis Bay and the islands as an integral part of the territory of Namibia from a 
legal point of view.‖80 Hage Geingob‘s argument was that UN Resolution 432 which 
specifically addresses the question of Walvis Bay does not say ―you must 
negotiate…it says it is part and parcel of Namibia, it must be re-integrated after 
independence.‖81 This argument was countered by Pretorius that  
...this is not legally correct, and I am in favour of negotiations in this 
connection, because this will mean in legal terms annexation. I think 432 is a 
political decision, not a legal decision, and if we are able to do this, South 
Africa could have annexed the country before us.82  
According to Aristotle, character and emotion are constitutive features of the process 
of deliberation. This means that in order to render a determinate action-specific 
judgment, deliberation cannot simply be reduced to logical demonstration. Thus, he 
saw rhetoric as needed to make people see and understand one‘s point of view. The 
exchanges of arguments at the Windhoek Assembly took leaf from Aristotle‘s 
conclusion. Geingob had a short reply that  
...the resolutions of the United Nations are part of the sources of International 
Law - it is not just a political decision. This is going to be in an international 
court, not any other court and resolutions of the United Nations are sources of 
International Law.83  
His position was affirmed by Ben Amathila of SWAPO who argued that  
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...if one takes Resolution 432 of the Security Council of the United Nations as 
a basis for future litigation or discussions - that at least our constitution has to 
establish that claim. If you don‘t establish it, obviously it might weaken one‘s 
case against South Africa‘s position.84  
The provision in UN Resolution 435 gives recognition that Walvis Bay including the 
13 islands will be re-integrated into Namibia and that the United Nations will help a 
new nation to get those territories re-integrated in the country.  
During a discussion of a clause on discrimination, political parties were at 
pains to avoid to be seen by the voters as opposing certain proposals sponsored by 
the opposition. They attempted to portray a positive attitude to the Namibian people. 
A key figure in the committee, Dirk Mudge, while sceptical of affirmative action, had 
some kind words:  
Just not to be misunderstood I said that we are in favour of affirmative 
action…We even, in one of our policy documents; use the words, ―wieder 
guttmachung.‖ Translated into English means that you have to compensate 
somehow for damages done…but…you must make it very clear that it is 
going to be affirmative action and that it is not going to be discrimination in 
reverse…I am concerned about the formulation because read by somebody 
who is not well informed and read by somebody who is suspicious, this might 
create serious problems…I was only hoping that when it comes to very 
sensitive issue like this, that we will be able to sit down and discuss it 
responsibly. You can have my word that we as party has (sic) a lot of 
understanding for the fact that some people, because of the laws of the past, 
lagged behind. For instance the fact that they could not own property, just to 
mention one we have not made a secret of it on public platforms and we 
believe in the principle. But when it comes to the inclusion of such a thing in 
the Bill of fundamental Rights, I think we must think very carefully when it 
comes to formulation.85 
 
The rhetoric of concession 
In negotiation, a first offer can serve as an anchor that biases the other party's 
judgments of the underlying structure of the bargaining encounter (Neale and 
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Bazerman 1991). Anchoring can be examined in a single-issue distributive 
bargaining context by looking at the extremeness of a counteroffer, that is, the 
distance between one party's initial offer and the other party's initial counteroffer. 
There was general agreement between the framers of the Constitution at the 
Windhoek Assembly that executive power should not be unchecked. There were, 
however, differing views on how these powers could be subjected to oversight. One 
finds evidence of similar concerns during the constitutional debates at the Federal 
Convention in Philadelphia. ―The decision to establish the office of the president 
caused ‗considerable pause‘, according to James Madison. Virginia‘s George Mason 
feared that the office would create a ―foetus of a monarchy.‖ But with Congress and 
the Court holding sufficient countervailing power, the framers were able to establish 
an office that was powerful yet under control‖ (Geingob 2004: 127). DTA had argued 
that providing for a constitutional head of state would be in line with the Westminster 
type of democracy. According to the subdivision of the ad hominem arguments by 
Walton, this argument by the DTA should be classified as a circumstantial ad 
hominem. It was interesting that the DTA opposed executive presidency despite the 
fact that in South Africa, with whom DTA had longstanding relations, there was an 
executive state president. Concern was also expressed that executive presidencies 
in Africa were not on the whole successful. Going forward, Mudge presented 
proposals that were meant to break the impasse. His party wanted a parliamentary 
head of state because such a parliamentary head of state  
assures the upholding and, indeed, safeguarding of a certain democratic 
doctrine of separation of powers in so far as the president, as head of the 
executive, is guided by the wishes of his executive and cannot encroach 
either on the powers of the legislature or the judiciary.86  
It was implied that the parliamentary head of state is in fact the guardian of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers by assuring that the judiciary remains 
independent at all times, that the legislature embodies the wishes of the people and 
that the executive follows the demands of the legislature. Mudge‘s intention to 
persuading his listeners had to be concerned not only about the logical proofs but 
also about affecting the appropriate emotional response in the audience and about 
inducing the audience's confidence in his good sense, goodwill and virtue. Every use 
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of rhetoric immediately raises issues of motive and intention and at the same time 
makes those issues nearly impossible to resolve authoritatively. As a practical 
matter, a persuasive discourse is not merely a collection of arguments to act in our 
own best interest, but depends fundamentally on projecting a convincing depiction of 
the speaker‘s character, competence and intentions. The classical tradition of 
rhetoric goes beyond the orator‘s act of communication to his qualities of character 
or ethos. A model orator is necessarily morally virtuous and could only persuade if 
his behaviour met with social approval. This means that a public speaker is able to 
portray the standards acceptable to the audience.  
Other things being equal, a counteroffer will be closer to the value of the initial 
offer if the party making the counteroffer has been anchored by the initial offer than if 
not. Further to that, as with most negotiations, the delegates at the Windhoek 
Assembly laboured under the assumption that ‗nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed‘ it proved very difficult, in the end, to exchange concessions across issues. 
And while this prevented the final outcome from being hostage to a few issues, it 
may also have prevented useful trades between parties that had different intensity of 
preferences. Fisher and Ury (1981) believes that this bargaining stance is referred to 
as ‗‗positional bargaining,‘‘ ‗‗contending‘‘ or ‗‗contentious bargaining‖. Distributive 
bargaining implies an effort to dominate the negotiation through the use of pressure 
tactics, persuasive arguments and threats‖. Kosie Pretorius was quite aware of the 
availability of tools. Returning to the discussion on discrimination, Pretorius chose to 
apply arguments: 
I know the German law is making provision for it by adding the words ―no 
person may be wilfully or intentionally discriminated against.‖ It is very 
important, because for example for me not having a legal background, if you 
and Mr Mudge ask me to fetch you a cup of tea, and one of flasks is already 
empty after I have poured your tea, and I pour out of the other flask for Mr 
Mudge and the one cup of tea is warm and the other is cold, that is 
discrimination, but it was not wilfully. So, it is very important for me…because 
I will not be the government, and I never thought about it. But during the tea-
pause Mr Mudge said he thought he would be the president. So, it is 
important to me that we say not being discriminated against. It is not so easy 
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for the courts to make the difference. I think we must ask the specialists about 
this.87  
Scholars define bargaining power in various ways, but they all boil down to just one 
thing: the ability to convince the other side to give you what you want even when the 
other side would prefer not to do so. Accomplishing this task demand the ability to 
make arguments that gets accepted. Numbers or personalities are nice to have. But 
none of these assets guarantees the ability to exercise bargaining power in any 
particular negotiation. Pretorius found out quickly from Rukoro: 
I think when it comes to this thing, discrimination is absolutely prohibited. The 
question of your state of mind is totally irrelevant - whether you intended it or 
not.88 
Pretorius unexpectedly found an ally in Hartmut Ruppel, SWAPO legal advisor. A 
leading assumption in coalition formation is that people aim to maximise their own 
payoffs. Ruppel‘s arguments in support of Pretorius are worth quoting verbatim: 
I agree for once with Honourable Mr Pretorius that there should be a slight 
qualifying clause. We discussed it when we had certain deliberations on our 
draft. Take for instance discrimination on the basis of sex. It is a practice in 
any democratic country I know that when it comes to providing facilities, that 
there is a difference made between women and men for ablution 
facilities…That is discriminating on the basis of sex. But it is perfectly 
acceptable in terms of the norms of the democratic state. A woman who 
wants to go to a man‘s toilet and everything that goes with it, can go to a 
constitutional court in a future Namibia and enforce her right to do so…There 
are many, I just thought of this sexual one. But certainly, hospitals 
discriminate on that basis. They have women wards and men wards. I think if 
there is a very explicit provision to be made, it will not be frivolous. I think the 
example of the toilet may not be the most appropriate one. There are very 
democratic countries where women are not allowed to be co-signatories to 
their bank accounts or property and all that. I just wanted to give an 
example.89 
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In a bargaining interaction, the negotiators should be able to survey the political 
environment and evaluate the initial distribution of power. Specifically, the negotiator 
with the most advantageous best alternative to a negotiated agreement will enjoy 
relative power over his or her counterpart because he is in a better position to walk 
away if he doesn‘t get what he demands. Mudge was fully aware that he did not 
have the numerical strength to shoot down the proposal but was able to put forth 
counterarguments: 
I am afraid the word ―discrimination‖ has got a specific connotation, something 
which is wrong and I cannot agree that you can qualify discrimination. As far 
as concerned, discrimination is discrimination - unless you find a better word. I 
am not saying this only because of the connotation; I am also saying this 
because I know why Mr Pretorius wants those words in there. We have 
discussed it before. He maintains that if he has a school in which he wants to 
educate people in a specific culture and tradition and language and religion 
which, in the end, will boil down to racial discrimination, he will be able to 
defend it on the grounds that it is not discrimination, but in fact differentiation, 
or something like that. If we really want to have peace in this country, then we 
must avoid making provision for any form of discrimination. The way I 
understand discrimination doesn‘t mean that I say that from now on my wife 
will have to open the door for me when we get in to the car. I think we all 
realise that in some cases there will have to be special provision for women. 
There will be special provision for the handicapped. There will have to be 
special provision for many other categories of persons. But then we have to 
find another word. The minute you qualify discrimination then you look for 
trouble and I speak from experience. I don‘t want to discuss the merits, all I 
want to say is that I will not support any proposal in that paragraph. Not now. I 
think we can discuss the paragraph that I am prepared to do.90 
Negotiators should balance these front-end and back-end costs to determine 
whether to push for more precision in the deal at hand. This approach may lead to 
opposite conclusions. Negotiators need not worry as much about vague terms if they 
have a cost-efficient mechanism for resolving disputes that may arise. When lack of 
trust threatens to derail your negotiation, one solution is to stop arguing about the 
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structure of the deal and instead reshape the negotiation process. Lack of trust is 
never a good thing, but it‘s most problematic when negotiators perceive themselves 
to be vulnerable to exploitation. Changing the negotiation process can help mitigate 
risk and make distrust less of a barrier to deal making. 
Negotiation is more than simply a context for social interaction. The 
negotiation encounter creates the conditions for effortful analysis and complex 
problem solving. It may be true that preparation and analysis in advance of a 
negotiation encounter improves one's chances for success (Lewicki et al. 1994; 
Murnighan 1992). If a negotiator plans his or her first moves, for example, he or she 
will be less likely to be influenced by the other party's first offer. Proper planning 
provides an antidote to many of the tactics commonly used in distributive bargaining. 
During the debate on the bill of right on 8 December 1989, Pretorius expressed the 
view that  
...it is very important to me that you have in any Bill of Rights the necessary 
balance between rights and responsibilities, guarantees…We are stressing 
the balance between individual and group rights…91  
In support of his argument, Pretorius made reference to the UN Declaration of 
Human rights. What pragmatic reasons does the act or strategy of alluding to the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights create for Pretorius? He probably may have reasoned 
that, other things being equal, he could not deny the premise without risking criticism 
for ignorance about what one of the nation‘s founding documents stated. This is a 
pragmatic reason for acknowledging premise adequacy. But Pretorius‘ analysis or 
lack thereof did not serve him well judging by Mudge‘s sharp reply to the proposal of 
Pretorius:  
I cannot agree at all with Mr. Pretorius, and he knows that I will never support 
that a group has a fundamental right. I cannot accept that, because right now I 
am terribly concerned about the situation where a group – and they consider 
me to be part of that group – is trying to privatise schools and that will directly 
affect my position. I want to be free…92   
Mudge found an ally in Vekuii Rukoro who was ―not so comfortable‖93 with Pretorius‘ 
position, ―normally this thing is identified with repressive regimes that tries to take 
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away what they are giving with another hand…‖94 Rukoro was also strategic in 
appealing to patriotism. Not feeling patriotic serves as a fallible sign that one is 
unpatriotic, does not recognise the allusion or does not understand the fundamental 
position of the premise of a new nation being created by the very act of constitution-
making. Thus, appealing to patriotism compels recognition of premise adequacy. 
However, the goodness of arguments is determined by the acceptance of the 
interlocutor, the badness of arguments by the refusal to do so. 
In general, distributive bargaining tends to be more competitive. Common 
tactics include trying to gain an advantage by insisting on negotiating on one's own 
home ground; having more negotiators than the other side, using tricks and 
deception to try to get the other side to concede more than you concede; making 
threats or issuing ultimatums - generally trying to force the other side to give in by 
overpowering them or outsmarting them, not by discussing the problem as an equal.  
Often these approaches to negotiation are framed as incompatible.  Long (1952) 
reminds us that the amoral concept of administrative neutrality is the natural 
complement of the concept of bureaucracy as an instrument. According to 
Katjiuongua, the seat of reason and conscience resides in the legislature. He made 
the argument in the context that all senior appointments made by the president 
should be ratified by parliament as is the case with United States. Whatever 
grudging concession may be made to the claims of the political executive and a 
major task of constitutionalism is the maintenance of the supremacy of the 
legislature over the bureaucracy. The latter's sole constitutional role is one of neutral 
docility to the wishes of the day's legislative majority (Long 1952). At the Windhoek 
Assembly, the majority party, SWAPO, argued against Katjiuongua‘s proposal. 
Hartmut Ruppel argued that the president ―must not every time run back to the 
legislature‖95 every time there is an appointment to be made, citing the principle of 
separation of powers. Pendukeni Ithana argued that  
...we may scare some of the people who would do a better job if they are 
given that opportunity, if we will subject their lives to be discussed in 
parliament.96  
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Katjiuongua was not convinced. He argued that the proposed method makes sure 
that the president would not employ criminals. He concluded that he ―cannot agree to 
things here which I cannot explain outside to my people.‖97 From the discussions, it 
was apparent that differing proposals had different intended purposes. Dirk Mudge 
agreed that  
...it is not for a legislative body to discuss appointments…The alternative is 
that we make sure…that the Judicial Service Commission…must be 
appointed in a very, very responsible manner.98  
His thinking was that if the Judicial Service Commission is properly appointed, 
judges would not need to be confirmed by the national assembly. Mudge‘s argument 
should be seen in the context of Friedrich‘s contention that the essence of 
constitutionalism is the division of power in such a way as to provide a system of 
effective regularised restraints upon governmental action. The purpose of this 
division of power is not to create some mechanical equipoise among the organs of 
government but to represent the diversity of the community that its own pluralism is 
reflected in pluralism within the government (Friederich 1950). 
Fisher et al., authors of the negotiation best-seller Getting to Yes, say that 
integrative bargaining is superior to distributive bargaining in most, if not all, 
circumstances - even in situations in which something is to be divided up.  By 
cooperating and focusing on interests rather than positions, they argue that the pie 
can almost always be enlarged or some other way can be found to provide gains for 
all sides.  Other theorists suggest this is naïve that distributive situations requiring 
competitive or hard bargaining often occur. In any argument, statements about 
grounds provide the basic facts which serve as the foundation for the discussion 
which follows. Obviously, facts are themselves socially-constructed knowledge. 
Claims-makers and their audiences may agree to accept grounds statements without 
question or one or both parties may have reservations about the statements' truth 
and their relevance. The discussion on the functions and powers of the proposed 
second chamber of parliament again provides useful insights. Moses Katjiuongua 
had proposed that the second chamber will act as a body of review for legislation – 
through the exercise of a delaying function ―by simply allowing time for a deeper 
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material reflection and not simply a frustration of that decision-making process.‖99 It 
is unclear whether Katjiuongua had John Locke in mind when he made this proposal. 
Locke, writing the apologia for the Glorious Revolution and its accompanying shift in 
political power, held that "there can be but one supreme power, which is the 
legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate‖ (1947: 87). To be sure, 
Locke conceived of the legislature only as the fiduciary of the people, from whom all 
legitimate power ultimately stemmed. But since the legislature was considered the 
authentic voice of the people changeable only by revolution, this limitation could be 
forgotten in practice. Despite Locke's qualifications, the latter-day exponents of his 
views have given currency to what Jackson called the "absurd doctrine that the 
legislature is the people‖ (ibid: 88). Angula of SWAPO was not convinced of the 
arguments that have been advanced by Katjiuongua. He understood the rationale to 
address the fears of a minority but did not believe that there were people who could 
be classified as a minority because  
certain tribes are even more representative than others in terms of numbers, 
and if a decision is going to be taken in the National Assembly I can‘t see how 
certain regions or whatever it is, tribes, ethnic groups, minorities are going to 
be left out from the decision-making process.100 
Rukoro was without frustration in response to Angula that the framers of the 
constitution were moving in a very dangerous slope given the type of interpretation of 
the argument presented. He warned that  
...we will end up in a deadlock which could be very disastrous for this whole 
exercise. At this point in time I would love to respond to what he has said, but 
I am afraid I will simply contribute to what I am trying to avoid.101  
Each party will typically stress the factual aspects of the situation that support its own 
position, and neglect others. Other parties may in turn be counted on to expose this 
bias, so that in the end a more balanced picture emerges (Elster 1992). Clearly, 
Rukoro‘s remarks pointed to a desire to reach an agreement. In a seminal article on 
the role played by the unanimity decision rule in the political system of the EU and its 
inherent consequences (the joint-decision trap), Fritz Scharpf (1985) drew the 
attention of scholars to the implications of formal rules. He wrote that decisions made 
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by national governments under the unanimity decision rule will systematically lead to 
suboptimal policy outcomes creating ―the joint-decision trap‖ (Scharpf 1985: 48). The 
Windhoek Assembly members found themselves in a similar situation where 
decisions had to be reached – not by voting, but by consensus. The requirement of 
the unanimity decision rule can be expected to produce stalemate and deadlock 
because joint decisions under the unanimity decision rule express the position of the 
most reluctant actor and preserve the institutional status quo (Scharpf 1985). 
 
Bargaining and the politics of (mis)trust 
Lax and Sebenius argue that the bargaining processes consist of ―an attempt 
by two or more parties to find a form of joint action that seems better to each than 
the alternatives‖ (1986: 11). Moravcsik, in turn, referred to it as ―the process of 
collective choice through which conflicting interests are reconciled‖ (1993: 497). As 
stated before, politics being largely about images, various representatives at the 
Windhoek Assembly were concerned about how their constituencies would perceive 
their interests being addressed by their elected representatives. White 
representatives were concerned about their languages; namely, German and 
Afrikaans. Pretorius identified as a possible area of dispute and proposed that the 
question of the role of languages in an independent Namibia be referred to a 
committee. Hartmut Ruppel had a problem with Pretorius placing on record language 
as a point of difference: 
If the honourable member wants to say that this is a matter which should be 
dealt with another committee, then that must be clearly stated. It is a political 
decision. We cannot just say there is a difference and then just leave it like 
that. We must decide what we are going to do with this difference. Is it a 
difference which will be referred or is it difference where we will just use our 
combined vote against you?…We have to be practical and we don‘t want to 
be going on matters in committees where it is quite clear that only a very, very 
minute minority, although they may be washed away in any event by the 
consensus in this committee. So, we must be practical. Otherwise we will find 
all sorts of small differences which really don‘t matter and they will all be 
subject to lengthy discussions in committees…102 
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What are the ethical implications of the negotiation? Negotiators must implicitly 
acknowledge the legitimacy of each other‘s interests and claims. Failing to recognise 
someone‘s status appropriately could trigger negative emotions. Identifying and 
respecting your fellow negotiators‘ areas of status is likely to improve rapport and 
mutual cooperation - and keep heated emotions from brewing. That said, negotiators 
often commit the error of attributing people‘s behaviour to their character rather than 
the situation. As a result, negotiators are biased toward dismissing negotiating 
partners based on past history. This was true of white delegates who were perceived 
to be racist. Pretorius pleaded with the committee that  
...for the sake of the feeling of our people and also the other language groups, 
that something is not done overnight. So, it is important to me that there is the 
exception of the fact that you have the right to talk your language even in 
public schools up to a certain stage.103  
SWAPO was determined to remove any symbols of apartheid and proposed that 
English shall be the official language. This is clearly discernable from Tjiriange‘s 
intervention: 
I am trying to understand the honourable member. His concerns are already 
covered. What he says is that he wants the groups to reserve the right to talk 
their languages in schools and that is exactly what is said. So it is 
covered…104 
Chairman of the committee, Hage Geingob, summed up Pretorius‘ fears, ―It seems 
that Mr Pretorius thinks once independence comes, English will be spoken, 
Afrikaans stops. That is not what this means.‖105 Will that not be the effect of this? 
Pretorius had asked.  
 Many countries across the globe have begun transitions from authoritarian 
rule to democracy, marking what has become popularly known as the "third wave" of 
democratisation Garro (1993). Garro explains it this way because the 
institutionalisation of the rule of law helps the new democratic state achieve two 
important goals: the realisation of a clear break with the past, and the development 
of a constitutional culture which teaches state actors that the legal bounds of the 
system cannot be transgressed for the achievement of partisan political gains. As the 
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rule of law is espoused during the transition, democratic procedures of government 
become more secure and the new political system can progress more smoothly 
toward consolidation. Ideally, through the application of judicial or constitutional 
review, judges cannot only mediate conflicts between political actors but also prevent 
the arbitrary exercise of government power. In fulfilling this role, the courts become 
powerful actors in maintaining the submission of the state to law. Nonetheless, the 
ability of the courts to fulfil this role is by no means automatic. Instead, it is heavily 
contingent upon the independence of the judicial branch. It is normally believed that 
without independence, the judiciary can be easily manipulated to prevent it from 
questioning the illegal or arbitrary acts of state actors. The framers of the Namibian 
constitution were challenged to design a formula on how judges were to be 
appointed in order to preserve their independence. Eric Biwa of the United 
Democratic Front suggested that the president should nominate a judge, which 
nomination should be done in consultation with the Judicial Service Committee, and 
subjected to the approval of parliament by a two-thirds majority. Parliament was 
essential in the avoidance of judges who may be favoured by a single party. Biwa‘s 
proposal resonated with Alexander Hamilton‘s argument that  
Ideally, public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the 
judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment. 
The Framers of the Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial 
role, and as a consequence, they established that Article III judges would be 
appointed, rather than elected, and would be sheltered from public opinion by 
receiving life tenure and salary protection.106  
At the Windhoek Assembly, Hamilton found another ally in Katjiuongua who 
proposed that judges‘ be appointed for life ―so that they know they might not be 
removed.‖107 Dr. Tjitendero of SWAPO did not disagree with the preposition for a life 
appointment of the judges but wanted a proviso that for the first group of judges, 
their term should be limited to a number of years. Vekuii Rukoro was against the 
proposal of judges serving a limited period. He proposed the US system where 
judges go through confirmation hearings and serve for life and can only be removed 
for incompetence or gross misconduct. But SWAPO‘s real intentions were revealed 
by Peter Katjavivi who  
                                                 
106
 Ibid., 15 December 1989. 
107
 Ibid.. 15 December 1989. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
63 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
...was concerned about inheriting judges from the old dispensation...the fear 
that judges who were on the opposite of the struggle would continue to 
operate from the bench despite their age.108  
The strategy here was to get the opposition parties to think that the proposal was the 
best and there is a chance that it can be accepted even if it may not be one which 
the opposition parties had wanted. However, SWAPO did not try to get the 
opposition parties think that the proposal was all they could get or that they were not 
capable of getting more. It was important then that the opposition parties were 
satisfied they got a very good deal. In this instance, the process of picking a person 
to be a judge is woven into the political fabric and is, by any definition, a political 
process. Accordingly, it would be unrealistic to suggest that it is possible totally to 
remove politics from the process of selecting judges. Rather, the goals should be to 
limit, to the extent feasible, the impact of partisan politics; and to minimise the effect 
of other political considerations on the process. The argument that it is important not 
only that judges be independent, but that they be perceived as independent as well, 
runs as follows. In our society, the power and authority of the judiciary depend upon 
the public‘s continued respect and support for that institution. One of the 
cornerstones of our system is respect for the ―rule of law.‖ Therefore, the public‘s 
degree of respect for the judiciary bears a direct correlation to the belief that judges 
will decide cases fairly and impartially, in accordance with the ―rule of law‖—that 
decisions will be reached based upon the facts and the applicable law, without 
regard to extraneous influences, whether in the form of special interest groups or 
popular opinion. This is a powerful argument to oppose. 
There was a proposal in the draft constitution to give powers to the president 
to nominate six people to the national assembly. SWAPO wanted this clause 
retained. The minority parties were divided with the NNF supporting SWAPO on the 
grounds that people with certain expertise may not be good with politics and could 
be brought in on the basis of the proposed clause. Dirk Mudge argued that his party 
―could not support appointed members to an elected body…I rejected it entirely and 
completely.‖109 Katjiuongua also did not support the clause because  
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...it will be an insult to 72 members, elected members in this House to go and 
look for a talent outside…to say we are not good enough, we don‘t have the 
expertise, we have to bring in somebody from outside…110  
The chairman of the assembly summed up the debate that the ―majority seems to 
want retention. We must be democratic in our outlook.‖111 It follows, then, that 
focusing on interests rather than positions encourages a cooperative approach. 
Negotiators can build cooperative momentum by exhibiting a strong early 
commitment to cooperative attitudes. A particular negotiation may be located within a 
larger relationship and an ongoing series of dealings. A past history of cooperative 
dealings can create the expectation of further cooperation. Shifting the focus to 
maintaining trust and relationships also encourages cooperation. Lax and Sebenius 
also note that "when the negotiation is in fact one of many similar repeated 
encounters; the negotiators may be able to mitigate claiming in subsequent rounds 
by agreeing initially on a principle for division of gains" (1992: 58). Negotiators may 
stress norms of appropriate behaviour, such as being reasonable, civilised or fair, 
which favour cooperative behaviour. Over time these norms can become 
internalised. 
 
Conflict at the Windhoek Assembly 
The question of conflict management is closely related to the question of how 
power is exercised. Disagreements about cause-effect relationships and objectives 
lead to conflict and the greater use of power. Debate involves an agreement to 
engage in exchange. The agreement is that although a person has the right to have 
his argument weighed, he must also weigh the arguments of others. This position 
manifested itself at the Windhoek Assembly in a debate about whether a president 
should be elected directly by the people or elected by the national assembly. 
Katjiuongua reaffirmed what he ―understood to be the agreement whereby the first 
president for the five years will be elected by parliament and will be a member of 
parliament.‖112 He held the view the assembly should decide between the powers of 
the president in the period of transition, the five years and how to relate that to the 
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other powers, and then the powers of the president permanently, what they will be in 
relation to the other institutions as well.  
If we say the president is elected by the people, the name of that person must 
be on a ballot box for election by the people. You can‘t turn the leader of the 
majority party ultimately into the president. So, therefore I think we should not 
have too many elections...At the end of the day as long as we have a party-
system – I think it will be very clear to the people. I don‘t think we will confuse 
people. Let‘s take the position today. If you say the party, SWAPO, wants its 
leader to be the president of Namibia, the candidate, then they put that name 
on the ballot and SWAPO, the same party wants members to the National 
Assembly and regional councils. In essence really people are voting for the 
same party, not different parties, and the same thing will apply to all the 
parties. So at least we minimise the number of elections. Which means the 
president is elected now directly by the people, whoever that might be, so it is 
not just to parliament.113 
Dr. Tjitendero argued that he did not see any reason, if the law or the practicality of 
the situation requires that in the interest of separation of powers, why the president 
cannot step down ―from being a member of parliament so as to facilitate the desire 
that we are trying to establish in terms of separation of powers.‖114 Whether or not 
there was a misunderstanding, the DTA argued that all future presidents should be 
elected by the national assembly sitting as an electoral college. Mudge argued thus: 
I want to make it very clear, when we discuss this constitution and discuss the 
position of a President, we are not discussing Mr Sam Nujoma or Mr Biwa or 
any other person, we are discussing the position of a state president, because 
political leaders will come and go, but the constitution must be the stable and, 
as we see it, the everlasting basis for state institutions and the rule of law. I 
can refer you to the history of the world, maybe I should not, but I can refer to 
Washington, but I can also refer to Hitler and Iddi Amin, and I am sure you will 
know the difference. We will feel very strongly about the concentration of 
power, because as we see it power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely. The proposals in the working document, as I see it, have the 
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inherent danger of establishing the system whereby the head of state 
exercises absolute power.115  
Gurirab reaffirmed SWAPO‘s position that head of state of Namibia must be elected 
by the people by popular vote. But Mudge found the proposal  
…as we see it, politically unwise, and practically impossible. The direct 
election of a president in accordance with the SWAPO proposals, or the 
working document emphasise ethnic divisions, and I think we must do 
everything in our power to avoid that, because such an occurrence could very 
well lead to national disunity…Politically the proposal for a directly elected 
president is unsound and dangerous, because it denies the existence of a 
multi-party system and begs for the…creation of a one-party system. That is 
our view.116 
This magpie-like tendency to pluck lines and ideas from here and there and meld 
them into a coherent whole is inherent to good speechmaking and part of what made 
Gurirab effective at the Windhoek Assembly. It has allowed him to adapt quickly to 
rivals' attacks, which he often absorbed into his remarks, parroting them and turning 
them to his and SWAPO‘s advantage. The choice of point of departure is a powerful 
rhetorical device. It ensures that the audience knows what is to be talked about, but 
it also indicates what the speaker regards as focal. SWAPO was determined to have 
its president elected universally. Gurirab‘s point of departure was striking: 
For all the things that we have ascribed to him, embodying as it does the 
national consensus, the will of all the people, that person, more than any other 
public official, must carry the will of the people. That remains the solid 
unquestionable position of SWAPO. So, there you have it on the table, 
honourable Chairman. If that would mean that we would reopen the 
discussion, so be it. If it means that we must vote on it, so be it. At this point I 
am not really, in this particular issue, interested in us going back, wasting time 
on what the minute said. SWAPO‘s position is that the president of the 
republic must be elected by popular vote and I shall come back to it for much 
as that will be required.117 
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This was SWAPO‘s bottom-line.  Nothing in the world would have them change the 
position. Mudge attempted to convince the members that minutes of the committee 
actually support his claim. Gurirab responded that ―rereading the minutes will not 
change SWAPO‘s position‖. Mudge was disappointed: 
…we will have to report back and we are also responsible to report to our 
supporters and our people and we don‘t want to be blamed for the fact that we 
have to delay the process now.  I just want to make that clear and I am sure 
that you will also understand that we have informed our people that we are 
making progress, we have informed them that we have reached consensus 
on the position of the president, amongst others, and now we have to go and 
inform them that apparently there is a misunderstanding, apparently we 
haven‘t reached consensus.118 
It was beginning to become clear that this was the argument the minority parties 
were not going to win. This is very much evident from a statement by Biwa that his 
party was prepared to go along with an arrangement or a provision where the 
president is elected directly by popular vote, provided that  
the powers conferred upon the president and the limitations put to the 
exercise of this powers are not affected in any way…that parliament has the 
power to impeach the president and I think that is provided for in the 
constitution, and we would like to agree well in advance, while on this issue, 
that we will allow the parliament to impeach the president…there should be a 
provision in the constitution empowering the president to address parliament 
and giving the members of parliament that power to question the president.119 
These are situations that ultimately involve an element of pure bargaining in which 
each party is guided mainly by its expectations of what the other party will accept. 
But with each guided by expectations and knowing that the other is too, expectations 
become compounded. A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, sufficient 
concession. Why does the other party concede? Because one party thinks the other 
will not. It was an untenable position for Mudge to accept an executive president as 
opposed to a ceremonial president because ―the president must be above 
politics‖120. He asked: is the cabinet part of the executive or not? …there must be no 
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misunderstanding whether the cabinet is part of the executive, he said. Whether the 
delegates tended to transform their position when they presented them as impartial 
views, as hypothesised by Elster, remains to be seen. In many instances, the 
hypocrisy of the speakers did not seem to affect their behaviour, and this seemed to 
be clearly understood by the other participants. The members of the committee 
indeed often talked in the name of their parties, not in their own individual capacities 
and they probably did so to avoid the opprobrium associated with the naked 
expression of their interests. But this did not prevent them, individually, from 
defending their own interests, and collectively from resorting to bargains as well as to 
deliberation.  
Many types of negotiation include distributive elements, even when they are 
more complex. In other settings, unsophisticated negotiators tend to assume that all 
negotiation is distributive, and to miss cues that would allow both parties to come out 
of the deal with more. This is not what Gurirab had in mind. He continued to plead for 
the election of the president of the Republic by popular vote, because he believed, 
that the procedure is the most democratic. He said  
...the head of state to sit at the same time in the Assembly contradicts, 
negates that separation of powers and will not support that for the reasons 
mentioned.121  
The opposition parties wanted the president to be a member of parliament elected by 
parliament. But there was a legal problem with the proposal by the opposition. A 
legal advisor Prof. Wiechers advised that if the leader of the majority party or the 
leader of a coalition party becomes head of state or president, it means a 
qualification is added. It was true, he said, Pres. de Klerk was the leader of his party 
and he became president, but it was not by virtue of his leadership that he became 
president, but by virtue of his election at an electoral college.  
So, if tomorrow Mr. de Klerk is not the head of the party; he won‘t be affected 
in his status as head of state. I just want to point out if you make a leadership 
party-political leadership the criterion, then you are complicating matters in the 
sense that that becomes a qualification and the day he isn‘t leader, are you 
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going to say he loses head of state but he stays on and there is another 
leader of the party.122 
There is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both 
sides than no agreement at all. To insist on any such point is pure bargaining, since 
one always would take less rather than reach no agreement at all, and since one 
always can recede if retreat proves necessary to agreement. Yet if both parties are 
aware of the limits to this range, any outcome is a point from which at least one party 
would have been willing to retreat. Deep disagreements allowed, the chairperson 
became frustrated as a result of a lack of progress. He proposed to take the proposal 
to the House since voting at committee level was forbidden by the rules. He summed 
SWAPO‘s position as saying the president must be elected directly by the population 
and that was the bottom-line. Mrs. Ithana agreed with the chairman that a deadlock 
has been reached: 
SWAPO, on its part, has been trying to propose ways of getting out, but I 
must say that our colleagues on the other side are not forthcoming. We 
propose this, they have objection, we propose that, they are not satisfied. 
They are not committed. If they were committed to something then we could 
follow it up and try to get solutions.123 
This position was shared by Hartmut Ruppel who though that  
...if we come to speak about material disputes it becomes very serious. I tried 
to understand and analyse the issues at stake and I find that what is beyond 
any dispute is that we have it in principle to have an executive president.124  
He argued that on the SWAPO-side  
...we believe that it is a logical outflow of an executive president to be directly 
elected, and that he is then checked through various mechanisms provided 
for in the constitution. That is our principle point of departure and it has always 
been.125 
The basic principle underlying the realisation of joint gains from differences is to 
match what one side finds or expects to be relatively costless with what the other 
finds or expects to be most valuable and vice versa. There were many sources of 
differences between SWAPO on one hand and the opposition parties on the other. 
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They traded off differences in form and substance, ideology and practice and 
outcome and reputation. When the parties differed in their expectations of future 
benefits contingency agreements were useful in the sense that in the end, a more 
watered down presidency was agreed to than what the opposition called a ―run-away 
president‖. SWAPO‘s uncompromising stand was again stated by Theo-Ben Gurirab. 
He posited that the elections which were held in November 1989 clarified a number 
of things:  
One clarity was the composition of the Constituent Assembly, the different 
majorities or, if you will, the representation of the political parties in the 
Assembly. As a result of that reality in the Constituent Assembly it is very 
clear to my mind that SWAPO is the majority party. So, we are not discussing 
for the purposes of the present Constituent Assembly a theoretical matter. 
The leader of that Party is Sam Nujoma. I have no difficulty whatsoever to 
deduce from that given the present realities in the Constituent Assembly, that 
the first president of the Republic of Namibia will be Comrade Sam Nujoma. 
Why am I saying that? I take it, talking to, distinguish-wise, members of the 
Constituent Assembly, as represented in the Standing Committee, joined now 
by distinguished lawyers, that the Constituent Assembly, as it is constituted 
now will be converted into the National Assembly of Namibia. So, every time 
that I talk I don‘t want to be misunderstood that I am not talking about that. 
That is the given, the public know that. Equally it is so clear to me that Sam 
Nujoma‘s reality as the leader of the majority party will be ratified by the 
converted Constituent Assembly. So, in the sense he will be elected by the 
National Assembly. So that issue to me is solved. So when I am intervening, I 
am talking about post 435-elections. My only problem is about membership of 
Sam Nujoma in the converted National Assembly and consequently as a 
member of the National Assembly, and as was the case with the Federal 
Convention; the next person in line will become the leader of the majority 
party in the Assembly. So, I have no problem with that aspect. My intervention 
has to do with post 435 – elections. For that we would want the elections to be 
by popular vote, and with that I would then ask to consider the provisions for 
the president, as stipulated here, and weigh them against that position.126 
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After Gurirab‘s statement, there could be no doubt about what SWAPO desired. 
Katjiuongua addressed the committee that, indeed, a deadlock has been reached 
and proposed to table the matter to the full sitting of the constituent assembly for a 
public debate. 
I think that is the easiest way to do it, because the way we are interpreting 
facts here differ materially. As far as I am concerned, the election we had in 
terms of 435 was to elect an assembly to write a constitution – period. Then, if 
we are going to convert this Assembly into anything else, it must be by 
understanding between the parties writing the constitution that we cannot 
have another election to convert this Assembly on the following 
understanding: I do not take it that the first person on the list of a political 
party automatically, because that party is the majority, becomes the President 
of Namibia and that should be seen that that person was directly elected. I 
cannot accept that, because it is just against the spirit of the whole Resolution 
435 as I understand it, especially the 1982 Principles. So, I think if we can 
make a separate understanding as a transitional arrangement about the 
relationship between a president permanently in future elections it is a 
separate matter. As things stand right now either we accept the fact, as I see 
it, that the president elected by the Assembly will be a member of the 
Assembly, will sit in the Assembly and be accountable in the manner that we 
have pointed out here. If that is not acceptable to other people, then we are 
deadlocked, then I think we must go to the Assembly and clarify our 
positions.127 
Inspired by the classic advice to separate the people from the problem, Fisher and 
Ury (1981) differentiated between emotions that are directed toward a negotiator‘s 
offer and emotions that are directed toward the negotiator as a person to reconcile 
the seemingly contradictory findings concerning the effects of anger on negotiator 
concessions. SWAPO was not ready to be cowed into submission. Nahas Angula 
introduced a proposal so that the President of the Republic will be elected by 
universal and equal suffrage after every five years, save the first term of the 
president, who will be elected by the first National Assembly acting as the Electoral 
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College. The opposition seemed surprised and taken aback with the SWAPO 
proposal. Mudge stated as follows: 
Let us, for God‘s sake, discuss this problem in a spirit of goodwill; let us make 
all of us feel confident about the future. I don‘t see any problems and I want to 
say this, our party will not object to a president being elected directly if we are 
sure and confident that there will be no abuse of power.128  
Not to be outdone, Hidipo Hamutenya weighed in: 
Mr Chairman, we can‘t read the minds of the people, what they will do 
tomorrow or the day thereafter. We can only draft a constitution which, we 
hope, will work…Suspicion cannot be resolved here; it has nothing to do with 
what we are writing. If we are writing a constitution based on suspicion we will 
make no progress whatsoever.129 
The persuasion is accomplished by character whenever the remarks are held in such 
a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence. Hamutenya has always acted as 
a power broker within the assembly. As a result, he appeared credible among his 
colleagues and his audience formed a good impression of him that propositions put 
forward by him were acceptable. This was especially true in cases where there were 
vast differences. 
The success of committees such as the drafting committee is influenced by 
the commitment of their members. Committees operate as a team whose members 
interact with each other through talk. As stated elsewhere, in a distributive bargaining 
process, only one side wins. This interpretation was clearly present during a 
discussion on the draft constitution that ministers must be confirmed by parliament. 
Dr. Tjiriange argued that if the president had the right to nominate his ministers, 
there was no need for the assembly to do so: ―The freedom must be given to the 
president to bring these people without that proviso that they have to be confirmed 
by the assembly.‖130 This was not exactly the line of thought Rukoro had:  
I think suppose he appoints those three people to the cabinet from outside, 
then I think those three people should not be subject to confirmation just like 
the other members of the cabinet. But suppose he appoints the other three as 
people having these special skills, those three, the non-cabinet members, I 
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think should be subject to confirmation because based on the debate we had 
the last time, they being people with special expertise to benefit the 
proceedings in the assembly and some of the members have reservations 
about maybe these people would be appointed on a party-political basis or 
their skills or alleged skills will be questionable, then on that basis I think that 
the non-cabinet members should be subject to testing by the rest of the 
assembly as to their suitability.131  
This view was shared by Staby who believed that the confirmation of the 
appointment of ministers by parliament was actually in the interest of the ministers 
themselves. He argued that given SWAPO‘s numerical strength, it was highly 
unlikely that the ministers would not be appointed. ―So I fail to see the reservations 
or the resistance to the request that ministers be confirmed by parliament.‖132 The 
Chairman ruled that ―we have already decided yesterday that they are not going to 
be confirmed by parliament.‖133 Given these divisions, the final compromise had to 
aggregate a large array of interests and visions, and could not simply combine the 
basic preferences of major actors.  
 
Essence of ultimatums  
Claims-makers intend to persuade and they try to make their claims as 
persuasive as possible. Claims-making inevitably involves selecting from available 
arguments, placing the arguments chosen in some sequence and giving some 
arguments particular emphasis. These are rhetorical decisions. Moreover, as claims-
makers assess the response to their claims or as they address new audiences, 
claims may be revised and reconstructed in hopes of making them more effective. In 
such cases, even the most ingenuous claims-maker must become conscious of 
doing rhetorical work. True, SWAPO was suspicious of the bicameral proposal. Dr. 
Tjitendero of SWAPO had in mind the Zimbabwe situation where the bicameral 
parliament remained a white elephant since that country‘s independence in 1980. He 
argued that the drafters should reflect on Namibia‘s conditions in order to build 
institutions that were not only relevant but would also promote the kind of values 
Namibia desired for the future. He did not see the justification for the creation of a 
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second House in relation to the national assembly. Nahas Angula of SWAPO was 
just as not convinced that the second house would serve national interest because 
he could not see  
…how this house can restore what is perceived to be a national imbalance, 
because once you bring in people you still have to do it on the basis of 
numbers of people. So, we come back to what we have now in the 
Constituent Assembly...this particular proposal will add nothing to the kind of 
things we want to do for this country.134  
Persuasive communication is used to comfort the believers or annoy the opponent 
as a moment in a strategy. Richard Gregg (1967) argues that the role evidence plays 
in the discourse of advocacy is of major importance to anyone interested in 
argumentation. Standard treatises on argument emphasise the significance of 
evidence in the building of proof, suggest that the advocate begin his analysis by 
gathering and examining evidence and provide certain tests for judging the probity of 
evidential material. Underlying the concern for evidence is the assumption that 
rational decision-making requires a careful examination of all the data relevant to a 
proposition. Therefore an advocate is obligated to build his case upon a strong 
evidential foundation and those who analyse arguments must evaluate the credibility 
of the evidence presented. A corollary assumption seems to be that those arguments 
which employ sound evidence will be more effective than those which do not. At the 
Windhoek Assembly, it appeared that Katjiuongua was less successful in his task as 
could be read from Angula‘s treatment of the proposal as simply an attempt to  
...impress people of other countries that we have a Bill of Rights in our 
constitution. It is a nice thing, but I am saying we should also start to address 
ourselves to the actual problems of our people...135  
It stands to be reasoned that expressing anger toward the situation would lead an 
opponent to make large concessions, as can be predicted on the basis of a strategic 
decision-making perspective. But on the other hand, Van Kleef et al. contend, 
directing anger toward the person may produce a quite different effect. When the 
anger is directed toward the person instead of their offer, in a sense it loses some of 
its informative qualities. Public officials have an obligation to offer good reasons for 
the exercise of social and political power. But given the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
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the resources for inventing those reasons seem to be lacking as could be seen from 
Rukoro‘s argument in support of a bi-cameral parliament: 
there was a need to prevent precipitate action, legislative or otherwise, by the 
lower house…who can sit down and say ‗here you were right‘ here it was an 
over-hasty consideration or decision; please have a second look at this 
thing‘…But if we are going to have a perpetuation of that, whereas one guy 
said…‘Look here, we had this election sealed up, the DTA was running very 
strongly and we were confronted by the ―border of Oshivelo‖, meaning, in 
tribal terms obviously, that we will have a situation where one particular region 
in this country for generations to come, not will, but may decide the national 
affairs in this country. What type of implications…this hold for us a nation, for 
our political stability?136 
Accounts of practical reason have become increasingly important for political 
philosophers seeking to theorise the regulative principles governing democratic 
deliberation. Aristotle (1991) believed that rhetors must arrange the arguments 
carefully in order to fit the situation. Whether by design or accident, members of the 
Windhoek Assembly could not escape Aristotle‘s view that rhetoric is instructive and 
is a means to win arguments. Rukoro based his arguments on the lexicon of conflict 
– employing words such as ―confronted‖ and ―political stability‖ – to arouse emotions 
that are associated with anger and resentment. These emotions then evoke strong 
feelings of antipathy towards an entity which they identify as ―the enemy‖. Power 
determines whether negotiators will adopt a strategic route and consider the 
strategic implications of a counterpart‘s anger or whether they have the necessity of 
adopting an emotional route. The perceived justifiability of the opponent‘s anger 
determines to what extent negotiators who adopt the emotional route feel inclined to 
retaliate, with unjustifiable anger producing stronger retaliation desires than 
justifiable anger. Indeed, Rukoro‘s arguments served only to unite SWAPO 
delegates against what they saw as attempts by the minority parties to neutralise 
SWAPO‘s electoral gains. In the words of Angula, Rukoro  
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...was against putting in things in the constitution which could be read by other 
people to be against them,…then I am not quite sure whether we are creating 
a good atmosphere for people to accept this.137  
Angula continued to state reasons of his rejection of the proposal. The strategy or 
act of reason giving created or gave to Angula a pragmatic reason for holding the 
standpoint. Emotional flooding poses obvious hazards to negotiators who need to be 
able to think clearly when faced with the complex, strategically demanding task of 
creating and claiming value. For this reason, emotional regulation can be an 
essential component of negotiation. But different types of regulation create different 
results. Expressing positive emotions may increase the willingness of your 
counterpart to agree to your proposals and to view you and the situation in a better 
light. While putting your counterpart in a good mood is a useful strategy, it often can 
seem like an impossible goal. 
The consequences of policy change stand to make the conflict even more 
apparent. Thus, the framing of the issue can therefore be pivotal in making a case in 
favour of or against competing values. Moses Katjiuongua seemed to have been 
infuriated by Angula‘s response. He called upon his oratory skills to draw on life 
images to convey very strong and potent political evaluations: 
With all due respect for that, I would also like to appeal that the brotherly, 
comradely spirit here should not prevent us from talking frankly…It is no 
attempt to spoil the spirit here...I think I am not here to plead for any suspicion 
about motives, because I am not hiding what I am saying. I am telling you 
straight what I feel…because suspicion by definition can cut two ways. If you 
suspect me of something, by definition I also suspect… you are 
trying…certain things. I think that is not productive. I prefer us to differ 
because we hold different views about certain problems. I would not like us to 
differ because of misunderstanding or because of not listening to each other 
or to differ because of ignorance. So, Mr. Chairman, I know my SWAPO 
brothers and sisters are experienced people…hard negotiators; they want to 
lose at nothing…I think they must also have a similar respect for us. So 
far…we have accepted your institutions as proposed: executive president, 
prime minister and many of the institutional proposals you have made. We 
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feel that in the spirit of give and take, why not? After all it is in our common 
interest…But I think equally should not try to make what we are saying look 
ridiculous or that we trying to smuggle rotten things through the backdoor, 
because that is not fair. I think we may differ on these things and I wouldn‘t 
like to refer to the type of discussion we are having here on the floor of the 
Assembly…But if you say that you cannot even contemplate agreeing to this 
type of proposal, then I wouldn‘t want to have a feeling that you only want to 
take, you don‘t want to give. Thank you.138 
In the case of a negotiation, there is a greater expectation on the part of both parties 
that threats may be used should resolution of a conflict reach impasse. It was clear 
that the disagreements were wide and stood to spoil the prevailing good 
atmosphere. Katjiuongua wanted SWAPO to commit to a bicameral chamber 
proposal as a matter of principle. What he wanted  
…is the acceptance in no uncertain terms that…as part of our future 
constitutional system…we envisage a two chamber parliament…My 
acceptance and my support of all the things that I have supported here are 
significantly contingent upon agreement that is also part of that particular 
future we are talking about.139  
Walton (1988) states that, ‗‗One of the most trenchant and fundamental criticisms of 
reasoned dialogue as a method of arriving at a conclusion is that argument on a 
controversial issue can go on and on, back and forth, without a decisive conclusion 
ever being determined by the argument. The only defense against this criticism lies 
in the use of the concept of the burden of proof within reasoned dialogue. Once a 
burden of proof is set externally, then it can be determined, after a finite number of 
moves in the dialogue, whether the burden has been met or not. Only by this device 
can we forestall an argument from going on indefinitely, and thereby arrive at a 
definite conclusion for or against the thesis at issue‘‘ (p. 251). 
Katjiuongua continued to issue threats. But, as Schelling (1956) wrote, the 
threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party and the threat is 
ineffectual unless the one who threatens can rearrange or display his own incentives 
so as to demonstrate that lie would, ex post, have an incentive to carry it out. Clearly, 
Katjiuongua was not in a position to effect demands given his numerical strength in 
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the assembly – he being the only delegate. How, then, could he commit himself to an 
act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out? Perhaps he bluffed in order to 
persuade SWAPO that the costs to not reaching an agreement were higher. It is not 
clear what Katjiuongua would have done had his threats not been met. Nevertheless, 
this is an ad baculum argument because of the threat Katjiuongua‘s argument is 
meant to arouse in his audience. 
Katjiuongua found solace in Hamutenya‘s conciliatory submission that while 
there was an emerging consensus, there was no agreement yet. SWAPO had 
difficulties in accepting the proposal because there was no ―logical and convincing 
argument‖140 that has been advanced by Katjiuongua. Other members of the drafting 
committee weighed in141: 
Dr. Tjiriange: It is a bit unfortunate that the honourable member is giving us 
such a condition that we have to … 
Member: No conditions. 
Dr. Tjiriange: If there is no condition, then I cannot agree to agree on this in 
uncertain terms, as it was put. I think we have to have enough time to get 
what has been requested and we can then make up our minds. I have not yet 
agreed, because I don‘t know what to agree on. My questions have not even 
been answered. I will not maybe have any insurmountable problems after I 
am convinced, but at this moment I am not. So, why should I be driven into 
agreeing if I am not yet clear on what I am to agree on?142 
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2003) pursue the argument that, ‗‗The discussant 
who is challenged by the other discussant to defend the standpoint that he has put 
forward in the confrontation stage is always obliged to accept this challenge, unless 
the other discussant is not prepared to accept any shared premises and discussion 
rules; the discussant remains obliged to defend the standpoint as long as he does 
not retract it and as long as he has not successfully defended it against the other 
discussant on the basis of the agreed premises and discussion rules‘‘ (139). The 
participants themselves will determine the reasonableness of the interlocutor‘s 
moves and they do so by applying their own standards. Angula opined that ―…it will 
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not be good for us to dictate to each other - that it is either this or that‖143. No one 
likes to be told what to do. When someone makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand or 
tells you how to behave, he is limiting your freedom to decide and act as you see fit. 
Romer-Rosenthal theory of veto threats of ultimatum bargaining in political settings 
posits that a party that proposes makes a single, final, take-it-or-leave-it offer to a 
another party. In this case, a threat serves different functions in that political rhetoric 
boxes the speaker so he cannot retreat from his position without paying a steep 
price. The speaker's commitment then alters the subsequent behaviour of opponents 
(Thomas and Rosenthal 1978). Katjiuongua wanted a definite commitment from 
SWAPO on future support on other areas of dispute which SWAPO wanted 
agreement on. He was fully aware that SWAPO wanted to reach consensus on the 
constitution as soon as possible in order for Namibia to gain independence. 
According to Geingob (2004) opposition parties believed that under proportional 
representation, with the whole of Namibia as one constituency, SWAPO would 
continue to secure a majority in the National Assembly for years to come. However, 
if a second house were created with equal representation from various regions, with 
elections based on a constituency system, SWAPO would fail to gain a majority in 
the second house. In Paris, on the other hand, the principle of bicameralism was 
rejected after debate. However, with the later addition of a senate to the legislature, 
France today has a bicameral parliament. Bicameralism was adopted in Namibia, a 
unitary state, in the spirit of compromise by SWAPO. 
 
Conclusion 
The distributive bargaining situation demonstrates that when only one policy 
dimension is bargained, deadlocks can only be broken if the reluctant political parties 
obtain side deals that buy their consent. The unanimity voting rule enhances the 
bargaining power of each party. This feature explains why the costs of reaching 
agreement under unanimity can be extremely high. This finding illustrates that there 
are some ways in which the unanimity or joint-decision trap can be overcome, 
although unanimity requirements in multiparty negotiating situations do present many 
obvious difficulties. Although there were tendencies at the Windhoek Assembly to 
focus on parties‘ preferences, this chapter tried to show that rhetoric in bargaining 
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situations is critical. Consequently, we should not underestimate the impact that the 
type of bargaining situation will have on outcomes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RHETORIC OF COMPROMISE 
 
The Chairman said the first day when he became chairman that this was a process of give 
and take. Now I think I have been giving…and I don‘t want the people to break their part of 
the deal. I have been giving and so far I have scored no point. So really, brothers and sisters, 
I must also report something back home. So, I take it here you will not die if you do not 
compromise. 
Moses Katjiuongua, 1989 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with distributive bargaining, where one party gives 
up something in exchange for another in the course of deliberation. As the delegates 
at the Windhoek Assembly met to draw a constitution for Namibia, they had to 
resolve constitutional options and differences. This chapter investigates compromise 
as a concept of finding agreement through a mutual acceptance of terms often 
involving variations from an original goal or desire. The chapter also deals with 
determining whether or not members of the drafting committee compromised as a 
result of the content and rhetoric of their negotiations by investigating how specific 
agreements were reached through classical exchanges of concessions. The chapter 
further investigates whether compromise, as an object of negotiations, was desirous 
at all and how it helped or hindered negotiations at the Windhoek Assembly. 
 
The art of compromise 
Politics is commonly called the "art of compromise." This label is especially 
appropriate for democratic politics. Elected officials, representing different voters, 
meet in legislative chambers to hammer out policies that all constituents can live 
with. Of course, no politicians receive everything they want in the final legislative 
package: the need to assemble at least a simple majority to implement any policy 
almost invariably means that supporters of some policy must sacrifice something of 
value to others active in the political process. Politicians unwilling to compromise are 
typically labelled ideologues - a label not regarded as a badge of honour among 
members of the political class. Successful politicians early on learn the survival value 
of compromise. Economist Donald Wittman (1995: 154) correctly observes, "That is 
what good politicians do: create coalitions and find acceptable compromises." 
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Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995: 61) is almost rhapsodic about 
democratic compromise: ―But compromise is not a mediocre way to do politics; it is 
an adventure, the only way to do democratic politics.‖  
Deliberation is, thus, key to compromise. Only through deliberation do 
negotiators discover each other‘s needs. The concept of public deliberation emerges 
from democratic deliberative theory. According to Chambers (2003), democratic 
deliberative theory begins with a turning away from liberal individualist or economic 
understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in conceptions of 
accountability and discussion. Talk-centric democratic theory replaces voting-centric 
democratic theory. Voting-centric views see democracy as the arena in which fixed 
preferences and interests compete via fair mechanisms of aggregation. In contrast, 
deliberative democracy focuses on the communicative processes of opinion and will 
formation that precedes voting. Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual 
core of legitimacy. A legitimate political order is one that could be justified to all those 
living under its laws. Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of ―giving 
an account‖ of something; that is, publicly articulating, explaining and most 
importantly justifying public policy. Consent does not disappear. Rather, it is given a 
more complex and richer interpretation in the deliberative model than in the 
aggregative model. Although theorists of deliberative democracy vary as to how 
critical they are of existing representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not 
usually thought of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an 
expansion of representative democracy. 
The sustained and even growing interest in public deliberation is premised on 
a number of reasonable but largely untested assumptions. According to Mendelberg 
(2002), if it is appropriately empathetic, egalitarian, open-minded and reason-
centred, deliberation is expected to produce a variety of positive democratic 
outcomes (Barber 1984; Chambers 1996 and Sunstein 1993). Citizens will become 
more engaged and active in civic affairs (Barber 1984). Tolerance for opposing 
points of view will increase (Gutmann & Thompson 1996). Citizens will improve their 
understanding of their own preferences and be able to justify those preferences with 
better arguments (Chambers 1996; Gutmann & Thompson 1996). People in conflict 
will set aside their adversarial, win-lose approach and understand that their fate is 
linked with the fate of the other, that although their social identities conflict they ―are 
tied to each other in a common recognition of their interdependence‖ (Chambers 
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1996). Faith in the democratic process will be enhanced as people who deliberate 
become empowered and feel that their government truly is ―of the people‖ (Fishkin 
1995). Political decisions will become more considered and informed by relevant 
reasons and evidence (Chambers 1996). The community's social capital will 
increase as people bring deliberation to their civic activities (Fishkin 1995 and 
Putnam 2000). The legitimacy of the constitutional order will grow because people 
have a say in and an understanding of that order (Chambers 1996; Gutmann & 
Thompson 1996). 
In fact, politics stymies more beneficial compromise than it promotes. 
Labelling politics as the art of compromise makes sense only if politics is compared 
with the breadth and depth of compromise occurring in other institutional settings. 
Such a comparison shows that politics does not excel at compromise, even if voters 
put no ideological restraints on the ability of politicians to logroll. While all parties 
sidling up to the political bargaining table must compromise amongst themselves, 
only a relatively small handful of interested parties ever get seats at this table 
(Gwartney and Wagner 1988). To make a final argument on this point: politics is 
weak at compromise not only because voters vote excessively ideologically, but also 
because politics artificially and unnecessarily limits the number of bargaining parties 
(Crew and Twight 1990; Twight 1994). Thus, parties excluded from the political 
bargaining table never have their interests on the table to be weighed against the 
interests of the select few sitting at the table.  
Those who make choices about objectives in negotiation often assume that a 
limited array of outcomes is possible. So those who see a negotiation as an 
opportunity to ―win‖ or maximise one ―side‘s‖ gain, assume scarce resources which 
must be allocated. Compromise, then, necessarily becomes desirable. While many 
have criticised those who compromise, especially ―unprincipled‖ politicians, 
Machiavelli (1998), at least, has argued that the leader sometimes must compromise 
if he is to hold the whole (and conflicting) polity together. And Edmund Burke, 
consummate politician, observed that ―all government…every virtue and every 
prudent act is founded on compromise and barter‖ (1977: 130-131). By finding 
―golden means‖ or agreeable, if not optimal, solutions to contested problems, 
politicians, like negotiators, make things happen, keep the peace, and often also 
keep some rough accounting of just deserts for the next time around. And in better 
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case scenarios, negotiators can actually solve problems and get parties just what 
they need. 
The willingness to compromise is praised as the mark of the reasonable 
person. Conversely the refusal to compromise seems to be one of the most 
important marks of the person who is outside of normal politics. This emphasis on 
compromise in politics is reflected in political science. We are told, for example, that 
"…a political system is above all, a mechanism for the making of 
decisions…Decisions involve compromise among many conflicting points of view 
held by social groups, parties, associations, interest organizations, and regions" 
(Macridis and Brown 1964). As an illustration, there was general agreement between 
the framers of the Constitution at Windhoek that executive power should not be 
unchecked. There were, however, differing views on how these powers could be 
subjected to oversight. DTA had argued that providing for a constitutional head of 
state would be in line with the Westminster type of democracy. As stated elsewhere, 
it was interesting that they opposed executive presidency despite the fact that in 
South Africa, with whom DTA had longstanding relations, there was an executive 
state president. Concern was also expressed that executive presidencies in Africa 
were not on the whole successful. SWAPO, on the other hand, viewed the African 
experience in a different light. Proposing a compromise, Nahas Angula stated as 
follows: 
...I listened to the arguments and I attempted to ascertain that we will not have 
a run-away president because the constitution will not allow it to do so. Here I 
would like to draw the attention to the provisions made to very seriously curb 
the functions and the powers of the president. In article 28(6) the president 
can be impeached if he tries to run away from his responsibilities. That is 
provided for. In 28(5) the term of office of the president is prescribed as ten 
years. However popular this person might be to the people, the people will 
only be able to elect this person two times. In article 31, the powers of the 
president is very limited in terms of what he can appoint and who he cannot 
appoint by himself without control by the national assembly. Article 31(7) is 
about reviewing, reversing and correcting. Again, here the functions of the 
president are strictly monitored by the national assembly so that the assembly 
will be in a position to review, reverse and correct those actions and activities 
of the president. Article 38: Here we have the situation whereby the national 
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assembly can actually impeach a member of the president‘s cabinet which will 
be a reflection on the president himself. Then we come to article 40. This one 
is about accountability. Again here, we see that the national assembly will 
have power to ensure that the ministers, individually and collectively, are 
accountable to the national assembly, otherwise the action to monitor or to 
investigate their activities can be re-instated. So, in these chapters on the 
executive we have severely restricted the activities of the president. If you add 
to these provisions made in the chapter dealing with fundamental human 
rights and freedoms and you add to this the judiciary as a watchdog to make 
sure that the constitution is adhered to, and many others which I don‘t want to 
state here, you see that the powers of the president are very much restricted. 
You cannot under any circumstances have a run-away president... This is my 
submission and I am coming back to the proposal I made yesterday that the 
president should therefore be elected by universal suffrage, save the first 
one.144 
The concept of compromise was the basis for Windhoek delegates‘ understanding of 
the process by which political disputes were settled. They also believed that given 
sufficient discussion, free from partisanship, the right solution to a dispute could be 
discovered. A dialectical process is envisaged in which, as Aristotle explains, 
through pitting an antithesis against a generally received opinion, men are able to 
discern the truth and falsehood in both. Mutual correction is achieved as each side 
raises difficulties to the other's argument. To compromise would truncate the 
necessary discussion short of reaching the truest answer possible, and thus risk a 
false or at least an unnecessarily uncertain, answer.  
One way in which democratic participation in politics can generate 
compromise is by altering preferences. As individuals meet and deliberate, they 
come to understand each other‘s viewpoints, develop empathy, recognise the value 
of moderation, internalise the common interest and de-emphasise narrow self-
interest. This is an old theme in democratic theory. One of the merits of democratic 
participation, wrote John Stuart Mill (1946), is that the citizen is called upon, while so 
engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, 
by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and 
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maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good. ... He is made to 
feel himself one of the public and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit. In 
this view, democracy induces cooperation and compromise not by changing the 
constraints we face, but by changing the type of people we are. Democracy makes 
us less selfish and more public-spirited. This view can be best understood by citing 
the response by Mudge to Angula‘s submission: 
I just want to get clarity in my mind. Mr. Angula has now emphasised that we 
have, according to him ―severely restricted powers of the president‖. To 
prevent him from and I quote, it is not my word or my formulation ―being a run-
away president‖. What has the election of the president got to do with that in 
any case, whether he is directly elected or whether he is elected by 
parliament? Can anybody tell me how will that influence the powers of the 
president and the accountability of the president? If I can get clarity on that I 
will be able to…145 
The inevitability of compromise says nothing about the desirability of compromise in 
general and nothing about the desirability of making particular compromises in 
specific situations. Since compromise can lead just as surely to individual 
degeneration and social decay as it can to individual growth and social progress, it is 
essential that we have some standards with which to measure the limits of what, in 
specific situations, can be safely conceded. The principle of compromise, as a self-
sufficient principle, cannot supply that standard. If there is any virtue in making 
concessions, that virtue inheres not in the technique of compromise but in what is 
accomplished by that technique. The substance of compromise, therefore, is more 
important than the procedure.  
Compromise as the animating and self-sufficient principle of politics can lead 
eventually only to the elimination of politics as mediation. If anything can be done so 
long as it is done by mediation and compromise, what is to prevent the stronger 
groups in society from demanding more and more concessions from the weaker? 
How can the weaker interests refuse to grant more and more concessions to give up 
eventually their interests entirely, particularly if they cannot properly question the 
legitimacy of any of the proposals made by the stronger interests, appeal to the 
conscience of the stronger interest or appeal to the sense of justice of the community 
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at large? SWAPO was well aware of the importance of making far-reaching 
concessions if they had to win over opposition parties. It seemed that Angula‘s 
submission was not enough to satisfy the smaller parties. Hartmut Ruppel tabled 
what he called ―an elaborate compromise package‖:  
1. The Executive power shall vest in the Cabinet of Ministers, which will be 
headed by the President. 
2. The President will, as we have discussed before, exercise his functions in 
terms of the constitution in consultation with members of the Cabinet. 
3. The President can be removed from his high office on the grounds that he has 
been guilty of a violation of the constitution or serious violation of the laws of 
the land or gross misconduct or inaptitude, which would in the view of at least 
a two-thirds majority of the house (legislature) render him unfit to hold with 
dignity and honour him unfit to hold with dignity and honour his high office. 
That is basically the impeachment, the provision provides for a two-thirds 
majority of the house. 
4. The President can also be removed as soon as he fails to qualify for being the 
president in the first place. He must meet certain qualifications to be able to 
be a candidate for presidency. If he during his term of office loses one of the 
qualifications, he is out of office. 
5. There is a provision that the acts of the president, any action taken by him, 
pursuant to the powers vested in him can be reviewed, reversed or corrected 
if it is deemed necessary or appropriate by at least a two-thirds majority of the 
legislature and two-thirds of the Cabinet. 
6. Appointments by the executive President shall be valid but could, similarly, be 
challenged by the same procedure as I have described a moment ago. 
7. The President is empowered to terminate the services of any minister, but 
again this decision is subject to the same review, procedures as I have been 
referring to in respect of the previous - two kinds of actions. 
8. The president will have no choice but to terminate an appointment to the 
cabinet if the legislature with a simple majority brings out a vote of no 
confidence against a particular minister. 
9. If a bill is passed by the legislature with a two-thirds majority and passed on 
the President for signature, he will have to sign the bill. He cannot decline to 
do so.  
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10. If the bill is passed with less than two-thirds majority, the president may 
decline to sign the bill and he must then send the bill back to the legislature, 
which body may then decide to once again refer to the president. If he once 
again declines to sign, he must dissolve both the legislature and his own 
office and call for elections. It is basically if there is a deadlock between the 
ruling party-president. 
11. The legislature shall be dissolved, new elections called, if the president is 
advised to do so by his Prime Minister, acting in concurrence with the majority 
of the Cabinet, and that would then also mean that the president is up for 
elections again. 
12. If he decides to withhold his assent to a bill on the grounds that he regards it 
as being unconstitutional, he can be overruled by the constitutional Court, and 
the court‘s ruling will be binding on the President. That is if as far as the 
checks are concerned and with that I want to conclude.146 
By finding agreeable solutions to contested problems, negotiators make things 
happen and keep the peace. And in better case scenarios, negotiators can actually 
solve problems and get parties just what they need. Thus, the solutions that 
bargaining and negotiation produce, through a process of engagement, consent and 
decision, by giving something to everyone, may have greater participation, legitimacy 
and longevity than other ways of doing business. Jon Elster (1995), in a study of 
comparative constitutional processes, noted that the ―second best‖ form of secret, 
committee-based, bargaining that produced the American constitution, filled with 
compromises, has been more robust than the more open, principled, and plenary 
forms of decision-making that formed the first French constitution.  
As the drafting of the Namibian constitution demonstrated, the complexity of 
managing multiple stakeholders with some conflicting and some complementary 
interests required processes that allowed trades (where parties exchange 
agreements, for instance delegates agreed to accept an executive presidency in 
exchange for a bicameral parliament); joint fact finding (where parties work together 
to arrive a solution such as the groundbreaking decision by the delegates to jointly 
engage outside lawyers to draft the constitution in legal terms) and contingent 
agreements (agreements reached pending further agreements – especially with 
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regard to how the parties agreed to the president appointing judges provided he did 
so at the recommendation of an impartial body). Susskind (2000) observes that 
although freighted with its own ethical dilemmas, the negotiation of multi-party 
disputes permits both instrumentally satisfying and more ethical processes and 
outcomes to be utilised. More people participate, and instead of looking for majority 
votes, parties seek solutions that satisfy as many needs as possible, without making 
any party necessarily worse off. This facilitated negotiation or ―consensus building‖ is 
intended to improve on what conventional processes of voting and strategic 
behaviour usually produce. The method of persuasion need to be considered here: 
The two disputants in immediate conflict came together by themselves to consider 
their difficulties. It is assumed that, with goodwill and the use of reason, truth in the 
matter of value conflicts may be discovered. One of the disputants was persuaded 
that their position was better than the opponent‘s. On the other hand, SWAPO was 
persuaded that the opponent‘s position was wrong. In a case of this kind something 
quite different from compromise took place. Neither side had made any concessions; 
neither had lost anything. They both arrived at a position that was acceptable to all. 
Thus, the method of persuasion has its presuppositions. It assumes that through the 
use of reason objective truth in the matter of values and principles, together with 
particular exemplifications of these, can in general be determined and that the 
disputants have goodwill and honestly seek the truth before all else. Obviously, in 
any particular case, the method of persuasion is inefficacious if its presuppositions 
are not satisfied in fact. 
During a debate on citizenship on 8 December 1989, a material dispute arose 
as to whether naturalised citizenship should be granted after an applicant has been 
resident in Namibia after 5 or 10 years. Mr. Mudge arguing in favour of five years 
said  
I really think it s unfair. If it is only a matter of a person being here for five 
years and one month, but if he has been here for nine years, somebody who 
has devoted his life to this country for nine solid years, I think it is unfair to 
exclude him.147  
Rukoro offered a compromise: ―I have no big problems with five years as a 
compromise in exchange for a concession from Mr. Mudge on some other 
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aspect‖.148 Mr. Barney Barnes of the DTA wanted clarity: ―is the honourable member 
horse-trading?‖149 In the method of persuasion, when incompatible ends, principles 
or objects are willed by two disputants, the function of reason is that of being a critic 
of the values willed. Each disputant transcends himself, becomes a critic of his own 
will, on the supposition that, since there is objective truth in such matters, there is the 
possibility that one or the other or both of them are wrong. However, the method of 
compromise is necessary because oftentimes disputants lack goodwill (a term 
referring to making correct decisions in reference to other people) and will not allow 
reason to lead them to truth. Hence, in compromise reason is appealed to not to 
reach a new or fuller truth but to alleviate the effects of bad will. 
The recognition of the exact distinction between the method of persuasion 
and the method of compromise is important because all too often they are confused 
and compromise is identified with persuasion. However, as explained above, even 
though certain examples of the method of persuasion may have the form of 
compromise, they lack the essential factors that define the method of compromise. In 
literature, the terms "persuasion" and "compromise" are often used interchangeably 
as having the same meaning. Just as the method of persuasion sometimes has the 
form of compromise, but lacks its substance, so the method of compromise may 
produce a similar illusion. The difference lies in the function of reason in the two 
cases. As this has already been discussed, it will suffice here to point out that in the 
method of persuasion, disputants yield because of insight into a new or fuller truth 
discovered through reason. In compromise, they yield because each feels that it is 
more reasonable to lose a little than run the risk of losing all. The form is that of 
persuasion, but the substance is that of compromise. 
 
Persuasion as a social heuristic 
As the Constituent Assembly turned its attention to working out details about 
the nature of the legislature, some of the concerns of the members of the assembly 
were to bring about accountability and establish a system of checks and balances. 
However, at the same time, one could see that the reasoning behind non-SWAPO 
parties arguing for a bicameral parliament was informed not just by their desire to 
enhance accountability. They believed that under proportional representation, with 
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the whole of Namibia as one constituency, SWAPO would continue to secure a 
majority in the National Assembly for years to come. However, if a second house 
were created with equal representation from various regions, with elections based on 
a constituency system, SWAPO would fail to gain a majority in the second house.  
Non-SWAPO parties‘ thinking was based on the belief that the composition of 
regions would remain the same as that prevailing in the pre-independence era 
irrespective of their population sizes. As SWAPO‘s power base was perceived to be 
restricted to one northern region where most of the Oshiwambo speaking people 
lived, non-SWAPO parties felt that they stood a good chance of controlling the 
second house as they could gain majorities in many other regions (Geingob 2004).  
Moses Katjiuongua directly sought SWAPO to compromise:  
The Chairman said the first day when he became chairman that this was a 
process of give and take. Now I think I have been giving …LAUGHTER…and 
I don‘t want the people to break their part of the deal. I have been giving and 
so far I have scored no point. So really, brothers and sisters, I must also 
report something back home. So, I take it here you will not die if you do not 
compromise.150  
Katjiuongua wanted SWAPO to compromise on the grounds that he has 
compromised enough. He wanted to appeal to the emotion of pity. Is there 
something wrong with attempting to arouse the emotion of pity in others when they 
do not already feel it themselves? A question remains as to whether appeals to pity 
be rejected because any emotion is inimical to clear thinking and is simply irrelevant 
to the justification of action. Katjiuongua knew it may not be enough to rely for appeal 
to emotion in argument: 
...I just want to discuss the principle. I simply want to repeat what I said in the 
Assembly and I believe in that sincerely, I think it is the only practical and 
conducive manner to build a healthy nation, it so provide mechanisms by 
which all of us, in bigger or smaller numbers, feel that we are part of the same 
process, we are making decisions this or the other way, but at the end of the 
day we all have institutional inputs in what this country will look like. That is 
one reason why I feel strongly that we must have a bicameral legislature. That 
is one important reason. Therefore I am a proponent – and I want to leave no 
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in doubt that I feel we should a bicameral legislature. After this Assembly of 
ours has run its time out, at the end of it we should have in future a bicameral 
legislature and I said in my proposition that the numbers could be trimmed 
down to make the whole exercise cost effective. So, I am not looking for 
having institutions all over the place. Apart from the fact that I feel in the 
context of Namibia, an institution of that nature is necessary, I also feel for a 
number of other reasons that we have checks and balances, so that we make 
sure that our country always makes the best decisions in the world...I am not 
saying our president will do that, I am saying that here we are talking about 
institutions that will shape people and somehow make sure that they behave 
in a certain way.151  
It is clear from the statements by Katjiuongua that he was motivated, partly by his 
fear of what the new government would do or not do. Thus, it was in his interest to 
somehow curtail the powers of the executive. Fear is an influential emotion whose 
history reveals its impact not only on individuals, but on entire nation. Fear has been 
particularly important politically and the history of republics reveals a political 
discourse rife with appeals to fear. Scholars have shown that emotions can alter the 
bases of political decision-making, influence the desire to seek information and 
trigger political action. Fear is often described as a wild emotion that endangers both 
social order and the possibility of constructive political dialogue. On 11 December 
1989, during a heated proposal by the Administrator General to privatise certain 
schools for whites, many black delegates opposed the proposal on the grounds that 
no separate schools for whites and blacks will be tolerated in an independent 
Namibia. Mudge weighed in:  
I want to make one thing clear which seems to been overlooked. The problem 
that we have the whole idea of privatising schools is not that we consider this 
only to affect black people. The pupils and parents of many towns and villages 
are terribly concerned about this whole thing because it will affect the other 
fifty schools. What is going to happen to the other fifty schools if the top-class 
students and more wealth parents send their children to the private schools? 
Those schools will definitely not be able to accommodate all the children. So, 
not all white pupils are going to benefit from this, and for that reason my party 
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and the white members of the DTA are very much opposed to the privatization 
of school buildings, and I think we will want to have the opportunity to express 
our concern. The impression must not be created that...only black people who 
are opposed to the privatization. There are hundreds of white people who are 
opposed to that, because this is going to be a sort of ―rykmans-apartheid.‖ 
The more wealthy people and the clever children will go to private schools 
and the other pupils from Outjo, Otavi, Omaruru, Usakos, Mariental, and all 
those other places will find themselves in a very difficult position...I would 
want to know what is going to happen now. Is the AG going to go ahead or is 
he prepared to wait?152 
And yet, fear is an indispensable political emotion.  For, without angry speech, the 
body politic would lack the voice of the powerless to question the justice of the 
dominant order. As Lyman (2004) observes, ―A dialogical politics can only emerge 
when fear is heard with empathy rather than domesticated or silenced‖ (133). 
Political deliberation is a social practice in which citizens communicate with each 
other about how they should direct the actions of their political communities. As 
such, it has two basic elements: some form of public reasoning; some way in which 
citizens exchange their views about matters of common interest and an opportunity 
to consider together this exchange of opinion and argument in reaching decisions 
about which collective action to support. ―But the discourse of fear has animated a 
great deal of controversy and debate that reveals a recurring uneasiness and 
uncertainty among scholars, citizens and policymakers about the compatibility of this 
emotional state with effective political deliberation and policy making‖, Pfau 2007: 
216). That debate is for another time. But from the perspective of the philosopher 
and informal logician, appeals to fear have been regarded as fallacious, as attempts 
by immoral rhetors to sidestep the standards of logic and reason in order to 
manipulate their audiences. Katjiuongua went on to make his case: 
...I think there is a dire necessity to have a bicameral legislation. I am talking 
about basic principles. I think the technicalities can be left out for the time-
being. Whether you call that a National Assembly and the other one you call a 
Senate- I am not very much for the idea of calling it a Senate, a Senate is 
more abstract, it is a bit more foreign. The feeling is one of a nation. So, I 
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would prefer a national council or something like that and a house of deputies, 
who represent people. A national assembly seems to be an all…institution. It 
sounds like a parliament. That is why I think you call it a ―Staatsraad‖ or 
National Council or something like that. But the terminology is not so 
important for me.153 
Appeal to fear argument is used here to mean a specific type of argument that cites 
some possible outcome that is fearful to the target audience.  In order to get that 
audience to take a recommended course of action by arguing that in order to avoid 
the fearful outcome, the audience should take the recommended course of action. In 
this respect, the fear appeal possesses a conditional structure and operates 
according to the logic of dichotomisation in which the fear appeal argument sharply 
divides the respondent‘s available options into two mutually exclusive actions in 
which the only way you can avoid this very fearful outcome is to take the 
recommended action.  
In order to understand and model what are normally referred to as ―emotions‖ 
in humans and other animals, there is a need to start from a deeper analysis of the 
concepts we are aiming to instantiate (Sloman 2001). This task is made difficult by 
the fact that we do not all agree in our usage of the word ―emotion‖. For example, 
some will call surprise an emotion whereas others (Ortony et al. 1988) will say that it 
is just a cognitive state in which an expectation has been violated, as often happens 
in a complex and dynamic world and can even occur when doing mathematics. Of 
course, surprise, like any other state, can trigger states that most people would call 
emotions. There are also disagreements over whether pains and pleasures are 
emotions, some regarding it as obvious that they are, whereas others find it equally 
obvious that one can have the pain of a pin-prick or the pleasure of eating an ice 
cream without feeling at all emotional about it. Another example: some people 
believe that emotions, by definition, cannot exist without being experienced, whereas 
others regard it as obvious that someone can be angry or infatuated (and therefore 
in an emotional state) without being aware of their state, even if friends notice it. On 
further investigation, this dispute can sometimes turn on whether an emotion‘s being 
experienced is taken to imply that the emotion is recognised and labelled as such or 
only to imply that it involves being aware of some mental states and processes 
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related to the emotion. At one extreme, a theorist will say that you cannot enjoy 
something unless you recognise and categorise your state as enjoyment. An 
intermediate position would claim that there must be some experience that you 
recognise and categorise which is part of the enjoyment, even if the total state is not 
recognised. 
Katjiuongua knew that he must not only appeal to reason and emotion. He 
recognised that unless he did that, SWAPO would not move from their bottom line.  
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle (1991) makes clear that fear is connected to regime 
preservation precisely by way of collective perception and deliberation. Fear makes 
people inclined to deliberation. Such a statement seems highly questionable from the 
perspective of those Platonists and traditionalists who tend to juxtapose emotion and 
reason, but makes sense within Aristotle‘s ―cognitive theory of emotions‖ (Morreall 
1993: 359). According to this tradition, some emotional states necessarily entail a 
cognitive component - one must have particular beliefs or perceive events in 
particular ways, in order to experience the emotion. Not all emotions possess such a 
cognitive dimension, but the cognitive nature of Aristotle‘s account of fear is evident 
in his definition of fear as ―a sort of pain or agitation derived from the imagination of a 
future destructive or painful evil‖ (1991: 139). 
If the democratic method be identified completely with the method of 
compromise, the following implications may be drawn. Human nature being what it 
is, persuasion with its normative use of reason, cannot be depended on as workable. 
Conflicts between groups of individuals cannot be resolved with a total gain for all 
parties concerned. Rather, each loses something and gains only in the negative 
sense of not losing all. Also, it follows directly from the meaning of compromise that 
no disputant can surrender the whole end, principle or object willed, for such 
surrender can take place only through persuasion or force. Geingob (2004) argued 
later that the concept of bicameralism, as sought and secured by non-SWAPO 
parties, was ill-conceived for various reasons. First, Namibia was conceived to be a 
unitary state and not a federal state, and regions were administrative rather than 
political units. Second, as in the United States, this was an attempt to balance rights 
attached to individuals with rights attached to regions. Nonetheless, bicameralism 
was adopted in Namibia, a unitary state, in the spirit of compromise by SWAPO. 
SWAPO also accepted the concept of bicameral parliament, because it considered 
that the regional aspect of the second house would be very useful in bringing 
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democracy closer to the people. This thinking was in tandem with SWAPO‘s belief in 
the de-concentration of power from the centre to the periphery to make decisions 
more relevant to the developmental needs of the regions. As illustrated by Geingob‘s 
conclusion, a compromise may also be wrong because it has aesthetically bad 
consequences. In this case, SWAPO accepted the bicameral concept only because 
they wanted to live with the spirit of give and take. In reality, the second chamber has 
proven useless and a waste of resources. Compromise is not an end in itself but a 
means to the resolution of conflict. 
One of the sticking points at the Windhoek Assembly was the power of the 
president to make appointments to certain positions. Particularly, members of the 
opposition parties were worried about judicial appointments. As a result, they 
proposed that all appointments made by the president should be ratified by 
parliament. Ruppel held a contrary view, arguing that 
...as a matter of principle one should really not use parliament to okay every 
executive action which is necessary in the running of the country. It is really 
overburdening the functions of parliament. I think there are certain things 
which must be done by the president. He appoints, but he must not every time 
run back to the legislature. There is a separation of functions. The legislature 
has one kind of function, namely that is elected to make laws. That is its 
principle function and we must not use that body for all sorts of other work if it 
is really not essential. So I strongly move that this appointment is a clear 
appointment and not subject to any other person‘s approval. If somebody is 
desperately unhappy with it, they can always review that decision.154 
He was supported by fellow SWAPO delegate, Pendukeni Ithana who warned that  
if we are subjecting every appointment to the approval of the National 
Assembly, we may scare some of the people who would do a better job if they 
are given that opportunity, if we will subject their lives to be discussed in 
parliament.155  
Gurirab amplified her point: 
I hope that we will not be selecting and appointing criminals for any position in 
the state organs, but we want to ensure that the president of the Republic of 
Namibia does not appear on the paper as a paper-tiger, a puppet president of 
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parliament. We don‘t want to send such a message across the land or abroad 
for that matter. He will be a democratically president, popularly elected – I 
hope that what we will agree – and we should give him such flexibility and 
authority within the boundaries of this constitution to carry out his 
responsibilities for the life of his office and therefore every bit of appointment 
does not really have to be approved by parliament. We are not dealing with a 
person who installed himself, declared himself emperor. We have already 
gone a long way in emasculating the powers of the executive president. I think 
at some point we should be conscious about the kind of executive president 
that we would like to have as head of our state.156 
Katjiuongua disagreed with the SWAPO position. To make his case, he cited an 
example of the United States where  
...the chief of the joint chiefs are confirmed by the Senate and this is done in 
some other countries as well. So, that is also an opportunity to find out that 
the president is not employing criminals – and I don‘t want to use the word, 
but it was used by my colleague here...157  
On one hand, SWAPO continued to argue that Judges should be appointed by the 
president on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. On the other, 
the opposition parties insisted on parliamentary approval of all appointments. The 
total sum of the opposition fears were captured by Vekuii Rukoro: 
This question relates very seriously to the whole question of the 
independence of the judiciary who, in my opinion, really are the final 
defenders of this constitution. We can say that the president must protect the 
constitution, but in the final analysis it is the courts of law who are going to 
come in and say: ―Mr President, you are going too far.‖ That is why I feel that 
apart from the approval by the National Assembly, which is subject to the 
changing majorities, you need an independent body of provisional with 
integrity to in the first place recommend, (a) both in terms of appointments 
and (b), in terms of dismissals and for the Assembly to debate these matters 
subsequently. But to leave them simply to political complexion of this House. I 
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don‘t think that is too reassuring in terms of the independence of the judiciary 
in the long term.158 
What appeared to be a compromise came from the ranks of the opposition parties in 
the person of Dirk Mudge of the DTA: 
...I fully support the principle that the president must not be free to arbitrarily 
appoint people, but on the other hand I also support the view that it is not for a 
legislative body to discuss appointments. I am not very happy with that. The 
alternative is that we make sure – and think this also in line with what our 
learned friend said right now – that the Judicial Service Commission and the 
public Service Commission must be appointed in a very, very responsible 
manner. Those must not be lackeys of politicians. They must be professional 
people as far as possible. I reserve the right, when we come to the 
appointment of the Judicial Service Commission and the Public Commission 
also for the interim period, that we make sure that we have the right people 
there. Then the appointment by the president will in fact be a formality. I think 
this was always the case. I don‘t think presidents normally appoint people 
without having been assisted by professional committees and bodies, unless 
they want to make it a political appointment...159 
Barnes felt strongly in favour of discussing presidential appointments in parliament 
for various reasons. Primarily, he thought parliamentary approval would also serve 
as a vetting process: 
I just want to cite a very, very recent example. Very recently the president of 
the United States wanted to appoint a certain secretary. If that secretary didn‘t 
appear before the senate Committee, and despite the findings of the Senate 
Committee this man was absolutely – I could use the word corrupt, He was an 
alcoholic, he was a womanizer, but the president of the United States insisted 
on appointing Brown and the Senate Committee turned it down. This saved 
the people of the United States a lot of embarrassment. The idea that a 
person would feel that he is being scrutinised,  If he has nothing to hide then 
he has nothing to hide and then – without due respect to honourable Ruppel, 
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defending a position of appointment in here – that also grants a reason that 
there is a need for parliament to approve or ratify.160 
Compromises are appraised as good or bad, better or worse, right or wrong, fair or 
unfair. For Aristotle, the means by which we communicate our reasoning to each 
other in political deliberation is the particular form of persuasive speech he calls 
deliberative rhetoric. We deliberate together in political communities by making and 
listening to each other‘s attempts to persuade us that some future action will best 
serve the end that citizens share with each other, the common good or advantage of 
the political community. It is this shared goal that distinguishes deliberative rhetoric, 
and therefore public reasoning, from the other forms of rhetoric and political 
judgment that Aristotle examines. When we make legal judgments, forensic rhetoric 
seeks to persuade us of the justice or injustice, the guilt or innocence, of the people 
that we put on trial. When we make judgments about rewards and censure, 
epideictic rhetoric seeks to persuade us of the honourable or dishonourable 
character of the individuals under consideration. And when we make judgments 
about the making of law and policy, deliberative rhetoric seeks to persuade us that 
one course of action rather than another will best serve the common good or 
advantage (Rhetoric 1351b). 
The most widely debated conception of democracy in recent years is 
deliberative democracy - the idea that citizens or their representatives owe each 
other mutually acceptable reasons for the laws they enact. It suffice to say that 
deliberative democracy contributes to our understanding of how democratic citizens 
and their representatives can make justifiable decisions for their society in the face of 
the fundamental disagreements that are inevitable in diverse societies. Like the 
deliberation of each individual, political deliberation seeks to determine which acts 
will most contribute to the ends that we seek to achieve. It deals with contingencies 
rather than necessities, since no one deliberates about things that cannot be done or 
actions that we cannot avoid performing. And it focuses on the consequences of 
future acts rather than, as in our judgments about justice and injustice or praise and 
blame, on our assessment of acts that have already been performed. Thus, a 
compromise is good when it resolves the conflict between the parties. This is a 
prudential consideration, because it is in their interest that the conflict should be 
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resolved. The sense of ―good‖ involved is instrumental. The compromise is good as 
a means to the end of resolving the conflict. Ngarikutuke Tjiriange weighed in on the 
debate: 
I do understand the sentiments of the previous two speakers, but the question 
was asked: If you make the Public Service Commission subject to this 
approval of the Assembly, it means it has been given the mandate to appoint 
those people that they are supposed to appoint. Now whilst they appoint 
them, why should the people that have been given the mandate to appoint, go 
back again to the Assembly again for approval? That makes it twice. They 
have delegated powers to appoint. Once they have been appointed by 
Assembly, then they are carrying out the job which we have appointed them. 
Whoever they appoint is on the delegation of powers from the Assembly.161 
Rukoro conceded that the final appointment must be made by the executive, but on 
recommendation of the judicial Service commission.  
...that being the case, once the Public Service Commission or the Judicial 
Services Commission was itself approved by parliament – as we are about to 
agree – then in that case the second approval by the National Assembly falls 
away.162 
The compromise can be accepted by all because it bears the imprint of all. 
Discussion has as its purpose compromise, and therefore the achievement of 
compromise is the justification for discussion in a democracy. If there has been no 
compromise, discussion has been useless. This exchange between Hage Geingob, 
the chairman of the committee, and Moses Katjiuongua, illustrates the nature of 
heated discussion: 
Chairman: It is true, agreement was reached, but Mr Mudge spoke about the 
practical situation. He said: ―For practical reasons we have agreed for the first 
five years. Five years. Let us face it that unless we want to score points and I 
think we have passed that stage...‖ and he went on. 
Mr. Katjiuongua: How does that differ from what I am saying?  
Chairman: I deliberately asked what the agreement is. We seem to have 
misunderstanding that is why we are wasting time. 
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Mr. Katjiuongua: No, I am not wasting time. Mr Chairman, don‘t say I am 
wasting time. 
Chairman: I said ―we‖. The chairman has the right to put the decision here. I 
asked what has been agreed upon, whether we all understand one another.163 
From a pragmatic perspective, seeking consensus with those who oppose you often 
makes exceptional sense. If there is an element of truth in the attacks on you, going 
head-to-head with your opponents could provoke an ongoing dispute that will bring 
out all the gory details. When an attack comes from an individual with a legitimate 
complaint and if they are willing to compromise, then the cooperative route may be 
the best way to go. However, attacks don't always come from honest brokers, but 
from individuals with agendas that offer no room for compromise or cooperation. 
They are attacking for their own reasons and giving in not only plays into their hands, 
but also risks giving them an excuse to up the ante. If a majority engages in 
discussion with a minority, and if that discussion is conducted in a spirit of give-and-
take the result will be that the ideas of the majority are widened to include some of 
the ideas of the minority which have established their truth in the give-and-take of 
debate. 
 
Rhetoric of conflict resolution 
Another area of disagreement related to the nomination of persons to the 
national assembly by the president. Arguments for the proposal were advanced by 
Vekuii Rukoro, a member of the opposition. His arguments were based on the fact 
that there are people out of politics with some expertise and could make some 
contributions but who do not wish to submit to a rigorous campaign for political office. 
Another member of the opposition, Dirk Mudge opposed that proposal ―on principle 
grounds [we] cannot accept appointed members to an elected body.‖164 Rukoro 
made another effort to convince his comrade: 
But the problem is that because we have that expertise, they are not good 
with politics, generally. How we are going to affect the balance in this House if 
they don‘t have the right to vote? Their only contribution is to bring their 
expertise to the benefit of the nation and the president is not going to appoint 
them because they belong to the ruling party. That is why I really urge you in 
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the national in the national interest, to simply let this provision remain...If that 
can be done with you changing the balance of power within the Assembly, 
and at the same time serve a paramount national interest, like for instance the 
representation of distinct interest groups in this country, whether we talk of 
organised labour, whether we talk of organised commerce, or for instance, as 
I proposed in the House in my submission, the representation of traditional 
leaders. These are hopefully non-party political interests and concerns, they 
are of vital interest to all of us, and provided the president, acting on the 
advice of the cabinet, can make appropriate appointments of these people to 
the national assembly so that we can benefit from their direct input in terms of 
policy formulation, without themselves having the right to vote when it comes 
to the vote. That does not affect the balance of forces in the house and 
therefore I can only see it as really adding to the strength of the functional 
democracy, rather than running counter to the democratic principles. I would 
really urge reconsideration of retaining that principle.165  
Katjiuongua, like Mudge, did not support the idea of appointing outside members to 
the national assembly:  
I think it will be an insult to 72 members, elected members in this House to go 
and look for a talent outside, to say we are not good enough, we don‘t have 
the expertise. We have to bring in somebody from outside who was not 
prepared to stand the democratic test.166 
There is a threat to compromise if party militants reject compromise by their party 
leaders. To the extent that party leaders follow this demand, of course, they make 
democratic government difficult if not impossible in a multiparty system. Compromise 
thus acquires a shady side. This, of course, it can have in any political system. 
Compromise, even in a democracy, can be carried too far in a log-rolling sense. This 
kind of duplicity can lead at worst to a double standard in politics. Such a double 
standard has seldom, if ever, been fatal to a political system. In an attempt to refute 
the arguments for the proposal, Hamutenya missed the opportunity to make a case 
based on facts and reasons: 
For me the problem is not so much about the democratic nature of this 
exercise. My problem is criteria of choosing these six. I foresee problems 
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down the road in any attempt to appoint these six individuals. I have listened 
to the various criteria advanced here, but I still foresee problems. If it is a 
question of proportion, what does it change? It will still leave the question the 
same. If we need more people, why don‘t we increase the number of the 
assembly from 72 to 78, then you solve the problem if the number of the seats 
in the Assembly is the problem. Proportionality will simply get us back to 
where we are in the terms of the balance of forces in terms of parties. I cannot 
see very objective criteria which will be acceptable for all of us here to appoint 
the six people I have a problem with this clause myself. If it was left to me I 
would do without it.167 
While Mudge supported Hamutenya, he sensed a great deal of consensus on the 
matter. Still, he took a neutral route, that ―...depending on what we are going to 
decide later, then I will agree that we move on."168 On the pluralistic theory of moral 
obligation a person who is called upon to act in one way or another or to abstain 
from action in a given situation may be subject to many different and conflicting 
claims or obligations of varying strength, arising out of various factors in his past 
history and various relations in which he stands to various persons, institutions and 
communities. Whichever alternative he chooses, he will fulfil some of these 
component obligations and in doing so he will necessarily break others which conflict 
with the former. In such cases, the right action is the one which makes the best 
compromise between the several conflicting claims, when due weight is given to their 
number and their relative urgency. But no general principles can be suggested for 
deciding what the best compromise is. 
The philosophical problems about compromise fall under the heads of 
problems of interpretation and problems of valuation, though some of the problems 
come under both heads. For instance, virtually all writers on compromise comment 
on the fact that our attitude towards it is ambivalent. On the one hand, to be 
uncompromising is to be obstinate and inflexible, so that it is morally right to 
compromise. On the other, to compromise is to be a trimmer and a time-server, so 
that it is morally wrong to compromise. Trust is a relationship of reliance. A trusted 
party is presumed to seek to fulfil policies, ethical codes, law and their previous 
promises. Trust does not need to involve belief in the good character, vices or 
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morals of the other party. Persons engaged in a criminal activity usually trust each 
other to some extent. Also trust does not need to include an action that you and the 
other party are mutually engaged in. Trust is a prediction of reliance on an action, 
based on what a party knows about the other party.  
The two faces of compromise are always with us. Every political system and, 
more important, every human being - must choose between them. If politics were the 
sum total of human life, there can be no doubt that the politics of compromise would 
be preferable. Compromise is indeed the rule and the art of the game of politics. 
Ethical action in politics, as elsewhere, is always an "either-or" proposition (Rintala 
1969). At the Windhoek Assembly, it was not possible to negotiate a package of 
compromises although it was possible to offer one in exchange of some other 
agreement elsewhere. The draft constitution made provision for a council of 
ministers. But the president, in the exercise of his functions, was not obliged to follow 
the advice tendered by the council. This was worrisome to members of the 
opposition who feared a repeat of the African experience in Namibia. Barney Barnes 
summed up the opposition stance: 
There is no other option. In accordance with the principle of the executive 
presidency, the president – and I think we have to in all sincerity think not in 
terms of the negative experiences from Africa and Third World – the principle 
in an executive head and I think if we go to the extent of saying ―on the advice 
of‖, as opposed to ―in consultation with‖, I don‘t know what we are doing to 
ourselves and the future institutions here. I strongly and very humbly oppose. 
I would think that ―consultation with‖ is an executive, practical, conventional 
decision making procedure. I don‘t think, because we are bound by our 
negative experiences; take stereotypic examples from negative quarters. I 
think we have to be very frank, we are not making this for ourselves, quite 
obviously, and I also want to say that when we are making these decisions, 
we must know that we are not even in the position in which our comrades 
were in Zimbabwe, where our colleagues from Zimbabwe where pointing to 
Lancaster House. This is a historic opportunity we have been given as 
Namibians to write this constitution ourselves, either to mess it up to take in to 
account our actions that we are taking today, and I am inclined to think that 
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we are thinking too much of the immediate environment. ―In consultation with‖ 
is appropriate.169 
As stated elsewhere, one of the outstanding facts of contemporary politics is its 
emphasis on compromise. The willingness to compromise is praised as the mark of 
the "reasonable person." Conversely the refusal to compromise seems to be one of 
the most important marks of the person who is outside of normal politics. This 
contrast was almost visible in the exchange between SWAPO, on one hand and the 
opposition parties, on the other: 
Mr. Ruppel: Yes, I think the more crucial one, and we are getting bogged 
down on some technicality, the principle is stated in paragraph (2) which is 
clearly stating the joint exercise. It says: ―The executive power vests in the 
Cabinet headed by the president‖, and whether you say here at the bottom ―in 
consultation with and on advise‖ doesn‘t make a big difference, because the 
executive function of the government vests in the cabinet headed by the 
president. So it is really splitting hairs, it is not going to make a difference at 
all. 
Mr. Katjiuongua: ...I think the word ―obliged to in consultation‖ is important. It 
looks like he is going to take decision after consulting. When you are obliged 
to somebody, it means you must take their advice, and if you say ―advice‖ it is 
not good for his dignity.170 
The term "compromise" is also used sometimes to designate what are really two 
variations of the method of persuasion. First, even when there is goodwill on the part 
of two parties and the method of persuasion would ordinarily be used, in a given 
case a decision may have to be made before there is time enough to resolve the 
matter in the ideal manner. One may have to accept the other's point of view or both 
accept a third. The two parties may be said to have compromised, but only in the 
sense that, though the method of persuasion was willed, circumstances beyond their 
control prevented its usual consequences from being realised. Secondly, sometimes 
it happens that, even with goodwill and after a great deal of thought and discussion 
on the part of the disputants, there remains a considerable honest difference of 
opinion. Consequently, it is necessary to reach some compromise position. 
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Politics, many contemporary students of politics declare, is concerned with the 
conflict of power-seeking interest groups. As a result, debates about the nature of 
politics have traditionally submerged issues of process in controversies about what 
actors and issues to think of as political. That people should disagree about the 
scope and domain of politics is understandable both because politics is an elastic 
concept and because the debate is itself a high stakes political struggle. As Lasswell 
and Kaplan (1950), Dahl (1957, 1968) and Baldwin (1979, 1980) have demonstrated, 
the relevant sources of power vary across different issues, actors, institutions and 
political arenas. Moreover, how people use those resources varies with prevailing 
rules and norms. Consequently, theories built around issue-oriented puzzles are 
likely to conceptualise the nature and uses of power in significantly different ways. 
The same observation can be made about linkage politics. Politics almost always 
involves linkages across multiple arenas, but the number and character of the 
political arenas are likely to vary across time and different issues, actors and 
strategic contexts. However, while the debate is understandable, it is too often 
destructive and self-defeating. The scope and domain of the political vary for the 
simple and inescapable reason that the primary actors and issues, plus the goals 
and values of the participants, vary. There are times when those faced with a 
decision in the real world of politics will decide on a course of action that on the 
surface appears to be a despicable compromise or even an outright sell-out, when in 
fact, if all the details were known, they are doing what is best for the very cause 
embraced by those condemning them for their compromise. Political decision-
making is overly sensitive to the demands of organised interest groups and relatively 
insensitive to the demands of unorganised groups. That is, not all parties affected by 
political choices are represented at the political bargaining table. While compromise 
is commonplace among politicians representing organised interest groups, the fact 
that many politically affected people are not party to these compromises means that 
political compromises are selective. It follows, then, that the public interest is 
anything and everything that can be secured by the mediation of conflicting claims 
for power. Compromise not only is a worthy, self-sufficient political ideal but the 
distinguishing and essential characteristic of democracy as a form of government. It 
is correct that Ruppel was not at all being truthful as to the exact significance of ―in 
consultation with and on advice‖. The fact that the opposition parties sought to 
include them is itself significant. But it was not in SWAPO‘s interest to do so. 
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SWAPO had to compromise for the general good. At a time when clarity and 
agreement as to the meaning of democracy are so vitally essential, it is appropriate 
that such a view should be examined with care. For if opposition members reason 
that truth, justice and freedom are too ambiguous to serve as guideposts in the 
democratic solution of conflict, then such an assertion can and should not go 
unchallenged. 
Geingob (2004) writes that, as regards presidential elections, there was 
unanimity that the president should be elected by direct, universal and equal 
suffrage, with Namibia as one constituency. Further, the elected candidate must 
receive over 50% of the votes cast. If necessary, a number of ballots should be 
conducted until such a result is achieved. In reality, there was no unanimity at all. On 
one hand, SWAPO had wanted a directly-elected president. On the other, the 
smaller parties wanted the national assembly, sitting as the Electoral College, to 
elect the president. There were several reasons advanced for the two proposals: 
first, Hidipo Hamutenya of SWAPO, argued that 
I believe very firmly in the notion of separation of powers and for that reason I 
seriously have problems to agree to the proposition that the president should 
be elected by the legislature, whether it is single chamber or bicameral, 
because once you have done that you cannot talk about the president as 
being on par in terms of power-sharing with the legislature anymore, because 
he is an appointee of the legislature.171 
For the opposition, Dirk Mudge argued that the proposals in the working document 
concerning the president are politically unwise and practically impossible.  
The direct election of a president in accordance with the SWAPO-proposals, 
or the working document emphasise ethnic divisions, and I think we must do 
everything in our power to avoid that, because such an occurrence could very 
well lead to national disunity. Further to this question of the direct election of a 
president after every five year. It will also mean that two national elections – 
one for a National Assembly and one for a president – will be held at the 
same time and apart from the administrative cost other complications, this 
lead to overall disruption of National life. Politically the proposal for a directly 
elected president is unsound and dangerous, because it denies the existence 
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of a multi party system and begs for the…… of all state powers and the 
creation of a one-party system. That is our view.172 
He was aided by Eric Biwa of the United Democratic Front, argued as follows: 
The main reason why I opposed to the direct election of the president is 
because I don‘t believe that a president, directly elected by the electorate, can 
be controlled by the parliament. There is a serious need that the parliament 
must be controlled by the cabinet and the legislature.173  
But Biwa later conceded that ―after we have agreed on a number of checks and 
balances intended to keep the president in check, I can agree to the direct election of 
the president, provided I am assured that these checks and balances can keep the 
president in check although he is directly elected.‖174  
As Smith (1942) argues, compromise arises in the narrow context of social 
necessity and functions in the expanding context of individual growth and social 
progress. By transmuting the necessary into the desirable, men of goodwill make 
some minimum freedom of their uttermost fate. That every social situation requires 
some compromises is a truism that can readily be granted but that the necessity or 
inevitability of making compromises thereby renders the practice desirable or even 
tolerable, does not logically follow. 
Later, Mudge reopened the debate about the election of the president. He 
proposed that the president be elected by parliament in the mean time and that 
parliament appoints a commission to investigate the modes of electing a president 
directly which can then be considered by parliament.  
In other words, the constitution can be amended but then we know exactly 
what and how, on the condition that he civil service commission is appointed 
by parliament…that the president need not be a member of parliament, but 
that he president should be accountable to parliament in the following 
manner: that when his vote comes up for discussion, he must then personally 
appear in the parliament to defend his vote, as is the case normally with 
various, because there will be a vote, the vote for the state president. That he 
must appear and then that will be the opportunity for the members to confront 
him as far as his policy is concerned.175 
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This proposal would not to come down well with SWAPO delegates who thought 
they were gaining the upper hand on the election of the president. Gurirab 
responded in a very strong language: 
Thank you very much, honourable Mr. Chairman. I didn‘t think that I was 
going to ask for the floor so early in the deliberation but I was prompted to do 
so by the honourable Mr. Mudge‘s intervention...After the various parties 
introduced their constitutional proposals in the assembly, the work of this 
committee commenced. We had a series of deliberations in this committee. 
We identified collectively and confirmed that there were three areas of 
material dispute: the presidency or executive presidency, the voting method 
and whether we would have one or two houses. It was with those three issues 
before us that we deliberated and indeed agreed on a package. We wanted, 
as we do now, an executive president elected by the people. We wanted a 
voting system to be a single member constitutional system and we wanted 
only one house. We accepted PR system, not single member constituent 
system. We also accepted in principle that there would be a second house 
that was the package. I don‘t know what will happen further down when we 
get to the second house business. We are still now seeking to, in my view, 
emasculate the presidency, the executive and to talk under the present 
circumstance about yet another package seems, and the way that the 
proposal was presented, is certainly to my mind quite disproportionate. It is a 
very substantial proposal that honourable Mr. Mudge has made, and certainly 
he heard me speaking yesterday, he cannot expect us to even as much as 
give serious consideration to his proposal as it stands…thank you.176 
Political power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting alliances between 
diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, 
social life and individual conduct. Power is not so much a matter of imposing 
constraints upon citizens as of 'making up' citizens capable of bearing a kind of 
regulated freedom. Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a 
key term in its exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the 
subjects of power but play a part in its operations. Foucault (1979) argued that, since 
the eighteenth century, this way of reflecting upon power and seeking to render it 
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operable had achieved pre-eminence over other forms of political power. It was 
linked to the proliferation of a whole range of apparatuses pertaining to government 
and a complex body of knowledge and ―know-how‖ about government, the means of 
its exercise and the nature of those over whom it was to be exercised. The ultimate 
aim of politics is to access power. Posed that an uncompromising person is one who 
is not disposed to make any concessions, a compromising person is one who is 
pliant and disposed to make concessions - regardless of whether he receives any 
concession in return.  
However true this may be, one must insist that compromise necessarily 
involves mutual concessions on values. If a compromise is to approximate a solution 
to conflict rather than being a temporary truce, it must be made within a framework of 
interests and values commonly shared and mutually respected by all parties to the 
agreement. If it is to approximate a solution, moreover, it must embody what is best 
in all proposals and this can be determined only by appealing to those common 
interests and values that are shared. A compromise is not good in itself; it is good 
only if it leads to good results. But one can know if it will lead to good results only by 
subjecting the substance of the compromise to the test of some ideal goal one hopes 
to attain. 
 
Diplomatic approach 
Members of the standing committee have sometimes resorted to a ‗diplomatic‘ 
approach. This has been a constant attitude among participants since the very 
beginning of assembly. Agreeing on an ambivalent concept or on a flexible wording, 
leaving room for different interpretations and thereby preventing the emergence of 
overt opposition, is a well-known constitutional device (Sunstein 2001). Sometimes, 
the authors of a constitution even agree to leave controversial issues out of their 
agreement, so as to avoid incompatibilities (Holmes 1988). Hidipo Hamutenya was 
always there to break deadlocks. During a discussion on the mode of election of the 
president, he proposed how the committee can move forward: 
Mr Chairman, we can‘t read the minds of the people, what they will do 
tomorrow or the day thereafter, we can only draft a constitution which we 
hope will work. I think the advice given by the legal experts do provide 
grounds for us to move forward in terms of tackling the formulation of the 
constitution. Suspicion cannot be resolved here; it has nothing to do with what 
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we are writing. If we are writing a constitution based on suspicion, we will 
make no progress whatsoever. What is crucial is that I appeal that we 
proceed with article 28 with the proviso that wherever our colleagues of the 
DTA would wish to refer back in this constitution to the power of the president 
and the relationship between legislature and the judiciary, even in relation to 
those clauses we have already agreed to, that they be allowed to refer back, 
as long as it only relates to the power of the president. I hope that we can go 
a long way to allay their fears. If we can allay their fears, then I think we will 
progress...If it is an acceptable proposition, I think we can go somewhere. We 
can break the impasse where we are now stuck.177 
In many instances, the decisions of the Committee can be understood in these 
terms. More importantly, the major institutional compromise of the assembly can be 
seen as an instance of a ‗diplomatic agreement‘. However, spreading out the 
incompatibility in time, ―in the hope that later circumstances will be such that the 
choice can be avoided or the decision taken within a better understanding of the 
issues‖ is a risky strategy, because it ―can create new and more serious 
(incompatibilities) in the future‖ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 200). The 
principal merit of this approach is that ―it encourages a continuation of the dialogue‖ 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 201). But this strategy was, by itself, in 
contradiction with the very raison d’être of the Assembly. 
The ‗practical‘ approach was the dominant style adopted by the standing 
committee members. On most issues, during the plenary sessions but also within the 
working groups, the meetings of the components or the parties, the members tried to 
explain their position in terms of concrete impact, not by referring to abstract 
concepts or to emotions. As a way of illustration, the remarks by Prof. Mburumba 
Kerina of the Federal Convention of Namibia, created context: 
I have been trying to trace the beginning of the discussions with regard to the 
constitutional draft before us up to the time when it was referred to the 
attorneys, and the product that we now have before us. Mine is just a humble 
appeal.  We have travelled a road to be here, and I think as a newcomer to 
the discussions I am very honourable to be part of the spirit that has been 
demonstrated by all the parties and all the representatives of the various 
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parties in this committee.  I have listened very carefully and sensitively to the 
reservations, to the disagreements, to the agreements and to the 
disagreements of the agreements, and I think finally we are at the point where 
we have to find a solution to what we have been discussion this morning.  I 
don‘t think there are serious differences.  I think the test relating to the 
president is very clear and I would like to appeal to all of us to agree that the 
first president be elected the National Assembly as stated in this draft.178 
Beside this practical pattern of thought, logical arguments have also played an 
important role in these debates. A priori, one could assume that a rationalist mode or 
argument would be impossible in such a divided assembly. This approach indeed 
assumes that ―one can clarify sufficiently the ideas one uses, make sufficiently clear 
the rules one invokes‖ and that ―the unforeseen has been eliminated, that the future 
has been mastered‖ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 198). With the Namibian 
people waiting for independence, delegates to the Windhoek Assembly were 
conscious not to be seen to be playing delaying tactics. Thus, there was pressure to 
agree. Biwa espoused this view more clearly: 
I am not taking the floor to offer a solution; I merely want to state our position 
in regard to this issue under discussion.  Unfortunately some of the things I 
wanted to state were overtaken by events; therefore I will confine myself to 
those things that keep within the framework of what we have agreed upon.  
But I would like to state that it is the feeling of our caucus that we stick to the 
agreement which is reflected in the draft, namely that the president will be 
elected by the National Assembly and that he will be a member of the 
National Assembly.  But in the spirit of what we have decided to do now, I 
would like to state that we – and that is the feeling of everybody – are 
prepared to go along with an arrangement or a provision where the president 
is elected directly by popular vote, provided that the powers conferred upon 
the president and the limitations put to the exercise of this powers are not 
affected in any way.  Secondly, provided that parliament has the power to 
impeach the president and I think that is provided for in the constitution, and 
we would like to agree well in advance, while on this issue, that we will allow 
the parliament to impeach the president.  Thirdly, there should be a provision 
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in the constitution empowering the president to address parliament and giving 
the members of parliament that power to question the president.179   
The insistence on the constitutional nature of the assembly‘s task, combined with the 
legal background of some delegates, fostered arguments moulded in legal terms. 
The committee had members with legal training. Their participation, especially on 
matters related to resolving conflicts through compromise. Applying legal arguments 
in the context of constitutional negotiations was substantively helpful. First, it 
provided a jargon which was largely shared by the members and could be a negative 
equivalent of a common language. Secondly, lawyers – like theologians – tended to 
forge their arguments on the basis of widely accepted, if not uncontested, texts: this 
provided deliberation with a set of common written references. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, law is by definition a means to build compromise: ―Legal progress 
consists of the development of techniques – which are always capable of 
improvement – that make it possible to reconcile conflicting claims‖ (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 414).  
Indeed, lawyers are routinely asked to negotiate the vexing, layered and often 
emotionally-charged problems that others have finally relinquished to the care of 
professionals. Much of the stuff of these problems can be articulated in terms of 
common law rights and duties, statutory rules and remedies, costs and benefits, 
profits and losses. But within the pores of these dispassionate analyses lurk the lost 
child and the quivering voice, the full scope of the client‘s need and history-fed 
bitterness over disputed boundaries. In contemplating the root cause and ricocheted 
effects of legal problems, and in managing the matrices of human interaction that 
arise in negotiated attempts to solve them, lawyers rely on an inductive process of 
knowing that is driven as much by emotional sense as it is by more dispassionate 
logics. For lawyers, the final destination of virtually all individual deliberation is 
collective deliberation. In lawyering, the thinker deliberates in service of a larger 
endeavour (a dispute, a lawsuit, a transaction, a legislative proposal), which 
invariably involves decision-making by at least one other person (at minimum, the 
client). Collective deliberation is, of course, the most basic form of negotiation, and 
be it preparing for litigation, conducting a private settlement hearing, or addressing 
the Senate – it is the currency of legal practice. 
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Compromise as a social heuristic 
The social heuristic uses human capacities for social learning and imitation. In 
brief, this heuristic is based on choosing what the majority of one's peers are 
choosing. Compromise is a useful device for dealing with small items with people 
you see in an ongoing relationship. But we run into trouble when we split the 
difference in situations in which a compromise will harm everyone involved. The term 
social heuristics to refer to the rules of thumb people use to make snap decisions in 
social environments, in part to reduce conflict. Similarly, negotiators tend to 
compromise not because splitting the difference is the best option, but because they 
have learned that such social heuristics get them through life with less hassle. The 
best illustration of this point can be found in the discussion on whether the number of 
ministries should be stipulated in the constitution or left to the discretion of the 
president. Barney Barnes proposed that in order for the new government to gain 
credibility, the number of ministries should be related to the size of the population of 
the country. This view was shared by Dirk Mudge: 
I don‘t have a problem with the number because I am sure the assembly will 
have to vote the money for the salaries of these people. So if the president 
would continue to appoint too many ministers, he will definitely find a slight 
problem to get the necessary funds to pay their salaries.180 
Peter Katjavivi felt there was no need to determine the number of ministries in 
advance. He proposed instead that the president should have some flexibility to 
create and dissolve ministries as circumstances dictate. Hage Geingob argued that 
stipulating the number of ministries in the constitution will be cumbersome because if 
the president needed to increase ministries, a constitutional amendment will have to 
be sought. As stated elsewhere, the debate about the number of ministries in 
Namibia has been ongoing for some time. As at the time of this research, Namibia 
had twenty six ministries in a country of about 2 million people. Therefore the 
wisdom of this compromise becomes illogical. When the compromise is illogical, the 
tendency to rely on social heuristics can be dangerous. Far too often, in an effort to 
make sure that all are included, we compromise on the content of a decision. But 
true respect for the opinions of others should mean that we can debate the merit of 
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alternative actions and make a choice, rather than compromise on a plan that is 
logically confused. But the opposition parties did not want to argue on small things, 
especially when the bigger fights were still to come. 
At a political level, the term bipartisan describes the behaviour of responsible, 
cooperative politicians who drop their biased concerns in the search for value-
creating changes for society. In other words, two parties co-operate regardless of the 
affiliation to support one cause. For example, on 8 December 1989, SWAPO and the 
DTA were united in their opposition to the Administrator General‘s stated intention to 
reserve schools for whites as part of the outgoing government‘s efforts to reach out 
to white interest. When true bipartisanship occurs, citizens should support such 
innovation. With regard to multi-partisanship, more parties drop the party label to 
identify as a united group. A good example is when all parties in the constituent 
assembly agreed to 21st March 1990 as the date for Namibia‘s independence. For 
purposes of this exercise, reference is made to the discussion on whether or not 
Namibia should adopt a bicameral parliament. At the Windhoek Assembly, a concern 
existed for diverse political-constitutional topics. One of them referred to the system 
of government: if from the proposed unicameral chamber of parliament we must 
transfer to a bicameral system. This concern arose because, according to the 
opposition parties, the balance of power has been inclined decidedly to favour the 
Executive. In the constitutional systems, there is a rule of underlying gold, not 
necessarily written, but inferred from its own structure of equilibrium of the 
constitutional democracy. According to this, to any increment of power there must be 
a corresponding strengthening of the controls, an improvement of individual rights or 
guarantees and emphases of the responsibilities. In other words: the more power the 
more control, better rights and superior responsibilities. This rule, which demands a 
correlation between the problems of the dimension of the power and the problem of 
qualification of the rights that achieve the equilibrium of that power, is pinpointing the 
need for an equivalence that, if it breaks, alters the functionality of the system and 
this one enters a slope. Katjiuongua was strongly for the bicameral chamber and he 
presented his argument as follows: 
...Namibia needs national integration through institutions, thereby creating 
participation and liberating the people from fear or sectional loyalties. It is a 
form, over and above, of discussions and the right to speak as a numerical 
minority in parliament...that go beyond just merely speaking. There is a form 
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of institutionalised expression by which those who might not necessarily be 
elected by numbers can also express concerns and interests of the areas they 
represent...we feel that the elected majority, without becoming ineffective as a 
government, must take into account the views of the political minority of the 
day, the views that are relevant to national peace and stability.181 
Nahas Angula was not convinced of the necessity of the two chambers of 
parliament, ―But I will go by the decision of the majority, if the majority want a second 
chamber...‖182 One type of decision which has the potential to arouse negative 
emotions are when trade-offs have to be made between two highly valued things as 
in the case above. Because making trade-offs can generate negative emotions, 
individuals may cope with emotion-laden decisions by avoiding strategies which use 
trade-offs and instead use non-compensatory strategies. Context is, perhaps, useful 
to explain this compromise. A debate had ensured whether there was a need to have 
two chambers and which of the two chambers was more senior that the other. 
Members of either chamber have argued that theirs was the superior house. By 
observing the functions of each chamber, it was not surprising to find that the 
national assembly, which has the powers to make laws, was the superior one. The 
national council on the other hand simply reviewed laws passed by the national 
assembly. SWAPO was clear from the beginning that it did not want a second 
chamber. The nature of the powers of the house lies in a bipartisan compromise 
reached between the parties at the Windhoek Assembly. But bipartisanship can also 
be a shortcut to lazy compromises for those eager to reach any deal at all. The 
negative emotions experienced while making a choice involving difficult trade-offs 
have been shown to impact on strategy selection and decision-making. In addition, 
evidence suggests that decision-makers tend to confront between-attribute trade-offs 
explicitly when attributes are relatively low in emotional trade-off difficulty, but they 
avoid these explicit trade-offs when attributes are higher in emotional trade-off 
difficulty. This compromise solution is not likely to be effective. A better solution 
would be to debate strong ideas that make conceptual sense rather than watering 
down elements of various plans. Too often, policymakers make compromise 
between strategies. While each strategy may be viable, the compromise is generally 
too weak to be effective. 
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Social heuristic should be understood through its relation to hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics has as its principal task the formulation of a set of elementary or 
general principles for interpretation and construction. Toward this end, Lieber (1839) 
constructed "elementary principles of interpretation" and "general principles of 
construction." Conceived at a high level of abstraction, these principles function as 
regulative maxims. Along Kantian-transcendental lines, they regulate the 
understanding and so make interpretation and construction possible. In accordance 
with this conception of their nature and function, Lieber endeavoured only "to lay 
down the most essential principles, sufficient at least to direct attention to the main 
points" (65). He acknowledged the place of lower-level, more applied rules of 
interpretation and construction, and in the course of the Hermeneutics he intimates 
what some of them look like. But, generally, Lieber thinks that only regulative 
maxims lie within the scope of a general science, properly so-called. In this way, 
Lieber's most general contribution to debates over the Constitution was to show that 
the rules and principles which governed its interpretation and construction were 
entailed or implied by even more elementary or general ones. Lieber, in brief, 
provided a place for constitutional hermeneutics within the broader science of 
interpretation and construction which, in turn, was necessary "on account of the 
character of human language" (157). 
Seizing as he did on words, Lieber (1839) underscored the importance of 
language to human life. He also intimated that the rules and methods of hermeneutic 
science had as their foundation the linguistic nature of human experience. In brief, 
Lieber believes that language instantiates a system of intentional signs which 
functions for communication, action and the constitution of certain social practices. 
Of the first of these functions, Lieber (1839) says that language is essential for "the 
most wonderful and most important [process] on this earth," namely, "the conveying 
of ideas from one distinct individual to another; for the communion of mind with mind" 
(442).  
Weaker or stronger compromises sometimes crept in as a result of the time 
pressure felt by the delegates. In other words, time factor forced members of the 
drafting committee to compromise. As an illustration, Rukoro argued that the word 
―fraternity‖, whose opposite meaning is ―sorority‖, is sexist and proposed that it be 
replaced with a more neutral term. The chairman, Hage Geingob, overruled him: 
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The word ―fraternity‖ is neutral in this context and therefore I think, since we 
have now spoken for one hour, I want a clear decision that we deliberated on 
the preamble...and now finally agreed to it.183 
Time pressure has been shown to be one of the most important decision task 
variables. Errors in judgment can be made from either deciding too soon (rush-to-
judgment) or from delaying decisions too long. History will tell whether the committee 
made an error of judgment. 
In negotiation, the greatest form of power is a strong outside alternative to 
agreement. Therefore, if you already have a good offer, trying to bargain further with 
someone who knows you have nowhere else to go may not be the best strategy. The 
draft constitution included the word ―secular‖ in its preamble. Kosie Pretorius had a 
problem with ―secular‖ because ―it has various interpretations…and is also 
contradictory to some of the rights…‖184 Hidipo Hamutenya defended the inclusion of 
secular on the grounds that  
...this word appears in so many constitutions and it simply means that it is not 
a theocratic state…we don‘t want another Iran here…we don‘t want to mix up 
our politics…185  
But it was the arguments of Gerhard Erasmus, one of the three legal experts, co-
opted to advise members of the drafting committee, who put more powerful 
arguments on the exact meaning of secular: 
I am not going to consult the Bible. It is true that there is a popular meaning of 
the kind indicated by Mr. Barnes and the reference to the Oxford dictionary. 
The Oxford dictionary, on the other hand, is not an explanatory document on 
constitutional principles. There are examples of constitutions and I have got 
here, for example Malta and other countries where they explicitly state in the 
constitution that for example the Roman Catholic Church will be the official 
church of the country that they single out a certain religion, a state religion. 
What are you doing when you use a constitutional document and insert the 
word ―secular‖? You indicate exactly the opposite, that there will be that 
official religion. In a certain manner, it is support of the idea of freedom of 
religion, very type of religion for the people. The fact that in particular parlance 
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there is a meaning given to ―secular‖ is correct. I think we must limit our 
interpretation to what we want in t constitution and what we want to convey in 
terms of the official position or not of church and religion in the state.186 
Pretorius is widely respected in the community for his Christian faith. Reconciling his 
strong faith and his opposition to include ―secular‖ in the constitution is hard to 
understand. But he quickly understood that accepting the offer on the table and then 
asking for more may be the most effective route when you‘re at a power 
disadvantage as he were. As Beresford and Sloper (2008) writes, choice is the 
outcome of a process which involves assessment and judgement; that is, the 
evaluation of different options and making a decision about which option to choose. 
In order for these processes to take place and a choice to be made, there need to be 
two or more alternatives from which to choose. In addition, these alternatives should 
have some positive value; in this sense a choice between something which is 
definitely desired and something which is definitely not desired is not a true choice. 
Individual differences in values will define what constitutes an accurate or high 
quality decision. It is also likely that human beings adjust their ‗quality standards‘ as 
a function of task demands.  
 
Conclusion 
Deliberation is supposed to have an end. It is supposed to resolve something. 
Occasionally, deliberation yields a decision directly, as when a genuine consensus 
has emerged. But deliberative assemblies even of the most ideal sort more typically 
have to force a decision, announcing an end to the deliberations and calling for a 
vote. That final show of hands is what is crucial in conferring democratic legitimacy 
on the decision. However free and equal the preceding discussion may have been, 
the democratic credentials of the ultimate decision would be deeply suspect had it 
merely been left to the chairperson of the meeting to summarise the ―sense of the 
meeting‖ with no ratification from others. But however crucial that distinctly non-
deliberative final show of hands may be in providing democratic legitimacy for the 
decision, it is the preceding discussion which renders that decision a democratically 
deliberative one. Deliberation is expected to lead to empathy with the other and a 
broadened sense of people's own interests through an egalitarian, open-minded and 
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reciprocal process of reasoned argumentation. Following from this result are other 
benefits: citizens are more enlightened about their own and others' needs and 
experiences, can better resolve deep conflict, are more engaged in politics, place 
their faith in the basic tenets of democracy, perceive their political system as 
legitimate and lead a healthier civic life. 
A study of the proceedings of the Windhoek Assembly which framed the 
Constitution shows that many of the provisions of that instrument which are 
seemingly straightforward and artless rest in reality upon compromises after serious 
deliberations, often laboured and tortuous. The concept of compromise was the 
basis for Windhoek delegates‘ understanding of the process by which political 
disputes are settled. They also believed that given sufficient discussion, free from 
partisanship, the right solution to a dispute could be discovered. From the point of 
view of a party to the dispute, compromise involves compromising one's principles or 
beliefs without being convinced of their erroneousness. 
Members of the standing committee have sometimes resorted to a ‗diplomatic‘ 
approach. This has been a constant attitude among participants since the very 
beginning of assembly. Agreeing on an ambivalent concept or on a flexible wording, 
leaving room for different interpretations and thereby preventing the emergence of 
overt opposition, is a well-known constitutional device. Sometimes, the authors of the 
Namibian constitution even agreed to leave controversial issues out of their 
agreement, so as to avoid incompatibilities. They also resorted to applying 
compromise as a social heuristics. Similarly, negotiators tended to compromise not 
because splitting the difference was the best option, but because they learnt that 
such social heuristics got them through life with less hassle. 
The appeal to fear strategy, as a means to enable delegate to better 
recognise the nature of the problems facing the political community and to begin 
thinking about potential solutions, was clearly at play at the Windhoek Assembly. 
From the perspective of the philosopher and informal logician, appeals to fear have 
been regarded as fallacious, as attempts by immoral rhetors to sidestep the 
standards of logic and reason in order to manipulate their audiences. This art was 
used effectively at the Windhoek Assembly. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RHETORICAL CREATION OF COMMON GROUND 
 
The situation here is that if the Attorney General is a senior member in a political party and he 
is appointed by that political party into a position where he is supposed to be absolutely 
neutral, professional in his actions. This is the question that arises in our mind. It is 
continuously said, political appointments. I would like to ask this question with due respect: Is 
the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the Governor General, the 
Director of Planning, are they part of the institutions administration or are they political figures, 
because the minute we politicize our departments and heads of departments, then we are 
heading for trouble... 
Barney Barnes, 1989 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter posited that compromise is one of the means of conflict 
resolution, not an end in itself and concluded that participants sit down together not 
in order to compromise but in order to achieve a shared outcome. This chapter 
investigates how the rhetorical creation of common ground influenced the outcome 
of negotiations for Namibia‗s Constitution by focusing on how highly controversial 
issues were resolved in favour of both parties. The key element in creating common 
ground is that each party works at understanding what the other really needs out of 
the negotiation. This, in turn, depends on being able to question the other party 
about their interests or otherwise discover what they really are. This vignette is just 
one of innumerable instances during the Windhoek Assembly debate which centred 
upon questions regarding the frequency of elections, the nature of the legislature and 
extent of legislative powers, national sovereignty and nature of the presidency. 
These arguments impact rhetorical praxis because the differing views on 
representation affected the course and substance of the Constitutional debate to the 
extent that some negotiators could not escape to negotiate a constitution that they 
thought was best. The chapter will conclude by investigating whether common 
ground evoked common places to help reach agreement on a negotiated constitution 
of Namibia. 
 
Creating common ground 
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Let it suffice for now that common ground is not fixed: it changes through the 
course of the dialogue, by virtue of the physical context in which the interlocutors find 
themselves, but critically also by virtue of the linguistic context, that is, each 
interlocutor‘s contributions to the dialogue. When a speaker makes a contribution, he 
does so with the intention and expectation that it will bring about a change in the 
knowledge state of his addressee. Thus, common ground increments through the 
course of the dialogue. Indeed, successful communication depends upon the 
accumulation of common ground. By adding to common ground, the speaker may 
also be conferring obligations upon the addressee. If interlocutors are successful in 
accumulating common ground, then increasingly the private set of beliefs and 
knowledge with which each interlocutor started out the interaction becomes part of 
the mutual set of beliefs and knowledge that the two interlocutors share. 
In any negotiation, the decision to put the first offer on the table is a double-
edged sword. To the one who offers, there is a potential disadvantage: an initial offer 
conveys information about aspirations and utilities (Rubin & Brown 1975). Depending 
on the underlying structure of reservation, this information may cut off part of the 
range of potential agreements to the disadvantage of the one who offers. On the 
other hand, an opening offer may lead the opponent to perceive that settlements will 
favour the party making the first offer. This is more likely to happen when the first 
offer is an extreme one (Siegel & Fouraker 1960). Dirk Mudge at the very beginning 
of the meeting rose to take  
the floor not because I want to dominate the meeting, please don‘t get me 
wrong, but I have done some homework with my colleagues…we 
have…taken your proposal as the basis for our discussion, not because I 
think it is the best proposal, of course, but because it represents the views of 
the majority and we have to take that into account.187  
SWAPO delegates were caught by surprise at the proposal of the DTA at finding 
common ground. Mudge narrated the differences between his party and SWAPO 
proposals, which he said could be ironed out by engaging legal advisors. He 
concluded by making it clear that he was not accepting SWAPO‘s proposal.  
What I do say and what I said, I had to find out what SWAPO disagrees with 
us. So I had to look at their constitution and disagree with just for the purpose 
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 Windhoek Constituent Assembly, Hansard of the Standing Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and 
Internal Arrangements, 8 December 1989. 
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of identifying those differences let us look SWAPO‘s constitution. Then we will 
find the areas of dispute.188  
Even Pretorius said he was also prepared to accept SWAPO‘s constitution as a 
basis of discussion. Seemingly unprepared, Dr. Tjitendero responded on behalf of 
SWAPO to Mudge‘s proposal of accepting SWAPO‘s constitutional proposals as a 
working document: 
I was very much impressed by the approach that Mr. Mudge took. I think it 
was beginning to show progress in that direction. The differences that were 
state in all the statements, is where there is a material dispute or fundamental 
differences in the submissions. If we go by bringing in all the tangents, then 
obviously we will subject this session again to the same discussions we had 
before. I think Mr. Mudge made a very progressive move by saying let‘s first 
adopt. In any conference you come to, you have a working document. You 
look for its shortcomings and its omissions, and then you try to fill that. So, I 
feel that we have the material in front of us here, which are all related to one 
thing, the constitution, and I assume and I thought the reasons why Mr. 
Mudge had suggestion.189  
One consequence is that many negotiators practice an elaborate form of quid pro 
quo (this for that) in which the initial object is to find out whether the opponent is 
willing to play by integrative principles. If the opponent won't play by these rules, the 
negotiator may feel safer reverting to a distributive approach. While all agree that 
joint-gain negotiations foster working relationships, there is some disagreement as to 
the strategies that one should use during the negotiation (Fisher, Ury & Patton 
1991). Various techniques exist that lead to different levels of win-win outcomes. It is 
up to the negotiators to determine what outcomes are desired and what joint-gain 
negotiation technique is required to achieve those objectives. These choices leave 
many negotiators frustrated because of the time and energy needed to, first, 
determine the technique and, second, to complete the negotiation. 
Flexibility has long been considered an important part of the process of 
negotiations. In the vast majority of situations, it is clear that some degree of 
flexibility is required in order for negotiators to reach agreement. Therefore, flexibility 
has often been considered to be a highly valued characteristic of negotiators. At the 
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same time, too much flexibility has generally been believed to encourage exploitation 
by other parties. Because of the mixed-motive nature of all negotiating situations, the 
dilemma faced by most negotiators is to identify the appropriate balance between the 
degree of flexibility necessary to reach agreement and the degree of firmness 
required to avoid being exploited and to assure oneself of an adequate share of the 
value being negotiated. There were varying degrees on whether death penalty 
should be kept on statute books in a future independent Namibia. Given Namibia‘s 
colonial past, some argued against it while others argued for it and still others were 
non-committal. Pendukeni Ithana was one of those who argued against the inclusion 
of the death penalty in the constitution: ―We agree that the words from ―except‖ up to 
the end must go.  So, that it reads:   ‗No person shall be deprived of his right or 
personal liberty‘.‖190 
Integrative negotiations recognise that information sharing and trust are 
necessary in order to achieve mutual outcomes that lead to sustained relationships. 
Most negotiators believe that information sharing is at the core of integrative 
negotiations. The greater the amount of useful information provided by each party, 
the more likely it is that perceptions converge and joint-gain solutions result. Ithana‘s 
intervention generated a very interesting debate between members of the drafting 
committee. For the sake of completeness, the dialogue is repeated:  
Angula:  Yes, I think that is a progressive step, but you must know what that 
implies. It means no death sentence in Namibia.   
Chairman:  That was the whole debate. 
Angula:  If that is what you are saying you must be careful. 
Mudge:  That is what we are saying, whether we agree or not. 
Chairman:  We are clear. No death sentence even if it is something very bad. 
Bessinger:  I am afraid that either I as individual was misled.  After further 
consultation it was said that the ―except according to procedures established 
by law‖ should remain.  For that sole reason that until you have cleared up 
this issue of this sentence, we cannot remove that portion of the article.  
There are many grounds on which the death sentence is being argued for or 
against.  We have to sort that out and then we can come back to that 
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clause…because we cannot just let it hang in the air like that.  It hangs in the 
air with the deletion.191 
Bench-Capon (2003) asks the question: Why do rational people disagree? There are 
many reasons. It may be through ignorance: if one of the parties is unaware of a 
crucial piece of information, they may refrain from drawing a conclusion until they 
discover it. It may be through weakness: it may be that one party, although in full 
possession of all the relevant information is incapable of drawing some required 
inference. It may be through deliberate fault: one party may simply refuse to accept a 
conclusion that has been demonstrated, although here rationality is called into 
question. Such disagreements can be resolved through education, explanation or 
goodwill. Sometimes, however, the dispute may seem to be irreconcilable: both 
parties agree on the facts, are capable of making the required inferences and be 
reasonable seekers after truth, and yet still they disagree. As Perelman (1980) puts 
it, ―If men oppose each other concerning a decision to be taken, it is not because 
they commit some error of logic or calculation. They discuss apropos the applicable 
rule, the ends to be considered, the meaning to be give n to values, the interpretation 
and characterisation of facts‖(150). It is to resolve this kind of disagreement that the 
need for argumentation, intended to secure assent through persuasion rather than 
intellectual coercion, arises. 
Too much rigidity on the part of negotiators risks creating stalemate, whereas 
too much flexibility by one of the parties risks exploitation by more rigid opponents. 
From the point of view of reaching agreement, flexibility is thus a valued commodity. 
But from the point of view of each party's own individual interest, flexibility may 
detract from winning a sufficiently large share of the benefits of the negotiation. The 
right balance is thus difficult to strike, and a negotiator is constantly faced with cross 
pressures between acting flexibly in order to reach agreement and behaving rigidly in 
order to avoid exploitation or to gain the largest possible share of the outcome. 
Vekuii Rukoro was very aware of the choices members of the drafting committee 
were faced with: 
This thing can be taken to mean that the life of a person is sacrosanct except 
in deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.  If we are in the war you have to 
shoot somebody in self–defence. So, that is one level where I will have no 
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problem.  If this particular proviso refers for instance to acts or war whereby 
soldiers and the police have to shoot in execution of their official functions. 
That is a different question.  The proviso is intended to cover a judicially 
pronounced death sentence.  If there are people who are for the death 
sentence as a verdict by a court of law, then maybe we need a debate on 
it…But if we talk in terms of the ―according to the procedures established by 
law‖ in a different context, that I will accept, I have no problem with that one.  
We can even have ―except according to the procedures‖, as it is. I have no 
problem with it if it means things like self-defence or acts of war.  But if it is 
supposed to include and allow capital punishment, judicially pronounced, then 
I think we need a debate on it.192 
But how is information entered into common ground? It cannot be the case that the 
mere act of producing an utterance is sufficient for the speaker‘s intended meaning 
to become part of the speaker and addressee‘s mutual knowledge. Instead, the 
successful accumulation of common ground requires both participants to establish 
that each utterance has been understood as the speaker intended. For the 
proposition to be grounded, that is, established as part of their common ground to 
the extent necessary for current purposes, both participants must take positive action 
to ensure that they ―mutually believe that the partners have understood what the 
contributor meant, to a criterion sufficient for current purposes,‖ (Clark and Schaefer 
1989: 262). Thus the speaker and addressee act under a mutual burden of 
responsibility. Clark and Schaefer (1989) suggested that they meet this Principle of 
Responsibility through a two-stage process of collaboration. In the first stage, the 
speaker presents an utterance for the addressee to consider. Then, the addressee 
accepts the utterance by providing positive evidence that he believes that he 
understands what the speaker meant by that utterance. Such evidence may take 
several forms: the addressee may continue to attend to the speaker, may produce a 
relevant new contribution, may provide explicit acknowledgement of understanding 
or may repeat the speaker‘s utterance verbatim and so on. All of these forms provide 
different strengths of evidence for understanding. An addressee‘s continuing 
attention may be weaker evidence of understanding than verbatim repetition. After 
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acceptance, the next contribution to the dialogue may be made and an iterative 
process of presentation/acceptance takes place. 
It might perhaps be felt that if two disputants differ as to their ranking of 
values, persuasion would be difficult, if not impossible. Since the value order does 
not affect the acceptability of such arguments, persuasion should be possible with 
respect to them, even against a background of different value rankings. What is true, 
however, is that a persuasive dialogue must be directed towards the value 
judgements of the audience not the speaker. It may well be, therefore, that the 
speaker may have to offer a line of reasoning which he does not himself find 
persuasive in order to convince his audience. This need not, however, compromise 
sincerity, since he will independently believe his claim by his own lights. Nahas 
Angula was non-committal on the question of the death penalty, but for different 
reasons: 
I just feel incompetent to decide on that myself.  I think we need to consult a 
broad spectrum of the … (inaudible). If we provide them with a fait accompli 
about the death sentence, I am not sure whether we are truly and fairly 
reflecting the society‘s desires and expectations.  I don‘t know what the 
implications would be. But there must be provision.  So, as much as I don‘t 
like capital punishment, I will also not be in a position to say no capital 
punishment in the law.  I feel incompetence to do so.193  
Argumentation plays a key role in finding a compromise during a negotiation. Indeed, 
an offer supported by a good argument has a better chance to be accepted by one 
party. Argumentation may also lead a negotiator to change his goals and finally may 
constrain him to respond in a particular way. For example, if a negotiator receives a 
threat, he may accept the offer even if it is not really acceptable. Nico Bessinger, 
however, was explicitly for the death sentence and argued that it must be used 
discretionary:  
There are occasions where an act perpetrated by an individual or individuals 
against society, that it provokes society to the point where, unless that death 
penalty is applied, it disrupts the function of society that as a whole, and that 
means that if the expression of society that the supreme penalty should be 
applied is oppressed and it cannot happen, it can lead to disaster…So, I say it 
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is something that needs to be there, but it needs to be used in a discretionary 
fashion.  But if it is not there, it creates problems.194 
However, sharing information comes with a price. Each participant runs a risk when 
disclosing his or her desires and goals. If, for instance, one party believes that the 
negotiation is distributive, they will use any information disclosed by the other party 
to gain power. Therefore, if the parties do not take the time to discuss and agree 
upon the type of negotiation to use, it is likely that little information will be shared. 
The parties will fear vulnerability and not disclose important pieces of information. 
While information sharing is critical, it is nearly impossible to achieve if trust, a 
characteristic of integrative negotiation, is missing. Mose Tjitendero argued against 
death penalty saying that enough case studies that prove that death sentence is not 
a deterrent against crime.  
I think if we were to be fair to ourselves as representatives, this is one of the 
issues that can be thrown out eventually on a referendum or whatever.  But I 
don‘t think that there are sufficient grounds.  I am inclined to believe that there 
are not sufficient grounds to maintain the death penalty in a contemporary 
constitution. There is just no basis for it.  I think there are different ways in 
which human character can be reformed.  By getting rid of the life you are not 
doing anything, the acts will still be perpetuated.  So, in sociology there are 
different views of changing peoples‘ actions and behaviour through a model, 
but not through a death penalty, and I think I would like to agree with those 
who are advocating for the removal of the death penalty. It is not a deterrent 
at all.195   
The committee was divided. The integrative technique assumes that a lack of 
resources is the only reason for conflict. By obtaining more resources, parties satisfy 
their goals. This technique is only possible when additional resources are available, 
and parties must work together to collect those resources (Bazerman & Neale 1992). 
While this approach is simple in theory, it is difficult to do because additional 
resources do not always exist. Also, this technique assumes that parties‘ interests 
are not mutually exclusive, and the driving force for obtaining more resources is the 
desire to be able to continue working together (Neale & Bazerman 1991). If this 
technique is possible, it is an efficient way to achieve joint-gain without destroying 
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relationships. And yet, little relationship building occurs because only limited 
interaction is needed. There was need to find common ground on one of the most 
controversial issues during the drafting of the new constitution. Pruitt and Lewis 
introduced the concept of ―flexible rigidity‖. The essence of this concept is to be firm 
about fundamental interests and basic goals, to which one must be resolutely 
committed, while exhibiting flexibility about means of negotiating a solution to the 
problem. While this is a useful advance, it does not solve altogether at least two 
problems. On the one hand, where there are fundamental conflicts of interest, rigidity 
about basic goals may block progress altogether. On the other hand, flexibility in the 
negotiating process may be perceived by the other party as a sign of weakness that 
can be exploited to the other's benefit. Hartmut Ruppel introduced an element of 
flexibility in order to create common ground by proposing to leave the clause out of 
the constitution: 
If the people so strongly feel that it should be in, it could be a debate in 
parliament in good time. There could be a referendum which could put it back 
for some reasons to be decided. But let‘s kick off on a nice note. Let‘s give 
human rights a chance and let‘s respect human life in our first document.  We 
can always, for good and sound reasons and on debate and testing the 
feelings of our society get it back.  That is my approach.196 
The treatment of negotiating flexibility is thus often a function of which paradigm one 
selects. Within the realist, flexibility is generally defined in terms of the willingness to 
make new offers and concessions and to avoid commitments or retractions. Put 
differently, flexibility may be viewed as the prevalence of soft over hard negotiation 
styles, that is, the dominance of converging behaviours compared with. 
Another common integrative technique, logrolling, assumes that more than 
one issue is driving the conflict. Parties first provide a list of their issues and desires. 
Comparison of these lists helps parties discover that they have opposed preferences 
and values (Northcraft, Brodt & Neale 1995). Traditional logrolling assumes that 
parties have linear preferences and make calculated concessions in order to obtain 
important issues while giving away lesser valued issues (Tajima & Fraser 2001). The 
key here is that parties prioritise their issues differently and make appropriate 
concessions that result in a recognised willingness to concede on some issues in 
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order to maintain a working relationship (Pruitt 1981). This technique ensures that 
trade-offs make parties at least partially satisfied. 
Members of the drafting committee had to find common ground on the powers 
of the president of the republic especially with regards to the cabinet. From the 
onset, SWAPO wanted an executive president while the opposition parties wanted a 
ceremonial president with a prime minister as head of the government. Fearful of a 
possible dictatorship, the opposition wanted the president to share powers with 
cabinet members. Barnes proposed that the president ―act in consultation with‖ the 
cabinet. 
I think we have to be very frank. We are not making this for ourselves, quite 
obviously. And I also want to say that when we are making these decisions, 
we must know that we are not even in the position in which our comrades 
were in Zimbabwe, where our colleagues from Zimbabwe where pointing to 
Lancaster House. This is a historic opportunity we have been given as 
Namibians to write this constitution ourselves, either to mess it up to take into 
account our actions that we are taking today, and I am inclined to think that 
we are thinking too much of the immediate environment. ―In consultation with‖ 
is appropriate.197 
Once grounding has been achieved and a particular piece of information has entered 
common ground, both participants can refer to it freely and assume that it will be 
available to the other. In fact, both participants have access to two aspects of 
common ground, represented in an overall discourse representation. The first is 
represented in the component of the discourse representation that Clark (1992) 
terms the situational representation. This is the semantic component of common 
ground: the knowledge and beliefs that the interlocutors share. Addressees may also 
be influenced in their interpretation of the speaker‘s utterances by their knowledge of 
what is available in the speaker‘s situational representation. For example, an 
addressee may only interpret referential expressions with respect to referents that he 
knows are in common ground and not with respect to referents that are part of his 
privileged knowledge (Hanna and Tanenhaus 2004). Barnes argued that it was 
important that the president act on the advice of the cabinet because ―in 
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consultation‖ doesn‘t give a clear direction in line with the checks and balances that 
―we said was important for the good government function‖198. Ruppel did not agree: 
…I think the more crucial one, and we are getting bogged down on some 
technicality, the principle is stated in paragraph 2 which is clearly stating the 
joint exercise. It says: ―The executive power vests in the Cabinet headed by 
the president‖, and whether you say here at the bottom ―in consultation with 
and on advise‖ doesn‘t make a big difference, because the executive function 
of the government vests in the cabinet headed by the president. So it is really 
splitting hairs, it is not going to make a difference at all.199 
The third approach to integrative negotiation, compensation, suggests that to 
achieve desired outcomes, one party pays off the other in return for acquiescence 
(Pruitt 1981). This pay-off is unrelated to the request, but satisfies the giving 
individual. Compensation assumes that parties can determine truly desired 
outcomes by the other party, whether it is part of the negotiation or not. If this is 
done, it is possible to satisfy both parties since one achieves his or her desired 
negotiation goals, and the other receives a benefit that allows for easy recovery. 
Moses Katjiuongua wanted an even stronger obligation to work with cabinet. He 
proposed that the president be ―obliged to act in consultation with the cabinet‖.200 He 
believed that that way,  
...the president will take a decision only after consultation with the cabinet. 
When you are obliged to somebody, it means you must take their advice, and 
if you say ―advice‖ it is not good for his dignity.201  
Eric Biwa weighed in: 
For the sake of record, I would also like to say the following: I would have 
liked to have an explicit requirement that the president is advised by the 
cabinet and he is obliged to follow that advice. Now, as it stands here he is 
obliged to consult, but he is not obliged to follow that advice. He is merely 
obliged to inform on his actions and he has the right to proceed with that 
action, even if that action is not approved by the cabinet. Still, he will remain 
within the framework of the constitution … (inaudible) does not say that he 
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must be advised and should take that advice. It only says that he is obliged to 
consult. He can consult and proceed.202 
Biwa‘s approach fits with the cutting costs approach proposed by Pruitt (1981), which 
assumes that a party will accommodate the opposing party if costs associated with 
negotiating are limited or eliminated. It requires that each party know the other well 
enough to suggest cost-cutting strategies that are important to each. The party who 
desires to achieve their objectives must develop a plan that aids in the cutting of 
costs for the opposing party. This plan ensures that the opposing party is less 
affected by the time and energy used in negotiation. Although the shared cognition 
perspective is highly valuable to an understanding of negotiations, social identity 
theorists argue that negotiations are also influenced by the way negotiators identify 
with the social group(s) at stake (Oakes, Haslam and Turner 1994). As Eggins and 
others (2002) have argued, a negotiation can be seen as a communication process 
in which multiple social identities are at stake especially when negotiators represent 
a particular party or viewpoint. Their research further demonstrates that the extent to 
which negotiators identify with their own party and the negotiating group as a whole 
mediate the outcome of the negotiation. This idea is central to many recent 
perspectives on the management of (inter-group) conflict, which argue that a 
balanced expression of both identities is required to resolve inter-party disputes 
(Eggins et al. 2002). Thus, if a negotiation is ever to be successful, the different 
parties should establish common ground in the form of an overarching common 
identity in addition to their subgroup identities. 
 
Rhetoric of needs and desires 
A number of political theorists have argued the importance of deliberation to 
democracy and the need for a norm of consensus to govern such deliberation. John 
Rawls and Bruce Ackerman stress the urgency of such consensus particularly in 
deliberation of constitutional matters, those of most fundamental concern to a polity. 
Serious public debate of constitutional questions necessarily runs the risk of 
rhetorical vehemence, of mutual castigation by adversaries. It is true to say that to 
some extent, the constitutional symbolism of the Windhoek Assembly debate 
captured the collective political imagination of the time. This is not to mean that the 
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mere invocation of the word ―constitutional‖ engineered some occult change in the 
texture of political debate – that it magically transformed self-interest into collective 
interest, national or sectoral public goods into a Namibian public good, arms-length 
negotiation and compromise into deliberative rationality. The idea of a Constitution 
as a founding or transformative event is deeply inscribed in the modern political 
history, affected the terms on which and the enthusiasm with which at least some of 
Namibia‘s political classes engaged in the constitutional debate. Each side had 
intended to affect, either positively or negatively, the system and its capacity to 
provide a machinery of government which is fair and responsive to diverse demands, 
is mindful of citizen rights and is capable of delivering effective resolution and 
implementation of policy. They sought to provide both synoptic representations of the 
type of political community to which they referred and a standard to which the 
political community should aspire. Perhaps this typology can be explained better with 
Lyotard‘s notion of ―Diffèrend‖. Lyotard has written that what is at stake in a 
literature, in a philosophy and in politics, is to bear witness to diffèrends by finding 
idioms for them. By the term diffèrend, he means a case of a conflict, between at 
least two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment 
applicable to both arguments. Lyotard's focus here is on the construction, 
understanding and resolution of conflict. In cases where conflict-resolution may 
produce a diffèrend, it is important to note how the resolution which takes place 
between parties differs from a mere "litigation", in that in the former, the "regulation" 
of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the 
wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom. When a diffèrend occurs, 
the discourse of one party is excluded from the outset, for it is foreign to the genre of 
the tribunal. The claims of this party will be dismissed without even recognising 
them. Lyotard‘s notion is that as long as the discourse of the tribunal holds sway, 
nobody will even recognise the wrong (tort) done to the losing party, who becomes 
for this reason a victim. A diffèrend is therefore an implicit tie that has not been 
realised with a victim that has not been recognised.  
The fulfilment of desires and needs is stronger in the context of bargaining. 
Gilles Deleuze (1977) speaks of the "nomadization" of politics in a society where the 
face of the enemy perpetually changes. Foucault  believes that ―the relationships 
between desire, power and interest are more complex than we ordinarily think, and it 
is not necessarily those who exercise power who have an interest in its execution; 
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nor is it always possible for those with vested interests to exercise power‖ (1977: 
215). Desire will persist in all its varieties till desire transmutes itself into something 
other than itself. As Nietzsche says, it is "our needs that interpret the world; our 
drives and their ―for and against‖ (1967: 267). Yet, our lust to be and our imperatives 
of power are themselves mediated by structures, some cosmic and slow-changing, 
others cultural and labile. Creating common ground, thus, requires each side to 
identify each other‘s interests. This will take some work by the negotiating parties as 
interests are often less tangible than positions and are often not publicly revealed. A 
key approach to determining interests is asking why each side wants what it 
proposes. As stated elsewhere, some members of the drafting committee opposed 
continued reference to apartheid in the constitution. Mudge recognised that the 
nation emerged from an history of racial discrimination and could not imagine a new 
government going back to the policy of apartheid: 
Frankly, I think it is a past era. It is over and out. But if we have a democratic 
society, then…you must allow freedom of speech and we must not allow past 
experience although I agree we cannot forget the past. I don‘t expect you to 
forget the past, and you can even talk about the past. It is just normal. But 
throughout the document we find reference to, according to my feelings, too 
much about that. If anybody wants to propagate anything which is ridiculous, 
but which is not a threat to the security of the state, for God‘s sake, let them 
do that. What can we do about it? We will not go with them. There will be 
other people propagating other things which we will not like, and my problem 
is if we start specifying, where do we stop?203  
Mudge had little information about what other parties wanted. Even fellow minority 
party delegates felt compelled to side with SWAPO delegates that somehow, the 
constitution must recognise that the country suffered under apartheid. Katjiuongua 
argued that in all the constitutions of independent countries, the question of tribalism 
has been addressed by all of them, simply because they want to create a nation and 
they want to free the people from tribalism.  
In our context apartheid is part of our context apartheid is part of our problem 
and fascism is part of apartheid. So therefore I feel that these things which are 
part of our history or problems, we cannot ignore them. Other things, we leave 
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them out. If we need to make amendments in future to include them if they 
become problems, then we do so.204 
Despite the obvious prevalence and importance of negotiation, substantial evidence 
suggests that people often fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial 
outcomes. Many negotiation situations contain potential for joint gain, which are 
known as integrative negotiations. The Windhoek Assembly negotiated over 
inefficient offers and end with an efficient compromise. This meant that the parties 
considered offers which they could have never chosen. The inefficient offers and end 
with an efficient compromise refers to the parties‘ strategies and tactics rather than 
to their objectives and utilities and to the structure of the negotiation problem. It 
suggests that if one faces a distributive negotiation and proposes offers that are very 
―bad‖ for both sides, then such a negotiation becomes integrative. Paradoxically, 
stating that integrative negotiation produces efficient offers equates them with the 
―win-lose‖ description of distributive negotiations. A strictly efficient offer is, by 
definition, one that if there is another offer that produces gains only for one party it 
must also produce losses for the other party. Hence, an efficient offer creates a win-
lose situation that is typical for distributive negotiation implying that there is no 
analytical difference between the two types of negotiation. Another and related view 
of integrative negotiation is that it must end with an improvement of the parties‘ 
situation. It makes no sense for the parties (unless they are forced to negotiate) to 
engage in a time consuming process without an expectation that it would improve 
their situation. A similar argument may be made regarding the reservation values. 
Moreover, since the reservation values correspond to the offer that is unacceptable, 
it is obvious that the compromise has to dominate this offer.  
Kosie Pretorius was a strong proponent of group rights to which most black 
delegates and even perhaps some whites were opposed. As such, any discussion of 
group rights was viewed – rightly or wrongly, with suspicion. They feared that group 
rights would allow a situation where there would be whites-only schools or whites-
only hospitals as an exercise of the right to cultural minority. Pretorius allayed the 
fears that ―I will not use this article to justify it‖205. Dirk Mudge was not so convinced: 
Let me start off by saying that when you talk about discrimination in Namibia, 
it has a different connotation when you talk about discrimination in another 
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country, say for instance Japan. When you talk about group rights here, when 
we discuss the protection for minority rights and group rights in this country, 
we must do so against the background of our own experience. Let me say 
that not only the black people had bad experiences with group rights, as a 
white man I had bad experiences with this concept of group rights, and for 
that reason I am not opposed to discussing it. We can discuss it, but I will 
never agree with it. I personally feel that if you protect the individual, you are 
also protecting the individual in association with other people. Then you have 
to deal with groups that are voluntarily formed, but when you start defining 
groups, the way it is done in ACN‘s proposal, then they put me before the 
choice either to be a member of the group or not to be a member of anything 
at all, and then I am in trouble. But I don‘t want to go into detail.206 
The second aspect of common ground, which is represented in the textual 
representation, relates to the linguistic means that have been used in the dialogue to 
establish that knowledge and those beliefs. Thus, the textual representation 
constitutes a linguistic record of the utterances that each speaker has produced in 
the dialogue so far: the words and structures that have been used, their prosody, 
and so on. Some of this information may not be retained for long in the textual 
representation. For example, people are notoriously bad at remembering utterances 
verbatim (Jarvella 1971; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler 1976). But other information, 
such as the particular word that a speaker used to refer to an entity, may be retained 
for the duration of the dialogue (Horton and Gerrig 2005). In the illustration above, 
the word ―discrimination‖ was retained by Mudge as a textual representation. 
Integrative or "interest-based" bargaining is a form of negotiation in which 
each party attempts to understand the other's interests, on the expectation that it will 
achieve a better result by helping the opponent create a solution it sees as 
responsive to its own concerns. Deliberative democracy is focused on the 
circumstance in which a group must make a decision to which all members are 
bound whether they agree with it or not. Although even political deliberation can 
have various purposes, its essential aim is to reach a binding decision. From the 
perspective of deliberative democracy, other purposes - such as learning about 
issues, gaining a sense of efficacy or developing a better understanding of opposing 
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views - should be regarded as instrumental to this aim. Not only was Mudge trying to 
point out specific concerns about the article, he also wanted general agreement: 
I am afraid the word ―discrimination‖ has got a specific connotation, something 
which is wrong and I cannot agree that you can qualify discrimination. As far 
as I am concerned, discrimination is discrimination - unless you find a better 
word.  I am not saying this only because of the connotation; I am also saying 
this because I know why Mr. Pretorius wants those words in there.  We have 
discussed it before.  He maintains that if he has a school in which he wants to 
educate people in a specific culture and tradition and language and religion 
which, in the end, will boil down to racial discrimination, he will be able to 
defend it on the grounds that it is not discrimination, but in fact differentiation, 
or something like that.  If we really want to have peace in this country, then we 
must avoid making provision for any form of discrimination.207 
After interests were identified, the parties worked together cooperatively to try to 
figure out the best ways to meet those interests. Often by listing all the options 
anyone could think of without criticising or dismissing anything initially, parties came 
up with creative new ideas for meeting interests and needs that had not occurred to 
either party before. The goal was a win-win outcome, giving each side as much of 
their interests as possible, and enough, at a minimum that they saw the outcome as 
a win, rather than a loss. However, such tasks where people had to collaborate could 
not be the only context in which shared cognition plays an important part. In 
negotiations, a lack of common understandings among participants is an important 
reason for failure to come to an agreement. Thus, it would seem that shared 
cognition could also play a role as facilitator of negotiations. The exact relation 
between shared cognition and productivity may depend on the type of negotiations 
studied. For example, during negotiations characterised by a symmetrical structure 
of interests where all parties want exactly the same, shared cognition may provide a 
better understanding, but the attained outcome is very likely to be sub optimal 
(Carnevale & Pruitt 1992). Therefore, shared cognition is unlikely to contribute to 
productivity in any straightforward fashion. The scope for shared cognition to make a 
difference is much greater in those negotiations with an asymmetrical structure of 
interests. In this type of negotiation, it is possible to make trade-offs by the principle 
                                                 
207
 Ibid., 13 December 1989. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
138 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
of logrolling, allowing the development of win-win agreements, in which both parties 
accomplish their major goals (Carnevale & Pruitt 1992; Pruitt & Carnevale 1993). So, 
an integrative negotiation provides the opportunity for a group negotiation outcome 
to be productive without harming individual outcomes. In integrative negotiations, 
shared cognition as a common understanding of each other‘s problems and possible 
solutions would seem essential ingredient of reaching the maximum joint outcome. 
Thus, in integrative negotiations shared cognition may be a key predictor of group 
productivity.  
It is generally accepted that if two or more parties with conflicting interests 
wish to resolve the issue because they perceive it to be to their mutual benefit, they 
commit themselves to bargaining. In the bargaining process each party tries to 
maximise its gains and minimise its losses (Berkovitch 1984: 126-128). This creates 
the so-called bargaining problem, that is, whereas bargainers need to reach a 
settlement, they also prefer one that is most favourable to them. The mixed-motive 
nature of bargaining is expressed in the fact that "if they had no incentive to 
cooperate, they would not bargain at all; if they had no incentive to compete, they 
would not need to bargain" (Bacharach and Lawler 1981: 4). Given this mixture of 
competitive and cooperative motivation, the problem lies in determining the exact 
outcome of any bargaining process, given the range of possible agreeable outcomes 
within the contract zone (Roth 1979: 1).  
The issues surrounding the "politics of negotiation" in Namibia were complex 
and wide-ranging. The conflict originated with a dispute over a constitutional formula 
on which all parties could agree. One of the sticking points at the Windhoek 
Assembly was the powers of the president with regards to assenting of the bills 
passed by parliament and what happens when parliament re-passes the bill after the 
president had declined to assent. Mudge sought to ensure that the president does 
not abuse his powers to dissolve parliament:  
We did not want the president to dissolve the government for any other 
reasons than those of time or when the country becomes ungovernable. The 
problem that we have, I am not concerned with article 55 because you must 
always read the two articles together and it is a fact that he can only do it if 
the government is unable to govern effectively. I remember the honourable 
member Mr. Rukoro made a suggestion there that we should put that more 
clearly and not only say ―become ungovernable‖, but it should be because of 
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a major constitution crisis. How do you in any case define a major 
constitutional crisis? I think it is a practical problem. The question I want to 
ask, what is a government?  You know, you can have a problem because the 
cabinet cannot function properly and there might be nothing wrong with the 
Assembly. In that case I suppose the Assembly can move a motion of no 
confidence in the cabinet, am I right? I think we have that provision. Why 
should we allow any president to just dissolve a government just because he 
wants an election?  And if we must then in the case of a major constitutional 
crisis, then we must make sure that we can define that problem. I am not sure 
we can. A last point: what happens to the president in case of the government 
being dissolved? If he also must go it is another check that he wouldn‘t do it 
easily. But can we discuss that point now or must we discuss it when we 
come back to the point, the election of the president? I think that is about the 
only provision that we can make for power not being abused.208 
The integrative bargaining process involves both concession-making and searching 
for mutually profitable alternatives. Simply stated, it enables negotiators to search for 
better proposals than those explicitly before them. From this perspective, negotiators 
are viewed as partners who cooperate in searching for a fair agreement that meets 
the interests of both sides (Bartos 1995). Some common integrative bargaining 
techniques include clear definition of the problem; open sharing of information and 
exploration of possible solutions. This approach encourages the generation of, and 
commitment to, workable, equitable and durable solutions to the problems faced by 
the parties. The preferred outcome of this model is one of maximum joint gains. 
Bearing this in mind, the proposal was that the president will also have to resign 
within a certain time and he will have to call elections for both a new legislature and 
a new president. That is how the constitutional deadlock was proposed to be 
remedied. Vekuii Rukoro took the floor to oppose the proposal but also to offer a 
counterproposal. 
The president may dissolve the National Assembly in, instead of three, we say 
two ways. The first one is acting soloist, article 34(2) (a). My understanding of 
that is that he can do so in two ways. The first one is, for instance, to specify 
so that there can be no loopholes for abuse, that the president can resort to 
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this power in order to resolve a major constitutional crisis which materially 
affects the ability of the government to govern effectively. It is deliberately 
phrased in a general way because we cannot foresee all the types of 
constitutional crises that may come up. That will exclude this thing whereby 
he can dissolve because it is a good year for him. Secondly, I think the 
president can act under this power for the ordinary dissolution of parliament 
after four, five years when the term of tenure is up. That is the only possibility 
for him to act under this article. The second and final authority under article 
48(4) is stipulated in the DTA-draft, is what we talked about earlier on, namely 
the vote of no-confidence by parliament and the prime minister advises 
president accordingly.209 
In addition to public-spiritedness, the reasoning must show respect to the 
participants and their arguments, even if it challenges the validity of the claims. In 
mutual justification, deliberators present their arguments in terms that are accessible 
to the relevant audience and respond to reasonable arguments presented by 
opponents. The requirement of accommodation means that the reasoning must keep 
open the possibility of cooperation on other issues, even if the deliberators do not 
specifically propose alternatives or initiate collaboration. Equal participation requires 
that no one person or advantaged group completely dominate the reason-giving 
process, even if the deliberators are not strictly equal in power and prestige. Barnes 
held the view that the argument of Rukoro would have been very logical if the 
president was elected by the Assembly as a member of the assembly. Only then 
would the consequences would have followed to its logical consequences that if 
parliament is dissolved, he is dissolved because he is there by virtue of his election 
by parliament. Barnes made two specific points: 
We are dealing with an issue where we want to use the democratic process to 
bring something that is not completely democratic by avoiding an election. It 
can be argued that the 1982 Principles does provide for that, but the 
electorate out there was under the explicit impression that they are voting for 
a constitute assembly that will draft a constitution. With these two things in 
mind I further submit that the conflict situation that we will have to resolve is to 
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draft a constitution for an interim arrangement with a final solution to an 
independent state. 
How do we influence each other through communication and how does this affect 
the outcomes of group behaviour? First posits that we have to develop a common 
and accurate understanding of each other in order to attain outcomes that are 
satisfactory to all group members involved. The second approach advocates that the 
degree to which we feel part of certain social groups is decisive for the outcomes of 
our behaviour. When considered alone, each approach appears to be supported. 
However, they both tell only one part of the story and do not mention the fact that the 
two approaches may influence each other as well. It is argued here that in order to 
get a more complete understanding of social influence, a common ground is 
necessary. The process of creating common ground was itself not free from conflict if 
Hamutenya‘s call for a point order is anything to go by: 
I think Mr. Barnes is now out of order. He is now taking to other issues. What 
he has just said definitely is out of order. We are drafting the permanent 
constitution of Namibia. 
This response by Hamutenya seemed to have infuriated Barnes. Aristotle asked the 
question: Even when angry rhetoric would appear to be a reasonable, morally 
appropriate response, is there a way in which rhetors might manage anger in their 
public discourse in order to achieve ends which are both morally and pragmatically 
productive? The answer lies in non-angry rhetoric, which involves transforming and 
reflecting upon anger in public discourse. Because such rhetoric often promotes 
noble ends such as reconciliation and forgiveness, it is at least morally permissible 
and more likely morally virtuous. Barnes took leaf out of this theory: 
I was not out of order and I should be afforded the opportunity to prove that I 
was not out of order. That is democratic. The mere fact that I referred to a 
particular thing was under the assumption that you said cross reference we 
might be made and I assure you, that is what you have said. If I have then 
acted in good faith on the arrangement of ruling that you made, I was not out 
of order. 
As the philosopher of rhetoric Eugene Garver says, the particular passions Aristotle 
chooses to explore in the Rhetoric serve a role necessary for the kind of public, 
political decision making Aristotle assigns to rhetoric. These emotions serve to 
integrate - or segregate, as the case may be - ―distinct individuals into a deliberative 
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or judging body, or demos‖ (1994: 131). While there are times when individuals 
seem to deserve our angry rhetoric, it may not be justified from a broader moral 
perspective, especially when the goal is the good of the state or the community - 
especially if angry rhetoric leads to the violent dissolution of democratic community.  
As negotiators have to draw on shared norms to justify their positions in an arguing 
process, arguing might be more common as well as more successful, the denser the 
network of common knowledge and shared norms among the delegates is. The 
normative interpretation of the ―democratic peace‖ theory claims that it is that shared 
background that makes democracies particularly averse against entering armed 
conflict against each other, as they recognise each other as directed by the same set 
of cherished norms (Risse-Kappen 1995). In this case, dissolution of democratic 
order was not desirable because angry rhetoric hinders or assists individuals living, 
working and deliberating together. Geingob recognised this when making a ruling 
whether Barnes was in fact out of order: ―In good faith, you are out of order because 
you are bringing something we have already agreed upon.‖210 
Zagacki and Boleyn-Fitzgerald (2006) write in Philosophy and Rhetoric that 
the Old Testament is filled with many examples of a God and other Biblical 
characters discoursing angrily in order to achieve moral ends. However, Aristotle 
was one of the first to deal systematically with the relationship between anger, 
rhetoric and virtue. In Book 4, Chapter 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, he concedes 
the difficulty of coming up with a ―formula‖ for recommending when and how angry a 
person ought to get. Nevertheless, Aristotle supplies what might be construed as a 
topology for morally appropriate angry rhetoric, claiming that the virtuous person gets 
angry only in the manner that reason instructs, and at those people and for that 
length of time: ―what deserves praise‖ is that we ―show anger at the right person, on 
the right occasion, in the right manner, and so forth, while the extremes and 
deficiencies deserve blame‖ (1126b 5–10). Hamutenya exhibited some anger in 
reply to the opposition parties that appeared insistent on a ceremonial president, 
which SWAPO strongly opposed: 
In their documents they called it ceremonial, the same thing. So we know that 
the question of how the president is elected hinges on those basic 
propositions to begin with because his wings must be clipped. That was the 
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essence of the construction. In recognition of that fact we went through the 
exercise to curtail the powers, as my colleague Mr. Angula has just indicated. 
We on our part were saying we are interested in checks and balances, 
properly understood, not only the fiction of it. We were saying there will be a 
legislature directly elected by the people with its specific mandate to make 
laws and then we want an executive with its contrary mandate not an 
extension of the other organ of the state, to administer the country, to execute 
policies. So we wanted that balance to be established and that is what we 
have been fighting for all along. So we can continue to do that and that is 
where we are now. We are asking that in the light of the quid pro quo which 
were made. We gave you two things. You gave us one. Please give us that 
other thing in essence not only in appearance.211 
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle tries to explicate the causes of anger, the state of mind of 
those who become angry and those at whom people become angry. Emotions like 
anger are important to Aristotle‘s theory of rhetoric, although it is important to 
understand that there is a distinction between the emotional state of anger and angry 
rhetoric. Angry rhetoric, however it is performed publicly, tries to evoke anger in 
one‘s audience, as Aristotle himself demonstrates. Once evoked, anger has 
enormous implications, significantly altering both the spatial and temporal framework 
in which audiences see the world. Aristotle recognised that the pleasure of anger 
derives from the way people imagine how in the future their anger can be appeased. 
The delegates at the Windhoek Assembly exercised caution, however, even as they 
believed to have justified anger. Calmly but deliberately, Ben Amathila spoke about 
the desire to reach common ground: 
We deferred this matter yesterday because of an intervention by Mr. Mudge. 
Having had all the explanations given, again this morning upon the request of 
Mr. Mudge, I think we have a chance of making shortcuts in settling this issue 
because I think satisfactory explanations have been given and the relationship 
between the election of the president vis-à-vis the various powers and 
functions that we have been discussing the whole day. It would therefore be 
possibly important to invite the house, and Mr. Mudge in particular as to 
whether satisfactory explanations have been given in the issue we have been 
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discussing since yesterday. It is true that the wheel has been invented once 
for those who want to use the wheel, not to reinvent the wheel every time they 
want to use the wheel. It is equally true that the first wheel was probably made 
out of stone or wood and it didn‘t have a bearing, a…bearing to make it last 
longer. Therefore, maybe our experiences from place to place, country to 
country and state to state call upon us pay attention to our own situation. I am 
trying to say that in an effort to try and find a sort of local satisfaction for the 
president we are going to have, it will not be a run-away president; it will not 
be a person which will trigger our minds, given our past experiences what 
happened in countries in the neighbourhood or somewhere else. It would 
appear to me that it is very important as well for us to realise that the 
president we are trying to create will reflect the aspirations of this young 
nation which will be launched in the international community from which we 
have been denied access to, and the type and the dignity of this president has 
to be seen in relation to the task entrusted to him in relation to other 
presidents. We should not clip too much off his wings. Then we are obviously 
going to find the launching of this nation into the constellation of nations rather 
difficult.212 
Aristotle offers little obvious advice in the Rhetoric about when it is morally advisable 
to employ angry rhetoric in public discourse, although he does suggest practical 
ways for a speaker to ―put his hearers . . . into the right frame of mind‖ with regard to 
certain issues and the speaker‘s persuasive intent (1378a 15–16). For Aristotle, the 
problem of angry rhetoric seems closely connected to ethos or the character of the 
speaker. However, once again he offers little specific advice about the role anger 
might play in constituting the ethos of the orator, although we can speculate, given 
Aristotle‘s discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics, that an orator who does not 
respond angrily when appropriate may give an audience reason to question the 
speaker‘s goodwill, character or his sense of phronesis. Perhaps, we can find clues 
to the process in Tjiriange‘s contribution to the debate:  
Ladies and gentlemen, I think we have debated enough. There is nobody who 
can add new ideas to this debate; we just have to take a decision. We are for 
the directly elected president. We are very much convinced that this is the 
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most democratic way of going about things. We have been talking about 
democracy here. Let the people decide for themselves whom they want as 
their president. We are asking no more, no less. We just want democracy to 
prevail. Let the people find their own leader. This is what we are requesting 
and I think all of us are democrats here and we cannot afford to frustrate 
democracy.213 
Threats and promises are two faces of the same coin in that the same argument can 
be cast either in the form of a threat or of a promise. Threats and promises affect the 
behaviour rather than the belief structure of a persuadee. They are used, in general 
as a last resort, when reason fails. The effectiveness of a threat (promise) hinges on 
the power of the persuader to control the contingencies mentioned in the threat 
(promise). A threat (promise) is self-justified and does not need any extra 
justification. Because people want to satisfy their goals, threatening an important 
goal of a persuadee is the most effective of arguments. Aristotle‘s argument 
imagines one motive for avoiding anger or angry rhetoric and then suggests that all 
individuals who avoid them have that motive. Aristotle is right that one might be 
motivated to avoid anger or angry rhetoric out of a slavish sentiment. Dirk Mudge 
knew that there is was no way left for him to convince SWAPO otherwise. He also 
accepted that it will not be in the interest of negotiations to continue pursuing a line 
that will further alienate some moderates in the assembly: 
I agree with the honourable member that I think this discussion and all the 
arguments are more or less exhausted now and I am convinced that I will not 
even in this last contribution or intervention from my side will be able to 
persuade the majority. It doesn‘t mean that I have changed my mind. I also 
agree, and I am sure I represent my party, that we are in favour of a president 
being elected by parliament. We will reserve our right to speak in the 
assembly as far as this point is concerned. As democrats of course we will 
accept the outcome.214 
Institutional settings do not only provide different degrees of reference points 
enabling the triadic structure of arguing to play itself out, they also vary with regard to 
the (public) audiences, who can listen to the argumentative exchanges of the 
speakers. That was why Mudge voiced his eagerness to speak in the assembly 
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where he could speak without the restrictions of the committee being imposed on 
him. Elster (1991) has pointed out that public discourses tend to have a ―civilizing 
effect‖ on the participants in the sense that explicitly selfish interests can rarely be 
defended and justified in the public sphere. At least, actors have to pretend 
rhetorically that their interests serve the common good. Once universalistic claims 
are made in a public discourse, though, other speakers can weigh in and challenge 
the arguments as self-serving. On the other hand, Checkel (1999) claims that based 
on insights from the literature on persuasion, that arguing geared to a reasoned 
consensus is more likely in private in-camera settings and behind closed doors given 
the considerable risks which actors face when they expose their interests or even 
identities to arguing. Thus, arguing in front of a public would rarely result in a true 
dialogue, but more likely lead to ritualistic rhetoric and purely strategic arguing. Both 
claims might be correct, but depend on the institutional context of the negotiations. In 
the case of legal reasoning in front of a court, for instance, the civilising effects of an 
audience weigh heavily on the speakers even if they are strongly motivated by 
instrumental concerns. The point here is that judges and juries are obliged to be 
impartial and to decide about the validity of the arguments of the speakers. In 
contrast, arguing in front of an audience often results in ritualistic rhetoric and 
symbolic mobilisation, because the speakers‘ main purpose is to rally their own 
constituencies behind their positions and rhetorical performance criteria are at least 
as important as the ‗power of the better argument‘. Mudge seemed to grasp the full 
extent of what history will say: 
But Mr. Chairman, because the records of this assembly and this committee 
will become very important in future, I will very briefly and to the point make a 
few remarks for the record. First of all, our party proposed a ceremonial 
president. We have accepted an executive president because what we have 
now and will have will not be ceremonial president. There is no doubt about 
that. You have agreed on a number of restrictions. When you go back and 
look at the draft, you will find that those restrictions or whatever you might call 
them, clipping of the wings of the president, mainly boils down to the 
confirmation of a small number of appointments. I don‘t think for the rest that 
we have really clipped his wings. On the other hand, I also want to put on 
record that our party wants the government, the ruling party and the president 
to rule effectively. So, in a way we are happy that the majority is such that the 
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government can rule effectively. Otherwise it could have been a problem…I 
think that we have come together in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill. We 
have a tremendous responsibility towards the future generations and for that 
reason it was necessary that we discuss these issues – properly discuss them 
without fear, without hesitation to express our views because, Sir, history will 
judge and future generations will judge who were right and who were wrong. 
For that reason, I thought it necessary to put these things on record.215 
Whether or not you agreed with him, Mudge was able to articulate his position 
clearly. His abilities may have served him well. The key to successful arguing is how 
a speaker is perceived by the audience. There are certain strategies with which 
actors can gain the status as credible speaker. It does not suffice that actors claim to 
hold legitimate knowledge, but have to prove that the way they acquired this 
knowledge meets certain criteria of validity and can be shared inter-subjectively. 
Moreover, as other studies pointed out before, knowledge brokers must be perceived 
as honest and impartial or dedicated to a cause which is looked upon as being 
legitimate and in the interest of some common good. For persuasion to be effective, 
the appropriate type of argument has to be presented in each situation. An 
argument's convincing power derives from the strength of its justification. A 
justification does not always have to be explicit for the argument to be effective. A 
justification does not even have to make sense for an argument to be potentially 
persuasive. It suffices that the justification sounds plausible. Whether or not a 
justification is plausible depends at least partly on the conventional sources of 
persuasive arguments for the domain. 
 
The mixed-motive nature of rhetoric  
When common ground is reached, goals may have regulated arguments in 
several ways. Arguments focus on two (or more) persons‘ views about the worth of 
accomplishing incompatible goals. SWAPO and the smaller parties recognised that 
they had a goal conflict and that both of their goals could not be attained at the same 
time. If either party was unaware of the conflict, an argument could not begin. If 
mutual recognition occurred and the two parties sought to resolve their conflict by 
defending and advancing a position, then an argument could be pursued. Arguers 
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almost always enter a negotiation with the goal of persuading their opponent of the 
worth of their stance, especially at the beginning of a negotiation. They believe that 
their position is better and more valid than their opponent‘s. Consequently, the 
frequency of overt justification and explanation of goals and stances is high in 
arguments. There was recognition that each party has a role to play in order to reach 
agreement on the dissolution of parliament. Interestingly, the dissolution of 
parliament was linked to the proposed position and functions of prime minister. The 
DTA led by Mudge were not committal to the proposal: 
Mr. Chairman, it is not possible for our delegation here to finally make a 
proposal, we have to discuss it with our caucus, but the feeling among us 
here is that we might agree to amend our proposals in so far as the position of 
the prime minister is concerned. We make provision for a cabinet with the 
prime minister as the chairman of the cabinet. In your case the president will 
preside at the meetings of the cabinet. We do not have authority to as this 
point in time make concession there, but we have the feeling that there we 
might be able to make a concession. The main difference, I would say 
between our proposals and the working document, A.1, is the fact that we 
make provision for the prime minister and a cabinet which will have to be 
approved by parliament. It will not be in the sole discretion of the president to 
appoint the prime minister and the members of the cabinet. It will not be in his 
sole discretion, it will have to be approved by parliament. In other words, that 
will have to discuss and secondly, we make provision or we qualify the 
powers of the president by bringing in the word ―on instruction‖. It could also 
be ―on advice‖. That will not really make any difference, it is the same thing. 
We just have to keep that in mind.216 
Mudge tried to appeal to the status quo. The strength of this justification comes from 
the fact that, unless there exist strong evidence to the contrary, people tend to 
extrapolate the present. This form of justification is common when one argues about 
future events. Negotiations have several critical characteristics (Thompson 1990): 
communication is open and interactive, intermediate solutions are feasible, parties 
can make temporary offers and counteroffers and an agreement is not reached 
before all parties accept a proposal. The basic challenge in integrative negotiations 
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is the mixed-motive nature of the task. Negotiation implies tension between the 
creation and claiming of values (Lax & Sebenius 1986). The parties have incentives 
to cooperate in order to increase the size of the total pie. Typically, outcomes better 
than compromises can be achieved by making trade-offs across issues of differential 
importance to the parties. In order to make such tradeoffs, information exchange and 
joint problem-solving are needed. Simultaneously, however, the negotiators must 
safeguard against exploitation and secure a fair share of the value they created for 
themselves. This is achieved through distributive behaviour where they argue, focus 
on positions and ask for concessions. The tension between integration and 
distribution makes negotiations difficult and challenging. Therefore, negotiators 
frequently fail to reach high quality agreements that fully capitalise on the differences 
in priorities between negotiators. Motivational orientations and their interplay are 
here seen as potentially important causes of the process and outcomes achieved in 
integrative negotiations. 
Use of precedents as counter-examples provides a strategy to convince a 
persuadee that his claim is not as tenable as he would like to think. The power of 
counter-examples lies in their ability to point out contradictions between the claimed 
and the actual behaviour of the persuadee. This was clearly at play at the Windhoek 
Assembly. Under all circumstances, SWAPO would not have the opposition parties 
―approve‖ members of the cabinet. SWAPO argued that its numerical strength was 
huge enough not to be treated like a coalition government where parties must seek 
the co-operation of others. Hage Geingob made the argument for SWAPO: 
...I have never seen that you have to go and get permission for that. But on 
the other hand, if we are going to talk about where there is no absolute 
majority, where you have to co-opt and so on, it is slightly a different matter.217  
The persuasive power of these arguments depends on the importance of the goal 
that is claimed to be promoted by the adoption of the persuader's proposal. People 
will substitute the satisfaction of a lesser goal for a more important one. As stated 
elsewhere, common ground refers to the mutual knowledge, beliefs and assumptions 
of the participants in a conversation. During the conversation, common ground is 
updated in an orderly way, by each participant trying to establish that the others have 
understood their utterances well enough for the current purposes. A logical 
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consequence of the joint action perspective is that one of the primary roles of 
common ground is to act as the domain of interpretation for reference. However, 
while common ground ultimately does determine the appropriate context for 
interpretation, the timing of its effects remains an open empirical question.  
There will be bargaining phases in any negotiation. Negotiators have to justify 
their preferred principles on normative grounds and this process requires the use 
and exchange of arguments. Bargaining cannot solve disagreements over fairness 
principles. To put it differently: A bargaining compromise over fairness principles will 
unravel immediately, when it comes to distributing the cake, while a reasoned 
consensus over what constitutes a ―fair deal‖ is a pre-condition for solving the 
distributive problem. This can be elaborated by citing the discussion of 18 December 
1989 on the size of Namibia‘s new cabinet. Barney Barnes had proposed that the 
size of the cabinet should be determined by the constitution. He stated as follows:  
The one thing that I think can we do to gain greater credibility for this 
government-to-be, would be to put in a clause on how many ministers there 
should be in relation to our country, the size of the population and in relation 
to the first government. I think it would give an image of maturity, an image of 
a responsible government. I don‘t say it can happen, but in five years‘ time 
some executive president may come to power and he would start with saying 
that he has a carte blanche to appoint ministers, and the Assembly being 72, 
he would have 69 cabinet ministers. We trust that this government will be a 
responsible government. I agree with my colleague that the prerogative rests 
with the president as far as the Cabinet is concerned. But if the constitution 
did say 15 ministers and 18 deputy ministers just as a guideline, it would just 
about round off a constitution that we believe will be in the best interest of the 
country and its people.218 
Peter Katjavivi did not think it would be necessary to determine the numbers in 
advance and should be left flexible for the president to determine. Theo-Ben Gurirab 
agreed that to fix a number in the constitution would be arbitrary, but thought  
...a proliferation of ministries would not serve us well, they are very expensive. 
Some of you have experience in this, I don‘t, and the mere creation of 
ministries would not serve the president‘s interest and certainly those that are 
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members of the Assembly would be duty bound to advise the president if he 
were just to go on creating ministries to pay back his political friends and so 
on, that it is a costly business...I think the president should be advised that 
small things are beautiful.219 
Members of the negotiating group have joint interests related to the success of the 
partnership and potentially conflictive interests related to the allocation of burdens 
and rewards between the parties they represent. The mixed-motive nature of the 
tasks creates a dilemma for the group members (Lax & Sebenius 1986) regarding 
how to approach the negotiations. Some members may focus heavily on the 
competitive aspects of the negotiations and be motivated to only maximise their own 
gain. They may do so because they believe that the value of getting engaged in a 
partnership depends only on own gain. Other members may be inclined to focus also 
on the joint interests of the emerging partnership and are therefore motivated to 
maximise both own and joint gain. They may do so because they believe a viable 
partnership depends on values being created for all the partners. Thus, given that 
competitive and cooperative forces co-exists in many small group negotiations, we 
may expect members in small negotiating teams to be as likely to differ as to share 
motivational orientations (Brett 2001). When bargaining is repetitive, negotiators 
need to be concerned with their reputations (Raiffa 1982). A reputation for an 
aggressive or uncaring style might cause future negotiations to become distributive 
and hostile, while a reputation for a cooperative or friendly style might cause future 
negotiations to become more integrative. Valley et al. (1995) review the literature on 
how expectations of future interaction affect negotiator behaviour and conclude that 
reputations do indeed affect behaviour. In particular, negotiators who anticipate 
repeated future interactions with each other are more likely to trust each other, to 
feel more dependent on each other, to develop a working relationship, and generally 
to behave more cooperatively. Indeed, one lesson from Axelrod‘s (1984) exploration 
of the prisoner‘s dilemma is that one way to foster cooperation is to ensure a 
sufficiently long future of repeated interactions so that the value of defection today is 
outweighed by the value of continued cooperation. As Valley et al. emphasize, the 
utility of a single transaction often pales in comparison to the utility derived from a 
series of future interactions, and therefore, a negotiator may be willing to make large 
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concessions in a current transaction because of an expectation of gaining back even 
more in the future. 
A negotiator‘s concern for reputation also extends beyond the dyadic 
relationships negotiators have with each other. The current counterpart has friends 
and colleagues with whom the negotiator may later negotiate and with whom the 
counterpart may discuss the negotiator‘s bargaining style, honesty, cooperativeness 
or aggressiveness. Thus, it is wise for negotiators to value and cultivate their 
reputations so that future counterparts are not unfavourably biased against them. 
Any negotiation evaluation made on a stand-alone basis could easily miss these 
other values. The delegates were very much in agreement on a host of other 
matters. So much goodwill was generated on the 18 December 1989 to the extent 
that agreement was reached on a lot of subjects. At the end of the day, agreement 
was also reached to table the report to the constituent assembly. The relationship 
that was being developed is best captured in the intervention by Dirk Mudge and the 
response by Hage Geingob, chairman of the committee: 
Mudge: Mr. Gurirab made a very important request and that is tomorrow 
there will be again silence after the report has been tabled. Isn‘t there a 
possibility of at least some of the leaders making a short statement, not long 
speeches, just saying that we have made progress and that we found the 
other guys not very unreasonable, just say something for the people outside 
because they are asking us. The alternative is that parties can afterwards 
issue statements. But I don‘t think that is the right way of doing it - if we could 
just have short, brief statements in the House. 
Chairman: ...Thank you very much for your co-operation and also for 
wonderful participation. I think if this spirit is going to be maintained in the 
Cabinet and the Parliament of Namibia, we are going to teach the world a 
lesson. (Applause)220 
The problem has been defined, participants negotiated a common solution. This was 
the actual bargaining phase of the negotiations where horse trading, package deals 
and other bargaining tools were expected to be employed. As a result, arguing and 
reason-giving receded into the background and had less effect than during the 
earlier phases of the negotiations. And while a coercive solution sharply contradicts 
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the logic of arguing, it suffice to infer that the influence of finding common ground will 
describe the negotiation results as outright failure, agreement to disagree, 
compromise or consensus. This is to say that when two or more people come 
together to jointly solve a problem they contribute different perspectives and different 
areas of expertise. Different perspectives mean different goals, background 
knowledge and assumptions. Different areas of expertise often mean different 
languages for addressing the problem. Thus solving a problem jointly is both 
advantageous and difficult. On the one hand, the information processing resources 
being applied to the problem are increased, different viewpoints and skills 
overcoming some of the limitations of the individual.  
It is a fact that public disagreement on constitutional questions is extremely 
uncomfortable and prone to rhetorical excess. It seems then that the institutional 
guarantee of free political speech rubs up against the moral imperative to resolve 
constitutional crises on consensual terms. In other words, when political 
disagreement is pervasive and must end in decisive victory for one side over the 
other, it stands to reason that the norm of dissensus (as opposed to consensus) is 
on shaky ground. Instead, public deliberation of contested constitutional questions 
tends to be governed rather by a norm of consensus. This illustration from a debate 
of 18 December 1989 makes clear the point above. The question arose whether the 
Secretary to the Cabinet must be a civil servant or a political appointee. Hamutenya 
argued that the Secretary to Cabinet must be a civil servant. This view was 
supported by Barnes on condition that the incumbent has to be appointed by the 
Public Service Commission. Tjiriange was not too sure:  
I have no problem with that, but we have to take into consideration that in 
some places these people are almost like politicians. Take the case of 
Zambia, for example. The secretary is appointed by the president, and he is 
almost in the same position as the advisors of the president. He is a political 
appointee and he is like the ministers and so on. A civil servant will be 
appointed by the Civil Service Commission and be subjected to the rules of 
the civil service, but that is a political duty that he does in the Cabinet. I don‘t 
know I want to reconcile these two positions. He is a political animal.221 
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People's attitudes and goals are strongly influenced by the groups to which they 
belong. They use the achievements of their peers as a standard with which to 
compare their situation and expectations. The Zambian example illustrates the point. 
The irreducible matter of judgment that lurks here is exactly when, under what 
circumstances, is it appropriate to be partisan, adversarial, independent-minded to 
put faith in institutions for resolving conflict rather than good will and sincerity and 
when to favour a norm of consensus that urges us to concur rather than simply defer 
to the outcome of an adversarial procedure. Reasonable political judgment, then, 
requires that we recognise the ramifications of constitutional debate. That means 
that we must understand the public consequences of invoking a deliberative norm of 
consensus. 
One of the key differences between cooperative and contentious negotiating 
styles is in the nature of the underlying relationship. Whereas a cooperative 
negotiation style is founded on a communal relationship, a contentious style is 
founded on a transactional relationship. As a result, a cooperative style emphasises 
trust, whereas a contentious style emphasises power. However, trust is not simply a 
by-product of cooperation but also a pre-requisite for it (Pruitt 1981). Theoretical 
analyses of trust describe a cycle in which high initial trust elicits cooperation and 
cooperation in turn builds trust. Differing, yet similarly views shared by opposition 
and majority parties resulted in common ground: that it was necessary to have a 
Secretary to Cabinet who is a civil servant, nominated by president and appointment 
by Public Service Commission. 
 
Conclusion 
Common ground informs us that constitutionalism is based on the premise 
that for a constitution to be legitimate, it must have the support of the people. Without 
this legitimacy, there is less assurance that either the constitution or rule of law 
generally, will be willingly accepted and internalised. In order to achieve such 
legitimacy, new constitutionalism borrows from the ideas of democracy, to ensure 
that the populace is involved with the process of drafting the constitution. The 
promise of new constitutionalism can be clearly seen in post-conflict situations. By 
allowing opposing sides to come together and work together in creating their shared 
new constitution, and by assuring that all sides have ownership in the process, it 
enhances the new constitution‘s, and the new government‘s legitimacy. 
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Thus, four points, arising from the chapter, need restatement: first, in order to 
achieve collaborative solutions, participants must first understand that collaboration 
is voluntary. There should be no coercion used when establishing a problem solving 
team.  
Second, collaboration requires parity between participants. Every individual 
should have equal opportunities during interactions.  
Third, participants must recognise that collaboration is based on mutual goals. 
This recognition allows the stakeholders to focus on agreement rather than 
differences.  
Fourth, stakeholders must understand that collaboration depends on shared 
responsibility for participation and decision-making. Information sharing is imperative 
because it ensures that participants have similar perspectives. 
It is posited therefore that a powerful informal or cultural norm suggests to us 
that, with regard to constitutional deliberation, what is called for is not partisanship 
but statesmanship, not normal disagreement but the search for a common ground, a 
genuine expression of the popular will. Both Rawls and Ackerman have defended 
this statesmanship norm with elegance and passion. These theorists recognise and 
affirm the intimate connection between constitutional politics and deliberation to 
consensus. But there is also a connection between deliberative consensus seeking 
and rhetorical vehemence and vituperation. It is precisely the constitutional demand 
for statesmanship rather than partisanship that drives political oratory to the use of 
exclusionary invective, at least when there is actual disagreement among substantial 
numbers of negotiators. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The study focused on the rhetoric used during the drafting of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Namibia. The thesis offered a framework for understanding 
negotiation in terms of distinct and coherent rhetoric: Firstly, what reasons, grounds, 
justifications or explanations either in support of or in opposition to, some claim or 
position were provided? Secondly, what rhetorical distributive bargaining devices 
were applied during the negotiations for Namibia‘s Constitution? Thirdly, how did the 
application of common ground during the negotiations for Namibia‘s Constitution 
affect the outcome? Fourthly, how did the parties use the rhetoric of compromise 
during the constitution-making process? 
The study reveals that, with very few exceptions, most of the debates of the 
Windhoek Constituent Assembly were initially built on argument and many of them 
were solved through practical reasoning. This can be explained in part by the attitude 
of the members and in part by the constraint of the process. On the one hand, many 
members were sincerely seeking to reach integrative solutions. Most of them agreed 
that the very raison d’être of the body of which they were members was to bypass 
the shortcomings of the past and they were inclined to try and overcome divisions 
based on misunderstandings, prejudice, ideologies or interests. On the other hand, 
the process put them under pressure. The variety of their views and the 
unpredictable nature of many issues, made a logical approach very difficult in most 
instances.  
The study also reveals that the informative role of deliberation helped the 
framers of the Namibian constitution to form a more complete set of preferences 
than they originally had or even forced them to change positions when they were 
exposed to the full consequences or incoherence of their original proposals.  
The study shows that when political actors needed to justify their proposals, 
they found that impartial arguments were not available or, if they were, they were too 
obviously tied to a particular interest to be convincing. In this situation, framers of the 
Namibian constitution had no other alternatives than to change the original proposal 
for another that took into account the views and interests of others. Such a use of 
impartial argumentation yielded more equitable outcomes than pure bargaining and 
increased the overall legitimacy of the process among political actors.  
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The study shows that the no-voting rule enhanced the bargaining power of 
each party. This feature explained why the costs of reaching agreement under no-
vote rule can be extremely high. This finding illustrates that there are some ways in 
which the unanimity or joint-decision trap can be overcome, although unanimity 
requirements in multiparty negotiating situations do present many obvious difficulties. 
While there were tendencies at the Windhoek Constituent Assembly to focus on 
parties‘ preferences, this study showed that rhetoric in bargaining situations was very 
critical. Consequently, the impact the type of bargaining situation have on outcomes 
should not underestimated. 
This study also showed that the concept of compromise was the basis by 
which political disputes were settled. Delegates believed that given sufficient 
discussion, free from partisanship, the right solution to a dispute could be 
discovered. From the point of view of a party to the dispute, compromise involved 
compromising one's principles or beliefs without being convinced of their 
erroneousness. First, the integrative bargaining situation showed that when the 
preferences of delegates are strongly polarised and two or more constitutional 
proposals are negotiated issue linkages are the negotiating tools used to reach an 
agreement. Second, the distributive bargaining situation demonstrated that when 
only one constitutional proposal is bargained, deadlocks can only be broken if the 
reluctant political party or parties obtain side deals that buy their consent. In spite of 
these constraints, delegates often adopted a deliberative approach. The social norm 
of impartiality, combined with a sincere willingness of many members to reach an 
integrative agreement, led them to resort, in many instances, to a practical style of 
problem solving. Delegates often tried to reduce dissonance by mutual explanation. 
They also proposed ad hoc solutions to many issues and based their arguments on 
pragmatic or empiricist grounds that could be understood by the other delegates. 
Several important questions raised by the delegates could be solved, in large part, 
by such an approach. 
The study also reveals that the constitutional ethos forged by the majority of 
members of the committee favoured discussions moulded in legal terms. The legal 
background of some members and their inclination to reason in formal terms on 
constitutional issues strengthened this trend. This type of argument had the 
advantage to be based on common ground and to favour analogies with national 
constitutional devices, with which the members were familiar. This kind of argument 
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proved strong enough to force parties to make important concessions. In many 
instances, however, these two rational styles of arguing did not prove strong enough 
to help the parties overcome their divisions. On some major issues, the difference of 
visions between parties remained so strong that other modes of agreement-building 
were needed. In some cases, political parties resorted to the classic avenue of 
‗diplomatic‘ agreements: they excluded controversial subjects or forged compromise 
that remained vague or unpredictable, so that each party could give its own 
interpretation of the outcome. In these cases, the agreement remained an 
overlapping consensus: the parties agreed on the norm, but not on its motivation. In 
other cases, classic bargains re-emerged. Where some delegates believed that their 
vital interests were at stake, they used threats to preserve the status quo or to 
impose their view. 
Evolution set the template for our emotional lives and for our approach to 
negotiation. Our emotional framework is a starting point, not an end. Depending on 
how emotions are approached in negotiation, we may be either slaves or masters to 
them - with varying consequences. This study revealed that negotiators can improve 
their self-awareness of emotions and that emotions can be controlled to one‘s 
advantage when bargaining. The outcome of constitution-making in Namibia was 
also influenced by the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments among the 
framers. The participants of the Windhoek Assembly engaged in this process were 
motivated by moral reasons rather than by strategic purposes. On the one hand, 
depending on the intensity of the conflicts at stake, political deliberation actually 
sharpened rather than resolved existing disagreement among the participants. On 
the other hand, political deliberation was often affected by strategic purposes as 
when political actors argued from principle to legitimate a partisan position. The 
study revealed that the framers of the Namibian constitution used political 
deliberation to resolve their disagreements. 
The study further established that for constitutionalism to be legitimate, it must 
have the support of the people. Without this legitimacy, there is less assurance that 
either the constitution or rule of law generally, will be willingly accepted and 
internalised. In order to achieve such legitimacy, new constitutionalism borrows from 
the ideas of democracy to ensure that the populace is involved with the process of 
drafting the constitution. The promise of new constitutionalism can be clearly seen in 
post-conflict situations. By allowing opposing sides to come together and work 
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together in creating their shared new constitution, and by assuring that all sides have 
ownership in the process, it enhances the new constitution‘s legitimacy – as the 
Windhoek Assembly teaches us. 
The study further established that in order to achieve collaborative solutions, 
participants must first understand that collaboration is voluntary. There should be no 
coercion used when establishing a problem-solving team. Further to that point, 
collaboration requires parity between participants. Every individual should have 
equal opportunities during interactions and participants must recognise that 
collaboration is based on mutual goals. This recognition allows negotiators to focus 
on agreement rather than differences. 
The study also revealed that members of the Standing Committee sometimes 
resorted to a diplomatic approach. This has been a constant attitude among 
participants since the very beginning of assembly. Sometimes, the framers of the 
constitution even agreed to leave controversial issues out of their agreement, so as 
to avoid incompatibilities. Similarly, negotiators tended to compromise not because 
splitting the difference is the best option, but because they have learned that such 
social heuristics get them through life with less hassle. Social heuristic should be 
understood through its relation to hermeneutics. Hermeneutics has as its principal 
task the formulation of a set of elementary or general principles for interpretation and 
construction. Conceived at a high level of abstraction, these principles function as 
regulative maxims. Along Kantian-transcendental lines, they regulate the 
understanding and so make interpretation and construction possible. Weaker or 
stronger compromises sometimes crept in as a result of the time pressure felt by the 
delegates. In other words, time factor forced members of the drafting committee to 
compromise. 
Emotions play an important role in bargaining. These emotions serve to 
integrate or segregate distinct individuals into a deliberative or judging body. While 
there were times when individual delegates seemed to deserve angry rhetoric, it may 
not be justified from a broader moral perspective, especially when the goal is the 
good of the state or the community. As the Windhoek Assembly drew on shared 
norms to justify their positions in an arguing process, arguing was more common as 
well as more successful because the dissolution of a democratic order was not 
desirable because angry rhetoric hinders or assists individuals working and 
deliberating together. 
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The study shows that in actual situations, where the burden of history and 
diverse backgrounds exert significant pressure on participants, political deliberation 
is a vexed and complex, unpredictable process, through which participants come to 
a changed understanding of the process itself as well as of their own positions and 
goals. The study reveals that ―democratic deliberation‖ cannot be identified 
unilaterally with either rational argumentation or compromise and consensus. 
Compromise is one of the means of conflict resolution, not an end in itself. 
Participants sit down together not in order to compromise but in order to achieve a 
shared outcome.  
The study further concludes that political deliberation involves some form of 
public reasoning and communication. In the course of deliberation, conflicts 
necessarily arise and how these conflicts are dealt with is an essential part of the 
process. The thesis examined the many instances and sources of conflict within the 
Windhoek Assembly during the drafting of the Namibian Constitution, as well as the 
ways in which participants dealt with conflict. Thus, for instance, compromise is good 
if is resolves conflict, but it may not be good if it leads to some participants feeling 
that they gave up too much and compromised their interests. While democratic 
theory often emphasizes consensus-building in the context of deliberation, the study 
finds that the common ground on which participants can base their consensus-
building is not fixed, but is, rather, an element in the heuristic process of discovery 
that deliberation represents.  
 
Recommendations for future study 
The study of rhetoric of negotiations at the Windhoek Assembly unearthed 
interesting material on legislative rhetoric. The study established not only that such 
rhetoric is consequential, but that there is a need for other scholars to begin to view 
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legislative rhetoric as important. Rhetoric is a potent tool, all the more so when 
employed in the public legislative chamber. Thus, legislatures and individual 
legislators must take responsibility for using this rhetoric in positive ways. 
Further, a comparative study of the rhetoric of constitutional discourse 
between Namibia and South Africa should be conducted by other scholars. It suffices 
to mention that both countries first adopted constitutional principles and then held 
constitutional assemblies to draft their respective constitutions. The similarities are 
striking: both countries were breaking from apartheid; both were led by liberation 
movements – namely, SWAPO in Namibia, and the African National Congress in 
South Africa; local people were the architect of their own constitutions; and two of 
the three legal advisors at the Windhoek Assembly – namely, Arthur Chaskalson and 
Marinus Wiechers, later advised the South African constitutional talks. 
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APPENDIX A 
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA 
 
A. Constituent Assembly 
1. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolution 435(1978), 
elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution 
for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and 
powers of all levels of government. 
— Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation 
from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly.  
— Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or 
write. 
— The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the 
electoral system, the preparation of voter rolls and other aspects of electoral procedure 
will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, 
without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and 
participate in the electoral process. 
— Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed.  
— The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent 
Assembly to different political parties which gain substantial support in the election.  
2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an Independent Namibia 
in accordance with the principles in Part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a 
whole by a two-thirds majority of its total membership. 
 
B. Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia 
1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign, and democratic state . 
2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State. It may be amended only by a 
designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum.  
3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of 
government. It wi ll provide for a system of governance with three branches; an elected 
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executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch 
to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage 
of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the 
interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the 
law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine 
elections which will be held by secret vote. 
4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A.1 above.  
5. there will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, 
personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of 
expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and 
association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality 
before the law; to protection from arbitrary depravation of private property or deprivation 
of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, 
religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be 
entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights. 
6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide 
for increased penalties with retrospective effect. 
7. Provisions will be made for the balanced structure of the public service, the police 
service and defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these 
services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be 
assured by appropriate independent bodies. 
8. Provisions will be made for the establishment of elected council for local and/or 
regional administration. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF THE NAMES OF MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
STANDING RULES AND ORDERS AND INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
SWAPO 
Mr. Hage Geingob (Chairman)  
Dr. Ernst Tjiriange 
Mr. Hartmut Ruppel 
Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya 
Mr. Theo Ben Gurirab 
Mrs. Pendukeni Ithana 
Dr. Nickey Iyambo  
Dr. Mose Tjitendero 
Mr. Nahas Angula 
Dr. Peter Katjivivi  
Mr. Nico Bessinger 
Mr. Ben Amathila 
 
DTA 
Mr. Dirk Mudge 
Mr. Piet Junius later replaced by Mr. Barney Barnes 
Mr. Hans Staby 
Mr. Andrew Matjila 
 
NNF 
Mr. Vekuii Rukoro  
  
FCN 
Mr. Hans (J.G.A) Diergaardt later replaced by Prof. Mburumba Kerina 
 
NPF 
Mr. Moses Katjiuongua  
 
ACN 
Mr. Kosie (J.W.F) Pretorius 
 
UDF 
Mr. Reggie Diergaardt later replaced by Mr. Eric Biwa 
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PREAMBLE 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace; 
 
Whereas the said rights include the right of the individual to life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness, regardless of race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion, creed or social or 
economic status; 
 
Whereas the said rights are most effectively maintained and protected in a democratic 
society, where the government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the 
people, operating under a sovereign constitution and a free and independent judiciary; 
 
Whereas these rights have for so long been denied to the people of Namibia by 
colonialism racism and apartheid; 
 
Whereas we the people of Namibia - 
have finally emerged victorious in our struggle against colonialism, racism 
and apartheid; 
 
are determined to adopt a Constitution which expresses for ourselves and 
our children our resolve to cherish and to protect the gains of our long 
struggle;  
 
desire to promote amongst all of us the dignity of the individual and the 
unity and integrity of the Namibian nation among and in association with 
the nations of the world; 
 
will strive to achieve national reconciliation and to foster peace, unity and 
a common loyalty to a single state; 
 
committed to these principles, have resolved to constitute the Republic of 
Namibia as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State securing to 
all our citizens justice, liberty, equality and fraternity, 
 
Now therefore, we the people of Namibia accept and adopt this Constitution as the 
fundamental law of our Sovereign and Independent Republic. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Republic 
 
Article 1  Establishment of the Republic of Namibia and Identification of its 
Territory 
 
(1)  The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as a sovereign, secular, 
democratic and unitary State founded upon the principles of democracy, 
the rule of law and justice for all. 
(2)  All power shall vest in the people of Namibia who shall exercise their 
sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the State. 
(3)  The main organs of the State shall be the Executive, the Legislature and 
the Judiciary. 
(4)   The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory 
recognised by the international community through the organs of the 
United Nations as Namibia, including the enclave, harbour and port of 
Walvis Bay, as well as the off-shore islands of Namibia, and its southern 
boundary shall extend to the middle of the Orange River. 
(5)   Windhoek shall be the seat of central Government. 
(6)   This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia. 
 
Article 2  National Symbols 
 
(1)  Namibia shall have a National Flag, the description of which is set out in 
Schedule 6 hereof. 
(2)  Namibia shall have a National Coat of Arms, a National Anthem and a 
National Seal to be determined by Act of Parliament, which shall require a 
two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly for 
adoption and amendment. 
(3)  (a) The National Seal of the Republic of Namibia shall show the Coat of 
Arms circumscribed with the word "NAMIBIA" and the motto of the 
country, which shall be determined by Act of Parliament as aforesaid. 
(b) The National Seal shall be in the custody of the President or such 
person whom the President may designate for such purpose and shall be 
used on such official documents as the President may determine. 
 
Article 3  Language 
 
(1)   The official language of Namibia shall be English. 
(2)  Nothing contained in this Constitution shall prohibit the use of any other 
language as a medium of instruction in private schools or in schools 
financed or subsidized by the State, subject to compliance with such 
requirements as may be imposed by law, to ensure proficiency in the 
official language, or for pedagogic reasons. 
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(3)   Nothing contained in Sub-Article (1) hereof shall preclude legislation by 
Parliament which permits the use of a language other than English for 
legislative, administrative and judicial purposes in regions or areas where 
such other language or languages are spoken by a substantial 
component of the population. 
 
___________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Citizenship 
 
Article 4  Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship 
 
(1)   The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by birth: 
(a) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence whose fathers 
or mothers would have been Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of 
such persons, if this Constitution had been in force at that time; and 
(b) those born in Namibia before the date of Independence, who are not 
Namibian citizens under Sub-Article (a) hereof, and whose fathers or 
mothers were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such 
persons: provided that their fathers or mothers were not then persons: 
(aa) who were enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any 
law relating to diplomatic privileges; or 
(bb) who were career representatives of another country; or 
(cc) who were members of any police, military or security unit 
seconded for service within Namibia by the Government of 
another country: provided further that this Sub-Article shall not 
apply to persons claiming citizenship of Namibia by birth if such 
persons were ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of 
Independence and had been so resident for a continuous period 
of not less than five (5) years prior to such date, or if the fathers or 
mothers of such persons claiming citizenship were ordinarily 
resident in Namibia at the date of the birth of such persons and 
had been so resident for a continuous period of not less than five 
(5) years prior to such date; 
(c) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence whose fathers 
or mothers are Namibian citizens at the time of the birth of such persons; 
(d) those born in Namibia after the date of Independence who do not 
qualify for citizenship under Sub-Article (c) hereof, and whose fathers or 
mothers are ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time of the birth of such 
persons: provided that their fathers or mothers are not then persons: 
(aa) enjoying diplomatic immunity in Namibia under any law 
relating to diplomatic privileges; or 
(bb) Who are career representatives of another country; or 
(cc) who are members of any police, military or security unit 
seconded for 
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service within Namibia by the Government of another country; or 
(dd) who are illegal immigrants: provided further that Sub-Articles 
(aa), (bb), (cc) and (dd) hereof will not apply to children who would 
otherwise be stateless. 
(2)   The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by descent: 
(a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Sub-Article (1) hereof and 
whose fathers or mothers at the time of the birth of such persons are 
citizens of Namibia or whose fathers or mothers would have qualified for 
Namibian citizenship by birth under Sub-Article (1) hereof, if this 
Constitution had been in force at that time; and 
(b) who comply with such requirements as to registration of citizenship as 
may be required by Act of Parliament: provided that nothing in this 
Constitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which 
requires the birth of such persons born after the date of Independence to 
be registered within a specific time either in Namibia or at an embassy, 
consulate or office of a trade representative of the Government of 
Namibia. 
(3)   The following persons shall be citizens of Namibia by marriage: 
(a) those who are not Namibian citizens under Sub-Article (1) or (2) 
hereof and who: 
(aa) in good faith marry a Namibian citizen or, prior to the coming 
into force of this Constitution, in good faith married a person who 
would have qualified for Namibian citizenship if this Constitution 
had been in force; and 
(bb) subsequent to such marriage have ordinarily resided in 
Namibia as the spouse of such person for a period of not less than 
two (2) years; and 
(cc) apply to become citizens of Namibia; 
(b) for the purposes of this Sub-Article (and without derogating from any 
effect that it may have for any other purposes) a marriage by customary 
law shall be deemed to be a marriage: provided that nothing in this 
Constitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting legislation which 
defines the requirements which need to be satisfied for a marriage by 
customary law to be recognised as such for the purposes of this Sub-
Article. 
(4)  Citizenship by registration may be claimed by persons who are not 
Namibian citizens under Sub-Articles (1), (2) or (3) hereof and who were 
ordinarily resident in Namibia at the date of Independence, and had been 
so resident for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years prior to 
such date: provided that application for Namibian citizenship under this 
Sub-Article is made within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of 
Independence, and prior to making such application, such persons 
renounce the citizenship of any other country of which they are citizens. 
(5)  Citizenship by naturalisation may be applied for by persons who are not 
Namibian citizens under Sub-Articles(1), (2), (3) or (4) hereof and who: 
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(a) are ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time when the application for 
naturalisation is made; and 
(b) have been so resident in Namibia for a continuous period of not less 
than five (5) years (whether before or after the date of Independence); 
and 
(c) satisfy any other criteria pertaining to health, morality, security or 
legality of residence as may be prescribed by law. 
(6)  Nothing contained herein shall preclude Parliament from authorizing by 
law the conferment of Namibian citizenship upon any fit and proper 
person by virtue of any special skill or experience or commitment to or 
services rendered to the Namibian nation either before or at any time 
after the date of Independence. 
(7)  Namibian citizenship shall be lost by persons who renounce their 
Namibian citizenship by voluntarily signing a formal declaration to that 
effect. 
(8)  Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude Parliament from enacting 
legislation providing for the loss of Namibian citizenship by persons who, 
after the date of Independence: 
(a) have acquired the citizenship of any other country by any voluntary 
act; or 
(b) have served or volunteered to serve in the armed or security forces of 
any other country without the written permission of the Namibian 
Government; or 
(c) have taken up permanent residence in any other country and have 
absented themselves thereafter from Namibia for a period in excess of 
two (2) years without the written permission of the Namibian Government: 
provided that no person who is a citizen of Namibia by birth or descent 
may be deprived of Namibian citizenship by such legislation. 
(9)  Parliament shall be entitled to make further laws not inconsistent with this 
Constitution regulating the acquisition or loss of Namibian citizenship. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms 
 
Article 5 Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be respected and 
upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all organs of the Government 
and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons in 
Namibia, and shall be enforceable by the Courts in the manner hereinafter prescribed. 
 
Article 6 Protection of Life 
 
The right to life shall be respected and protected. No law may prescribe death as a 
competent 
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sentence. No Court or Tribunal shall have the power to impose a sentence of death 
upon any person. No executions shall take place in Namibia. 
 
Article 7  Protection of Liberty 
 
No persons shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedures 
established by law. 
 
Article 8  Respect for Human Dignity 
 
(1)   The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. 
(2)  (a) In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ 
of the State, and during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human 
dignity shall be guaranteed. 
(b) No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Article 9  Slavery and Forced Labour 
(1)   No persons shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
(2)   No persons shall be required to perform forced labour. 
(3)  For the purposes of this Article, the expression "forced labour" shall not 
include: 
(a) any labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court; 
(b) any labour required of persons while lawfully detained which, though 
not required in consequence of a sentence or order of a Court, is 
reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene; 
(c) any labour required of members of the defence force, the police force 
and the prison service in pursuance of their duties as such or, in the case 
of persons who have conscientious objections to serving as members of 
the defence force, any labour which they are required by law to perform in 
place of such service; 
(d) any labour required during any period of public emergency or in the 
event of any other emergency or calamity which threatens the life and 
well-being of the community, to the extent that requiring such labour is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or 
existing during that period or as a result of that other emergency or 
calamity, for the purpose of dealing with that situation; 
(e) any labour reasonably required as part of reasonable and normal 
communal or other civic obligations. 
 
Article 10  Equality and Freedom from Discrimination 
(1)   All persons shall be equal before the law. 
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(2)   No persons may be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race, 
  colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status. 
 
Article 11  Arrest and Detention 
(1)   No persons shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
(2)  No persons who are arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed promptly in a language they understand of the grounds for such 
arrest. 
(3)  All persons who are arrested and detained in custody shall be brought 
before the nearest Magistrate or other judicial officer within a period of 
forty-eight (48) hours of their arrest or, if this is not reasonably possible, 
as soon as possible thereafter, and no such persons shall be detained in 
custody beyond such period without the authority of a Magistrate or other 
judicial officer. 
(4)  Nothing contained in Sub-Article (3) hereof shall apply to illegal 
immigrants held in custody under any law dealing with illegal immigration: 
provided that such persons shall not be deported from Namibia unless 
deportation is authorised by a Tribunal empowered by law to give such 
authority. 
(5)  No persons who have been arrested and held in custody as illegal 
immigrants shall be denied the right to consult confidentially legal 
practitioners of their choice, and there shall be no interference with this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security or for public safety. 
 
Article 12  Fair Trial 
(1)  (a) In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charges against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal 
established by law: provided that such Court or Tribunal may exclude the 
press and/or the public from all or any part of the trial for reasons of 
morals, the public order or national security, as is necessary in a 
democratic society. 
(b) A trial referred to in Sub-Article (a) hereof shall take place within a 
reasonable time, failing which the accused shall be released. 
(c) Judgments in criminal cases shall be given in public, except where the 
interests of juvenile persons or morals otherwise require. 
(d) All persons charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty according to law, after having had the opportunity of calling 
witnesses and cross-examining those called against them. 
(e) All persons shall be afforded adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation and presentation of their defence, before the commencement 
of and during their trial, and shall be entitled to be defended by a legal 
practitioner of their choice. 
(f) No persons shall be compelled to give testimony against themselves or 
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their spouses, who shall include partners in a marriage by customary law, 
and no Court shall admit in evidence against such persons testimony 
which has been obtained from such persons in violation of Article 8(2)(b) 
hereof. 
(2)  No persons shall be liable to be tried, convicted or punished again for any 
criminal offence for which they have already been convicted or acquitted 
according to law: provided that nothing in this Sub-Article shall be 
construed as changing the provisions of the common law defences of 
"previous acquittal" and "previous conviction". 
(3)  No persons shall be tried or convicted for any criminal offence or on 
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence 
at the time when it was committed, nor shall a penalty be imposed 
exceeding that which was applicable at the time when the offence was 
committed. 
 
Article 13  Privacy 
 
(1)  No persons shall be subject to interference with the privacy of their 
homes, correspondence or communications save as in accordance with 
law and as is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others. 
(2)   Searches of the person or the homes of individuals shall only be justified: 
(a) where these are authorised by a competent judicial officer; 
(b) in cases where delay in obtaining such judicial authority carries with it 
the danger of prejudicing the objects of the search or the public interest, 
and such procedures as are prescribed by Act of Parliament to preclude 
abuse are properly satisfied. 
 
Article 14  Family 
 
(1)  Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, colour, 
ethnic origin, nationality, religion, creed or social or economic status shall 
have the right to marry and to found a family. They shall be entitled to 
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2)  Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 
(3)  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
 
Article 15  Children's Rights 
(1)  Children shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a 
nationality and, subject to legislation enacted in the best interests of 
children, as far as possible the right to know and be cared for by their 
parents. 
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(2)   Children are entitled to be protected from economic exploitation and shall 
not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be 
hazardous or to interfere with their education, or to be harmful to their 
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. For the 
purposes of this Sub Article children shall be persons under the age of 
sixteen (16) years. 
(3)  No children under the age of fourteen (14) years shall be employed to 
work in any factory or mine, save under conditions and circumstances 
regulated by Act of Parliament. Nothing in this Sub-Article shall be 
construed as derogating in any way from Sub-Article (2) hereof. 
(4)  Any arrangement or scheme employed on any farm or other undertaking, 
the object or effect of which is to compel the minor children of an 
employee to work for or in the interest of the employer of such employee, 
shall for the purposes of Article 9 hereof be deemed to constitute an 
arrangement or scheme to compel the performance of forced labour. 
(5)  No law authorising preventive detention shall permit children under the 
age of sixteen (16) years to be detained. 
 
Article 16  Property 
 
(1)  All persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and 
dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in 
association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or 
legatees: provided that Parliament may by legislation prohibit or regulate 
as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are 
not Namibian citizens. 
(2)  The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may 
expropriate property in the public interest subject to the payment of just 
compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 17  Political Activity 
 
(1)  All citizens shall have the right to participate in peaceful political activity 
intended to influence the composition and policies of the Government. All 
citizens shall have the right to form and join political parties and; subject 
to such qualifications prescribed by law as are necessary in a democratic 
society to participate in the conduct of public affairs, whether directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. 
(2)  Every citizen who has reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall have 
the right to vote and who has reached the age of twenty-one (21) years to 
be elected to public office, unless otherwise provided herein. 
(3)  The rights guaranteed by Sub-Article (2) hereof may only be abrogated, 
suspended or be impinged upon by Parliament in respect of specified 
categories of persons on such grounds of infirmity or on such grounds of 
public interest or morality as are necessary in a democratic society. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
14 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
Article 18  Administrative Justice 
 
Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and 
comply with the requirements imposed upon such bodies and officials by common law 
and any relevant legislation, and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and 
decisions shall have the right to seek redress before a competent Court or Tribunal. 
 
Article 19  Culture 
 
Every person shall be entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any 
culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms of this Constitution and further 
subject to the condition that the rights protected by this Article do not impinge upon the 
rights of others or the national interest. 
 
Article 20  Education 
 
(1)   All persons shall have the right to education. 
(2)  Primary education shall be compulsory and the State shall provide 
reasonable facilities to render effective this right for every resident within 
Namibia, by establishing and maintaining State schools at which primary 
education will be provided free of charge. 
(3)  Children shall not be allowed to leave school until they have completed 
their primary education or have attained the age of sixteen (16) years, 
whichever is the sooner, save in so far as this may be authorised by Act 
of Parliament on grounds of health or other considerations pertaining to 
the public interest. 
(4)  All persons shall have the right, at their own expense, to establish and to 
maintain private schools, or colleges or other institutions of tertiary 
education: provided that: 
(a) such schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education are 
registered with a Government department in accordance with any law 
authorising and regulating such registration; 
(b) the standards maintained by such schools, colleges or institutions of 
tertiary education are not inferior to the standards maintained in 
comparable schools, colleges or institutions of tertiary education funded 
by the State; 
(c) no restrictions of whatever nature are imposed with respect to the 
admission of pupils based on race, colour or creed; 
(d) no restrictions of whatever nature are imposed with respect to the 
recruitment of staff based on race or colour. 
 
Article 21  Fundamental Freedoms 
(1)   All persons shall have the right to: 
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(a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the 
press and other media; 
(b) freedom of thought, conscience and belief, which shall include 
academic freedom in institutions of higher learning; 
(c) freedom to practise any religion and to manifest such practice; 
(d) assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(e) freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form and join 
associations or unions, including trade unions and political parties; 
(f) withhold their labour without being exposed to criminal penalties; 
(g) move freely throughout Namibia; 
(h) reside and settle in any part of Namibia; 
(i) leave and return to Namibia; 
(j) practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
(2)  The fundamental freedoms referred to in Sub-Article (1) hereof shall be 
exercised subject to the law of Namibia, in so far as such law imposes 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
conferred by the said Sub-Article, which are necessary in a democratic 
society and are required in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of 
Namibia, national security, public order, decency or morality, or in relation 
to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
 
Article 22  Limitation upon Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
Whenever or wherever in terms of this Constitution the limitation of any fundamental 
rights or freedoms contemplated by this Chapter is authorised, any law providing for 
such limitation shall: 
(a) be of general application, shall not negate the essential content 
thereof, and shall not be aimed at a particular individual; 
(b) specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation and identify the 
Article or Articles hereof on which authority to enact such limitation is 
claimed to rest. 
 
Article 23  Apartheid and Affirmative Action 
 
(1)  The practice of racial discrimination and the practice and ideology of 
apartheid from which the majority of the people of Namibia have suffered 
for so long shall be prohibited and by Act of Parliament such practices, 
and the propagation of such practices, may be rendered criminally 
punishable by the ordinary Courts by means of such punishment as 
Parliament deems necessary for the purposes of expressing the revulsion 
of the Namibian people at such practices. 
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(2)   Nothing contained in Article 10 hereof shall prevent Parliament from  
Enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of 
persons within Namibia who have been socially, economically or 
educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or 
for the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing 
social, economic or educational imbalances in the Namibian society 
arising out of past discriminatory laws or practices, or for achieving a 
balanced structuring of the public service, the police force, the defence 
force, and the prison service. 
(3)  In the enactment of legislation and the application of any policies and 
practices contemplated by Sub-Article (2) hereof, it shall be permissible to 
have regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered 
special discrimination and that they need to be encouraged and enabled 
to play a full, equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and 
cultural life of the nation. 
 
Article 24  Derogation 
 
(1)  Nothing contained in or done under the authority of Article 26 hereof shall 
be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution to 
the extent that it authorises the taking of measures during any period 
when Namibia is in a state of national defence or any period when a 
declaration of emergency under this Constitution is in force. 
(2)  Where any persons are detained by virtue of such authorisation as is 
referred to in Sub-Article (1) hereof, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) they shall, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any case not 
more than five (5) days after the commencement of their detention, be 
furnished with a statement in writing in a language that they understand 
specifying in detail the grounds upon which they are detained and, at their 
request, this statement shall be read to them; 
(b) not more than fourteen (14) days after the commencement of their 
detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that they 
have been detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under 
which their detention is authorised; 
(c) not more than one (1) month after the commencement of their 
detention and thereafter during their detention at intervals of not more 
than three (3) months, their cases shall be reviewed by the Advisory 
Board referred to in Article 26 (5)(c) hereof, which shall order their release 
from detention if it is satisfied that it is not reasonably necessary for the 
purposes of the emergency to continue the detention of such persons; 
(d) they shall be afforded such opportunity for the making of 
representations as may be desirable or expedient in the circumstances, 
having regard to the public interest and the interests of the detained 
persons. 
(3)  Nothing contained in this Article shall permit a derogation from or 
suspension of the fundamental rights or freedoms referred to in Articles 5, 
6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 21(1)(a), (b), (c) and (e) hereof, or the 
denial of access by any persons to legal practitioners or a Court of law. 
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Article 25  Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
(1)  Save in so far as it may be authorised to do so by this Constitution, 
Parliament or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any 
law, and the Executive and the agencies of Government shall not take 
any action which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and 
freedoms conferred by this Chapter, and any law or action in 
contravention thereof shall to the extent of the contravention be invalid: 
provided that: 
(a) a competent Court, instead of declaring such law or action to be 
invalid, shall have the power and the discretion in an appropriate case to 
allow Parliament, any subordinate legislative authority, or the Executive 
and the agencies of Government, as the case may be, to correct any 
defect in the impugned law or action within a specified period, subject to 
such conditions as may be specified by it. In such event and until such 
correction, or until the expiry of the time limit set by the Court, whichever 
be the shorter, such impugned law or action shall be deemed to be valid; 
(b) any law which was in force immediately before the date of 
Independence shall remain in force until amended, repealed or declared 
unconstitutional. If a competent Court is of the opinion that such law is 
unconstitutional, it may either set aside the law, or allow Parliament to 
correct any defect in such law, in which event the provisions of Sub 
Article (a) hereof shall apply. 
(2)  Aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom 
guaranteed by this Constitution has been infringed or threatened shall be 
entitled to approach a competent Court to enforce or protect such a right 
or freedom, and may approach the Ombudsman to provide them with 
such legal assistance or advice as they require, and the Ombudsman 
shall have the discretion in response thereto to provide such legal or 
other assistance as he or she may consider expedient. 
(3)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Court referred to in Sub 
Article (2) hereof shall have the power to make all such orders as shall be 
necessary and appropriate to secure such applicants the enjoyment of 
the rights and freedoms conferred on them under the provisions of this 
Constitution, should the Court come to the conclusion that such rights or 
freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated, or that grounds exist 
for the protection of such rights or freedoms by interdict. 
(4)  The power of the Court shall include the power to award monetary 
compensation in respect of any damage suffered by the aggrieved 
persons in consequence of such unlawful denial or violation of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms, where it considers such an award to be 
appropriate in the circumstances of particular cases. 
 
______________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Public Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law 
 
Article 26  State of Emergency, State of National Defence and Martial Law 
 
(1)  At a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional 
order, the President may by Proclamation in the Gazette declare that a 
state of emergency exists in Namibia or any part thereof. 
(2)  A declaration under Sub-Article (1) hereof, if not sooner revoked, shall 
cease to have effect: 
(a) in the case of a declaration made when the National Assembly is 
sitting or has been summoned to meet, at the expiration of a period of 
seven (7) days after publication of the declaration; or 
(b) in any other case, at the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days after 
publication of the declaration; unless before the expiration of that period, 
it is approved by a resolution passed by the National Assembly by a two-
thirds majority of all its members. 
(3)  Subject to the provisions of Sub-Article (4) hereof, a declaration approved 
by a resolution of the National Assembly under Sub-Article (2) hereof 
shall continue to be in force until the expiration of a period of six (6) 
months after being so approved or until such earlier date as may be 
specified in the resolution: provided that the National Assembly may, by 
resolution by a two-thirds majority of all its members, extend its approval 
of the declaration for periods of not more than six (6) months at a time. 
(4)  The National Assembly may by resolution at any time revoke a 
declaration approved by it in terms of this Article. 
(5)  (a) During a state of emergency in terms of this Article or when a state of 
national defence prevails, the President shall have the power by 
Proclamation to make such regulations as in his or her opinion are 
necessary for the protection of national security, public safety and the 
maintenance of law and order. 
(b) The powers of the President to make such regulations shall include 
the power to suspend the operation of any rule of the common law or 
statute or any fundamental right or freedom protected by this Constitution, 
for such period and subject to such conditions as are reasonably 
justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation which has given 
rise to the emergency: provided that nothing in this Sub-Article shall 
enable the President to act contrary to the provisions of Article 24 hereof. 
(c) Where any regulation made under Sub-Article (b) hereof provides for 
detention without trial, provision shall also be made for an Advisory 
Board, to be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission, and consisting of no more than five (5) 
persons, of whom no fewer than three (3) persons shall be Judges of the 
Supreme  
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Court or the High Court or qualified to be such. The Advisory Board shall 
perform the function set out in Article 24 (2)(c) hereof. 
(6)  Any regulations made by the President pursuant to the provisions of Sub 
Article (5) hereof shall cease to have legal force if they have not been 
approved by a resolution of the National Assembly within fourteen (14) 
days from the date when the National Assembly first sits in session after 
the date of the commencement of any such regulations. 
(7)  The President shall have the power to proclaim or terminate martial law. 
Martial law may be proclaimed only when a state of national defence 
involving another country exists or when civil war prevails in Namibia: 
provided that any proclamation of martial law shall cease to be valid if it is 
not approved within a reasonable time by a resolution passed by a two-
thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly. 
 
___________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
The President 
 
Article 27  Head of State and Government 
 
(1)  The President shall be the Head of State and of the Government and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force. 
(2)  The executive power of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the 
President and the Cabinet. 
(3)  Except as may be otherwise provided in this Constitution or by law, the 
President shall in the exercise of his or her functions be obliged to act in 
consultation with the Cabinet. 
 
Article 28  Election 
 
(1)   The President shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution and subject thereto. 
(2)  Election of the President shall be: 
(a) by direct, universal and equal suffrage; and 
(b) conducted in accordance with principles and procedures to be 
determined by Act of Parliament: provided that no person shall be elected 
as President unless he or she has received more than fifty (50) per cent 
of the votes cast and the necessary number of ballots shall be conducted 
until such result is reached. 
(3)  Every citizen of Namibia by birth or descent, over the age of thirty-five 
(35) years, and who is eligible to be elected to office as a member of the 
National Assembly 
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shall be eligible for election as President. 
(4)  The procedures to be followed for the nomination of candidates for 
election as President, and for all matters necessary and incidental to 
ensure the free, fair and effective election of a President, shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament: provided that any registered political 
party shall be entitled to nominate a candidate, and any person supported 
by a minimum number of registered voters to be determined by Act of 
Parliament shall also be entitled to be nominated as a candidate. 
 
Article 29  Term of Office 
 
(1)  (a) The President's term of office shall be five (5) years unless he or she 
dies or resigns before the expiry of the said term or is removed from 
office. 
(b) In the event of the dissolution of the National Assembly in the 
circumstances provided for under Article 57(1) hereof, the President's 
term of office shall also expire. 
(2)  A President shall be removed from office if a two-thirds majority of all the 
members of the National Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of 
all the members of the National Council, adopts a resolution impeaching 
the President on the ground that he or she has been guilty of a violation 
of the Constitution or guilty of a serious violation of the laws of the land or 
otherwise guilty of such gross misconduct or ineptitude as to render him 
or her unfit to hold with dignity and honour the office of President. 
(3)   A person shall hold office as President for not more than two terms. 
(4)  If a President dies, resigns or is removed from office in terms of this 
Constitution, the vacant office of President shall be filled for the unexpired 
period thereof as follows: 
(a) if the vacancy occurs not more than one (1) year before the date on 
which Presidential elections are required to be held, the vacancy shall be 
filled in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 hereof; 
(b) if the vacancy occurs more than one (1) year before the date on which 
Presidential elections are required to be held, an election for the 
President shall be held in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 
hereof within a period of ninety (90) days from the date on which the 
vacancy occurred, and pending such election the vacant office shall be 
filled in accordance with the provisions of Article 34 hereof. 
(5)  If the President dissolves the National Assembly under Articles 32(3)(a) 
and 57(1) hereof, a new election for President shall be held in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 28 hereof within ninety (90) days, and 
pending such election the President shall remain in office, and the 
provisions of Article 58 hereof shall be applicable. 
(6)  If a person becomes President under Sub-Article (4) hereof, the period of 
time during which he or she holds office consequent upon such election 
or succession shall not be regarded as a term for the purposes of Sub-
Article (3) hereof. 
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Article 30  Oath or Affirmation 
 
Before formally assuming office, a President-elect shall make the following oath or 
affirmation which shall be administered by the Chief Justice or a Judge designated by 
the Chief Justice for this purpose: 
“l, .................................... do hereby swear/solemnly affirm, That I will strive to the best 
of my ability to uphold, protect and defend as the Supreme Law the Constitution of the 
Republic of Namibia, and faithfully to obey, execute and administer the laws of the 
Republic of Namibia; That I will protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and the material and spiritual resources of the Republic of Namibia; and That I will 
endeavour to the best of my ability to ensure justice for all the inhabitants of the Republic 
of Namibia. (in the case of an oath) 
So help me God." 
 
Article 31  Immunity from Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
 
(1)  No person holding the office of President or performing the functions of 
President may be sued in any civil proceedings save where such 
proceedings concern an act done in his or her official capacity as 
President. 
(2)  No person holding the office of President shall be charged with any 
criminal offence or be amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of any Court in 
respect of any act allegedly performed, or any omission to perform any 
act, during his or her tenure of office as President. 
(3)   After a President has vacated that office: 
(a) no Court may entertain any action against him or her in any civil 
proceedings in respect of any act done in his or her official capacity as 
President; 
(b) a civil or criminal Court shall only have jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings against him or her, in respect of acts of commission or 
omission alleged to have been perpetrated in his or her personal capacity 
whilst holding office as President, if Parliament by resolution has removed 
the President on the grounds specified in this Constitution and if a 
resolution is adopted by Parliament resolving that any such proceedings 
are justified in the public interest notwithstanding any damage such 
proceedings might cause to the dignity of the office of President. 
 
Article 32  Functions, Powers and Duties 
 
(1)   As the Head of State, the President shall uphold, protect and defend the 
Constitution as the Supreme Law, and shall perform with dignity and 
leadership  
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all acts necessary, expedient, reasonable and incidental to the discharge 
of the executive functions of the Government, subject to the overriding 
terms of this Constitution and the laws of Namibia, which he or she is 
constitutionally obliged to protect, to administer and to execute. 
(2)  In accordance with the responsibility of the executive branch of 
Government to the legislative branch, the President and the Cabinet shall 
each year during the consideration of the official budget attend 
Parliament. During such session the President shall address Parliament 
on the state of the nation and on the future policies of the Government, 
shall report on the policies of the previous year and shall be available to 
respond to questions. 
(3)  Without derogating from the generality of the functions and powers 
contemplated by Sub-Article (1) hereof, the President shall preside over 
meetings of the Cabinet and shall have the power, subject to this 
Constitution to: 
(a) dissolve the National Assembly by Proclamation in the circumstances 
provided for in Article 57(1) hereof; 
(b) determine the times for the holding of special sessions of the National 
Assembly, and to prorogue such sessions; 
(c) accredit, receive and recognise ambassadors, and to appoint 
ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, diplomatic representatives and other 
diplomatic officers, consuls and consular officers; 
(d) pardon or reprieve offenders, either unconditionally or subject to such 
conditions as the President may deem fit; 
(e) negotiate and sign international agreements, and to delegate such 
power; 
(f) declare martial law or, if it is necessary for the defence of the nation, 
declare that a state of national defence exists: provided that this power 
shall be exercised subject to the terms of Article 26(7) hereof; 
(g) establish and dissolve such Government departments and ministries 
as the President may at any time consider to be necessary or expedient 
for the good government of Namibia; 
(h) confer such honours as the President considers appropriate on 
citizens, residents and friends of Namibia in consultation with interested 
and relevant persons and institutions; 
(i) appoint the following persons: 
(aa) the Prime Minister; 
(bb) Ministers and Deputy-Ministers; 
(cc) the Attorney-General; 
(dd) the Director-General of Planning; 
(ee) any other person or persons who are required by any other 
provision of this Constitution or any other law to be appointed by 
the President. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
23 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
(4)   The President shall also have the power, subject to this Constitution, to  
appoint: 
(a) on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission: 
(aa) the Chief Justice, the Judge-President of the High Court and 
other Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court; 
(bb) the Ombudsman; 
(cc) the Prosecutor-General; 
(b) on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission: 
(aa) the Auditor-General; 
(bb) the Governor and the Deputy-Governor of the Central Bank; 
(c) on the recommendation of the Security Commission: 
(aa) the Chief of the Defence Force; 
(bb) the Inspector-General of Police; 
(cc) the Commissioner of Prisons. 
(5)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution dealing with the signing of 
any laws passed by Parliament and the promulgation and publication of 
such laws in the Gazette, the President shall have the power to: 
(a) sign and promulgate any Proclamation which by law he or she is 
entitled to proclaim as President; 
(b) initiate, in so far as he or she considers it necessary and expedient, 
laws for submission to and consideration by the National Assembly; 
(c) appoint as members of the National Assembly but without any vote 
therein, not more than six (6) persons by virtue of their special expertise, 
status, skill or experience. 
(6)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution or any other law, any person 
appointed by the President pursuant to the powers vested in him or her 
by this Constitution or any other law may be removed by the President by 
the same process through which such person was appointed. 
(7)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law of 
application in this matter, the President may, in consultation with the 
Cabinet and on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission: 
(a) constitute any office in the public service of Namibia not otherwise 
provided for by any other law; 
(b) appoint any person to such office, 
(c) determine the tenure of any person so appointed as well as the terms 
and conditions of his or her service. 
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(8)   All appointments made and actions taken under Sub-Articles  
(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) hereof shall be announced by the President by 
Proclamation in the Gazette. 
(9)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and save where this 
Constitution otherwise provides, any action taken by the President 
pursuant to any power vested in the President by the terms of this Article 
shall be capable of being reviewed, reversed or corrected on such terms 
as are deemed expedient and proper should there be a resolution 
proposed by at least one-third of all the members of the National 
Assembly and passed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the 
National Assembly disapproving any such action and resolving to review, 
reverse or correct it. 
(10)  Notwithstanding the review, reversal or correction of any action in terms 
of Sub-Article (9) hereof, all actions performed pursuant to any such 
action during the period preceding such review, reversal or correction 
shall be deemed to be valid and effective in law, until and unless 
Parliament otherwise enacts. 
 
Article 33  Remuneration 
 
Provision shall be made by Act of Parliament for the payment out of the State Revenue 
Fund of remuneration and allowances for the President, as well as for the payment of 
pensions to former Presidents and, in the case of their deaths, to their surviving 
spouses. 
 
Article 34  Succession 
 
(1)  If the office of President becomes vacant or if the President is otherwise 
unable to fulfil the duties of the office, the following persons shall in the 
order provided for in this Sub-Article act as President for the unexpired 
portion of the President's term of office or until the President is able to 
resume office, whichever is the earlier: 
(a) the Prime Minister; 
(b) the Deputy-Prime Minister; 
(c) a person appointed by the Cabinet. 
(2)  Where it is regarded as necessary or expedient that a person deputise for 
the President because of a temporary absence from the country or 
because of pressure of work, the President shall be entitled to nominate 
any person enumerated in Sub-Article (1) hereof to deputise for him or 
her in respect of such specific occasions or such specific matters and for 
such specific periods as in his or her discretion may be considered wise 
and expedient, subject to consultation with the Cabinet. 
 
________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
The Cabinet 
 
Article 35  Composition 
 
(1)  The Cabinet shall consist of the President, the Prime Minister and such 
other Ministers as the President may appoint from the members of the 
National Assembly, including members nominated under Article 46(1)(b) 
hereof, for the purposes of administering and executing the functions of 
the Government. 
(2)  The President may also appoint a Deputy-Prime Minister to perform such 
functions as may be assigned to him or her by the President or the Prime 
Minister. 
(3)  The President or, in his or her absence, the Prime Minister or other 
Minister designated for this purpose by the President, shall preside at 
meetings of the Cabinet. 
 
Article 36  Functions of the Prime Minister 
 
The Prime Minister shall be the leader of Government business in Parliament, shall co-
ordinate the work of the Cabinet and shall advise and assist the President in the 
execution of the functions of Government. 
 
Article 37  Deputy-Ministers 
 
The President may appoint from the members of the National Assembly, including 
members nominated under Article 46(1)(b) hereof, and the National Council such 
Deputy-Ministers as he or she may consider expedient, to exercise or perform on behalf 
of Ministers any of the powers, functions and duties which may have been assigned to 
such Ministers. 
 
Article 38  Oath or Affirmation 
 
Before assuming office, a Minister or Deputy-Minister shall make and subscribe to an 
oath or solemn affirmation before the President or a person designated by the President 
for this purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 2 hereof. 
 
Article 39  Vote of No Confidence 
 
The President shall be obliged to terminate the appointment of any member of the 
Cabinet, if the National Assembly by a majority of all its members resolves that it has no 
confidence in that member. 
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Article 40  Duties and Functions 
 
The members of the Cabinet shall have the following functions: 
(a) to direct, co-ordinate and supervise the activities of Ministries and 
Government departments including para-statal enterprises, and to review 
and advise the President and the National Assembly on the desirability 
and wisdom of any prevailing subordinate legislation, regulations or 
orders pertaining to such para-statal enterprises, regard being had to the 
public interest; 
(b) to initiate bills for submission to the National Assembly; 
(c) to formulate, explain and assess for the National Assembly the budget 
of the State and its economic development plans and to report to the 
National Assembly thereon; 
(d) to carry out such other functions as are assigned to them by law or are 
incidental to such assignment; 
(e) to attend meetings of the National Assembly and to be available for 
the purposes of any queries and debates pertaining to the legitimacy, 
wisdom, effectiveness and direction of Government policies; 
(f) to take such steps as are authorised by law to establish such economic 
organisations, institutions and para-statal enterprises on behalf of the 
State as are directed or authorised by law; 
(g) to formulate, explain and analyse for the members of the National 
Assembly the goals of Namibian foreign policy and its relations with other 
States and to report to the National Assembly thereon; 
(h) to formulate, explain and analyse for the members of the National 
Assembly the directions and content of foreign trade policy and to report 
to the National Assembly thereon; 
(i) to assist the President in determining what international agreements 
are to be concluded, acceded to or succeeded to and to report to the 
National Assembly thereon; 
(j) to advise the President on the state of national defence and the 
maintenance of law and order and to inform the National Assembly 
thereon; 
(k) to issue notices, instructions and directives to facilitate the 
implementation and administration of laws administered by the Executive, 
subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law; 
(I) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the 
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest 
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect 
and assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been 
the victims of these pathologies. 
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Article 41  Ministerial Accountability 
 
All Ministers shall be accountable individually for the administration of their own 
Ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of the Cabinet, both to the 
President and to Parliament. 
 
Article 42  Outside Employment 
 
(1)  During their tenure of office as members of the Cabinet, Ministers may 
not take up any other paid employment, engage in activities inconsistent 
with their positions as Ministers, or expose themselves to any situation 
which carries with it the risk of a conflict developing between their 
interests as Ministers and their private interests. 
(2)  No members of the Cabinet shall use their positions as such or use 
information entrusted to them confidentially as such members of the 
Cabinet, directly or indirectly to enrich themselves. 
 
Article 43  Secretary to the Cabinet 
 
(1)  There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet who shall be appointed by the 
President and who shall perform such functions as may be determined by 
law and such functions as are from time to time assigned to the Secretary 
by the President or the Prime Minister. Upon appointment by the 
President, the Secretary shall be deemed to have been appointed to such 
office on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. 
(2)  The Secretary to the Cabinet shall also serve as a depository of the 
records, minutes and related documents of the Cabinet. 
 
____________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
The National Assembly 
 
Article 44  Legislative Power 
 
The legislative power of Namibia shall be vested in the National Assembly with the 
power to pass laws with the assent of the President as provided in this Constitution 
subject, where applicable, to the powers and functions of the National Council as set out 
in this Constitution. 
 
Article 45  Representative Nature 
 
The members of the National Assembly shall be representative of all the people and 
shall in the performance of their duties be guided by the objectives of this Constitution, 
by the public interest and by their conscience. 
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Article 46  Composition 
 
(1)   The composition of the National Assembly shall be as follows: 
(a) seventy-two (72) members to be elected by the registered voters by 
general, direct and secret ballot. Every Namibian citizen who has the 
qualifications described in Article 17 hereof shall be entitled to vote in the 
elections for members of the National Assembly and, subject to Article 47 
hereof, shall be eligible for candidature as a member of the National 
Assembly; 
(b) not more than six (6) persons appointed by the President under Article 
32(5)(c) hereof, by virtue of their special expertise, status, skill or 
experience: provided that such members shall have no yote in the 
National Assembly, and shall not be taken into account for the purpose of 
determining any specific majorities that are required under this 
Constitution or any other law. 
(2)  Subject to the principles referred to in Article 49 hereof, the members of 
the National Assembly referred to in Sub-Article (1)(a) hereof shall be 
elected in accordance with procedures to be determined by Act of 
Parliament. 
 
Article 47  Disqualification of Members 
 
(1)   No persons may become members of the National Assembly if they: 
(a) have at any time after Independence been convicted of any offence in 
Namibia, or outside Namibia if such conduct would have constituted an 
offence within Namibia, and for which they have been sentenced to death 
or to imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of 
a fine, unless they have received a free pardon or unless such 
imprisonment has expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their 
election; or 
(b) have at any time prior to Independence been convicted of an offence, 
if such conduct would have constituted an offence within Namibia after 
Independence, and for which they have been sentenced to death or to 
imprisonment of more than twelve (12) months without the option of a 
fine, unless they have received a free pardon or unless such 
imprisonment has expired at least ten (10) years before the date of their 
election: provided that no person sentenced to death or imprisonment for 
acts committed in connection with the struggle for the independence of 
Namibia shall be disqualified under this Sub-Article from being elected as 
a member of the National Assembly; or 
(c) are unrehabilitated insolvents; or 
(d) are of unsound mind and have been so declared by a competent 
Court: or 
(e) are remunerated members of the public service of Namibia; or 
(f) are members of the National Council, Regional Councils or Local 
Authorities. 
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(2)   For the purposes of Sub-Article (1) hereof: 
(a) no person shall be considered as having been convicted by any Court 
until any appeal which might have been noted against the conviction or 
sentence has been determined, or the time for noting an appeal against 
such conviction has expired; 
(b) the public service shall be deemed to include the defence force, the 
police force, the prison service, para-statal enterprises, Regional Councils 
and Local Authorities. 
 
Article 48  Vacation of Seats 
 
(1)   Members of the National Assembly shall vacate their seats: 
(a) if they cease to have the qualifications which rendered them eligible to 
be members of the National Assembly; 
(b) if the political party which nominated them to sit in the National 
Assembly informs the Speaker that such members are no longer 
members of such political party; 
(c) if they resign their seats in writing addressed to the Speaker; 
(d) if they are removed by the National Assembly pursuant to its rules and 
standing orders permitting or requiring such removal for good and 
sufficient reasons; 
(e) if they are absent during sittings of the National Assembly for ten (10) 
consecutive sitting days, without having obtained the special leave of the 
National Assembly on grounds specified in its rules and standing orders. 
(2)  If the seat of a member of the National Assembly is vacated in terms of 
Sub Article (1) hereof, the political party which nominated such member 
to sit in the National Assembly shall be entitled to fill the vacancy by 
nominating any person on the party's election list compiled for the 
previous general election, or if there be no such person, by nominating 
any member of the party. 
 
Article 49  Elections 
 
The election of members in terms of Article 46(1)(a) hereof shall be on party lists and in 
accordance with the principles of proportional representation as set out in Schedule 4 
hereof. 
 
Article 50  Duration 
 
Every National Assembly shall continue for a maximum period of five (5) years, but it 
may before the expiry of its term be dissolved by the President by Proclamation as 
provided for in Articles 32(3)(a) and 57(1) hereof. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
30 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
Article 51  Speaker 
 
(1)  At the first sitting of a newly elected National Assembly, the National 
Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall elect a member 
as Speaker. The National Assembly shall then elect another member as 
Deputy-Speaker. The Deputy-Speaker shall act as Speaker whenever the 
Speaker is not available. 
(2)  The Speaker or Deputy-Speaker shall cease to hole! office if he or she 
ceases to be a member of the National Assembly. The Speaker or 
Deputy-Speaker may be removed from office by resolution of the National 
Assembly, and may resign from office or from the National Assembly in 
writing addressed to the Secretary of the National Assembly. 
(3)  When the office of Speaker or Deputy-Speaker becomes vacant the 
National Assembly shall elect a member to fill the vacancy. 
(4)  When neither the Speaker nor the Deputy-Speaker is available for duty, 
the National Assembly, with the Secretary acting as Chairperson, shall 
elect a member to act as Speaker. 
 
Article 52  Secretary and other Officers 
 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of the laws pertaining to the public service and 
the directives of the National Assembly, the Speaker shall appoint a 
person (or designate a person in the public service made available for 
that purpose), as the Secretary of the National Assembly, who shall 
perform the functions and duties assigned to such Secretary by this 
Constitution or by the Speaker. 
(2)  Subject to the laws governing the control of public monies, the Secretary 
shall perform his or her functions and duties under the control of the 
Speaker. 
(3)  The Secretary shall be assisted by officers of the National Assembly who 
shall be persons in the public service made available for that purpose. 
 
Article 53  Quorum 
 
The presence of at least thirty-seven (37) members of the National Assembly entitled to 
vote, other than the Speaker or the presiding member, shall be necessary to constitute a 
meeting of the National Assembly for the exercise of its powers and the performance of 
its functions. 
 
Article 54  Casting Vote 
 
In the case of an equality of votes in the National Assembly, the Speaker or the 
Deputy-Speaker or the presiding member shall have and may exercise a casting vote. 
 
Article 55  Oath or Affirmation 
 
Every member of the National Assembly shall make and subscribe to an oath or solemn 
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affirmation before the Chief Justice or a Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this 
purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 3 hereof. 
 
Article 56  Assent to Bills 
 
(1)  Every bill passed by Parliament in terms of this Constitution in order to 
acquire the status of an Act of Parliament shall require the assent of the 
President to be signified by the signing of the bill and the publication of 
the Act in the Gazette. 
(2)  Where a bill is passed by a majority of two-thirds of all the members of 
the National Assembly and has been confirmed by the National Council 
the President shall be obliged to give his or her assent thereto. 
(3)  Where a bill is passed by a majority of the members of the National 
Assembly but such majority consists of less than two-thirds of all the 
members of the National Assembly and has been confirmed by the 
National Council, but the President declines to assent to such bill, the 
President shall communicate such dissent to the Speaker. 
(4)  If the President has declined to assent to a bill under Sub-Article (3) 
hereof, the National Assembly may reconsider the bill and, if it so 
decides, pass the bill in the form in which it was referred back to it, or in 
an amended form or it may decline to pass the bill. Should the bill then be 
passed by a majority of the National Assembly it will not require further 
confirmation by the National Council but, if the majority consists of less 
than two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly, the 
President shall retain his or her power to withhold assent to the bill. 
If the President elects not to assent to the bill, it shall then lapse. 
 
Article 57  Dissolution 
 
(1)  The National Assembly may be dissolved by the President on the advice 
of the Cabinet if the Government is unable to govern effectively. 
(2)  Should the National Assembly be dissolved a national election for a new 
National Assembly and a new President shall take place within a period of 
ninety (90) days from the date of such dissolution. 
 
Article 58  Conduct of Business after Dissolution 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 57 hereof: 
(a) every person who at the date of its dissolution was a member of the 
National Assembly shall remain a member of the National Assembly and 
remain competent to perform the functions of a member until the day 
immediately preceding the first polling day for the election held in 
pursuance of such dissolution; 
(b) the President shall have power to summon Parliament for the conduct 
of business during the period following such dissolution, up to and 
including the day immediately preceding the first polling day for the 
election held in  
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pursuance of such dissolution, in the same manner and in all respects as 
if the dissolution had not occurred. 
 
Article 59  Rules of Procedure, Committees and Standing Orders 
 
(1)  The National Assembly may make such rules of procedure for the 
conduct of its business and proceedings and may also make such rules 
for the establishing, functioning and procedures of committees, and 
formulate such standing orders, as may appear to it to be expedient or 
necessary. 
(2)  The National Assembly shall in its rules of procedure make provision for 
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the 
financial or business affairs of its members. 
(3)  For the purposes of exercising its powers and performing its functions any 
committee of the National Assembly established in terms of Sub-Article 
(1) hereof shall have the power to subpoena persons to appear before it 
to give evidence on oath and to produce any documents required by it. 
 
Article 60  Duties, Privileges and Immunities of Members 
 
(1)  The duties of the members of the National Assembly shall include the 
following: 
(a) all members of the National Assembly shall maintain the dignity and 
image of the National Assembly both during the sittings of the National 
Assembly as well as in their acts and activities outside the National 
Assembly; 
(b) all members of the National Assembly shall regard themselves as 
servants of the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which 
they seek improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from 
the people. 
(2)  A private members' bill may be introduced in the National Assembly if 
supported by one-third of all the members of the National Assembly. 
(3)  Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the 
National Assembly shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members 
shall be entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities. 
 
Article 61  Public Access to Sittings 
 
(1)  Save as provided in Sub-Article (2) hereof, all meetings of the National 
Assembly shall be held in public and members of the public shall have 
access to such meetings. 
(2)  Access by members of the public in terms of Sub-Article (1) hereof may 
be denied if the National Assembly adopts a motion supported by two-
thirds of all its members excluding such access to members of the public 
for specified periods or in respect of specified matters. Such a motion 
shall only be considered if it is supported by at least one-tenth of all the 
members of the National Assembly and the debate on such motion shall 
not be open to members of the public. 
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Article 62  Sessions 
 
(1)   The National Assembly shall sit: 
(a) at its usual place of sitting determined by the National Assembly, 
unless the Speaker directs otherwise on the grounds of public interest, 
security or convenience; 
(b) for at least two (2) sessions during each year, to commence and 
terminate on such dates as the National Assembly from time to time 
determines; 
(c) for such special sessions as directed by Proclamation by the President 
from time to time. 
(2)  During such sessions the National Assembly shall sit on such days and 
during such times of the day or night as the National Assembly by its 
rules and standing orders may provide. 
(3)  The day of commencement of any session of the National Assembly may 
be altered by Proclamation by the President, if the President is requested 
to do so by the Speaker on grounds of public interest or convenience. 
 
Article 63  Functions and Powers 
 
(1)  The National Assembly, as the principal legislative authority in and over 
Namibia, shall have the power, subject to this Constitution, to make and 
repeal laws for the peace, order and good government of the country in 
the best interest of the people of Namibia. 
(2)  The National Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject 
to this Constitution: 
(a) to approve budgets for the effective government and administration of 
the country; 
(b) to provide for revenue and taxation; 
(c) to take such steps as it considers expedient to uphold and defend this 
Constitution and the laws of Namibia and to advance the objectives of 
Namibian independence; 
(d) to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international 
agreements as may have been entered into prior to Independence by 
administrations within Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian 
people have historically not enjoyed democratic representation and 
participation; 
(e) to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements 
which have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32(3)(e) 
hereof; 
(f) to receive reports on the activities of the Executive, including para-
statal enterprises, and from time to time to require any senior official 
thereof to appear before any of the committees of the National Assembly 
to account for and explain his or her acts and programmes; 
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(g) to initiate, approve or decide to hold a referendum on matters of 
national concern; 
(h) to debate and to advise the President in regard to any matters which 
by this Constitution the President is authorised to deal with; 
(i) to remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the 
scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest 
themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect 
and assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been 
the victims of these pathologies; 
(j) generally to exercise any other functions and powers assigned to it by 
this Constitution or any other law and any other functions incidental 
thereto. 
 
Article 64  Withholding of Presidential Assent 
 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall be 
entitled to withhold his or her assent to a bill approved by the National 
Assembly if in the President's opinion such bill would upon adoption 
conflict with the provisions of this Constitution. 
(2)  Should the President withhold assent on the grounds of such opinion, he 
or she shall so inform the Speaker who shall inform the National 
Assembly thereof, and the Attorney-General, who may then take 
appropriate steps to have the matter decided by a competent Court. 
(3)  Should such Court thereafter conclude that such bill is not in conflict with 
the provisions of this Constitution, the President shall assent to the said 
bill if it was passed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority of 
all its members. If the bill was not passed with such majority, the 
President may withhold his or her assent to the bill, in which event the 
provisions of Article 56(3) and (4) hereof shall apply. 
(4)  Should such Court conclude that the disputed bill would be in conflict with 
any provisions of this Constitution, the said bill shall be deemed to have 
lapsed and the President shall not be entitled to assent thereto. 
 
Article 65  Signature and Enrolment of Acts 
 
(1)  When any bill has become an Act of Parliament as a result of its having 
been passed by Parliament, signed by the President and published in the 
Gazette, the Secretary of the National Assembly shall promptly cause two 
(2) fair copies of such Act in the English language to be enrolled in the 
office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court and such copies shall be 
conclusive evidence of the provisions of the Act. 
(2)  The public shall have the right of access to such copies subject to such 
regulations as may be prescribed by Parliament to protect the durability of 
the said copies and the convenience of the Registrar's staff. 
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Article 66  Customary and Common Law 
 
(1)  Both the customary law and the common law of Namibia in force on the 
date of Independence shall remain valid to the extent to which such 
customary or common law does not conflict with this Constitution or any 
other statutory law. 
(2)  Subject to the terms of this Constitution, any part of such common law or 
customary law may be repealed or modified by Act of Parliament, and the 
application thereof may be confined to particular parts of Namibia or to 
particular periods. 
 
Article 67  Requisite Majorities 
 
Save as provided in this Constitution, a simple majority of votes cast in the National 
Assembly shall be sufficient for the passage of any bill or resolution of the National 
Assembly. 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
The National Council 
 
Article 68  Establishment 
 
There shall be a National Council which shall have the powers and functions set out in 
this Constitution. 
 
Article 69  Composition 
 
(1)  The National Council shall consist of two (2) members from each region 
referred to in Article 102 hereof, to be elected from amongst their 
members by the Regional Council for such region. 
(2)  The elections of members of the National Council shall be conducted 
according to procedures to be prescribed by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 70  Term of Office of Members 
 
(1)  Members of the National Council shall hold their seats for six (6) years 
from the date of their election and shall be eligible for re-election. 
(2)  When a seat of a member of the National Council becomes vacant 
through death, resignation or disqualification, an election for a successor 
to occupy the vacant seat until the expiry of the predecessor's term of 
office shall be held, except in the instance where such vacancy arises 
less than six (6) months before the expiry of  
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the term of the National Council, in which instance such vacancy need not 
be filled. Such election shall be held in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed by the Act of Parliament referred to in Article 69(2) hereof. 
 
Article 71  Oath or Affirmation 
 
Every member of the National Council shall make and subscribe to an oath or solemn 
affirmation before the Chief Justice, or a Judge designated by the Chief Justice for this 
purpose, in the terms set out in Schedule 3 hereof. 
 
Article 72  Qualifications of Members 
 
No person shall be qualified to be a member of the National Council if he or she is an 
elected member of a Local Authority, and unless he or she is qualified under Article 
47(1)(a) to (e) hereof to be a member of the National Assembly. 
 
Article 73  Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson 
 
The National Council shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other business, 
elect from its members a Chairperson and a Vice-Chairperson. The Chairperson, or in 
his or her absence the Vice-Chairperson, shall preside over sessions of the National 
Council. Should neither the Chairperson nor the Vice Chairperson be present at any 
session, the National Council shall elect from amongst its members a person to act as 
Chairperson in their absence during that session. 
 
Article 74  Powers and Functions 
 
(1)   The National Council shall have the power to: 
(a) consider in terms of Article 75 hereof all bills passed by the National 
Assembly; 
(b) investigate and report to the National Assembly on any subordinate 
legislation, reports and documents which under law must be tabled in the 
National Assembly and which are referred to it by the National Assembly 
for advice; 
(c) recommend legislation on matters of regional concern for submission 
to and consideration by the National Assembly; 
(d) perform any other functions assigned to it by the National Assembly or 
by an Act of Parliament. 
(2)  The National Council shall have the power to establish committees and to 
adopt its own rules and procedures for the exercise of its powers and the 
performance of its functions. A committee of the National Council shall be 
entitled to conduct all such hearings and collect such evidence as it 
considers necessary for the exercise of the National Council's powers of 
review and investigations, and for  
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such purposes shall have the powers referred to in Article 59(3) hereof. 
(3)  The National Council shall in its rules of procedure make provision for 
such disclosure as may be considered to be appropriate in regard to the 
financial or business affairs of its members. 
(4)  The duties of the members of the National Council shall include the 
following: 
(a) all members of the National Council shall maintain the dignity and 
image of the National Council both during the sittings of the National 
Council as well as in their acts and activities outside the National Council; 
(b) all members of the National Council shall regard themselves as 
servants of the people of Namibia and desist from any conduct by which 
they seek improperly to enrich themselves or alienate themselves from 
the people. 
(5)  Rules providing for the privileges and immunities of members of the 
National Council shall be made by Act of Parliament and all members 
shall be entitled to the protection of such privileges and immunities. 
 
Article 75  Review of Legislation 
 
(1)  All bills passed by the National Assembly shall be referred by the Speaker 
to the National Council. 
(2)  The National Council shall consider bills referred to it under Sub-Article 
(1) hereof and shall submit reports thereon with its recommendations to 
the Speaker. 
(3)   If in its report to the Speaker the National Council confirms a bill, the 
Speaker shall refer it to the President to enable the President to deal with 
it under Articles 56 and 64 hereof. 
(4)  (a) If the National Council in its report to the Speaker recommends that 
the bill be passed subject to amendments proposed by it, such bill shall 
be referred by the Speaker back to the National Assembly. 
(b) If a bill is referred back to the National Assembly under Sub-Article (a) 
hereof, the National Assembly may reconsider the bill and may make any 
amendments thereto, whether proposed by the National Council or not. If 
the bill is again passed by the National Assembly, whether in the form in 
which it was originally passed, or in an amended form, the bill shall not 
again be referred to the National Council, but shall be referred by the 
Speaker to the President to enable it to be dealt with under Articles 56 
and 64 hereof. 
(5)  (a) If a majority of two-thirds of all the members or the National Council 
objects to the principle of a bill, this shall be mentioned in its report to the 
Speaker. In that event, the report shall also indicate whether or not the 
National Council proposes that amendments be made to the bill, if the 
principle of the bill is confirmed by the National Assembly under Sub-
Article (b) hereof, and if amendments are proposed, details thereof shall 
be set out in the report. 
(b) If the National Council in its report objects to the principle of the bill, 
the 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
38 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
National Assembly shall be required to reconsider the principle. If upon 
such reconsideration the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the 
bill by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, the principle of the bill 
shall no longer be an issue. If such two-thirds majority is not obtained in 
the National Assembly, the bill shall lapse. 
(6)  (a) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under Sub-
Article 5(b) hereof by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the 
report of the National Council proposed that in such event amendments 
be made to the bill, the National Assembly shall then deal with the 
amendments proposed by the National Council, and in that event the 
provisions of Sub-Article 4(b) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
(b) If the National Assembly reaffirms the principle of the bill under Sub-
Article 5(b) hereof by a majority of two-thirds of all its members, and the 
report of the National Council did not propose that in such event 
amendments be made to the bill, the National Council shall be deemed to 
have confirmed the bill, and the Speaker shall refer the bill to the 
President to be dealt with under Articles 56 and 64 hereof. 
(7)  Sub-Articles (5) and (6) hereof shall not apply to bills dealing with the 
levying of taxes or the appropriation of public monies. 
(8)  The National Council shall report to the Speaker on all bills dealing with 
the levying of taxes or appropriations of public monies within thirty (30) 
days of the date on which such bills were referred to it by the Speaker, 
and on all other bills within three (3) months of the date of referral by the 
Speaker, failing which the National Council will be deemed to have 
confirmed such bills and the Speaker shall then refer them promptly to the 
President to enable the President to deal with the bills under Articles 56 
and 64 hereof. 
(9)  If the President withholds his or her assent to any bill under Article 56 
hereof and the bill is then dealt with in terms of that Article, and is again 
passed by the National Assembly in the form in which it was originally 
passed or in an amended form, such bill shall not again be referred to the 
National Council, but shall be referred by the Speaker directly to the 
President to enable the bill to be dealt with in terms of Articles 56 and 64 
hereof. 
 
Article 76  Quorum 
 
The presence of a majority of the members of the National Council shall be necessary to 
constitute a meeting of the National Council for the exercise of its powers and the 
performance of its functions. 
 
Article 77  Voting 
 
Save as is otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions in the National Council 
shall be determined by a majority of the votes cast by members present other than the 
Chairperson, or in his or her absence the Vice-Chairperson or the member presiding at 
that session, who shall, however, have and may exercise a casting vote in the case of 
an equality of votes. 
 
_____________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
The Administration of Justice 
 
Article 78  The Judiciary 
 
(1)  The judicial power shall be vested in the Courts of Namibia, which shall 
consist of: 
(a) a Supreme Court of Namibia; 
(b) a High Court of Namibia; 
(c) Lower Courts of Namibia. 
(2)  The Courts shall be independent and subject only to this Constitution and 
the law. 
(3)  No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall 
interfere with Judges or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial 
functions, and all organs of the State shall accord such assistance as the 
Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity and 
effectiveness, subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law. 
(4)  The Supreme Court and the High Court shall have the inherent 
jurisdiction which vested in the Supreme Court of South-West Africa 
immediately prior to the date of Independence, including the power to 
regulate their own procedures and to make court rules for that purpose. 
 
Article 79  The Supreme Court 
 
(1)  The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such additional 
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission, may determine. 
(2)  The Supreme Court shall be presided over by the Chief Justice and shall 
hear and adjudicate upon appeals emanating from the High Court, 
including appeals which involve the interpretation, implementation and 
upholding of this Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed thereunder. The Supreme Court shall also deal with matters 
referred to it for decision by the Attorney-General under this Constitution, 
and with such other matters as may be authorised by Act of Parliament. 
(3)  Three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when it 
hears appeals or deals with matters referred to it by the Attorney-General 
under this Constitution: provided that provision may be made by Act of 
Parliament for a lesser quorum in circumstances in which a Judge seized 
of an appeal dies or becomes unable to act at any time prior to judgment. 
(4)  The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to appeals shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
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Article 80  The High Court 
 
(1)  The High Court shall consist of a Judge-President and such additional 
Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission, may determine. 
(2)  The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate 
upon all civil disputes and criminal prosecutions, including cases which 
involve the interpretation, implementation and upholding of this 
Constitution and the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed 
thereunder. The High Court shall also have jurisdiction to hear and 
adjudicate upon appeals from Lower Courts. 
(3)  The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to appeals shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 81  Binding Nature of Decisions of the Supreme Court 
 
A decision of the Supreme Court shall be binding on all other Courts of Namibia and all 
persons in Namibia unless it is reversed by the Supreme Court itself, or is contradicted 
by an Act of Parliament lawfully enacted. 
 
Article 82  Appointment of Judges 
 
(1)  All appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court 
shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission and upon appointment Judges shall make an oath or 
affirmation of office in the terms set out in Schedule 1 hereof. 
(2)  At the request of the Chief Justice the President may appoint Acting 
Judges of the Supreme Court to fill casual vacancies in the Court from 
time to time, or as ad hoc appointments to sit in cases involving 
constitutional issues or the guarantee of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, if in the opinion of the Chief Justice it is desirable that such 
persons should be appointed to hear such cases by reason of their 
special knowledge of or expertise in such matters. 
(3)  At the request of the Judge-President, the President may appoint Acting 
Judges of the High Court from time to time to fill casual vacancies in the 
Court, or to enable the Court to deal expeditiously with its work. 
(4)  All Judges, except Acting Judges, appointed under this Constitution shall 
hold office until the age of sixty-five (65) but the President shall be entitled 
to extend the retiring age of any Judge to seventy (70). It shall also be 
possible by Act of Parliament to make provision for retirement at ages 
higher than those specified in this Article. 
 
Article 83  Lower Courts 
 
(1)  Lower Courts shall be established by Act of Parliament and shall have the 
jurisdiction and adopt the procedures prescribed by such Act and 
regulations made thereunder. 
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(2) Lower Courts shall be presided over by Magistrates or other judicial  
Officers appointed in accordance with procedures prescribed by Act of 
Parliament. 
 
Article 84  Removal of Judges from Office 
 
(1)  A Judge may be removed from office before the expiry of his or her 
tenure only by the President acting on the recommendation of the Judicial 
Service Commission. 
(2)  Judges may only be removed from office on the ground of mental 
incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the provisions 
of Sub-Article (3) hereof. 
(3)  The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not a Judge 
should be removed from office on such grounds, and if it decides that the 
Judge should be removed, it shall inform the President of its 
recommendation. 
(4)  If the deliberations of the Judicial Service Commission pursuant to this 
Article involve the conduct of a member of the Judicial Service 
Commission, such Judge shall not participate in the deliberations and the 
President shall appoint another Judge to fill such vacancy. 
(5)  While investigations are being carried out into the necessity of the 
removal of a Judge in terms of this Article, the President may, on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and, pending the 
outcome of such investigations and recommendation, suspend the Judge 
from office. 
 
Article 85  The Judicial Service Commission 
 
(1)  There shall be a Judicial Service Commission consisting of the Chief 
Justice, a Judge appointed by the President, the Attorney-General and 
two members of the legal profession nominated in accordance with the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament by the professional organisation or 
organisations representing the interests of the legal profession in 
Namibia. 
(2)  The Judicial Service Commission shall perform such functions as are 
prescribed for it by this Constitution or any other law. 
(3)  The Judicial Service Commission shall be entitled to make such rules and 
regulations for the purposes of regulating its procedures and functions as 
are not inconsistent with this Constitution or any other law. 
(4)  Any casual vacancy in the Judicial Service Commission may be filled by 
the Chief Justice or in his or her absence by the Judge appointed by the 
President. 
 
Article 86  The Attorney-General 
 
There shall be an Attorney-General appointed by the President in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 32(3)(i)(cc) hereof. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
To
wn
42 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
Article 87  Powers and Functions of the Attorney-General 
 
The powers and functions of the Attorney-General shall be: 
(a) to exercise the final responsibility for the office of the Prosecutor-
General; 
(b) to be the principal legal adviser to the President and Government; 
(c) to take all action necessary for the protection and upholding of the 
Constitution; 
(d) to perform all such functions and duties as may be assigned to the 
Attorney-General by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 88  The Prosecutor-General 
 
(1)  There shall be a Prosecutor-General appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. No person shall be 
eligible for appointment as Prosecutor-General unless such person: 
(a) possesses legal qualifications that would entitle him or her to practise 
in all the Courts of Namibia; 
(b) is, by virtue of his or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity a 
fit and proper person to be entrusted with the responsibilities of the office 
of Prosecutor-General. 
(2)   The powers and functions of the Prosecutor-General shall be: 
(a) to prosecute, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, in the name 
of the Republic of Namibia in criminal proceedings; 
(b) to prosecute and defend appeals in criminal proceedings in the High 
Court and the Supreme Court; 
(c) to perform all functions relating to the exercise of such powers; 
(d) to delegate to other officials, subject to his or her control and direction, 
authority to conduct criminal proceedings in any Court; 
(e) to perform all such other functions as may be assigned to him or her in 
terms of any other law. 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
43 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
CHAPTER 10 
 
The Ombudsman 
 
Article 89  Establishment and Independence 
 
(1)  There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall have the powers and functions 
set out in this Constitution. 
(2)  The Ombudsman shall be independent and subject only to this 
Constitution and the law. 
(3)  No member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall 
interfere with the Ombudsman in the exercise of his or her functions and 
all organs of the State shall accord such assistance as may be needed for 
the protection of the independence, dignity and effectiveness of the 
Ombudsman. 
(4)  The Ombudsman shall either be a Judge of Namibia, or a person 
possessing the legal qualifications which would entitle him or her to 
practise in all the Courts of Namibia. 
 
Article 90  Appointment and Term of Office 
 
(1)  The Ombudsman shall be appointed by Proclamation by the President on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. 
(2)  The Ombudsman shall hold office until the age of sixty-five (65) but the 
President may extend the retiring age of any Ombudsman to seventy 
(70). 
 
Article 91  Functions 
 
The functions of the Ombudsman shall be defined and prescribed by an Act of 
Parliament and shall include the following: 
(a) the duty to investigate complaints concerning alleged or apparent 
instances of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, abuse of 
power, unfair, harsh, insensitive or discourteous treatment of an 
inhabitant of Namibia by an official in the employ of any organ of 
Government (whether central or local), manifest injustice, or corruption or 
conduct by such official which would properly be regarded as unlawful, 
oppressive or unfair in a democratic society; 
(b) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the functioning of the 
Public Service Commission, administrative organs of the State, the 
defence force, the police force and the prison service in so far as such 
complaints relate to the failure to achieve a balanced structuring of such 
services or equal access by all to the recruitment of such services or fair 
administration in relation to such services; 
(c) the duty to investigate complaints concerning the over-utilization of 
living natural resources, the irrational exploitation of non-renewable 
resources,  
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the degradation and destruction of ecosystems and failure to protect the
 beauty and character of Namibia; 
(d) the duty to investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by 
persons, enterprises and other private institutions where such complaints 
allege that violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under this 
Constitution have taken place; 
(e) the duty and power to take appropriate action to call for the 
remedying, correction and reversal of instances specified in the preceding 
Sub-Articles through such means as are fair, proper and effective, 
including: 
(aa) negotiation and compromise between the parties concerned; 
(bb) causing the complaint and his or her finding thereon to be 
reported to the superior of an offending person; 
(cc) referring the matter to the Prosecutor-General; 
(dd) bringing proceedings in a competent Court for an interdict or 
some other suitable remedy to secure the termination of the 
offending action or conduct, or the abandonment or alteration of 
the offending procedures; 
(ee) bringing proceedings to interdict the enforcement of such 
legislation or regulation by challenging its validity if the offending 
action or conduct is sought to be justified by subordinate 
legislation or regulation which is grossly unreasonable or 
otherwise ultra vires; 
(ff) reviewing such laws as were in operation before the date of 
Independence in order to ascertain whether they violate the letter 
or the spirit of this Constitution and to make consequential 
recommendations to the President, the Cabinet or the 
Attorney-General for appropriate action following thereupon; 
(f) the duty to investigate vigorously all instances of alleged or suspected 
corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by officials and to 
take appropriate steps, including reports to the Prosecutor-General and 
the Auditor-General pursuant thereto; 
(g) the duty to report annually to the National Assembly on the exercise of 
his or her powers and functions. 
 
Article 92  Powers of Investigation 
 
The powers of the Ombudsman shall be defined by Act of Parliament and shall include 
the power: 
(a) to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of any person before the 
Ombudsman and the production of any document or record relevant to 
any investigation by the Ombudsman; 
(b) to cause any person contemptuous of any such subpoena to be 
prosecuted before a competent Court; 
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(c) to question any person; 
(d) to require any person to cooperate with the Ombudsman and to 
disclose truthfully and frankly any information within his or her knowledge 
relevant to any investigation of the Ombudsman. 
 
Article 93  Meaning of "Official" 
 
For the purposes of this Chapter the word "official" shall, unless the context otherwise 
indicates, include any elected or appointed official or employee of any organ of the 
central or local Government, any official of a para-statal enterprise owned or managed or 
controlled by the State, or in which the State or the Government has substantial interest, 
or any officer of the defence force, the police force or the prison service, but shall not 
include a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court or, in so far as a complaint 
concerns the performance of a judicial function, any other judicial officer. 
 
Article 94  Removal from Office 
 
(1)  The Ombudsman may be removed from office before the expiry of his or 
her term of office by the President acting on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission. 
(2)  The Ombudsman may only be removed from office on the ground of 
mental incapacity or for gross misconduct, and in accordance with the 
provisions of Sub-Article (3) hereof. 
(3)   The Judicial Service Commission shall investigate whether or not the 
Ombudsman shall be removed from office on the grounds referred to in 
Sub Article (2) hereof and, if it decides that the Ombudsman shall be 
removed, it shall inform the President of its recommendation. 
(4)  While investigations are being carried out into the necessity of the 
removal of the Ombudsman in terms of this Article, the President may, on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and, pending the 
outcome of such investigations and recommendation, suspend the 
Ombudsman from office. 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 11 
 
Principles of State Policy 
 
Article 95  Promotion of the Welfare of the People 
 
The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, 
inter alia, policies aimed at the following: 
(a) enactment of legislation to ensure equality of opportunity for women, 
to enable them to participate fully in all spheres of Namibian society; in 
particular, the Government shall ensure the implementation of the 
principle of non-discrimination in remuneration of men and women; 
further, the 
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Government shall seek, through appropriate legislation, to provide 
maternity and related benefits for women; 
(b) enactment of legislation to ensure that the health and strength of the 
workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused 
and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations 
unsuited to their age and strength; 
(c) active encouragement of the formation of independent trade unions to 
protect workers' rights and interests, and to promote sound labour 
relations and fair employment practices; 
(d) membership of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and, where 
possible, adherence to and action in accordance with the international 
Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO; 
(e) ensurance that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access 
to public facilities and services in accordance with the law; 
(f) ensurance that senior citizens are entitled to and do receive a regular 
pension adequate for the maintenance of a decent standard of living and 
the enjoyment of social and cultural opportunities; 
(g) enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the 
incapacitated, the indigent and the disadvantaged are accorded such 
social benefits and amenities as are determined by Parliament to be just 
and affordable with due regard to the resources of the State; 
(h) a legal system seeking to promote justice on the basis of equal 
opportunity by providing free legal aid in defined cases with due regard to 
the resources of the State; 
(i) ensurance that workers are paid a living wage adequate for the 
maintenance of a decent standard of living and the enjoyment of social 
and cultural opportunities; 
(j) consistent planning to raise and maintain an acceptable level of 
nutrition and standard of living of the Namibian people and to improve 
public health; 
(k) encouragement of the mass of the population through education and 
other activities and through their organisations to influence Government 
policy by debating its decisions; 
(I) maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and 
biological diversity of Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on 
a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and 
future; in particular, the Government shall provide measures against the 
dumping or recycling of foreign nuclear and toxic waste on Namibian 
territory. 
 
Article 96  Foreign Relations 
 
The State shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it: 
(a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment; 
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(b) promotes international cooperation, peace and security; 
(c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among 
nations; 
(d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations; 
(e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful 
means. 
 
Article 97  Asylum 
 
The State shall, where it is reasonable to do so, grant asylum to persons who 
reasonably fear persecution on the ground of their political beliefs, race, religion or 
membership of a particular social group. 
 
Article 98  Principles of Economic Order 
 
(1)  The economic order of Namibia shall be based on the principles of a 
mixed economy with the objective of securing economic growth, 
prosperity and a life of human dignity for all Namibians. 
(2)  The Namibian economy shall be based, inter alia, on the following forms 
of ownership: 
(a) public; 
(b) private; 
(c) joint public-private; 
(d) cc-operative; 
(e) co-ownership; 
(f) small-scale family. 
 
Article 99  Foreign Investments 
 
Foreign investments shall be encouraged within Namibia subject to the provisions of an 
Investment Code to be adopted by Parliament. 
 
Article 100  Sovereign Ownership of Natural Resources 
 
Land, water and natural resources below and above the surface of the land and in the 
continental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of 
Namibia shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned. 
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Article 101  Application of the Principles contained in this Chapter 
 
The principles of state policy contained in this Chapter shall not of and by themselves be 
legally enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide the Government in making 
and applying laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of the said principles. The 
Courts are entitled to have regard to the said principles in interpreting any laws based on 
them. 
 
_______________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 12 
 
Regional and Local Government 
 
Article 102  Structures of Regional and Local Government 
 
(1)  For purposes of regional and local government, Namibia shall be divided 
into regional and local units, which shall consist of such region and Local 
Authorities as may be determined and defined by Act of Parliament. 
(2)  The delineation of the boundaries of the regions and Local Authorities 
referred to in Sub-Article (1) hereof shall be geographical only, without 
any reference to the race, colour or ethnic origin of the inhabitants of such 
areas. 
(3)  Every organ of regional and local government shall have a Council as the 
principal governing body, freely elected in accordance with this 
Constitution and the Act of Parliament referred to in Sub-Article (1) 
hereof, with an executive and administration which shall carry out all 
lawful resolutions and policies of such Council, subject to this Constitution 
and any other relevant laws. 
(4)  For the purposes of this Chapter, a Local Authority shall include all 
municipalities, communities, village councils and other organs of local 
government defined and constituted by Act of Parliament. 
(5)  There shall be a Council of Traditional Leaders to be established in terms 
of an Act of Parliament in order to advise the President on the control and 
utilization of communal land and on all such other matters as may be 
referred to it by the President for advice. 
 
Article 103  Establishment of Regional Councils 
 
(1)  The boundaries of regions shall be determined by a Delimitation 
Commission in accordance with the principles set out in Article 102 (2) 
hereof. 
(2)  The boundaries of regions may be changed from time to time and new 
regions may be created from time to time, but only in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Delimitation Commission. 
(3)  A Regional Council shall be established for every region the boundaries 
of which have been determined in accordance with Sub-Articles (1) and 
(2) hereof. 
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Article 104  The Delimitation Commission 
(1)  The Delimitation Commission shall consist of a Chairperson who shall be 
a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, and two other persons 
to be appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament. 
(2)  The Delimitation Commission shall discharge its duties in accordance 
with the provisions of an Act of Parliament and this Constitution, and shall 
report thereon to the President. 
 
Article 105  Composition of Regional Councils 
 
Every Regional Council shall consist of a number of persons determined by the 
Delimitation Commission for the particular region for which that Regional Council has 
been established, and who are qualified to be elected to the National Council. 
 
Article 106  Regional Council Elections 
 
(1)  Each region shall be divided into constituencies the boundaries of which 
shall be fixed by the Delimitation Commission in accordance with the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament and this Constitution: provided that 
there shall be no fewer than six (6) and no more than twelve (12) 
constituencies in each region. 
(2)  Each constituency shall elect one member to the Regional Council for the 
region in which it is situated. 
(3)  The elections shall be by secret ballot to be conducted in accordance with 
the provisions of an Act of Parliament, and the candidate receiving the 
most votes in any constituency shall be the elected member of the 
Regional Council for that constituency. 
(4)  All Regional Council elections for the various regions of Namibia shall be 
held on the same day. 
(5)  The date for Regional Council elections shall be determined by the 
President by Proclamation in the Gazette. 
 
Article 107  Remuneration of Members of Regional Councils 
 
The remuneration and allowances to be paid to members of Regional Councils shall be 
determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 108  Powers of Regional Councils 
 
Regional Councils shall have the following powers: 
(a) to elect members to the National Council; 
(b) to exercise within the region for which they have been constituted 
such  
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executive powers and to perform such duties in connection therewith as 
may be assigned to them by Act of Parliament and as may be delegated 
to them by the President; 
(c) to raise revenue, or share in the revenue raised by the central 
Government within the regions for which they have been established, as 
may be determined by Act of Parliament; 
(d) to exercise powers, perform any other functions and make such by-
laws or regulations as may be determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 109  Management Committees 
 
(1)  Each Regional Council shall elect from amongst its members a 
Management Committee, which shall be vested with executive powers in 
accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament. 
(2)  The Management Committee shall have a Chairperson to be elected by 
the members of the Regional Council at the time that they elect the 
Management Committee, and such Chairperson shall preside at meetings 
of his or her Regional Council. 
(3)  The Chairperson and the members of the Management Committee shall 
hold office for three (3) years and shall be eligible for re-election. 
 
Article 110  Administration and Functioning of Regional Councils 
 
The holding and conducting of meetings of Regional Councils, the filling of casual 
vacancies on Regional Councils and the employment of officials by the Regional 
Councils, as well as all other matters dealing with or incidental to the administration and 
functioning of Regional Councils, shall be determined by Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 111  Local Authorities 
 
(1)  Local Authorities shall be established in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 102 hereof. 
(2)  The boundaries of Local Authorities, the election of Councils to administer 
the affairs of Local Authorities, the method of electing persons to Local 
Authority Councils, the methods of raising revenue for Local Authorities, 
the remuneration of Local Authority Councillors and all other matters 
dealing with or incidental to the administration and functioning of Local 
Authorities, shall be determined by Act of Parliament. 
(3)  Persons shall be qualified to vote in elections for Local Authority Councils 
if such persons have been resident within the jurisdiction of a Local 
Authority for not less than one (1) year immediately prior to such election 
and if such persons are qualified to vote in elections for the National 
Assembly. 
(4)  Different provisions may be made by the Act of Parliament referred to in 
Sub-Article (2) hereof in regard to different types of Local Authorities. 
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(5) All by-laws or regulations made by Local Authorities pursuant to 
powers vested in them by Act of Parliament shall be tabled in the 
National Assembly and shall cease to be of force if a resolution to that 
effect is passed by the National Assembly. 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 13 
 
The Public Service Commission 
 
Article 112  Establishment 
 
(1)  There shall be established a Public Service Commission which shall have 
the function of advising the President on the matters referred to in Article 
113 hereof and of reporting to the National Assembly thereon. 
(2)   The Public Service Commission shall be independent and act impartially. 
(3)  The Public Service Commission shall consist of a Chairperson and no 
fewer than three (3) and no more than six (6) other persons nominated by 
the President and appointed by the National Assembly by resolution. 
(4)  Every member of the Public Service Commission shall be entitled to 
serve on such Commission for a period of five (5) years unless lawfully 
removed before the expiry of that period for good and sufficient reasons 
in terms of this Constitution and procedures to be prescribed by Act of 
Parliament. Every member of the Public Service Commission shall be 
eligible for reappointment. 
 
Article 113  Functions 
 
The functions of the Public Service Commission shall be defined by Act of Parliament 
and shall include the power: 
(a) to advise the President and the Government or: 
(aa) the appointment of suitable persons to specified categories of 
employment in the public service, with special regard to the 
balanced structuring thereof; 
(bb) the exercise of adequate disciplinary control over such 
persons in order to assure the fair administration of personnel 
policy; 
(cc) the remuneration and the retirement benefits of any such 
persons; 
(dd) all other matters which by law pertain to the public service; 
(b) to perform all functions assigned to it by Act of Parliament; 
(c) to advise the President on the identity, availability and suitability of 
persons to be appointed by the President to offices in terms of this 
Constitution or any other law. 
 
__________________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 14 
 
The Security Commission 
 
Article 114  Establishment and Functions 
 
(1)  There shall be a Security Commission which shall have the function of 
making recommendations to the President on the appointment of the 
Chief of the Defence Force, the Inspector-General of Police and the 
Commissioner of Prisons and such other functions as may be assigned to 
it by Act of Parliament. 
(2)  The Security Commission shall consist of the Chairperson of the Public 
Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Inspector-
General of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons and two (2) members of 
the National Assembly appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly. 
 
 
CHAPTER 15 
 
The Police and Defence Forces and The Prison Service 
 
Article 115  Establishment of the Police Force 
 
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian police force with prescribed 
powers, duties and procedures in order to secure the internal security of Namibia and to 
maintain law and order. 
 
Article 116  The Inspector-General of Police 
 
(1)  There shall be an Inspector-General of Police who shall be appointed by 
the President in terms of Article 32 (4)(c)(bb) hereof. 
(2)  The Inspector-General of Police shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the police force and shall have the power to make suitable 
appointments to the police force, to cause charges of indiscipline among 
members of the police force to be investigated and prosecuted and to 
ensure the efficient administration of the police force. 
 
Article 117  Removal of the Inspector-General of Police 
 
The President may remove the inspector-General of Police from office for good cause 
and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament 
which may prescribe procedures considered to be expedient for this purpose. 
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Article 118  Establishment of the Defence Force 
 
(1)  There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian Defence 
Force with prescribed composition, powers, duties and procedures, in 
order to defend the territory and national interests of Namibia. 
(2)  The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Force 
and shall have all the powers and exercise all the functions necessary for 
that purpose. 
 
Article 119  Chief of the Defence Force 
 
(1)  There shall be a Chief of the Defence Force who shall be appointed by 
the President in terms of Article 32(4)(c)(aa) hereof. 
(2)  The Chief of the Defence Force shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the defence force and shall have the power to make 
suitable appointments to the defence force, to cause charges of 
indiscipline among members of the defence force to be investigated and 
prosecuted and to ensure the efficient administration of the defence force. 
 
Article 120  Removal of the Chief of the Defence Force 
 
The President may remove the Chief of the Defence Force from office for good cause 
and in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament 
which may prescribe procedures considered to be expedient for this purpose. 
 
Article 121  Establishment of the Prison Service 
 
There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Namibian prison service with 
prescribed powers, duties and procedures: 
 
Article 122  Commissioner of Prisons 
(1)   There shall be a Commissioner of Prisons who shall be appointed by the 
President in terms of Article 32(4)(c)(cc) hereof. 
(2)  The Commissioner of Prisons shall make provision for a balanced 
structuring of the prison service and shall have the power to make 
suitable appointments to the prison service, to cause charges of 
indiscipline among members of the prison service to be investigated and 
prosecuted and to ensure the efficient administration of the prison 
service. 
 
Article 123  Removal of the Commissioner of Prisons 
 
The President may remove the Commissioner of Prisons from office for good cause and 
in the public interest and in accordance with the provisions of any Act of Parliament 
which may prescribe procedures considered to be expedient for this purpose. 
 
______________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 16 
 
Finance 
 
Article 124  Transfer of Government Assets 
 
The assets mentioned in Schedule 5 hereof shall vest in the Government of Namibia on 
the date of Independence. 
 
Article 125  The State Revenue Fund 
 
(1)  The Central Revenue Fund of the mandated territory of South West Africa 
instituted in terms of Section 3 of the Exchequer and Audit Proclamation, 
1979 (Proclamation 85 of 1979) and Section 31(1) of Proclamation R101 
of 1985 shall continue as the State Revenue Fund of the Republic of 
Namibia. 
(2)  All income accruing to the central Government shall be deposited in the 
State Revenue Fund and the authority to dispose thereof shall vest in the 
Government of Namibia. 
(3)  Nothing contained in Sub-Article (2) hereof shall preclude the enactment 
of any law or the application of any law which provides that: 
(a) the Government shall pay any particular monies accruing to it into a 
fund designated for a special purpose; or 
(b) any body or institution to which any monies accruing to the State have 
been paid, may retain such monies or portions thereof for the purpose of 
defraying the expenses of such body or institution; or 
(c) where necessary, subsidies be allocated to regional and Local 
Authorities. 
(4)  No money shall be withdrawn from the State Revenue Fund except in 
accordance with an Act of Parliament. 
(5)  No body or person other than the Government shall have the power to 
withdraw monies from the State Revenue Fund. 
 
Article  126 Appropriations 
 
(1)  The Minister in charge of the Department of Finance shall, at least once 
every year and thereafter at such interim stages as may be necessary, 
present for the consideration of the National Assembly estimates of 
revenue, expenditure and income for the prospective financial year. 
(2)  The National Assembly shall consider such estimates and pass pursuant 
thereto such Appropriation Acts as are in its opinion necessary to meet 
the financial requirements of the State from time to time. 
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Article 127  The Auditor-General 
 
(1)  There shall be an Auditor-General appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Public Service Commission and with the approval 
of the National Assembly. The Auditor-General shall hold office for five (5) 
years unless removed earlier under Sub-Article (4) hereof or unless he or 
she resigns. The Auditor-General shall be eligible for reappointment. 
(2)  The Auditor-General shall audit the State Revenue Fund and shall 
perform all other functions assigned to him or her by the Government or 
by Act of Parliament and shall report annually to the National Assembly 
thereon. 
(3)   The Auditor-General shall not be a member of the public service. 
(4)  The Auditor-General shall not be removed from office unless a two-thirds 
majority of all the members of the National Assembly vote for such 
removal on the ground of mental incapacity or gross misconduct. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 17 
 
Central Bank and National Planning Commission 
 
Article 128  The Central Bank 
 
(1)  There shall be established by Act of Parliament a Central Bank of the 
Republic of Namibia which shall serve as the State's principal instrument 
to control the money supply, the currency and the institutions of finance, 
and to perform all other functions ordinarily performed by a central bank. 
(2)   The Governing Board of the Central Bank shall consist of a Governor, a 
Deputy-Governor and such other members of the Board as shall be 
prescribed by Act of Parliament, and all members of the Board shall be 
appointed by the President in accordance with procedures prescribed by 
such Act of Parliament. 
 
Article 129  The National Planning Commission 
 
(1)  There shall be established in the office of the President a National 
Planning Commission, whose task shall be to plan the priorities and 
direction of national development. 
(2)  There shall be a Director-General of Planning appointed by the President 
in terms of Article 32(3)(i)(dd) hereof, who shall be the head of the 
National Planning Commission and the principal adviser to the President 
in regard to all matters pertaining to economic planning and who shall 
attend Cabinet meetings at the request of the President. 
(3)  The membership, powers, functions and personnel of the National 
Planning Commission shall be regulated by Act of Parliament. 
 
___________________________________ 
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CHAPTER 18 
 
Coming into Force of the Constitution 
 
Article 130  Coming into Force of the Constitution 
 
This Constitution as adopted by the Constituent Assembly shall come into force on the 
date of Independence. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 19 
 
Amendment of the Constitution 
 
Article 131  Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3 hereof, in so far as such 
repeal or amendment diminishes or detracts from the fundamental rights and freedoms 
contained and defined in that Chapter, shall be permissible under this Constitution, and 
no such purported repeal or amendment shall be valid or have any force or effect. 
 
Article 132  Repeal and Amendment of the Constitution 
 
(1)  Any bill seeking to repeal or amend any provision of this Constitution shall 
indicate the proposed repeals and/or amendments with reference to the 
specific Articles sought to be repealed and/or amended and shall not deal 
with any matter other than the proposed repeals or amendments. 
(2)  The majorities required in Parliament for the repeal and/or amendment of 
any of the provisions of this Constitution shall be: 
(a) two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly; and 
(b) two-thirds of all the members of the National Council. 
(3)  (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sub-Article (2) hereof, if a bill 
proposing a repeal and/or amendment of any of the provisions of this 
Constitution secures a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the 
National Assembly, but fails to secure a majority of two-thirds of all the 
members of the National Council, the President may by Proclamation 
make the bill containing the proposed repeals and/or amendments the 
subject of a national referendum. 
(b) The national referendum referred to in Sub-Article (a) hereof shall be 
conducted in accordance with procedures prescribed for the holding of 
referenda by Act of Parliament. 
(c) If upon the holding of such a referendum the bill containing the 
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proposed repeals and/or amendments is approved by a two-thirds 
majority of all the votes cast in the referendum, the bill shall be deemed to 
have been passed in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, 
and the President shall deal with it in terms of Article 56 hereof. 
(4)  No repeal or amendment of this Sub-Article or Sub-Articles (2) or (3) 
hereof in so far as it seeks to diminish or detract from the majorities 
required in Parliament or in a referendum shall be permissible under this 
Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be valid 
or have any force or effect. 
(5)   Nothing contained in this Article: 
(a) shall detract in any way from the entrenchment provided for in Article 
131 hereof of the fundamental rights and freedoms contained and defined 
in Chapter 3 hereof; 
(b) shall prevent Parliament from changing its own composition or 
structures by amending or repealing any of the provisions of this 
Constitution: provided always that such repeals or amendments are 
effected in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 20 
 
The Law in Force and Transitional Provisions 
 
Article 133  The First National Assembly 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 46 hereof, the Constituent Assembly shall be 
deemed to have been elected under Articles 46 and 49 hereof, and shall constitute the 
first National Assembly of Namibia, and its term of office and that of the President shall 
be deemed to have begun from the date of Independence. 
 
Article 134  Election of the First President 
 
(1)  Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 28 hereof, the first President of 
Namibia shall be the person elected to that office by the Constituent 
Assembly by a simple majority of all its members. 
(2)  The first President of Namibia shall be deemed to have been elected 
under Article 28 hereof and upon assuming office shall have all the 
powers, functions, duties and immunities of a President elected under 
that Article. 
 
Article 135  Implementation of this Constitution 
 
This Constitution shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 7 
hereof. 
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Article 136  Powers of the National Assembly prior to the Election of a National 
Council 
(1)   Until elections for a National Council have been held: 
(a) all legislation shall be enacted by the National Assembly as if this 
Constitution had not made provision for a National Council, and 
Parliament had consisted exclusively of the National Assembly acting on 
its own without being subject to the review of the National Council; 
(b) this Constitution shall be construed as if no functions had been vested 
by this Constitution in the National Council; 
(c) any reference in Articles 29, 56, 75 and 132 hereof to the National 
Council shall be ignored: provided that nothing contained in this Sub-
Article shall be construed as limiting in any way the generality of Sub-
Articles (a) and (b) hereof. 
(2)  Nothing contained in Sub-Article (1) hereof shall detract in any way from 
the provisions of Chapter 8 or any other provision of this Constitution in 
so far as they make provision for the establishment of a National Council, 
elections to the National Council and its functioning after such elections 
have been held. 
 
Article 137  Elections of the First Regional Councils and the First National 
Council 
(1)  The President shall by Proclamation establish the first Delimitation 
Commission which shall be constituted in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 104 (1) hereof, within six (6) months of the date of 
Independence. 
(2)  Such Proclamation shall provide for those matters which are referred to in 
Articles 102 to 106 hereof, shall not be inconsistent with this Constitution 
and shall require the Delimitation Commission to determine boundaries of 
regions and Local Authorities for the purpose of holding Local Authority 
and Regional Council elections. 
(3)  The Delimitation Commission appointed under such Proclamation shall 
forthwith commence its work, and shall report to the President within nine 
(9) months of its appointment: provided that the National Assembly may 
by resolution and for good cause extend the period within which such 
report shall be made. 
(4)  Upon receipt of the report of the Delimitation Commission the President 
shall as soon as reasonably possible thereafter establish by Proclamation 
the boundaries of regions and Local Authorities in accordance with the 
terms of the report. 
(5)  Elections for Local Authorities in terms of Article 111 hereof shall be held 
on a date to be fixed by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a 
date within six (6) months of the Proclamation referred to in Sub-Article 
(4) hereof, or within six (6) months of the date on which the legislation 
referred to in Article 111 hereof has been enacted, whichever is the later: 
provided that the National Assembly may by resolution and for good 
cause extend the period within which such elections shall be held. 
(6)   Elections for Regional Councils shall be held on a date to be fixed by the 
President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) month of 
the date 
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of the elections referred to in Sub-Article (5) hereof, or within one (1) 
month of the date on which the legislation referred to in Article 106 (3) 
hereof has been enacted, whichever is the later: provided that the 
National Assembly may by resolution and for good cause extend the 
period within which such elections shall be held. 
(7)  Elections for the first National Council shall be held on a date to be fixed 
by the President by Proclamation, which shall be a date within one (1) 
month of the date of the elections referred to in Sub-Article (6) hereof, or 
within one (1) month of the date on which the legislation referred to in 
Article 69(2) hereof has been enacted, whichever is the later: provided 
that the National Assembly may by resolution and for good cause extend 
the period within which such elections shall be held. 
 
Article 138  Courts and Pending Actions 
(1)  The Judge-President and other Judges of the Supreme Court of South-
West Africa holding office at the date on which this Constitution is 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly shall be deemed to have been 
appointed as the Judge-President and Judges of the High Court of 
Namibia under Article 82 hereof on the date of Independence, and upon 
making the oath or affirmation of office in the terms set out in Schedule 1 
hereof, shall become the first Judge-President and Judges of the High 
Court of Namibia: provided that if the Judge-President or any such 
Judges are sixty-five (65) years of age or older on such date, it shall be 
deemed that their appointments have been extended until the age of 
seventy (70) in terms of Article 82(4) hereof. 
(2)  (a) The laws in force immediately prior to the date of Independence 
governing the jurisdiction of Courts within Namibia, the right of audience 
before such Courts, the manner in which procedure in such Courts shall 
be conducted and the power and authority of the Judges, Magistrates and 
other judicial officers, shall remain in force until repealed or amended by 
Act of Parliament, and all proceedings pending in such Courts at the date 
of Independence shall be continued as if such Courts had been duly 
constituted as Courts of the Republic of Namibia when the proceedings 
were instituted. 
(b) Any appeal noted to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa against any judgment or order of the Supreme Court of 
South-West Africa shall be deemed to have been noted to the Supreme 
Court of Namibia and shall be prosecuted before such Court as if that 
judgment or order appealed against had been made by the High Court of 
Namibia and the appeal had been noted to the Supreme Court of 
Namibia. 
(c) All criminal prosecutions initiated in Courts within Namibia prior to the 
date of Independence shall be continued as if such prosecutions had 
been initiated after the date of Independence in Courts of the Republic of 
Namibia. 
(d) All crimes committed in Namibia prior to the date of Independence 
which would be crimes according to the law of the Republic of Namibia if 
it had then existed, shall be deemed to constitute crimes according to the 
law of the Republic of Namibia, and to be punishable as such in and by 
the Courts of the Republic of Namibia. 
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(3)   Pending the enactment of the legislation contemplated by Article 79  
hereof: 
(a) the Supreme Court shall have the same jurisdiction to hear and 
determine appeals from Courts in Namibia as was previously vested in 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa; 
(b) the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine 
matters referred to it for a decision by the Attorney-General under this 
Constitution; 
(c) all persons having the right of audience before the High Court shall 
have the right of audience before the Supreme Court; 
(d) three (3) Judges shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court when 
it hears appeals or deals with matters under Sub-Articles (a) and (b) 
hereof: provided that if any such Judge dies or becomes unable to act 
after the hearing of the appeal or such matter has commenced, but prior 
to judgment, the law applicable in such circumstances to the death or 
inability of a Judge of the High Court shall apply mutatis mutandis; 
(c) until rules of the Supreme Court are made by the Chief Justice for the 
noting and prosecution of appeals and all matters incidental thereto, the 
rules which regulated appeals from the Supreme Court of South-West 
Africa to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa, and 
were in force immediately prior to the date of Independence, shall apply 
mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 139 The Judicial Service Commission 
(1)  Pending the enactment of legislation as contemplated by Article 85 hereof 
and the appointment of a Judicial Service Commission thereunder, the 
Judicial Service Commission shall be appointed by the President by 
Proclamation and shall consist of the Chief Justice, a Judge appointed by 
the President, the Attorney-General, an advocate nominated by the Bar 
Council of Namibia and an attorney nominated by the Council of the Law 
Society of South-West Africa: provided that until the first Chief Justice has 
been appointed, the President shall appoint a second Judge to be a 
member of the Judicial Service Commission who shall hold office thereon 
until the Chief Justice has been appointed. The Judicial Service 
Commission shall elect from amongst its members at its first meeting the 
person to preside at its meetings until the Chief Justice has been 
appointed. The first task of the Judicial Service Commission shall be to 
make a recommendation to the President with regard to the appointment 
of the first Chief Justice. 
(2)  Save as aforesaid the provisions of Article 85 hereof shall apply to the 
functioning of the Judicial Service Commission appointed under Sub-
Article (1) hereof, which shall have all the powers vested in the Judicial 
Service Commission by this Constitution. 
 
Article 140  The Law in Force at the Date of Independence 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all laws which were in force 
immediately before the date of Independence shall remain in force until 
repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are declared 
unconstitutional by a  
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competent Court. 
(2)  Any powers vested by such laws in the Government, or in a Minister or 
other official of the Republic of South Africa shall be deemed to vest in 
the Government of the Republic of Namibia or in a corresponding Minister 
or official of the Government of the Republic of Namibia, and all powers, 
duties and functions which so vested in the Government Service 
Commission, shall vest in the Public Service Commission referred to in 
Article 112 hereof. 
(3)  Anything done under such laws prior to the date of Independence by the 
Government, or by a Minister or other official of the Republic of South 
Africa shall be deemed to have been done by the Government of the 
Republic of Namibia or by a corresponding Minister or official of the 
Government of the Republic of Namibia, unless such action is 
subsequently repudiated by an Act of Parliament, and anything so done 
by the Government Service Commission shall be deemed to have been 
done by the Public Service Commission referred to in Article 112 hereof, 
unless it is determined otherwise by an Act of Parliament. 
(4)  Any reference in such laws to the President, the Government, a Minister 
or other official or institution in the Republic of South Africa shall be 
deemed to be a reference to the President of Namibia or to a 
corresponding Minister, official or institution in the Republic of Namibia 
and any reference to the Government Service Commission or the 
government service, shall be construed as a reference to the Public 
Service Commission referred to in Article 112 hereof or the public service 
of Namibia. 
(5)  For the purposes of this Article the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa shall be deemed to include the Administration of the Administrator-
General appointed by the Government of South Africa to administer 
Namibia, and any reference to the Administrator-GeneraI in legislation 
enacted by such Administration shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
President of Namibia, and any reference to a Minister or official of such 
Administration shall be deemed to be a reference to a corresponding 
Minister or official of the Government of the Republic of Namibia. 
 
Article 141  Existing Appointments 
 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, any person holding office 
under any law in force on the date of Independence shall continue to hold 
such office unless and until he or she resigns or is retired, transferred or 
removed from office in accordance with law. 
(2)  Any reference to the Attorney-General in legislation in force immediately 
prior to the date of Independence shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the Prosecutor-General, who shall exercise his or her functions in 
accordance with this Constitution. 
 
Article 142  Appointment of the First Chief of the Defence Force, the First 
Inspector-General of Police and the First Commissioner of Prisons 
The President shall, in consultation with the leaders of all political parties represented in 
the National Assembly, appoint by Proclamation the first Chief of the Defence Force, the 
first 
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Inspector-General of Police and the first Commissioner of Prisons. 
 
Article 143  Existing International Agreements 
 
All existing international agreements binding upon Namibia shall remain in force, unless 
and until the National Assembly acting under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides. 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 21 
 
Final Provisions 
 
Article 144  International Law 
 
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of 
public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this 
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia. 
 
Article 145  Saving 
 
(1)  Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as imposing 
upon the Government of Namibia: 
(a) any obligations to any other State which would not otherwise have 
existed under international law; 
(b) any obligations to any person arising out of the acts or contracts of 
prior Administrations which would not otherwise have been recognised by 
international law as binding upon the Republic of Namibia. 
(2)  Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed as recognising in 
any way the validity of the Administration of Namibia by the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa or by the Administrator-General appointed 
by the Government of the Republic of South Africa to administer Namibia. 
 
Article 146  Definitions 
(1)   Unless the context otherwise indicates, any word or expression in this 
Constitution shall bear the meaning given to such word or expression in 
any law which deals with the interpretation of statutes and which was in 
operation within the territory of Namibia prior to the date of Independence. 
(2)  (a) The word "Parliament" shall mean the National Assembly and, once 
the first National Council has been elected, shall mean the National 
Assembly acting, when so required by this Constitution, subject to the 
review of the National Council. 
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(b) Any reference to the plural shall include the singular and any 
reference to the singlular shall include the plural. 
(c) Any reference to the "date of Independence" or "Independence" shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the day as of which Namibia is declared 
to be independent by the Constituent Assembly. 
(d) Any reference to the "Constituent Assembly" shall be deemed to be a 
reference to the Constituent Assembly elected for Namibia during 
November 1989 as contemplated by United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 435 of 1978. 
(e) Any reference to "Gazette" shall be deemed to be a reference to the 
Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia. 
 
Article 147  Repeal of Laws 
 
The laws set out in Schedule 8 hereof are hereby repealed. 
 
Article 148  Short Title 
 
This Constitution shall be called the Namibian Constitution. 
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SCHEDULE 1 
 
Oath / Affirmation Of Judges 
 
"I,................................ do hereby swear/solemnly affirm that as a Judge of the Republic of Namibia I will 
defend and uphold the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia as the Supreme Law and will fearlessly 
administer justice to all persons without favour or prejudice and in accordance with the laws of the Republic 
of Namibia. 
 
(in the case of an oath) 
So help m e God." 
 
SCHEDULE 2 
 
Oath / Affirmation of Ministers and Deputy-Ministers 
 
"I,.................................... do hereby swear/solem nly affirm that I will be faithful to the Republic of Namibia, 
hold m y office as Minister/Deputy-Minister with honour and dignity, uphold, protect and defend the 
Constitution and faithfully obey, execute and administer the laws of the Republic of Namibia, serve the 
people of Namibia to the best of my ability, not divulge directly or indirectly any matters brought before the 
Cabinet and entrusted to me under secrecy, and perform the duties of my office and the functions entrusted 
to m e by the President conscientiously and to the best of my ability. 
 
(in the case of an oath) 
So help m e God." 
 
SCHEDULE 3 
 
Oath / Affirmation of Members of the National Assembly and the National Council 
 
"I,.................................... do hereby swear/solemnly affirm that I will be faithful to the Republic of Namibia 
and its people and I solemnly promise to uphold and defend the Constitution and laws of the Republic of 
Namibia to the best of my ability. 
 
(in the case of an oath) 
So help m e God." 
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SCHEDULE 4 
 
Election of Members of the National Assembly 
 
(1)  For the purpose of filling the seventy-two (72) seats in the National Assembly pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 46 (1)(a) hereof, the total number of votes cast in a general election for these 
seats shall be divided by seventy-two (72) and the result shall constitute the quota of votes per 
seat. 
(2)  The total number of votes cast in favour of a registered political party which offers itself for this 
purpose shall be divided by the quota of votes per seat and the result shall, subject to paragraph 
(3),  constitute the number of seats to which that political party shall be entitled in the National 
Assembly. 
(3)  Where the formula set out in paragraph (2) yields a surplus fraction not absorbed by the number of 
seats allocated to the political party concerned, such surplus shall compete with other similar 
surpluses accruing to any other political party or parties participating in the election, and any 
undistributed seat or seats (in terms of the formula set out in paragraph (2)) shall be awarded to the 
party or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplus. 
(4)  Subject to the requirements pertaining to the qualification of members of the National Assembly, a 
political party which qualifies for seats in terms of paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be free to choose in 
its own discretion which persons to nominate as members of the National Assembly to fill the said 
seats. 
(5)  Provision shall be made by Act of Parliament for all parties participating in an election of members 
of the National Assembly to be represented at all material stages of the election process and to be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity for scrutinising the counting of the votes cast in such election. 
 
 
SCHEDULE 5 
 
Property vesting in The Government of Namibia 
 
(1)  All property of which the ownership or control immediately prior to the date of Independence vested 
in the Government of the Territory of South West Africa, or in any Representative Authority 
constituted in terms of the Representative Authorities Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG 8 of 
1980), or in the Government of Rehoboth, or in any other body, statutory or otherwise, constituted 
by or for the benefit of any such Government or Authority immediately prior to the date of 
Independence, or which was held in trust for or on behalf of the Government of an independent 
Namibia, shall vest in or be under the control of the Government of Namibia. 
(2)  For the purpose of this Schedule, "property" shall, without detracting from the generality of that 
term as generally accepted and understood, mean and include movable and immovable property, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal and wheresoever situate, and shall include any right or interest 
therein. 
(3)  All such immovable property shall be transferred to the Government of Namibia without payment of 
transfer duty, stamp duty or any other fee or charge, but subject to any existing right, charge, 
obligation or trust on or over such property and subject also to the provisions of this Constitution. 
(4)  The Registrar of Deeds concerned shall upon production to him or her of the title deed to any 
immovable property mentioned in paragraph (1) endorse such title deed to the effect that the 
immovable property therein described is vested in the Government of Namibia and shall make the 
necessary entries in his or her registers, and thereupon the said title deed shall serve and avail for 
all purposes as proof of the title of the Government of Namibia to the said property. 
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SCHEDULE 6 
 
The National Flag of The Republic of Namibia 
 
The National Flag of Namibia shall be rectangular in the proportion of three in the length to two in the width, 
tierced per bend reversed, blue, white and green; the white bend reversed, which shall be one third of the 
width of the flag, is charged with another of red, one quarter of the width of the flag. In the upper hoist there 
shall be a gold sun with twelve straight rays, the diameter of which shall be one third of the width of the flag, 
with its vertical axis one fifth of the distance from the hoist, positioned equidistant from the top edge and 
from the reversed bend. The rays, which shall each be two fifths of the radius of the sun, issue from the 
outer edge of a blue ring, which shall be one tenth of the radius of the sun. 
 
 
SCHEDULE 7 
 
Implementation of this Constitution 
 
1.  On the day of Independence, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall administer to the 
President, elected in terms of Article 134 hereof, the oath or affirmation prescribed by Article 30 
hereof. 
2.  The President shall appoint the Prime Minister and administer to him or her the oath or affirmation 
set out in Schedule 2 hereof. 
3.  The President shall administer to the first Judges of Namibia, appointed under Article 138(1) 
hereof, the oath or affirmation set out in Schedule 1 hereof. 
4.  On the day determined by the Constituent Assembly the National Assembly shall first meet, at a 
time and at a place specified by the Prime Minister. 
5.  The members of the National Assembly, with the Prime Minister as Chairperson, shall: 
(a) take the oath or affirmation prescribed by Article 55 hereof before the Judge-President or a 
Judge designated by the Judge President for this purpose; 
(b) elect the Speaker of the National Assembly. 
6.  The National Assembly, with the Speaker as Chairperson, shall: 
(a) elect a Deputy-Speaker; 
(b) conduct such business as it deems appropriate; 
(c) adjourn to a date to be determined by the National Assembly. 
7.  The rules and procedures followed by the Constituent Assembly for the holding of its meetings 
shall, mutatis m utandis, be the rules and procedures to be followed by the National Assembly until 
such time as the National Assembly has adopted rules of procedure and standing orders under 
Article 59 hereof. 
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SCHEDULE 8 
 
Repeal Of Laws 
 
South-West Africa Constitution Act, 1968 (Act No. 39 of 1968) 
 
Rehoboth Self-Government Act, 1978 (Act No. 56 of 1976) 
 
Establishment of Office of Administrator-GeneraI for the Territory of South West Africa Proclamation, 1977 
(Proclamation N o. 180 of 1977 of the State President) 
 
Empowering of the Administrator-GeneraI for the Territory of South-West Africa to make Laws Proclamation, 
1977 (Proclamation No. 181 of 1977 of the State President) 
 
Representative Authorities Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 8 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Whites Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 12 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Coloureds Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 14 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Ovambos Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 23 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Kavangos Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG.26 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Caprivians Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 29 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Damaras Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 32 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Namas Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 35 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Tswanas Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 47 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority of the Hereros Proclamation, 1980 (Proclamation AG. 50 of 1980) 
 
Representative Authority Powers Transfer Proclamation, 1989 (Proclamation AG. 8 of 1989) 
 
Government of Rehoboth Powers Transfers Proclamation, 1989 (Proclamation AG. 32 of 1989) 
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Government Gazette 24 December 1998 no. 2014 
Act no. 34, 1998 NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION FIRST 
AMENDMENT ACT, 1998 
 
EXPLANATORY NOTE: 
 
___________________ Words underlined with a solid line indicates insertions in existing provisions. 
[   ] Words in bold type in square brackets indicate omissions from existing provisions. 
 
 
 
ACT 
To amend the Namibian Constitution so as to provide that the first President of Namibia 
may hold office as President for three terms, and to provide for incidental matters. 
 
 
( S i g n e d b y t h e P r e s i d e n t on 7 December 1998) 
 
 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of Namibia, in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 132 of the Namibian Constitution, as follows:- 
 
 
Amendment of Article 134 of the Namibian Constitution 
 
1. Article 134 of the Namibian Constitution is amended by the addition of the 
  following Sub-Article: 
“(3) Notwithstanding Article 29(3), the first President of Namibia may hold office as 
President for three terms” 
 
Short title 
 
2. This Act shall be called the Namibian Constitution First Amendment Act, 1998. 
 
 
____________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
HANSARD OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ORDERS AND 
INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
WINDHOEK 
8 DECEMBER 1989 
 
CHAIRMAN: When we adjourned yesterday we decided to go and work throughout the night to 
try to identify, I hope not only areas of disagreement, but first the area of agreement, so that we 
can see how close we are and then to point out areas to be discussed by the Namibian leaders 
and to iron out those differences and then to make a report to the full assembly on Tuesday. I am 
in the hands of the committee, but would like to propose that parties, or those who have done the 
job, who feel they can contribute, will start the ball rolling by somebody who thinks he did the 
most work. 
MR MUDGE: Mr Chairman, I take the floor not because I want to dominate the meeting, please 
don‟t get me wrong, but I have done some homework with my colleagues. We did spend many 
hours together, and we have – and I am not apologizing for that – taken your proposal as the 
basis for our discussion, not because I think it is the best proposal, of course, but because it 
represents…. 
CHAIRMAN: Of course, you are not meaning me… 
MR KATJIUONGUA: The chairman is neutral, SWAPO-proposal. 
MR MUDGE: Because it represents the views of the majority and we have to take that into 
account. Mr Staby, Mr Barnes, Mr Matjila and spent many hours together and we have gone 
through your proposal first of all, page by page and article by article. We have come to the 
conclusion that as far as the preamble is concerned, the first chapter and even part 2, the bill of 
fundamental rights, although we have identified certain basic differences – and I will ask Mr Staby 
to very shortly point out not the sentence by sentence and paragraph by paragraph, but I think a 
few fundamental things, mainly regarding certain constraints. We came to the conclusion that if 
we would refer the bill of fundamental rights and the preamble to a committee of specialists, of 
legal people, we are sure that it would be possible for us to reach agreement on those issues. I 
think instead of spending hours and hours discussing them. I do not want to propose that parties 
should not be allowed to express opinions on basic fundamental differences; I think that should 
be allowed, if you agree with that, but I don‟t think there will be many problems there. I will ask Mr 
Staby just to point out a few of the differences and I am sure some of the other parties will               
want to do the same. I would ask us not to spend too much time talking about that. I think most of 
these differences could be sorted out by the co-opted legal advisors legal advisors.  
When it comes to the president, think we have a problem there. I think that will have to be 
discussed. It is now already identified as one of the fundamental differences between at least our 
party and SWAPO‟s proposal. The same applies to the legislature where we propose a bicameral 
system, and the election procedure, where we propose proportional representation. We have also 
come to the conclusion that we have another practical problem, namely that if we want to 
transform the present assembly into a government, whatever we decide as far as a bicameral 
system is concerned, the regional councils and proportional representation, the question will then 
definitely come up: when, at what stage, because there are no elected regional councils at this 
stage and we don‟t have elected senators at this stage. How are we going to implement that? So, 
that will have to be discussed.  When it comes to the council of ministers, of course this is closely 
linked to the opposition of the president and I think that will then have to be discussed. When it 
comes to regional councils, I must say I don‟t find very serious differences between the SWAPO-
proposal and our proposal. Maybe I am not interpreting their proposal correctly, but I get the 
impression that even there…. But there Mr Katjiuongua indicated that he has a problem with the 
regional councils. 
With this introduction, if you would now just allow my colleague, Mr Staby, to very briefly point 
out, and it depends how you want to organize the meeting, whether you want us to discuss not 
article by article, but at least chapter by chapter. Then I would ask Mr Staby just to very briefly 
point out the problems that we have with SWAPO‟s proposal regarding fundamental rights. I think 
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we have only two problems in part 1, chapter 1 and 2. In Chapter 1 I think we will have to discuss 
the territory of Namibia. What do we mean when we talk about the territory of Namibia? I am now 
referring to article 1 (4) of SWAPO‟s proposal. 
CHAIRMAN: Could I just ask the other members, you are proposing that we use the SWAPO-
document. You used the SWAPO-document as a basis. Are we agreed that we will use that one 
as we go chapter by chapter? 
MR RUKORO: I have slightly different approach, namely that we start by trying to identify, and 
having identified, to formulate areas of material dispute, as we said yesterday, list them one by 
one. Which are the areas where we think there is bound to be some serious discussion? Just list 
them without discussing them. Then we have an idea o the task facing us, and having done that, 
secondly we also have terms of reference; we identify and formulate the working categories 
based on for instance this. That would be more or less what Mr Mudge was trying to do. For 
instance, you say next Tuesday when we start, we will start with chapter 1, all the provisions 
related to establishment or what in some other documents are referred to as general provisions. 
On that basis we work out a whole work schedule, even for a whole week, starting next week 
Tuesday. Then we get some kind of programme, rather than going into discussions now on the 
basis of a single document and not on the basis of categories. 
MR MUDGE: I don‟t want to be misunderstood, may I just make it clear. I am not accepting 
SWAPO‟s proposal. What I do say and what I said, I had to find out what SWAPO disagrees with 
us, so I had to look at their constitution and disagree with just for the purpose of identifying those 
differences let us look SWAPO‟s constitution, then we will find the areas of dispute. 
MR PRETORIUS: I just want to say I am also prepared to accept SWAPO‟s constitution as a 
basis for our discussion. 
MR AMATHILA: I want to support what I understood to be a proposal, that we use the SWAPO-
document as a basis for our discussion. I would also like to support the honourable Mr Rukoro‟s 
approach that parties actually have the chance to introduce their ideas and having done that, at 
least the basis for our discussion should be the document of SWAPO. 
MR TJITENDERO: We accept it was a working document. 
MR KATJIUONUA: I support the proposition by Mr Rukoro as a point of departure. I think we 
must stick to our terms of reference to begin with. I think only after we have identified appropriate 
working categories and so on, then we can decide what document we shall use as point of 
departure, and we have to come to that yet now. So, I think we must be more systematic, 
otherwise we will get into confusion and we will not make progress. So, I think first of all we 
should follow our instructions here, as we agreed upon yesterday, and then we say these are the 
points of differences, and then we categories areas of work and then we can take one of the 
documents. Otherwise there will be confusion. 
CHAIRMAN: We have decided not to debate on a small minor thing. The point is we adjourned 
the meeting to go and identify areas of differences. If we agree by categories, that you should talk 
about preamble, you point out the differences in the preamble. If you found them how they differ. 
But let‟s first, as we have agreed, identify differences. That is a systematic way, differences, but 
not a debate, please. First just to identify them. Basically we pointed out three areas, main ones: 
presidency, legislature and voting system. That some of us saw as main differences. If we want to 
add more, those who want to add, can take the floor to add additional ones. 
MR TJITENDERO: Thank you. I was very much impressed by the approach that Mr Mudge took. I 
think it was beginning to show progress in that direction. The differences that were state in all the 
statements, is where there is a material dispute or fundamental differences in the submissions, If 
we go by bringing in all the tangents, then obviously we will subject this session again to the 
same discussions we had Before. I think Mr Mudge made a very progressive move by saying let‟s 
first adopt. In any conference you come to you have a working document. You look for its 
shortcomings and its omissions, and then you try to fill that. So, I feel that we have the material in 
front of us here, which are all related to one thing, the constitution, and I assume and I thought 
the reasons why Mr Mudge had suggestion The adoption of a working document, was taking into 
account how conventionally it covers the areas that are covered by the constitutions, and on that 
basis we take – establishment and all the areas that have been made, we discuss in relation to 
establishment what is missing or what needs to be strengthened. When we agree, then we 
submit that to the experts. With every article in it, so I now want to discuss the one with which I 
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differ most and that is why I want SWAPO‟s constitution to be the basis of the discussions. I am 
just making a joke, Sir. In any case, let us start with the chapters, with the bill of fundamental 
Rights, and then can discuss it briefly, point out differences, refer it to the specialists and they can 
compare it and see if they can come with a combined thing. Then we go on chapter by chapter 
and identify areas of material dispute.  
CHAIRMAN: The committee seems to be divided. There is a proposal that we go chapter by 
chapter, but you seem not be accepting the SWAPO-paper as a basis to discuss chapter by 
chapter. 
MR KATJIUONGUA: Discussing chapter by chapter, does it mean to identify differences or to do 
what?  
CHAIRMAN: Yes. For instance, if in the preamble there are differences or omissions, we say 
preamble is omitting this area which is mentioned in other documents. There was a proposal. 
MEMBER: I want to second the proposal. 
CHAIRMAN: We take the preamble first. 
MR STABY: Concerning the preamble, I think it is necessary that the various proposals be 
reconciled as have been said in connection with the various other aspects of proposals yesterday 
and intimated this morning. So, one would have to look carefully at the various proposals that 
have been tabled. I just want to do so, bearing in mind certain principles, and unfortunately a 
preamble isn‟t a preamble in terms of a bill of rights, I think the attitude is fairly diverging. In 
essence I think the preamble should be fairly easily reconcilable, because they say the same 
thing in different word. First of all our attitude would be that the preamble must be oriented at the 
future and not deal with the past. I think that is the first pre-requisite. The second one is that we 
think the preamble must cover essentials only, and not embark on emotional things, for which we 
obviously have understanding. There is for instance in the proposal under discussion, in the fifth 
paragraph a reference to “apartheid, racism and colonialism.” We have understanding for that; 
there can be no argument about that. But I would just like to point out, particularly in view of the 
fact that further on in the document one has various prohibitions against the practice of apartheid 
and racism, with which we agree in essence, but we want to draw attention to the fact that there 
are other practices which are equally repugnant. If one takes fascism for instance. If we mention 
one expressly, the question arises whether we do not condone the others .So, one would have to 
look at these formulations in that light. I think that is basically what we are saying with regard to, 
for instance, a positive approach oriented at the future. I can just draw attention to the fourth 
paragraph where it says: “whereas these rights for the people of Namibia have so long been 
denied by apartheid, racism and colonialism...” It is one way of formulating it. The other one 
would be: “Whereas the people of Namibia have finally achieved freedom”, would be a positive 
way of formulating that. I just want to explain our approach to that. Mr. Chairman, I unfortunately 
have to leave this meeting at 10 o‟clock, so if I may be given the opportunity to look at the Bill of 
rights or to express some views on that before I leave, I would be most grateful. 
CHAIRMAN: We must go chapter by chapter. There is a comment on preamble. Any differences 
in preamble?  
MR PRETORIOUS: I don‟t want to point out any differences, but think in general I want to agree 
with Mr Staby that we must try to look in the future and not the past. 
MR RUPPEL: I think there should be at least a short reference to the context of this constitution, 
and then we will have to refer to the past and so on. We are not born in a vacuum, we are born as 
a nation and the background cannot just be disregarded completely. But I think there is a 
possibility of marrying the two differences. 
MR MUDGE: Let me make our view very clear. A constitution is not written for one generation, it 
is written for generations to come, and let me repeat that we have understanding. When anybody 
refers to apartheid and discrimination and colonialism I really appreciate your strong feelings 
about it, but in two or three generations from now, I hope the people will not even know the word 
“apartheid” anymore I hope it will not be part of the vocabulary anymore. Do we want to write 
things in to our constitution which in two or three generations will be understood. I don‟t have the 
answer; we have only identified differences of approach. It is probably not the responsibility of the 
committee at this point in time to now start arguing about it. Let us just identify it as an area of 
dispute which we think should be discussed. 
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MR GURIRAB: I think we will get around the concerns, but it would be injustice done to the future 
generations of Namibia if we where to, in a constitution which we are now charged to write, deny 
them their history, both the good of it and its negatives. All the good constitutions recall history, 
the circumstances under which they have been brought in to being, and on that basis they project 
a better future. I do not expect that we should be arguing in the preamble, but we cannot deny the 
past. So, it is a question of language, it is a question of drafting. 
MR KATJIUONGUA: Mr Chairman, myself and my colleague here, Mr Rukoro, did the following. 
First we identified what we regard as important areas of dispute or differences. Then we also 
identified areas in which clarity is needed as important areas in which this assembly has to 
provide clarity, not necessarily fundamental areas of difference, but through the discussion we 
noticed that have different ones with different emphasis and therefore clarity was required. So, 
first of all the areas of material disputes or differences are the presidency, the parliament, 
electoral system, regional or local government and amendments to the constitution. Those five 
points we see as points as serious differences between the parties here, and the army and police 
as well. Protection of fundamental rights, some people say emergencies can be used to suspend 
those rights, but maybe that is more a clarity than a dispute. Than we have the question of the 
army and police. Some people say there is no need to have an army, but Para-military force, 
including police. Myself…. Feel strongly that we must have a force of some sort. I think those are 
fundamental areas of differences.  Then there are areas on which clarity is needed. The nature of 
the state. Colleagues in the FNC say federal, and then a unitary state can also be terribly 
concentrated, it can be decentralized or not in lieu of federalism. That is another way. Then the 
issue of succession. We have all these debts which South Africa was talking about when he was 
here. Are we going to take those debts and other responsibilities or are we going to deny them? I 
think we cannot run way from that. Then we have the question of land reform. We haven‟t said 
much about that, but I understand – and I am sorry to mention race and colour – a lot of the black 
politicians in this campaign have been talking a lot about the question of land, and somehow it is 
a controversial issue we know very well, sometimes when you talk about historical lands. I was 
talking to my colleague here and I said: “When say to heroes the land goes back to the people, it 
means that Okahandja and the farm of Mr Mudge and some places must go back to the people 
without paying. Is this what we mean by land reform or not?” Things like that need clarity. The 
question of languages, we are not quite clear about that. Then, the question of environment: We 
mentioned the other day that there are people walking around here with money, bags of money, 
who think that they can give all this waste and we can get money to balance our budget and to 
have a nice time. Then the death penalty: I think that is a serious question. We know in England 
and many other countries, whether people who kill should be killed or not. I think our friends from 
the NNF have a different approach. The last thing , and I think and I think the point that Mr Mudge 
also referred to earlier, is the question of where do we go from here, what is the future, election, a  
government, what do we do? After we have written a constitution we must take action and what is 
that action going to be? From our side we thought may be these are the points on which we are 
going to take document, and I have no problem to take the SWAPO-constitution as a point of 
departure, on the understanding that when it comes to these provisions, I have a chance to bring 
in my ideas. 
CHAIRMAN:  After I gave the honourable member the floor to satisfy myself, I am now convinced 
my original decision was the correct one, because all those things are mentioned in the 
document. When we come to them, you will then intervene and say “here I have difference.” I am 
satisfied that I gave you the floor, but I am convinced the first decision was the correct one. When 
we come to those aspects you can point it out. 
MR MUDGE: I just want to ask, let us get absolute clarity on the question of the territory of 
Namibia. I am not hundred percent sure, for instance the DTA – and I am sure Mr Katjiuongua 
mentioned it the other day – is also concerned about the southern border. We feel it must be the 
middle of the Orange River and I think we must get absolute clarity among ourselves on the issue 
of Walvis Bay and the islands on the coast. I don‟t think we should bump our heads against a 
legal situation; we must take that in to consideration. All of us agree we want Walvis Bay, but we 
also have to consider the possibility of negotiations about certain areas. Can we just identify that 
as a point that will have to be properly investigated? I don‟t to argue about it at this stage. 
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CHAIRMAN: The constitution is for the future. Are we going to investigate this matter in the 
constitution? 
MR MUDGE: No before we draft the constitution, we must make sure that we all agree on the 
description of the territory, because I don‟t know when you say, which is accepted by the express 
consensus of the international community”‟ what does that mean? I don‟t know exactly. We want 
to have a specific description of the territory of Namibia. 
MR GURIRAB: Yes, I think we will need to do that. The formulation in NNF‟s version being more 
explicit than this formulation. But in the constitution. Whatever the future arrangement are going 
to be between Independent Namibian and South Africa, as Namibians we should define the 
territory of Namibia as being inclusive of Walvis Bay and the island and the southern border being 
the middle of the river resolution of the outstanding dispute, we will find ways to handle that, 
whether by negotiations or internationally in court.  
MR KATJUONGUA: I agree with my two colleagues that a constitution is a long-time document. 
So, I don‟t care so much about expressed will by the international community, but think as we 
ourselves understand it to be what is Namibia, I think we must try to put in the constitution 
everything that we think is Namibia. Maybe the only colleagues who have a point of difference 
here are the FCN who in their proposal say South West Africa as it exists today. That might 
exclude Walvis Bay and some other places. Maybe they can tell us what the problem is. 
MR MUDGE: Can we have a look at the DTA-proposal should be amended a little, when you say 
in article 6: 
“The Territory of the country shall be the territory known as South West Africa at the enactment of 
this constitution, and including additional territory as may be agreed upon.” 
We can change that a little, as is incorporated or whatever we might want to say there. But then 
we know exactly what we are talking about and then we can even mention Walvis Bay and we 
can mention the islands. I don‟t have a problem there, but let us be a little more specific, then we 
know what we are talking about. 
DR TJITENDERO: I think we should look at the specific, definition of the territory in the NNF-
proposal. I think that defiantly will take care of the concerns. 
MR PRETORIUS: Of the question of languages, I am identifying it. 
MR MUDGE: May I comment on this paragraph on language? I must say it is very reasonable. I 
think I should say that. As far as I am concerned it is very much appreciated what you have 
proposed. I have a problem with the role of Afrikaans.  
MR RUPPEL: I have a problem with the kind of thing which Mr Pretorius placed on record. If the 
honourable member wants to say that this is a matter which should be dealt with another 
committee, then that must be clearly stated. It is a political decision. We cannot just say there is a 
difference and then just leave it like that. We must decide what we are going to do with this 
difference. Is it a difference which will be referred, or is it difference where we will just use our 
combined vote against you? That sort of thing. We have to be practical and we don‟t want to be 
going on matters in committees where it is quite clear that only a very, very minute minority, 
although they may be washed away in any event by the consensus in this committee. So, we 
must b practical, otherwise we will find all sorts of small differences which really don‟t matter and 
they will all be subject to lengthy discussions in committees and committees. So, I think here is a 
forum, here is a good cross-cut of our party representation and we can say this is a material one 
or not. 
MR PRETORIKOS: I just want to say that I agree with Mr Mudge that we must now first identify, 
because if we want to debate every point, I don‟t think we will finish it. I was under the impression 
I must only identify. 
CHAIRMAN: No, we agreed we will identify it by pointing out differences when we come to the 
issue. You can explain what your problem is. 
MR RUPPEL: We have to, at the end of the day, not only to identify, but also give direction to the 
committees and if we now just go through the whole thing and identify and then go back and 
discuss it again, we have to give direction to the committees that is the second part of our 
mandate. 
MR PRETORIUS: It is very important to me, for the sake of the feeling of our people and also the 
other langue groups, that something is not done overnight. So, it is important to me that there is 
the exception of the fact that you have the right to talk your language even in public schools up to 
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a certain stage. You cannot do it overnight. It is against this background that I want to compare 
our proposals with those of SWAPO. 
MR BARNES: The honourable member Mr Pretorius did express his views, but we are still 
lacking in a directive. Shouldn‟t we just say then if there are differences, refer it to a committee 
and then move on. 
DR THIANGE: I am trying to understand the honourable member. His concerns are already 
covered. What he says is that he wants the groups to reserve the right to talk their languages in 
schools and that is exactly what is said. So it is covered. I do not understand his problem. Exactly 
what he said is provided for in 2. 
MR PRETORIOUS: But even in governmental structures, what will is position? Say for example 
somebody is elected who can only speak Ovambo or Afrikaans, what will the position be? 
DR THIANGE: Article 3. 
MR PRITORIOUS: That is local government, not national government. 
CHAIRMAN: It seems that Mr Pretorius thinks once independence comes, English will be spoken, 
Afrikaans stops. That is not what this means. 
MR PRETORIUS: Will that not be the effect of this?  
CHAIRMAN: You will want to say other languages, not only Afrikaans? Part 2: “Nothing contained 
in this constitution shall prohibit the use of any other language as a media of instruction in both 
private schools as well as schools financed or subsidized by the state, subject to proper 
compliance to such requirements as might be imposed by law.” 
MR PRETORIOUS: That is just as far as schools are concerned. 
CHAIRMAN: We are all proud of our languages. Are we going to say I should talk in the 
Assembly in Damara? 
MR PRETORIOUS: That is what I feel that we might discus, the practical situation.  
MR MUDGE: Do I understand Mr Pretorius correctly; does he want to include in paragraph 3 the 
central government as well? Is that what he wants to? 
MR PRETORIOUS: That is what I want to do. 
MR MUDGE: Well, then say that. 
CHAIRMAN: We just add “as well as central government.” 
DR Iyambo: I think it must be referred to a committee; it is changing the whole context there.  
MR RUKORO: I have no big problems with five years as a compromise in exchange for a 
concession from Mudge on some other aspect. LAUGHTER.  
MR MUDGE: I want to discuss the principle. The principal contained in paragraph 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Just not to be misunderstood I said that we are in favour of affirmative action. I am sure you all 
know w hat I mean when I talk about affirmative action. We even, in one of our policy documents, 
use the words, “weider guttmachung.” Translated into English means that you have to 
compensate somehow for damages done. In principle we have no problem, but I think the people 
in the country, the people that we need very much, when it comes to any form of affirmative 
action, you must make it very clear that it is going to be affirmative action and that it is not going 
to be discrimination in reverse. When I talk about this, I am not in any way differing from the 
principle. I am concerned about the wording, I am concerned about the formulation, because read 
by somebody who is not well informed and read by somebody who is suspicious, this might 
create serious problems. For instance, the fact that they say it can be changed after 25 years. If 
any government, responsible government decides after five or ten years that the injustices of the 
past have been eliminated, that the has been is approaches of affirmative action, that everybody 
is happy now, that the backlash has been recovered, then they will, but why 25 years? I was only 
hopping that when it comes to very sensitive issue like this, that we will be able to sit down and 
discuss it responsibly. You can have my word that we as party has a lot of understanding for the 
fact that some people, because of the laws of the past, lagged behind. For instance the fact that 
they could not own property, just to mention one we have not made a secret of it on public 
platforms and we believe in the principle. But when it comes to the inclusion of such a thing in the 
Bill of fundamental Rights, I think we must think very carefully when it comes to formulation I am 
just requesting the opportunity to at some stage discuss the formulation of these paragraphs. 
MR PRETORIOUS: I am not a legal person, but 6(2); I know the German law is making provision 
for it by adding the words “no person may be wilfully or internationally discriminated against.” It is 
very important, because for example for me not having a legal background, if you and Mr Mudge 
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ask me to fetch you a cup of tea, and one of flasks is already empty after I have poured your tea, 
and I pour out of the other flask for Mr Mudge and the one cup of tea is warm and the other is 
cold, that is discrimination, but it was not wilfully. So, it is very important for me and not for me 
because I will not be the government, and I never thought about it, but during the tea-pause Mr 
Mudge said he thought he would be the president. So, it is important to me that we say not being 
discriminated against. It is not so easy for the courts to make the difference. I think we must ask 
the specialists about this.  
MR RUKORO: I think when it comes to this thing, discrimination is absolutely prohibited. The 
question of your state of mind is totally irrelevant, whether you intended it or not. 
MR RUPPEL: I agree for once with honourable Mr Pretorius that there should be a slight 
qualifying clause. We discussed it when we had certain deliberations on our draft. Take for 
instance discrimination on the basis of sex. It is a practice in any democratic country I Know that 
when it comes to providing facilities, that there is a difference made between women and men for 
ablution facilities or whatever. That is discriminating on the basis of sex, but it is perfectly 
acceptable in terms of the norms of the democratic state. A woman who wants to go to a man‟s 
toilet, and everything that goes with it, can go to a constitutional court in a future Namibia and 
enforce her right to do so, unless we qualify it, and there is a formulation to qualify it without 
taking the principle away at all, to just make it clear that in certain categories of accepted norms, 
one can deviate. There are many, I just thought of this sexual one, but certainly hospitals 
discriminate on that basis. They have women wards and men wards. I think if there is a very 
explicit provision to be made, it will not be frivolous. I think the example of the toilet may not be 
the most appropriate one. There are very democratic countries where women are not allowed to 
be co-signatories to their bank accounts or property and all that. I just wanted to give an example. 
MR RUKORO: Maybe we can get out of that problem by re-drafting the whole thing so that it 
would read analogous to the universal Declaration where it says: “Every woman is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, etc.” I can see serious loopholes in this thing of lawfully or not 
lawfully, internationally or not internationally in a constitution. 
MR MUDGE: I am afraid the word “discrimination” has got a specific connotation, something 
which is wrong and I cannot agree that you can qualify discrimination. As far as concerned, 
discrimination is discrimination. Unless you find a better word. I am not saying this only because 
of the connotation; I am also saying this because I know why Mr Pretorius wants those words in 
there. We have discussed it before. He maintains that if he has a school in which he wants to 
educate people in a specific culture and tradition and language and religion which, in the end, will 
boil down to racial discrimination, he will be able to defend it on the grounds that it is not 
discrimination, but in fact differentiation, or something like that. If we really want to have peace in 
this country, then we must avoid making provision for any form of discrimination. The way I 
understand discrimination doesn‟t mean that I say that from now on my wife will have to open the 
door for me when we get in to the car. I think we all realize that in some cases they will have to be 
special provision for women. There will be special provision for the handicapped. There will have 
to be special provision for many other categories of persons. But then we have to find another 
word. The minute you qualify discrimination then you look for trouble, and I speak from 
experience. I don‟t want to discuss the merits, all I want to say is that I will not support any 
proposal that paragraph. Not now. I think we can discuss the paragraph - that I am prepared to 
do. 
MR PRETORIOUS: Mr Chairman, I don‟t want to get involved in political arguments, but it is 
important to me and I am now talking under correction, I think I once read in SWAPO-document, 
as far as private schools are concerned, that private schools may be instituted except on the 
basis of discrimination on the basis of colour, etc. So, there is some discrimination or making 
differences, and that is why I said not wilfully. It is accepted in western concepts and that is why I 
raised the point and it is not to justify only my point of view, but I think it may happen in future that 
this can create law consequences. 
CHAIRMAN: We marry the two. The right to free trail is covered. 
MR RUPPEL: Marry to DTA. Who would have thought that we would marry the DTA? 
MR BARNES: Who would have thought we would take up such a marriage.  
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MR MUDGE: I have a problem with 14(2): “No person and no political party shall have the right to 
practice or to propagate the ideology of apartheid, which has for so long.” I don‟t have a problem 
with that, but is that the only thing they will not be allowed to propagate? 
CHAIRMAN: Fascism, tribalism. 
MR PROTORIOUS: Will it be wise to mention certain and exclude the others? 
CHAIRMAN: But apartheid is a specific ideology under which we suffered and tribalism. Those 
two are crimes. Let‟s get the others. If they are bad, we mention them. 
MR PRETORIOUS: For example, communism. 
CHAIRMAN: We don‟t know yet. 
MR PRETORIOUS: According to Dr Crocker, the other day he said communism and apartheid is 
the same. 
MR MUDGE: 
 Let me say again my views on discrimination and apartheid is known, but I am afraid if any future 
government would apartheid to go on, I will be very surprised. Frankly, I think it is a past era, it is 
over and out. But if we have a democratic society, then in a democratic society you must allow 
freedom of speech and we must not allow past experience, although I agree, we cannot forget the 
past, I don‟t expect you to forget the past, and you can even talk about the past, it is just normal, 
but throughout the document we find reference to, according to my feelings, too much about that. 
If anybody wants to propagate anything which is ridiculous, but which is not a threat to the 
security of the state, for God‟s sake, let them do that. What can we do about it? We will not go 
with them. There will be other people propagating other things which we will not like, and my 
problem is if we start specifying, where do we stop? Everything which is not included or 
specifically excluded will be included. In Other words, anybody who would stand up and say 
terrible things will say “yes, but in the Bill of rights you only refer to one thing, so the rest I am 
allowed to do.” Isn‟t there another paragraph in this proposal where anything which might lead to 
disharmony could be stopped? Once you limit a political party, I think you have to be very 
specific. Then you have to say this and that will not be allowed, and there is a rule in common 
Law or in the Law that is not specifically excluded or the other way around…. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: I have all the sympathy for that, but I think that in our context our country 
and our society has suffered from certain specific things which have been part of our problem. 
Fascism is one, apartheid is one and tribalism is one. I think this attempt has been done all over 
Africa. In all the constitutions of independent countries the question of tribalism has been done all 
over Africa. In all the constitutions of independent countries the question of tribalism has been 
addressed by all of them, simply because they want to create a nation and they want to free the 
people from tribalism. In our context apartheid is part of our context apartheid is part of our 
problem and fascism is part of apartheid. So therefore I feel that these things which are part of 
our history or problems, we cannot ignore them. Other things, we leave them out. If we need to 
make amendments in future to include them if they become problems, then we do so. But 
otherwise, you want to build a... 
MR RUPPEL: In order to make this change, we must also change this one: “The practices of 
racial discrimination, or the practices and ideologies of apartheid, racism and tribalism.” Then you 
make it clear that it is an ideology.  
MR PRETORIUS: I don‟t want a marriage; I will be satisfied with a simple affair. Once again I 
please want to ask you whether we can‟t refer this to a committee and some specialist lawyers, 
because I don‟t think it is also in line with the international Covenant on civil and political Rights 
and also the International Covenant of religious Freedom. I think it is very important that this 
whole idea of group, and I am not prepare to plead here today, because I have not prepared 
myself, I thought we have only come here to appoint different committees. But take for example 
article 27 on the international Covenant on civil and Political Rights: “In those states in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities...” So, the concept of minorities is accepted. “Persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their 
own language”. Here the whole emphasis is on an individual and only his personal life and not in 
community with others. So I am very worried about it. 
MR RUKORO: I was just going to ask one or two questions to Mr Pretorius. Assuming we accept 
this rights as you for see them, would they for instance allow us to have a situation where we are 
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going to have white-only schools as an exercise of the right to cultural minority, or to have a 
white-only hospital? 
MR PRETORIOS: No, that is not the idea. I thought very hard in the past on the principle of free 
association, because race and colour can‟t be excluded when we talk about free association. But 
it was not included in this particular section. Race and colour, as far as I am concerned you are 
correct, except it is not included in such an article. I will not use this article to justify it. 
MR MUDGE: Let me start off by saying that when you talk about discrimination in Namibia, it has 
a different connotation when you talk about discrimination in another country, say for instance 
Japan. When you talk about group rights here, when we discuss the protection for minority rights 
and group rights in this country, we must do so against the background of our own experience. 
Let me say that not only the black people had bad experiences with group rights, as a white man I 
had bad experiences with this concept of group rights, and for that reason I am not opposed to 
discussing it. We can discuss it, but I will never agree with it. I personally feel that if you protect 
the individual, you are also protecting the individual in association with other people. Then you 
have to deal with groups that are voluntarily formed, but when you start defining groups, the way 
it is done in ACN‟s proposal, then they put me before the choice either to be a member of the 
group or not to be a member of anything at all, and then I am in trouble. But I don‟t want to go into 
detail. I have one problem with the sentence here. 
MR PRETORIUS: I want to raise a point of order. I have already informed you about it. I read in 
the “Times” this morning of which persons the committee was comprised and then the following: 
“All the committee members, with the exception of Mr Pretorius, expressed their unequivocal 
opposition to the move. Mr Pretorius, however when the committee met in the Tintenpalast, told 
his fellow committee member that he was only going along to gather information and not to 
question the merits of the issue. Mr Pretorius repeated this when they met Mr Pienaar in South 
West house. At the conclusion of the meeting with the AG, Mr Pretorius was requested to remain 
behind, according to reliable sources.” Mr Chairman, that is not true. All the members present 
know that this was not true, that is half of the truth and it was told by somebody, and what upsets 
is the fact that we are talking about reconciliation. Then we must accept each other‟s integrity. I 
want to put it on record that what I actually said here to the committee was that they must get 
used to it, those who don‟t, know me, that I am very Straight forward about the whole question. 
So, I asked Dr Tjitendero whether we are talking about the strategy or the merits and it was 
decided only the strategy. I told the committee that I was not involved in this whole question, but I 
know about it by questioning that is going on and my sympathy is with my people, but I never said 
what is in here. So I am very upset about it and I just wanted to put it on record, and I was not 
called back by the administrator General. I was called back by his secretary who wanted me to 
sign an envelope of the election. It is true that the administrator General then spoke a few words 
to me, but it was not he who called me back. So, either the committee trusts the members of the 
committee or in future I will…. 
MR MUDGE: May I realize a point of order? If Mr Pretorius or the chairman wants to discuss the 
newspaper report, I think we don‟t have time now for that, because you will have to make an 
announcement. 
CHAIRMAN: But the honourable member had the right to at least clear his name. I think it is only 
fair. This committee was appointed by us and we trusted the members we sent to represent us. 
He had a right to raise this in this committee and I think that the man who had led the delegation 
has a right to also explain and then we go.  
MR KATJIOUNGUA: I suggest that our delegation tells the AG that the whole question of schools, 
privatization and standards and so on, these questions are being taken care of by this council and 
the AG must leave those matters to the future government of Namibia. He should do nothing until 
a new decision is taken by the future National assembly. 
MR RUKORO: Mr Chairman, I got the distinct impression yesterday, talking to the AG, that he 
has made up his mind already and that he is going to go ahead with his deal of leasing public 
property to a private company. That is the first point. Secondly, he is relying on some false 
premises. For instance, he says these parents or grouping or whatever are concerned “about the 
English only education” which apparently is contained in our manifestos or coming from this 
house. I think it is false, because in none of our constitutions are we saying education or English 
shall be the medium of instruction only. In fact, our constitutions state the exact opposite. That is 
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the first thing. Secondly, they said they are concerned about mother-tongue and the standards of 
education which are going to be lowered. We have just read the SWAPO-constitution, 
guaranteeing those very things, and then thirdly, he said he was concerned about pupils, the 
children, being taken out of this country and registered in schools in the republic. Where is the 
evidence for this? Where are these things happening? Do we know these things? I think that we 
have somebody who is here who is trying to tell us he has been approaching, but as far as I am 
concerned, and surrounding all the circumstantial evidence, I feel he is part of this whole thing. 
He is on the planning of this whole thing for maybe Broenderbond related reasons and 
considerations, and I think we really need firm instructions from this standing committee that the 
subcommittee must go there, it must take a position on the question whether public utilities can 
be, not privatized, because he is, strictly speaking not privatizing them, he is simply leasing them, 
and I think, whether we overstepped our mandate or not, we indicated that we can‟t see why. 
Private companies should go there and build schools and not use public property. The funny thing 
is that you have you have a government building, you have kids of this country, you have 
teachers who presumably are on the payroll of the state now, and may even continue to be on the 
payroll of the state, from some of the implications of the discussion. The only thing that is 
interesting is the management function of these schools. That is where the leasing concept 
comes in, that the private company must come in and manage the schools.  
MR BARNES: Mr Chairman, I listened to the honourable members report. There is one question 
which I feel I should address and that is the excuse of preventing children attending school in the 
republic. That is the right of everybody to attend school where they want to if the parents can 
afford it. We, as a result of the system of government, were forced to go to the republic at times, 
even for lack of accommodation. I do not think that excuse or hiding behind that excuse should 
channel our way of thinking. The basic issue here is that I think the AG is busy with something to 
perpetuate the status quo, and I am expressing myself very strongly on this. Government 
buildings, equipment are involved, the teachers are involved, not the teachers as much, but they 
are salary-drawing people of state funds. They are our responsibility whether we like it or not, and 
I think that we should take a very strongpoint and tell the AG “keep your hands off our property, 
we will decide, the government will decide at the appropriate time what they will do. “We have 
peace because we subscribe to the idea of private schools, but not at the cost of the tax-payer. 
So, I think that our committee, with due respect, should give an absolute straight directive. But the 
question that follows is: what will our modus operandi be if the AG does what South Africa has 
been doing all these years, whether you oppose something he will still go ahead and do it? It is 
useless giving our honourable committee a directive that he can go ahead, have private schools 
as if it is going out fashion, now at the cost of this country‟s property and assets. That is 
absolutely non-negotiable, and that we also say that in the event that he goes ahead with this – 
because I get the impression that the chairman of the subcommittee gave the impression that this 
was practically a fait accompli. Other quarters that somehow SWAPO has encouraged the kind of 
thinking reflected in the AG‟s moves. Our thinking on what our educational system should look 
like is reflected in our draft constitution. What you said, Mr Chairman is true. If the honourable 
Comrade Katjiuongua‟s brother, Nahas Angula, were here, he would precisely make this point, 
more eloquently and strongly, that we would want to encourage the private sector to, among 
other things, under take responsibility of building more schools for us. We would not encourage 
any activity that would have the effect of under mining public interest in the area of education for 
the purpose of satisfying the needs of a section of our community. We would not encourage such 
a move. Yes, the AG himself called in, from what I understand, not only a SWAPO person in 
charge of education, but  also other spokespersons of other political parties to raise this matter, 
but I am confident, even though I was not the person called by the AG, that SWAPO would not, 
under any circumstances, encourage what the AG is doing. It is not in the best interest of the 
community at large. When we are talking about national reconciliation we should be frank about 
it. We should not, in the interest of national reconciliation encourage the kind of thinking that 
national reconciliation is okay as long as it promotes the interests of some section of our 
population. We should also see to it that the larger interest of our community is protected and in 
that sense what the AG is attempting to do is certainly not serving the larger interest of our 
people.  
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MR PRETORIOUS: Mr Chairman, this is a very delicate situation and I think we must not act too 
fast. I want to support the idea of Mr Katjiuongua and Dr Katjavivi that we must try to talk to the 
parents. 
MR MUDGE: I want to talk about the procedure. As I see it, the Constituent Assembly is not 
directly involved. We have agreed that the parties compose a delegation to go and see the AG 
and that the parties will then use the good offices of the chairman to make a statement. I feel 
strongly about this thing. I have a problem now. People are approaching us individually and as 
party leaders they want to get some direction from our side, and it will not be possible for me just 
to wait for a committee or a delegation to meet the AG on Monday and to report back on 
Tuesday. I think there is a large part of the white community who cannot support this move and 
they are waiting for direction from my side and from others. The AG is determined to go ahead. 
Mr Chairman, I don‟t want to start a quarrel with Mr Pretorius here, but as somebody who 
represents a large percentage of the white people, this whole thing was kept a secret. I was at no 
stage informed, consulted or in any approached. I hearing rumours, I had to rely on rumours, but 
the way this thing was done, makes it impossible for me to serve in a committee with Mr Pretorius 
because we are going to clash on this issue now. There is no doubt about that. I am going to 
have a problem with the church to which I belong, because even the way the church allowed 
themselves to be dragged into this thing, as a member of the reformed Church I am not aware of 
any discussions.  I as a member of the Church was never consulted.  So, all I want to ask is, 
when we approach the AG, Mr Pretorius must not insist on the right to be part of the delegation, 
he must not use us to make things easier for him now.  I am very much disturbed about the 
development.  What I want to ask is, will you allow me, if I am approached by people, to comment 
on this thing? I can‟t remain silent, sir, I cannot remain silent until Monday. 
MR PRETORIUS:  Article 17(4) (c):  “No restrictions of whatever nature are imposed with respect 
to the admission of pupils or recruitment of staff based on race, colour” and then “or creed.”   That 
is giving me many problems, because I think that clashes with this declaration on the Elimination 
of all forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.”  I couldn‟t lay may 
hands on the exact document, so I will give you all a copy of this report in the “Windhoek 
Advertiser” of January 7, 1982, but it is impossible for a private school, religious private schools 
not to discriminate on the basis of (c) as far as its staff and pupils are concerned. So, I want to 
ask whether the committee cannot have a look at it, please Mr Barnes:  These are the things that 
we are guarding against.  These are the things that we are trying to absolutely eliminate by way 
of terminology, inter alia, group rights versus these rights, by way of saying to a child “ but you 
cannot be admitted to this school, because this school practices Catholicism, and you are not a 
Catholic”, or “ this school practices Christian National.”  I have now actually developed a complex 
on this word “Christian National.”  It gives me gooseflesh, Mr Chairman. At all stage I would like 
us to avoid opening the perpetuation of the quo or repeat history. 
CHAIRMAN:  I went to a Catholic school and I am not a catholic, but I wasn‟t stopped.  If I wanted 
to apply to go there, why should I be stopped?  But conventions are there, a woman is not going 
to go to the school of the monks, she is not going to apply for it. 
Mr PRETORIUS: It is not the pupils as such, also the staff, because according to this United 
Nations document there must be freedom to religion, belief and worship and teaching, the right to 
train and appoint leaders.”  So, at a Catholic school I can‟t use a Christian National teaching to 
teach the catholic their religion. 
CHAIRMAN:  But suppose I am there teaching Biology or Mathematics? That school is a religious 
school, but I am a profession person to go and teach Mathematics. 
Mr THIRIANGE: Let us not forget, as somebody has said here, that we are emerging from the 
nightmare of apartheid.  We are not an ideal society up to now and we want to plug all the 
loopholes that can be used to bring about that nightmare again.  So, therefore I don‟t want a 
constitution that will be interpreted by anybody in the future to perpetuate or to bring about 
apartheid, and if we go by the honourable member‟s suggestion, we are exactly doing that. So, 
therefore we have no problem, some of us went to these schools although we did not belong to 
those religions.  There is only Church that has been notorious and it is the Dutch Reformed 
Church, when it comes to the black people and maybe we want to maintain that and we cannot 
allow that. So, therefore we cannot have things that will be used in future for apartheid. Therefore, 
creed or no creed, there is no room for discrimination.  
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Mr PRETORIUS: I have very much respect and understanding for the honourable member‟s 
emotional approach of this question, but again I want refer it to the committee, that it a point of 
difference, to look at it as far as the habit is in the rest of world, as for as creed is concerned. 
Mr MUDGE:  I don‟t want to use this opportunity to discuss the principle; I think Mr Pretorius has 
indicated that he wants s discussion to take place some other times on this issue.  Of course, I 
am tempted to react immediately, but if you agree that we can discuss the whole principle of 
group rights and admission of pupils to schools, private schools, we can arrange such a 
discussion, but frankly, I just cannot agree that this should be amended. But I am prepared to 
discuss it. Once you start, and awe have been through this many times over the past years, and I 
tell you that many people in this country still believe that this is another way of keeping schools 
racially segregated. And please, sir, I am Afrikaans-speaking white, you must have no doubt 
about that, I want my language so be protected…. 
Member:  your religion? 
Mr MUDGE:  My religion to be protected.  I want it to be protected, my language and my religion, 
but not this way. 
CHAIRMAN:  What religion do you belong to? 
Mr MUDGE: The Dutch reform Church. That is the problem right now. 
Mr RUPPLE:  May I suggest as a matter of principle again, we just get clarity on the procedure 
from here. If it is clear in this room that there is no chance of reconciliation of different viewpoints, 
then that should be formulated and that should go back to the Assembly to be voted on.  That is 
the only way one can break the deadlock in these circumstances.  We obviously try and negotiate 
as far as one can I Think that is why we sit here, but if it is clear that there is no way these 
different, irreconcilable points of view can be settled, then that is matter for the vote, and there is 
no point in going over it and over it and referring it to another committee and coming back here 
and being debated.  We will only waste time.  
MR BESSINGER:  I understand the problem that the previous speaker is trying to deal with, but 
we have to draw the lines.  I have also attended Catholic schools throughout my life and I can 
assure you the majority of the teachers who taught me were not Catholic teachers.  Having said 
that, I want to come to the opening remarks which were made in the Constituent Assembly by a 
member of the ACN in this maiden address? He said that they have accepted that the South 
West Africa that they have known shall never be. We on the majority side of the House felt that at 
least rigidity had been removed and flexibility installed.  So here we are in the interest of all, and I 
think we must say the spirit that prevailed around this table has been one of understanding, there 
have not been occasions where muscles have been shown or people being pushed around.  So, I 
would ask the minorities also to be understanding and to show understanding.  Things must 
change.  If the mathematical formula has to prevail that you want to move two sides. If you want 
to maintain equilibrium, then you must have equal and opposite forces.  So, I will appeal to ACN 
to stick to that beautiful speech that they have opened the Constituent Assembly with. 
CHAIRMAN:  As the Chairman I just made a statement, so we can move on.  This is a very 
emotional issue; we are operating in a spirit of co-operation, brotherhood and also in a spirit of 
reconciliation.  It also refers to the education forces.  We will come to know one another and trust 
is developed, so that the fears of the unknown are also being removed.  In that regard, maybe 
without changing anything in this paragraph, the honourable member is asking to discuss it later 
on.  Maybe he wants to go and consult other members of his group after receiving his education 
here, and also having received our strong point of view. 
So, maybe it will be fair to allow you to go and talk to your people and say:   “This is what they are 
saying, they are not going to change”, and then allow him to come back and we will face the 
same thing.  It is a compromise and not just to say “We are not going to listen to you “.  He is a 
colleague, he has a big problem.  Not that we are going to go back to apartheid, that is out, but 
allow him the chance to maybe go and explain to the others, then to come back and again 
discuss it, without changing anything her.  Article 18, electoral rights.  
MR MUDGE: I don‟t want to be very technical; I just want a general discussion to express our 
fears and reservation fears and reservations about an executive president. But I want to start off 
by saying that when I refer to ceremonial president and an executive president, maybe we are 
over-simplifying the matter, because we also don‟t want a useless and powerless president - that 
is also wrong. I was reported wrongly on radio the other day when I said the president must not 
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belong to a party at all. That is not correct. I said he must, in the execution of his duties, be above 
politics. That is what is said. But we, after having read this document and you have to look not 
only at the powers of the president when you discuss the powers of the president, you must also 
look at the powers of the prime minister, the powers of the president. I have no doubt in my mind 
that SWAPO will appoint a president, they will decide who the president will be, and they will 
decide who the prime minister is going to be and they will decide who the ministers are going to 
be. I have no doubt about that. So, I am not talking about my party‟s position in the government. 
When I look at the powers of the council of ministers, frankly, the first impression that you get 
when you look at their powers that they don‟t have any powers. All the power vest in the 
president. When you look at their powers, you get the impression that they are just there to 
advise the president. They cannot even give him instructions, they cannot even make firm 
recommendations, and frankly, Sir, to give so much power in the hands of one person, whoever 
that person might be, that is not important, because we are drafting a constitution for future 
generations. It is with much concern that we have taken note of that. What we want to ask at this 
point in time, having identified this as point of dispute, whether we shall discuss it right now or 
whether we should identify, report back to the assembly and whether you think it will be possible 
to come to some sort of an agreement, or whether you are actually firm that this is the bottom-
line, you are not even prepared to discuss it. If you say “Let us discuss it, let‟s see if we can find 
each other half-way”, maybe we can do that. I have now just made a very general remark about 
the powers of the president and the sort of lack of power on the part of the prime minister and the 
council of ministers. I want to leave it there so that we can discuss that point. Maybe even if you 
feel like it we can in private conversations talk about it to see if we cannot get an understanding 
as far as that is concerned. We are used to a system of government where the ministers have 
power, where the prime minister has an important role to play and where the president – we 
never had a president. 
MR GURIRAB: We have agreed that this would be one of the most contentious areas of our work, 
and it is an area that hinges on so many considerations. For us the president of the Republic 
should be seen as a father-figure, as a symbol of the authority of the nation and that is why we go 
ahead and provide that he be elected by all those who are qualified to participate in the vote. 
There are different models. Honourable Mr. Mudge sided with the South African model, its 
evolution and so on, throughout the campaign and particularly when the various drafts were 
introduced repeated references were being made to the American Presidency, probably the most 
powerful presidency on earth. Whether a president is an executive president or any of the other 
variants, ceremonial and others in-between the two, it is a question of the relationship of the 
presidency to other organs of the government, like cabinet, legislature. In the case of the 
American presidency what is taken to mean difference in the management of the affairs of the 
state and the government is the so-called checks and balances, how the power of the president 
relates to other important organs of the state and the government. So, it is not simply a question 
of an executive president, it is how he relates to other institutions. You cannot have a strong 
executive president and at the same time have a strong prime minister. In the Common Wealth 
countries usually there is a ceremonial president and an executive prime minister, i.e. Mrs. 
Thatcher, the prime minister of Canada, the prime minister of Australia and so on, and the prime 
minister of Zimbabwe until a change was made in that former Prime Minister Mugabe became 
executive president. So, we need to relate the concept of executive presidency to what is 
provided for. Since we provided for an executive president and the cabinet serves at the behest 
of the president and therefore its powers are limited, so we would want a prime minister who 
would be appointed by the president, but who would administer the government affairs. That is 
my initial contribution. 
MR HAMUTENYA: I think I was surprised when Mr Mudge pointed out the problem regarding the 
powers of the president in relation to the cabinet and the prime minister. I expected him to talk 
about the legislature and the judiciary, but he didn‟t say anything about that. Maybe this is where 
we went off in different directions in drafting this. We wanted to curb the powers of the president 
in relation to the judiciary and the legislature to which his accountable in so many instances, and 
which have the power to remove him from office if he abuses his powers and responsibilities. I 
think they are the most effective checks and balances which the American system has. So, 
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therefore I want to say we should look at the powers of the presidency in relationship to those two 
branches of the state machinery and less to the prime ministers.  
Mudge: NEITHER of these two titles appears in any one of the constitutions. We believe in the 
separation of powers, Mr Hamutenya. I agree separation of power between the executive, the 
legislative and judiciary. That is where the separation of power should be - that is where you get 
the checks and balances brought in to the system of government. We got used to a system and 
you will have to convince us now that it is not going to happen what has apparently happened, 
seen from here, from a distance, in many of our neighbouring countries. I was in Lusaka, you will 
remember, in 1984. Many people thought that while we were there we were only fighting. It is 
true, we had discussions with members from the Zambian government and other governments 
privately, having soda-water, and the impression we got was that ministers in many of those 
countries have the feeling that they are sort of just there; they are just glorified members of 
parliament. That is the impression we got, and feel checks and balances can only really work 
when all the power is not concentrated in the hand of one person. So, let us not quarrel about the 
title, let‟s not make things more difficult for ourselves by saying we want a ceremonial president 
and you want an executive president. Let‟s look at the powers of the president, let‟s look at the 
constraints that we impose on a single person to just do it his way. Let us talk sensibly. I have 
been involved in drafting constitutions for a long time. I cannot remember that in my whole 
political career progress was made in one day as the progress that we have made today. Sir, we 
have been discussing a Bill of fundamental Rights between the internal parties for months with 
our reaching agreement. We have done it in one day what normally took us months. It is 
unbelievable; I never thought it was possible. Now we come to the one point where we appear to 
disagree and I have a feeling we will also be able to solve that problem, because we have 
convinced each other, I hope, that we are not trying to discuss apartheid, defend apartheid, 
defend an unjust society. We know that you also agree with a democratic society, so it is just a 
matter of finding a solution to a problem which has been worrying us for a long time, the fear for 
dictatorship, the fear for concentrating power in the hands of one person, our fear that we might 
end up with an undemocratic society, the fact that things can get out of hand and it is now for us, 
over the coming days to discuss this problem. You must explain to us now how you see that there 
could be some restrictions, some restraints placed upon the state President so that he cannot do 
things on his own. 
MR HAMUTENYA: Before Mr Mudge can do that, I would like to just say one thing. He has 
already pointed out one thing; he mentioned the experience in Zambia. I think his point is not far 
from the truth, and there are two circumstances which need to be pointed out here. One of these, 
there is a phenomenon of one-party state. The other is that again in Zambia you have one party-
state, to begin, with then there is another system where the central committee is supreme to the 
cabinet. The colleagues of the presidents are members of the central committee and not the 
cabinet. So, that is the problem there. I think that is only……… in a single party state. When you 
have a multi-party system the president and his colleagues are sensitive to the views of the other 
parties and they have no monopoly to turn the central committee of the president into a cabinet 
over and above the real cabinet. So, I think we have taken care of that particular problem. 
CHAIRMAN: If we can maybe now clarify further and then look at the separation of powers 
concept, i.e. the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It is within that one can check the 
powers of the president. So, if we are going to instruct the committee, it is to look at how 
independent the president is from the judiciary, for instance, and from the legislature. Some of us 
grew up under an executive presidency. I never had any government here when I left. I live in 
America and in Zambia. In America you have an executive president, but just take one example. 
The president is very powerful in America, Cabinet is nothing there. It is to advise the president. 
The cabinet is nothing there, just like the Zambians one. Sometimes advisors are more powerful 
than the ministers. Kissinger was. He was a minister, but he was an advisor on national security. 
So cabinet is nothing in America too. Then you see the role the congress or the senate play in 
trying to check the powers of the president. Reagan, for instance, vetoed this ant-apartheid bill, 
and the house by a two thirds majority can overrule the president‟s veto. That is how the 
sanctions have been applied, because while the president was powerful and refused and vetoed 
the bill, the house again had power by two thirds to overrule him. That is how these checks and 
balances are working. So, it‟s a question of the Supreme Court sitting there and interpreting the 
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laws, whether the president or anybody else is acting in a legal fashion and can overrule the 
president, say he was unlawful. It never happens basically. The people are civilized; they know 
what is within the powers of their mandate and so on. But maybe in instructing the legal experts 
to look at the separation of powers so that we can see whether we have proper built-in checks 
and balances in those three branches. Then title doesn‟t matter too much. 
DR TJITENDERO: I thought I would just make two points contributing to the discussion. One is 
that I remember the statements made after the election results and one of them that was far-
reaching was that the victory was for the birth of democracy in Namibia. That to me meant a 
member of things. One is that at least a small nation in Namibia is beginning to mark a turning 
point in the politics of southern Africa and hopefully make a mark of influence in the world as a 
whole. I am saying birth of democracy, and I think the things we have proposed here in this 
constitution, I think if we are concerned with checks and balances, one of the things that we will 
be proud of as founding fathers and mothers, is that we are saying the term of office the president 
would not be the conventional terms where the person serves until he or she dies. We have 
specified a very specific term of office. That is one element of checks and balances. In ours we 
say a five year term. Then on top that we are talking about the Assembly‟s power to impeach the 
president.  
MR BARNES: I listened to the reasonable explanations of the honourable comrades. The 
question that was asked by my colleague was, is the executive president concept a bottom-line, 
because if it is a bottom-line, we can perhaps then carry on with the other matters and then refer 
this to the general assembly, saying that this is a bottom-line where we are very firm on a 
president, there is no doubt about that;  (b)  that although the terminology “ceremonial president” 
is used, we feel that the president must have certain powers, but we feel for our particular new 
start in sovereign independence, the fears, the uncertainties, that all those things can be 
accommodated in an executive prime minister with his cabinet. The fact remains, sir, that on this 
point we are not in dispute with each other. Should this Assembly be changed into the 
government, obviously your prime minister will rule in cabinet with the legislator. It would perhaps 
be favourable to consider an exercise to first contribute to national conciliation and nation building 
that could benefit the entire independence process in sovereign independence. But SWAPO‟s 
bottom line is an executive president, no matter what the discussions should evolve around that 
situation, we have a problem that we cannot perhaps find a solution, and think this is where my 
honourable colleague, Mr Mudge, made mention of how much give and take there is on both 
sides. We have already made mention of the fact that the concept of ceremonial president, we 
are not firm on the title and we feel that certain powers should be given to the president. From our 
side, what we stood for prior to the election result is already a small step in the spirit of give and 
take. So, against that background I can perhaps repeat the question, if we can perhaps simplify 
the discussion by knowing is leeway. 
MR HAMUTENYA: I just want to follow up on what honourable Ruppel has said. We are not really 
talking about any bottom-lines of any kind. It is give and take. If we run in to difficulties we can 
postpone the discussion and go to another thing and come back to it, until we find out what the 
understanding is. But I think for now if we can still do ourselves a good service if we continue to 
probe the meanings, so that somehow we get clarity and a common understanding as to what is 
being proposed here. 
MR HAMUTENYA: I would like to agree with the proposal by honourable Mudge that we now 
adjourn until Monday. Earlier on we said as far as SWAPO is concerned, there are three major 
areas of differences. One of them, the one we are dealing with now, the other one was 
legislature, the third proportional representation. In our caucus we had resolved to inform the 
committee that we are not fighting on the question of proportional representation. We are 
prepared to agree to your proposals. TRALISE, we don‟t want to rule from Windhoek. Taking that 
into account, it makes it more important for us that we should reach an agreement on the powers 
of the president, because we have to find checks and balances now. But I want to repeat, I don‟t 
have any problems. I am sure that we will be able to find an agreement on the bicameral system 
and the proportional representation as long as long as we feel happy that right from the outset all 
the checks and balances needed are in here. I have a few ideas, I made notes, I will go back to 
my caucus. Mr Barnes and myself do agree, because we have been sitting all night with Mr 
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Matjila and Mr Staby, but let us spend another day or two and we come back on Monday and 
then we can proceed.  
             
 
STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ORDERS AND INTERNAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
WINDHOEK 
11 DECEMBER 1989 
 
MR MUDGE: I want to make one thing clear which seems to be overlooked. The problem that we 
have the whole idea of privatizing schools is not that we consider this only to affect black people. 
The pupils and parents of many towns and villages are terribly concerned about this whole thing, 
because it will affect the other fifty schools. What is going to happen to the other fifty schools if 
the top-class students and more wealth parents send their children to the private schools? Those 
schools will definitely not be able to accommodate all the children. So, not all white pupils are 
going to benefit from this, and for that reason my party and the white members of the DTA are 
very much opposed to the privatization of school buildings, and I think we will want to have the 
opportunity to express our concern. The impression must not be created that is now only black 
people who are opposed to the privatization. There are hundreds of white people who are 
opposed to that, because this is going to be a sort of “rykmans-apartheid.” The more wealthy 
people and the clever children will go to private schools and the other pupils from Outjo, Otavi, 
Omaruru, Usakos, Mariental, and all those other places will find themselves in a very difficult 
position. There was a misunderstanding last week, I‟m afraid. I did not react because I was under 
the impression the committee will react at a later stage. But as a later stage, but as a leader of a 
group of people I will have to react and express my grave concern about these developments. I 
would want to know what is going to happen now. Is the AG going to go ahead or is he prepared 
to wait?  
MR TJITENDERO: Point number one was that all the proposals have included provision for 
private education for an independent Namibia. Secondly, the AG should not proceed with the 
exercise of privatizing state schools. Number three, the present arrangements regarding schools 
and education will continue until the present draft constitution comes into effect. Number four, the 
standing committee stands ready to meet the concerned parents. Five, a statement ready to meet 
the concerned parents. Five, a statement covering these five points will be issued by the standing 
committee.    
Mr. MUDGE:  We won‟t have black children and white children after independence.   
Mr PRETORIUS:  For Example, article 32 is referring to colonialism and apartheid. So, all I want 
to know …….. 
CHAIRMAN:  We didn‟t agree to remove reference to apartheid.  It is a fact of life we suffered 
through and lived with. 
Mr PRETORIUS: That is correct, but that is also something of the past.  It is too specific for me 
because otherwise would want to include communism, etc. 
CHAIRMAN:  We didn‟t suffer under communism in this country so far.  But apartheid is what we 
don‟t like in this country.  We all seem to agree now, even in South Africa, apartheid is bad. 
Mr PRETORIUS:  But to explain it to my people if they ask me if I have accepted it. I will say no, I 
preferred to delete it.   
CHAIRMAN:  Yes, your people must accept democracy.   
Mr PRETORIUS:  so I still will have the right to say that. 
CHAIRMAN:  But do your people still believe in apartheid?  
Mr PRETORIUS:  No, they believe in differentiation, diversity and minority rights. 
Mr MUDGE:  You were right when you said we agreed that we cannot expect you to forget the 
past, we said we don‟t want to emphasize it too much, that communism was never practiced in 
this country, but apartheid was practiced In this country.  So, I have understanding for people who 
have a feeling that there must be some reference to it.  
MR KATJIUONGUA:  I am also concerned about the pace of progress we are making.  When you 
talk about this question of the president, I discovered three versions in the debate in the 
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assembly.  One version is mine where the president is not exactly ceremonial, as some of you 
tend to understand, mine is more of a division of powers than purely a ceremonial role, as some 
people tend to ascribe to the president.  Then they are those who are saying the president should 
have executive powers with the prime minister merely as a bureaucrat, and then there was a 
version by Mr Rukoro of a parliamentary president, which I don‟t know exactly where he got that 
from, but unfortunately he is not here to explain that.  If you say the president must be 
accountable to parliament, it must also be related to the source of his election, how he was 
elected.  If he was directly elected by the people, as it is proposed here, and not elected by 
parliament, as some people also proposed, then you have a problem how a person not elected by 
parliament can be accountable to parliament.  You have a problem there. I also understand the 
point mentioned by one of my colleagues here, sometimes – and I think we must also be realistic 
– we tend to see the situation that we have now, and I think people assume that maybe I am not 
going to be the president, maybe somebody else, and let‟s make the office of the president 
useless because he is not mine.  But if the constitution is going to be long term, then maybe your 
turn will also come and how would you feel if the thing is useless?  Maybe we should consider all 
these possibilities and see how in between there we can come to a solution that all of us see as 
an institution and not necessarily a personality that is there.  But else my position, more as my 
views, on the presidency are the same as I said in my statement, but certainly I am there for 
discussion and debate and to find out what others also feel, and whether somewhere along the 
road we can find something that all of us can live with.  Consultation, at least he should do it in 
consultation. I think there are a few points that we will have to discuss it. We will not be to do that 
today, not in an hour‟s time it is not possible. I think we can report to the Assembly that we made 
progress on two issues, that as far as parliament is concerned and the president there are still a 
few issues that will have to be sorted out as far as the powers of the president is concerned and 
the bi or Assembly adjourns immediately and refer these matters back to this or another 
committees, whatever they might want to decide.  We have another week and then we bring in 
our consultants.  I don‟t know whether you feel pessimistic, I don‟t.  I think we are going to make 
progress, but somehow we have to report back to the Assembly tomorrow, and I think it would 
also be improper for this committee to now also solve the problem.  We were supposed to identify 
the problems, not to solve the problems.  I think we must have a new term of reference and then 
we can continue next week.  Frankly, Sir, I think we also have to before tomorrow at least have 
some idea whether have,  for instance, differences of opinion on justice, whether we have 
differences of opinion on local government – and I think we have.  We have to identify them, 
because we have to report back tomorrow, and on the question of a very important issue, 
communal land.  That is a thorny issue that we somehow have to discuss, and say that this is 
also a matter that we  
Issue we want to further discuss.  So, instead of going on now on the president, let us just find out 
whether there are other issues.  Mr Katjiuongua had a list, I have it in front of me, I think we 
should see if there are issues on that list that we also want to report back, and then after 
tomorrow we start working on these differences and see if we can‟t find the solutions. 
MR KATJIUONGUS:  Just to add to what Mr Mudge is saying, for the sake of progress, and in the 
light of our terms of reference.  I think tomorrow we must be in a position to report some progress.  
We can‟t say we have been doing nothing.   
MR BESSINGER: I think in reporting back to the Assembly we should use, as we have done in 
our deliberation, the constitution that has been proposed by SWAPO and which has been used 
as working document. According to my notes there are certain areas that have been referred 
committees, there are certain areas that had to be subjected to rephrasing of the wording, there 
are certain paragraphs which have been accepted without, at this point, any dispute. 
MR BESSINGER: Yes, that will also have to be stated, but I will not advise the honourable Mr. 
Pretorius as to use the floor of the Assembly to state categorically to his constituency that he has 
not agreed with us. So, I don‟t think we have a problem with that. But the basic idea is to quantify 
what we have agreed on, tremendous progress. So, to go to the assembly and leave the general 
public with the impression that there are more disputes than agreements is a totally wrong 
impression.  
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ODERS AND INTERNAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
WINDHOEK 
13 DECEMBER 1989 
 
 
MR RUPPEL: Yes, I have been informed by the lawyers had the benefit of consulting that it has 
been incorporated, it is more future-looking now. It still incorporates a reference to the past so 
that there is a proper context of where we operate in. I didn‟t have the time to check word against 
word here, but I have been assured that it is in, and I would suggest Mr Mudge goes through it 
and see whether he now agrees with it.  
MR MUDGE: May I just make sure that there is not a misunderstanding, because I personally feel 
very strongly that there must be no friction whatsoever. We must avoid suspicion that could exist. 
 MR RUPEL: The answer to that, as we understood it, is that will take our first draft as a working 
document, we will then listen to the problems, discuss them as we did before. We will then go and 
do our homework and come back with a draft which would substitute the first draft in an attempt 
to meet what we have discussed. It is subject to further discussion and, more important subject to 
this heavenly lawyers coming down to us and satisfying everybody. I think that is the 
understanding on which we worked, we put in a lot of work, I must tell you that.  
MR MUDGE: No, Mr Chairman, I am afraid there is a very serious misunderstanding and I can 
only hope that will sort that out. We were prepared to accept the SWAPO-proposal as a working 
document, but after having done that, SWAPO-document and the DTA-document and all the 
other documents would disappear from the table. Then we will have our document which will then 
be our constitution. But we can end up with revised SWAPO-proposal accept as the constitution 
for Namibia. Please, do not do this to the other parties. We can accept your document as a 
working document, but then we marry and a new document will then be born out of this and this 
document will be our document, not a particular party‟s document which was amended to 
accommodate other parties. I don‟t think that is the understanding, and I will really hope that this 
will not be expected from the other parties. We are only prepared and we are really prepared to 
accept your proposal as working document. That is where it stops. 
MR GURIRAB: I hope we are not missing one another along the way. I think the revised 
document would not be a SWAPO-document, it would be a document, it would be a document as 
amended, as revised per discussion that we had here. It was an initiative taken by SWAPO to 
incorporate the views expressed here, areas of agreement and so on. So, it is not as if SWAPO 
continuous to be beholden to its document and is merely trying to just sugar-coat it for the other 
parties. It was a sincere and faithful effort to reflect what we agreed here in this revised text. Of 
course, you did not have the benefit of going through it and therefore perhaps the questions that 
are coming up in your mind are justified, but if you perhaps had an opportunity to look at hoe the 
document has been revised, then perhaps your fears would be removed. 
 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: Act of parliament, I think we said that the committee on symbols will be 
appointed by this committee before independence.  
CHAIRMAN: There is a correction. 
MR MUDGE: There is no problem, all we want to say is that ultimately the symbols will have to be 
approved by an act of parliament. 
MR RUKORO: My understanding was that the subcommittee on symbols is doing to work now, so 
that their final product is accepted by this Constituent Assembly and forms part of this constitution 
and are not left over for an act of parliament after independence. In other words, it must be 
determined now before independence and become part of the constitution. 
CHAIRMAN: The SWAPO-document was saying three months after independence. So, we will 
change that. We must go ahead and appoint a committee.  
 Dr HAMUTENYA:  I would like to say that I think it is sufficient to say that the constitution will be 
amended by a two-thirds majority.  I don‟t think it is necessary to make provisions that certain 
things are sacrosanct and therefore cannot be amend.  Otherwise we can go on and so many 
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things are sacrosanct that they will be beyond any amendment.  I think we must just leave it at 
that point.   
Dr TJITENDERO:  I agree with Hidipo that the elaboration part of it is not necessary.  If 
something is so dear to the values of Namibia, it will go without saying, and therefore to say in the 
constitution that this cannot be changed under any circumstances, I think it is not an appropriate 
thing at this point, because that is exactly what we are trying to do with the constitution.  We are 
writing it as a lasting document and for it to last, it must appeal and must be continuous relevant 
to the changing circumstances of the society, but it should not be a matter of act or law that you 
say even if the circumstances have changed so drastically, we should not change or contemplate 
an amendment.  So, I cannot think it is necessary.  It is taken in by the… position. 
Mr RUKORO:  I am one of those who subscribe to the notion of this idea that certain values are 
so important and so fundamental to the type of society that we want to create, that having 
secured them with our independence now in this constitution, they should remain there forever.  
They should not be subject to the changing like majorities in parliament at any given point in time, 
and that is why,  for instance, also in my submission at point 6(13)(2) I propose that no 
amendment of the constitution that has the effect of removing the democratic and republic nature 
of the state should be entertained at all. But I am reasonable to arguments, such as the one 
introduced by honourable member Dr Tjitendero, that things do change, times do change and so 
on, and that maybe to bind oneself in this irrevocable manner for generations to come might be 
politically unhealthy.  But in that case I would then say, instead of a two-thirds we should require 
a three-quarters majority as a compromise. 
Mr. ANGULA:  The idea under discussion tend to imply to me that what we are trying to say is 
that certain things should never change, never, ever, but we know from our experiences the world 
is moving, there is always progress in thoughts and ideas, and that progress will continue to 
come.  To amend does not mean to take away something.  You may also add something new, 
something which has just come up.  The very thing we are talking about, human right was not 
there. It is something of recent times, and I would think that we also want to keep in touch with 
the coming changes and we should at least allow ourselves to include those changes in our 
constitution if we so feel, or least the coming generations.  I would like to say that a document like 
a constitution is a word of faith by and large.  It is nice to have it written as we want it, but let‟s not 
forget that much will depend upon ourselves as people.  I think really we should allow the 
possibility of change to take place. It is part of progress. 
Mr KATJIUONGUA:  Mr Chairman, first with reference to the mandate to constitutional principles, 
the principles designate a procedure by which the constitution, this one, is going to be adopted.  It 
does not specify by which method a future constitution may by amended. It may be amended only 
by a designated process involving the legislature and of votes cast in a popular referendum. So, I 
think the point is open when we talk about the parameters of the 1982 principles.  So, I think here 
we have agreed that the constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of the legislature.  
When I gave my statement, I took into account the question of flexibility to be compatible with 
some form of rigidity. So it is not changed every time a political party wants change or when there 
is a change in political leadership.  I was having in mind the constitution of the communist party of 
China, the communist party of the Soviet Union and even the state Constitution which is changed 
every time there is a change of political leadership.  That is why I thought a fairly rigid constitution 
is necessary. But I said fairly rigid, amend only when it is in the in the national interest to do so for 
the sole purpose of good government.  Those are important criteria‟s as far as I am concerned 
when you have to amend a constitution.  In may constitutions I have read, and talking to many 
constitutional lawyers as well, constitutions do – and I said in y statement that certain rights are 
considered as everlasting and fundament that are not subject to changes sometimes, and for 
example the rights in respect of the dignity of a human being, the freedom of expression and the 
right of existence of a political party.  Some lawyers see those as rights that should not be subject 
to a state of emergency and things like that.  When you talk about page 8, article 14, if that right is 
there, but can also be suspended in times of emergencies, then I disagree.  But I think therefore 
there is a need to specify which rights cannot be amended.  We should not say nothing can be 
amended, that is also maybe not correct.  I think we should be more specific and say which rights 
are fundamental and in that sense cannot be suspended or amended in the constitution. Then I 
think we are talking business. I seem to say that because we have agreed the constitution can be 
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amended by a two-thirds majority, then even some of these rights must be amended.  Then I tell 
you a two-thirds majority is not always difficult to obtain.  You can get it through the front door or 
through the back-gate, whatever the case may be.  But I think that we are building a civilization – 
this is my concern – a permanent civilization, certain things in our country must be taken for 
granted as part of our society, as part of our national values, and not subject to the whims of the 
political market. 
But on the other hand it is also subject to human failure.  If you care to remember, in 1933 in 
Germany a party which wasn‟t even the majority party used a trick to get to power and eventually 
in the passage of a few years time, changed what was a democracy into a fascist state.  It wasn‟t 
even a majority.  We are no better or no worse than anybody else that preceded us.  The result of 
what happened in Germany was that the German Constitution in fact now contains certain 
stipulations with regard to the conduct of political parties, which prohibits the change of the 
essence the state.  It does permit change of the constitution, it does permit changes to the law 
and so forth, but the essence of the state may not be changed, obviously because the German-
people had a negative experience with regard to the application of power. From the international 
universal Declaration of Human Rights and you can go back to the American Rights.  Where do 
you really end? One can always look and find one that is not there, because it is in a certain 
convention and we want to include it.  Where we are going to end? 
Mr GURIRAB:  partly the same point, but not perhaps for the same reasons.  The extent to which 
we must be exhausted in the draft about all those rights that we might agree around this table are 
fundamental, or all those rights which, because they are fundamental, are included in so many 
conventions that we all embrace. So, where do we really end about enumerating in the 
constitution all these beautiful rights?  In terms of schools I can think of so many conventions and 
civil and political rights, on economic, social, cultural rights and so on that are international 
documents.  Are we going to be so exhaustive as to include them all?  Look for those that are not 
there and then added on to what we have agreed to?  I have some problems there.  When we are 
going to be satisfied that all the rights defined as fundamental are incorporated in this 
constitution? There are so many conventions on these rights.  
Mr RUKORO:  I have no intention of copying verbatim all the international human rights 
documents in our constitution, but there are some important clauses which are simply so 
important that we have to include them in our own constitution, because international treaties, I 
don‟t know what the constitution law of this country is going to be.  There is a limit to the 
international agreements like treaties and so on, which individual citizens in some circumstances 
cannot even evoke in their own local counts.  So, I would want to have adequate remedies in 
terms of municipal law, rather than to rely on an international mechanism which can take up to 
five years simply to redress a particular grievance.  I know in the civil and political Convent there 
is a right to marry and raise a family according to one‟s own free will.  It is not here, I do not 
intend to put in here, because I think it is so obvious that nobody can even come and say, “No 
Rukoro, you cannot marry that beautiful wife of yours, you must marry Ruppel‟s daughter or 
sister.”  There are some others like the rights to social security and a living standard which is 
consistent with good health, etc.  It is not in our document and I think it paramount for the type of 
constituencies that some of us represent.  That is why I feel that those really need to be singled 
out and to be included now in this constitution.  
Mr MUDGE:  I want to agree with Mr Gurirab that one must really distinguish between rights and 
fundamental rights. If we have to draw up a list of rights, there would be probably several 
hundreds of them.  It doesn‟t mean that they 
Need not be included in the constitution, but under the chapter, fundament rights, I think we must 
be careful not to include every right as if they are all fundamental rights.  Then I would suggest 
that when we get the constitutional lawyer, the one who has to finally draft our constitution, we 
hope that he will also be a specialist in the field of fundamental rights, because he might point out 
to us that maybe we should include some of those, he might even suggest that we leave out 
some of those that we have included.  But when you talk about fundamental rights, I think we 
must be very clear on that.  We only want fundamental rights.  Something that you go to court on, 
something that will not be changed easily and something that you can rely on for the future.  Then 
I don‟t want to bore you, but I want to repeat again, I will very strongly insist that we stick to 
personal, individual rights.  But I think if we leave this for these experts, or for the man who has 
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the drafted thing.  I think he will be able to help us a lot.  Mr Rukoro, don‟t get me wrong, I see the 
importance the right to be employed in the civil service.  It is a right, but is it a fundamental right? 
MRS ITHANA:  We agree that the words from “except” up to the end must go.  So, that it reads:   
“No person shall be deprived of his right or personal liberty.” 
Mr ANGULA:  Yes, I think that is a progressive step, but you must know what that implies. It 
means no death sentence in Namibia.   
CHAIRMAN:  That was the whole debate. 
Mr ANGULA:  If that is what you are saying you must be careful. 
Mr MUDGE:  That is what we are saying, whether we agree or not. 
CHAIRMAN:  We are clear, no death sentence even if it is something very bad. 
Mr BESSINGER:  I am afraid that either I as individual was misled.  After further consultation it 
was said that the “except according to procedures established by law” should remain.  For that 
sole reason that until you have cleared up this issue of this sentence, we cannot remove that 
portion of the article.  There are many grounds on which the death sentence is being argued for 
or against.  We have to sort that out and then we can come back to that clause really, because 
we cannot just let it hang in the air like that.  It hangs in the air with the deletion. 
Mr RUKORO:  This thing can be taken to mean that the life of a person is sacrosanct, except in 
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.  If we are in the war you have to shoot somebody in self–
defence. So, that is one level where I will have no problem.  If this particular proviso refers for 
instance to acts or war whereby soldiers and the police have to shoot in execution of their official 
functions - that is a different question.  The proviso is intended to cover a judicially pronounced 
death sentence.  If there are people who are for the death sentence as a verdict by a court of law, 
then maybe we need a debate on it.  If there is nobody in favour of the death sentence, in that 
case I think we just have an agreement now on the question of death penalty.  But if we talk in 
terms of the “according to the procedures established by law” in a different context, that I will 
accept, I have no problem with that one.  We can even have “except according to the 
procedures”, as it is, I have no problem with it if it means things like self-defence or acts of war.  
But if it is supposed to include and allow capital punishment, judicially pronounced, then I think 
we need a debate on it. 
Mr ANGULA:  yes, for the very reasons and for different reasons that honourable Rukoro is 
talking about, I just feel incompetent to decide on that myself.  I think we need to consult a broad 
spectrum of the …. If we provide them with a fait accompli about the death sentence, I am not 
sure whether we are truly and fairly reflecting the society‟s desires and expectations.  I don‟t know 
what the implications would be, but there must be provision.  So, as much as I don‟t like capital 
punishment, I will also not be in a position to say no capital punishment in the law.  I feel 
incompetence to do so.  
Mr BESSINGER:  I just want to elaborate a little further.  It is an old argument whether there 
should be capital punishment or not, and this thing has been argued from many quarters.  In 
some cases it has been argued that it acts a deterrent, etc., but I am coming from a totally 
different approach.  It has nothing to do with being a deterrent or not.  I want to cite example.  
You have in the United States certain states where the death penalty is on the books, it is 
applied.  You get other states where it is not applied.  You get in Africa – and I take Tanzania as 
an example – where the death penalty is legally applied, but it is used only in extreme case.  The 
reason why we are saying that is precisely coming to your argument.  There are occasions where 
an act perpetrated by an individual or individuals against society, that it provokes society to the 
point where, unless that death penalty is applied, it disrupts the function of society that as a 
whole, and that means that if the expression of society that the supreme penalty should be 
applied is oppressed and it cannot happen, it can lead to disaster.  If we take – and I just want to 
point one case as an example of where society expresses itself very strongly – the Charles 
Manson cult -murder in the United States, it was done in a state where the death penalty didn‟t 
apply, but the whole society was screaming for the death penalty to be applied.  You have 
another case where the death penalty wasn‟t applicable and it is one of our neighbours, Malawi, 
where a politician in the opposition stated his case.  The state wanted to revert to applying the 
death penalty.  So, I say it is something that needs to be there, but it needs to be used in a 
discretionary fashion.  But if it is not there, it creates problems.   
Dr TJITENDERO:  it is ironic; I think I want to agree with the statement made by Nahas, at last.  
niv
ers
ity
 f
 C
ap
e T
ow
n
22 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
CHAIRMAN:  Honourable Mr Angula. 
Dr TJITENDERO:  I want to say two words, and that is, one; there is sufficient justification for 
maintenance of the death penalty and the function of death penalty itself to the society.  I think we 
had enough case studies in sociology that it appears that it is not a deterrent because there is a 
statute that calls for the death penalty.  I think if we were to be fair to ourselves as 
representatives, this is one of the issues that can be thrown out eventually on a referendum or 
whatever.  But I don‟t think that there are sufficient grounds.  I am inclined to believe that there 
are not sufficient grounds to maintain the death penalty in a contemporary constitution.  There is 
just no basis for it.  I think there are different ways in which human character can be reformed.  
By getting rid of the life you are not doing anything, the acts will still be perpetuated.  So, in 
sociology there are different views of changing peoples‟ actions and behaviour through a model, 
but not through a death penalty, and I think I would like to agree with those who are advocating 
for the removal of the death penalty. It is not a deterrent at all.   
Mr GURIRAS:  MR Chairman, after all, life is perhaps first on the list of the rights that we consider 
as fundamental, and therefore, to deny any human being of his life is a basic.  We go back to 
biblical days, to the very beginning of civil society.      
Honourable Mr Bessinger recalled the state of affairs in the United State, for example.  He is quite 
correct.  Some states had it on their statutory books, others don‟t.  Some states revoke the 
provision sometimes, they reinstate them later.  It fluctuates like that all the time.  There are times 
that I am for it personally; there are times when I am objective about it.  If it strikes far away from 
me, I object as an intellectual, I would like to understand the mitigating circumstances under 
which somebody was killed.  If it strikes home closer to me, my relative, my friend then I want that 
beast to be killed.  So, to have it in the constitution invokes some of the things we are saying.  Not 
to have it, on the other hand, what so we do?  In this case now after lunch, I am for the retaining 
the formulation as it stands.   
Mr RUPPLE:  I think we have a choice here.  I fully agree with the sentiments expressed by the 
honourable Comrade Angula.  We do not really know what the people in this country want; there 
was no testing of the sentiments.  It is not only about deterrents, it is also about revenge, the 
death sentence.  I think that has been expressed here implicitly today.  Sometimes if you don‟t 
have this release valve in a controlled fashion, people will go to the street to do the job.  So, one 
has to carefully gauge the sentiments of the nation.  But I think we have to do a basic decision 
here.  We don‟t have time to test all these sentiments and go back to the people; we must make a 
decision here.  We either say we provide for the death sentence or we don‟t provide for it.   I 
myself feel that we should give it a try and not put it in the constitution.  If the people so strongly 
feel that it should be in, it could be a debate in parliament in good time, there could be a 
referendum which could put it back for some reasons to be decided.  But let‟s kick off on a nice 
note, let‟s give human rights a chance and let‟s respect human life in our first document.  We can 
always, for good and sound reasons and on debate and testing the feelings of our society get it 
back.  That is my approach. 
CHIARMAN:  I think the debate was extensive and sentiments were well expressed. I am very 
much impressed and we can go on. 
Mr. RUKORO:  I wanted to help you by proposing the summary of what honourable member 
Ruppel suggested that we proceed accordingly.  We take out the death penalty until such time 
that we are confronted by a society that says:  “no, we feel strongly about it, bring it in.”   
CHAIRMAN:  The committee is divided and therefore, instead of debating, I would like to see 
those who like to have the retention of the clause as it is show hands.  (Discussion) I can only go 
back to the rules that govern the whole house.  This is a committee, there is a deadlock and the 
chairman can then rely on the rules of the House.   
CHAIRMAN:  the point is that this issue be referred to the whole Assembly.  
Mr PRETORIUS:  (4) (C):  I still remain with my point of view, but I will talk about it in the 
Assembly.   
MR MUDGE:  on a point of order.  If Mr Pretorius wants to discuss matters, and we can probably 
sort them out, and he is holding his views back, when are we going to discuss it then?  He is 
becoming a dark horse now. 
Mr PRETORIUS:  we have already discussed it and I couldn‟t succeed in winning a majority.  I 
was outvoted, so the ruling was that I am free to speak in the Assembly.   
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Mr MUDGE:  So you want speak to the gallery? 
Mr PRETORIUS:  No, for the minority on the gallery. 
Mr RUPPLE:  Some people want to die fighting, that is all.  
RUKORO:  Then we come to the big thing, sub-article (5) (b):  “The powers of the President to 
make such laws shall include the power to suspend the operation of any rule of the common law 
or Statute or any fundamental right protected by this Part, for such period and subject to such 
conditions as he may in his opinion consider necessary or expedient.”  I have though that very 
clearly, consistent with international standards; we need a clause at the end of this chapter which 
contains certain rights and freedoms which simply cannot be derogated from irrespective of the 
nature of the emergency.  For instance, all the authorities I have consulted suggest that the 
following is accepted uniformly, that you cannot, even if it is in time of war or whatever 
emergency, derogate from the right to life or freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  You can‟t say because there is war, let‟s torture people in order to get information or 
whatever.  Freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is never derogated from.  The right to judicial personality.  That is 
recognition as a person before the law.  It does not affect emergency.  The right to existence of a 
political party.  But more important, which is the last one, the judicial guarantees essential for the 
protection of the non-derogable right as a basic right in itself.  Thus we need a clause specifying 
those rights that are non-derogable, irrespective of the circumstances.  Which means that in 
times of emergency maybe 95% of the Bill of rights can be derogated from in the national interest, 
but there is 5% that you just simply cannot touch and I think we need a provision to that effect.   
Mr ANGULA:  I just want to follow up a bit on what the honourable Mr Rukoro has said.  First on 
(2) (b), the two-thirds majority.  When you look at it from the point of view of suspending the 
fundamental rights, of course that is very important that we should now allow people to just too 
arbitrarily suspend them that they agree.  But if we also look at the other side where society is 
being threatened by insurrection or something like that, they do need a position to deal with the 
problem and they don‟t know how one can do that.  If it is so that you have to call parliament, 
somebody might be sick, somebody might be on holiday because this is an emergency, it was not 
planned, then the insurrection is going on, life is being destroyed and the very rights you are 
defending are being trampled upon by the forces of whatever it is.  We also have to think as to 
how to protect society.  That aspect we should also bring in, the other angle.  How to make sure 
that to protect society for weeks, their fundamental rights you want to be maintained. So, that is 
one thing I want us to think carefully.  Article (3), this declaration of a period of not less than six 
months at a time, I don‟t know what the drafter was meaning.  Probably what he was meaning is 
that you can have it for more than six months.  I don‟t know what the drafter meant to say.  But I 
have no objections to putting “not more than”.  That is fine, but I have a problem with how to 
reach a decision to declare a state of emergency in order to protect society.  I don‟t know we 
should have a procedure which is a bit flexible; otherwise the very society you are trying to 
protect will actually be in danger.  
MR GURIRAB: I think I accept everything, except political parties. I don‟t think that is on par with 
the other. I am not very strong on that one. I don‟t know whether it is entirely necessary for 
political party to be sacrosanct. 
MR RUKORO: In response to the issue raised by honourable member Gurirab, I concede that in 
all the documents that I went through all the other rights were enumerated. In one document all of 
them, in some only some and so on, but the right to exist as a political party does not appear in 
any of them. I just included it to accommodate my colleague here. The honourable delegate from 
the NPF had it in his submission. So, I agree with you that the fundamentality of it is questionable. 
But go back to comrade Angula; the first answer was is that nothing in article 22(2) prohibits the 
president from acting swiftly, even within minutes or hours of a serious emergency or a war, 
because it says it is for the president at any time by proclamation to declare a state emergency. 
Having done so he must lay this declaration before parliament, for parliament to endorse within 
seven days or to reject. So, his ability to protect society is unaffected. Secondly, two-third is 
necessary, because if there is a serious emergency, an insurrection, that is even more reason 
why you will have more than two-thirds of parliament agreeing with the president. But it is there 
as a protection against these things like where you had Margaret Thatcher, Because there is an 
election coming on, popularity is going down, you decide to declare war on a mini Banana 
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Republic somewhere, and then our soldiers are killed simply for political reasons. That is why you 
need parliament to say yes by an overwhelming majority it is in the national interest to go to war. 
MRS ITHANA: I now entirely agree with honourable Comrade Rukoro. My problem was almost 
like his, but with the explanation that he gave I feel the rights that are to be guaranteed during the 
emergency must be really worked out, so that during a state of emergency people are not just 
going too bamboozled.  
MR TJITENDERO: I do not see the affinity of the existence of the political party in relation to the 
fundamental rights that were enumerated there, and this is where we want to understand. It is 
true, the example of the honourable Tjiriange, I do not necessarily envisage a situation where the 
Supreme Court may not meet, because if the parliament can meet then obviously other 
institutions under the same circumstances may meet. But I do not see  
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ORDERS AND INTERNAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
WINDHOEK 
14 DECEMBER 1989 
 
MR RUPPEL: We propose eleven important checks: 
1. The executive power shall vest in the Cabinet of Ministers, which will be headed by the 
President. 
2. The president will, as we have discussed before, exercise his functions in terms of the 
constitution in consultation with members of the Cabinet. 
3. The President can be removed from his high office on the grounds that he has been 
guilty of a violation of the constitution or serious violation of the laws of the land or gross 
misconduct or inaptitude, which would in the view of at least a two-thirds majority of the 
house (legislature) render him unfit to hold with dignity and honour him unfit to hold with 
dignity and honour his high office. That is basically the impeachment, the provision 
provides for a two-thirds majority of the house. 
4. The President can also be removed as soon as he fails to qualify for being the president 
in the first place. He must meet certain qualifications to be able to be a candidate for 
presidency. If he during his term of office loses one of the qualifications, he is out of 
office. 
5. There is a provision that the acts of the president, any action taken by him, pursuant to 
the powers vested in him can be reviewed, reversed or corrected if it is deemed 
necessary or appropriate by at least a two-thirds majority of the legislature and two-thirds 
of the Cabinet. 
6. Appointments by the executive President shall be valid but could, similarly, be challenged 
by the same procedure as I have described a moment ago. 
7. The President is empowered to terminate the services of any minister, but again this 
decision is subject to the same review, procedures as I have been referring to in respect 
of the previous, two kinds of actions. 
8. The president will have no choice but to terminate an appointment to the cabinet if the 
legislature with a simple majority brings out a vote of no confidence against a particular 
minister. 
9. If a bill is passed by the legislature with a two-thirds majority and passed on the President 
for signature, he will have to sign the bill. He cannot decline to do so.  
10. If the bill is passed with less than two-thirds majority, the president may decline to sign 
the bill and he must then send the bill back to the legislature, which body may then 
decide to once again refer to the president. If he once again declines to sign, he must 
dissolve both the legislature and his own office and call for elections. It is basically if there 
is a deadlock between the ruling party president. 
11. The legislature shall be dissolved, new elections called, if the president is advised to do 
so by his Prime Minister, acting in concurrence with the majority of the Cabinet, and that 
would then also mean that the president is up for elections again. 
12. If he decides to withhold his assent to a bill on the grounds that he regards it as being 
unconstitutional, he can be overruled by the constitutional Court, and the court‟s ruling 
will be binding on the President. 
That is if as far as the checks are concerned and with that I want to conclude. 
Mudge: By way of introduction I just want to say that constitutions are written for the future of 
a democratic state, and I think we should always remember that. They should not be tied to 
the position of one or other political party or one or other political leader, and because of the 
statue and the influence of a specific political leader. I want to make it very clear, when we 
discuss this constitution and discuss the position of a President, we are not discussing Mr 
Sam Nujoma or Mr Biwa or any other person, we are discussing the position of a state 
president, because political leaders will come and go, but the constitution must be the stable 
and, as we see it, the everlasting basis for state institutions and the rule of law. I can refer 
you to the history of the world, maybe I should not, but I can refer to Washington, but I can 
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also refer to Hitler and Iddi Amin, and I am sure you will know the difference. We will feel very 
strongly about the concentration of power, because as we see it power corrupts and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely. The proposals in the working document, as I see it, have the 
inherent danger of establishing the system whereby the head of state exercises absolute 
power. We have listened to the honourable member Mr Ruppel only now, we will have to look 
at his proposals at a later stage, but in the meantime we are of the opinion that the head of 
state, in terms of his proposal will exercise absolute power. As a matter o fact, as we see it 
runs counter to the whole democratic doctrine of separation of powers, and I will try to prove 
that. I am not going to discuss the legislature now, I am only going to refer to the legislature 
to sort of highlight and emphasize the powers of the President. Look at section 34(4) (e): 
“The President has the power to appoint no more than six persons to the national assembly.” 
The appointment of the members to the National Assembly runs contrarily to the democratic 
principle. That is the first point I want to make, the fact that he has the power to appoint six 
members to the National Assembly.  (b):  “In as far as the introduction of laws are concerned, 
the Assembly may not introduce them without the assent of the president.” Article 57 (2). (c): 
“The President may decline to sign any law passed by the National Assembly.” Article 48(2). 
Mr Ruppel has already reacted to that, but we will come back to that again. “The President 
may dissolve the National Assembly in  three manners: (1) acting soloist, Article 34(2) (a), by 
refusing to sign any law passed by the National Assembly, Article 48 (3), and by doing so on 
the advice of the Prime Minister, acting with concurrence of the majority of the Council of 
Ministers, Article 48(5). It should be borne in mind that the President has the power to appoint 
these very ministers, the council of ministers. 
Sir, if we look at the judiciary, and I am not going to discuss the judiciary, I am going to 
discuss the powers of President. The President has the power to appoint the Chief Justice, 
the judge President of the general Division, the president of the Constitutional Court and/or 
other judges – Article 34(2) (j) (cc). In so appointing them, he has to act in consolation with 
the council of Ministers and the judicial Services Commission – Article 74(4). The President 
has power to appoint all the members of the council of Ministers, as well as the members of 
the judicial Services Commission, those members who must advise him. He has the right to 
appoint them. Articles 34(2) (b), 34(2) (j) (aa), (bb), and (dd). The President has the power to 
discharge the members of the council of Ministers, as well as the members of the Judicial 
Services Commission by the same process, the people in consultation with whom he must 
now take decisions. 
Thus, Mr Chairman, the President has complete power regarding the appointment of the 
Judges and by doing so can exercise direct authority in the judiciary. 
I want to talk about the executive. The President is vested with the executive power of state 
and shall perform any act incidental to the discharge o the executive functions of the 
government – article 34(1) 
Although provisions are made for a council of ministers, the president in the exercise of his 
functions is not obliged to follow the advice tendered by the council – article 33. In terms of 
article 31(4), the nomination of the President is regulated by a law of parliament. This creates 
the possibility that such a nomination becomes the prerogative of one party holding a simple 
majority in parliament. Also article 31(5) makes it possible that the President can hold office 
for life since no limitation as to his tenure of office is expressed, and since the removal of the 
president can only be effected by two-thirds majority in Parliament – article 31(6), the 
possibility of removing a president has been given by the honourable Mr Ruppel mainly as 
ways and means to remove the president. I just want to say at this stage, I don‟t think we 
should rely too much on the removal of the President, I don‟t think we should follow the 
example of those countries who every two years remove a president. That is not what we 
have in mind. We don‟t want to remove presidents, we want to keep them, but we don‟t want 
them to find themselves in the position where they can abuse power. 
The proposals in the working document concerning the president are also, as we see it, 
politically unwise, and practically impossible. The direct election of a president in accordance 
with the SWAPO-proposals, or the working document emphasize ethnic divisions, and I think 
we must do everything in our power to avoid that, because such an occurrence could very 
well lead to national disunity.  
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Further to this question of the direct election of a president after every five year. It will also 
mean that two national elections – one for a National Assembly and one for a president – will 
be held at the same time and apart from the administrative cost other complications, this lead 
to overall disruption of National life. Politically the proposal for a directly elected president is 
unsound and dangerous, because it denies the existence of a multi party system and begs 
for the…… of all state powers and the creation of a one-party system. That is our view. I want 
to give you a few arguments on behalf of our delegation in favour of a parliamentary head of 
state, and I want to repeat that, a parliament head of state. We are not talking about a 
ceremonial President, I think we should avoid that terminology altogether. We talk about 
parliamentary head of state, because such a parliamentary head of state assures the 
upholding and, indeed, safeguarding of a certain democratic doctrine of separation of powers 
in so far as the president, as head of the executive, is guided by the wishes of his executive 
and cannot encroach either on the powers of the legislature or the judiciary. The 
parliamentary of state is in fact the guardian of the doctrine of the separation of powers. He 
assures that the judiciary remains independent at all times, that the legislature embodies the 
wishes of the people and that the executive follows he demands of the legislature. It is a well-
known fact that most democratic systems of government are under a parliamentary head of 
state. A well known exception is the American-system, but it must, however, be borne in mind 
that the American-system is a federal system and that the American President, although 
directly elected with strong executive powers, is strictly bound by the federal system and the 
doctrine of separation of powers which is deeply embedded in the American Constitution. For 
instance, the American President cannot encroach on powers of the federal states and he 
cannot violate the independence of the judiciary. Also he has to obtain the ratification of his 
executive appointments, conclusion of international treaties and other important executive 
acts, such as the declaration of war and states of emergency in his senate. Therefore, to use 
or to apply the American-mode to Namibia with its strong unified character and systems of 
central government is, as far as we are concerned, totally inappropriate. 
A parliament head of state who is mandated by a parliament becomes a symbol of unity and 
conciliation, since in the exercise of his executive powers he needs to follow the wishes of the 
representative of the people, and this democratic principle is in fact contained in article1 (2) 
which states emphatically that all powers shall ultimately reside with the Namibian and not 
vest in one single person. It is an undeniable fact that the office of head of state should be 
rooted in democratic traditions of that particular state. In Namibia there is not one tradition 
that points to executive head of state with vast unchecked powers. Indeed, all systems of 
government in Namibia since the historical times point to systems of government under which 
the chief or rulers were always under the authority of the people. In no instance the history of 
Namibia shows the institution of a director.  
For a Namibia head of state it is essential that both the interest of the people, as a 
represented by political parties, as well as the interest of regions is combined. For that reason 
it is proposed that the future Namibian head of state should be elected by the National 
assembly as well as a champion of the constitution and the laws. He should not be a party 
chief being elevated to the position of an autocrat, as the working document contemplates. 
These are a few points that we wanted to make, and I hope that the one thing which comes 
through is the fact that we don‟t want just a ceremonial head of state. We don‟t want 
somebody who is just a figure-head - that is not what we are looking for. We want somebody 
who has power, but the power must ultimately rest with the people and not with the individual, 
and the one thing that we do not want; we don‟t want power to get rid of him. This reminds 
too much of what has happened too often in the world - that the only way is to get rid of the 
president. So, when you come and tell me all the ways and all the means that we can use to 
get rid of the president, frankly does not impress us. We need other ways to ensure that we 
need not to get rid of the president. We want to keep him there, but somehow we want to 
control him. 
I will, for the time-being, conclude. We have in the meantime listened to Mr Ruppel. I want to 
say, I would have appreciated it more if Mr Ruppel would have reacted after having listened 
to us, because that is actually what you decided yesterday. Those were there instructions 
that you gave, we must come now and then after that, and I don‟t want to provoke you to call 
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me to order, but let me say this: I think the time has now come that we now consider 
appointing people to work for all of us, not only for some of us, and I am now blaming any 
party, because we are also now tempted to start drafting, and we might end up in a week‟s 
time again with seven drafts – one from your office, one from our office. Thank you. 
Katjiuongua: My approach is that I want endearing national, political institutions that can 
survive me, survive my political party and others; we can be passed over to generation to 
come. That is my approach. Therefore I think many of the constraints proposed here by my 
distinguished brother Mr Ruppel, which I think in a sense represent a degree of flexibility – I 
appreciated that – but I am only afraid of too many controls on the chief executive. I think 
somehow we must find out where to draw the line. But if we say at the time there is political 
instability in parliament, then the president must also stand up for election, I tell you the 
government might be overthrown every day by something or the other, maybe even an 
upheaval in the same political party. So, I just want us to be very careful not to tie the office of 
the head of state, whom I think should represent the dignity of our people, the unity of our 
people, the stability of our country. That is the way I look at it. Therefore I think we should be 
careful. We might that nobody might be interested in the office of head of state, because 
there is no comfort. The other thing, and I think we are here not to fool each other, at least I 
am not here to fool you, and if I talk straight, which I think is what I like in my life, because I 
think straight talk breaks no friendship, this is the only way I can be corrected if I am wrong, 
we must also face the realities of our situation, the composition of our population and the 
location of that population within the borders of our territory. What I am trying to avoid is that 
we should not have a Biafra one day here and succession and problems and so on. I am 
totally detribalized, nobody will ever blame me of tribalism, but I think I love this country. So 
therefore, I want my friends who are proponents of an executive president with extensive 
powers also to understand me very well that I also have sympathy for a brother or a sister 
who might land up in a useless office, because if you say the head of state represents the 
nation and the man in bogged dead by sitting in that house, then no Namibian would ever 
campaign for that office. I think we must work out the mechanisms how this can happen, and 
that of course is the powers of the president, his functions his relationship to parliament, his 
method of election, whether they should be elected by, as I proposed, a joint session of both 
houses of parliament and I want to be very frank with you people, that the role of the cabinet, 
the presidency, his powers position must be linked to the position that we will have on the 
question of a bi- or unicameral parliament. To me it is important, because also, as I talked 
about the diversity of our various factors, it also means that if you have two houses, whatever 
the numbers might be – I am for small numbers, because I believe small is beautiful, that they 
should not be elected in a similar manner, because that would be a duplication. So, if one is 
elected by way of proportional representation – and I must say it will be a mistake on the part 
of us here, even if I am talking different numbers in this country, it will be an injustice, unfair 
and stupid to try to control the numbers of your people in an artificial manner. You are going 
to create problems if people feel that they are Namibians, but their numbers don‟t count as 
equally as that of other people. I think we must take that into account and not make a 
mistake. Numbers must be given their full democratic chance of playing their parts. But I think 
if you say one house is elected by proportional representation, maybe in the election of the 
other house we can have a single member constituency method , so that maybe in that case 
the winner can take all, contribution to make.” For me that is very important. So, the powers 
of the presidency, his functions, the constraints on him and if you say the president is elected 
directly, you might have a perceptional problem. Can be……. If he is directly elected by the 
people? In America and France he is elected by the people directly. He cannot be overthrown 
by parliament. In France he can be impeached by special tribunal for that purpose. So, we 
must also link the method of electing the President to his role in the system of government we 
are going to have. If you have an executive president, is there a need to have a Prime 
Minister? In France they have a prime ministers. Maybe one of you comrades or brothers 
wants to be a bureaucratic Prime Minister. But nevertheless, whether one should have a 
prime minister still or vice-president, I don‟t know. 
In short, Mr Chairman, these are my ideas on the question of the presidency, the cabinet and 
parliament. I see them as a jackpot, so they must be dealt with in combination. 
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MR GURIRAB: We are at the point where the American were in 1776 in Philadelphia, where I 
spent quite a number of years trying to make sense out of my life. The issue we are 
discussing was before the Philadelphia Convention in 1776. The sentiments expressed here 
form some of the records of those discussions then. We have different heroes; we have 
different philosophical, political ideological preferences for different political systems. I don‟t 
think, for example, that – I was particularly addressing this to Mr Mudge – there was anything 
great about George Washington, the father of the American Nation. He was a slave-owner at 
the time when the constitution was being drafted. There is nothing great about that. He was 
among those who prosecuted and killed, massacred, carried out genocide against the Native 
Americans. I don‟t admire him as a man. He was not interested in free elections. The republic 
of United states was formed prior to the holding of elections. The American Constitution itself 
that was finally hammered out in Philadelphia had so many defects. Blacks were counted 
four-fifths of a man, they were of no consequences. Women were nothing, white or black. 
Women were not allowed to vote until1929 in the United States. It took that nearly perfect 
constitution – I grant you that – amendments just this side of ……, to correct the deficiencies 
and injustices that it contained. There are wonderful things about the American system and 
about the American Constitution That I admire. I know quite a bit about it and I lived in that 
system so long that I know its defects, but I also know wonderful things about it. 
Washington was as bad to me as Hitler and Iddi Amin. If you have mentioned Thomas 
Jefferson, I would have said the same thing too. My here of that period is Thomas Payne. 
I would find it very difficult to disagree with the concerns expressed about the need to ensure 
in our constitution the doctrine of checks and balances, it is so basic so fundamental to me. 
How you do it is a different question. I have no argument about separation of powers and that 
is precisely what we intended to do in our draft and in the amplification. There is no argument 
that. How you bring about the way of institution formation, by way of other kind of legal and 
administrative arrangements made to bring about harmony between different national 
institutions, branches of government - that is the business that brings us here together. But I 
don‟t want to listen time and again that we need separation of powers – I am not saying we 
shouldn‟t talk about it – I was convinced about it more than two decades ago that there is a 
need for it. I, of course, endorse the attempts made by honourable comrade Ruppel share 
with the House how we, having listened Friday last and in subsequent consultation, tried to 
improve what we considered to be the committee working paper, no longer a SWAPO 
working paper, and it was that paper that we though you would have in your hands last 
evening. I have since discovered that it did not reach all the leaders of the political parties 
represented here. It was an attempt precisely, because having listened to the discussion 
Friday; we found that there were some salient points, some fundamental points about 
separation of powers, checks and balances among the executive, the national Assembly and 
the judiciary. It was an attempt to improve our original submission. That is precisely what my 
colleague attempt to do. Those who had an opportunity to read through the revision we 
made, the paper we consider to be the committee working paper, will appreciate. In some 
instance I have a personal feeling that we probably went too far in some regards in 
prescribing the authority of the president. We differ philosophically, conceptionally and in 
terms of how our system should like. I believe that as we engage in this give and take, we will 
find harmony.  
It is good to say that we should not be writing the constitution with ourselves in mind. That 
sounds also wonderful, but what we are doing is precisely that. The concerns, the 
preoccupations, the trepidations we feel are because of our own fixation to the present and 
the past. The matter of ethnicity, for example, heterogeneity of our society, Namibia is not 
unique in that sense. I don‟t not necessarily consider that to be a handicap so big that we 
have to, by different means, by verbiage, entrench what we have fought against for so long, 
precisely ethnicity and fragmentation of our population. If we think about what we are doing 
as an effort to ensure unity, meaningful national reconciliation, that, as I believe, the last few 
weeks since we met as members of the Constituent Assembly have not been weeks wasted, 
but were weeks during which we, in addition to the work that we collaborate on, got to know 
each other better, that I believe the more we are able to work together in the Constituent 
Assembly, in the government and various other institutions that we will create in this Country, 
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the more the ethnicity – and I appreciate the sense in which the honourable Katjiuongua said 
it, that he came back home and found friends across the board in this country, that I believe 
to be true, it will happen for all of us – so I do not believe therefore that there is an inherent 
danger in having large ethnic groups in one region of the country and to have medium sized 
ones in yet another part and to have smaller ones somewhere else, and that therefore 
inherently constitutes a basis for imminent danger for our republic. I do not believe that. I 
cannot really think of a country where you have an animal called parliamentary head of state. 
Parliamentary leaders perhaps like in UK, but parliamentary head of state is a concept that is 
quite strange to me. I don‟t know whether our ideas as SWAPO were inspired by the French 
model. It does sound like it, but I also believe that it has its own unique features that would 
set it apart from the French model. I would hate to see a situation emerge in this country that 
would be akin to what we have in Nigeria, the problem of Biafra and so on. That was a good 
reference point to underline the argument. I don‟t see it happening and we as leader should 
do everything possible to prevent it from happening here in our country. So, perhaps the 
honourable chairman, as we continue to listen to different contributors, will appreciate these 
things are interrelated, you cannot talk about the executive without at the same time thinking 
about the parliament and the judiciary. We started the discussion last Friday. Ours was an 
attempt, a sincere attempt to improve on what we had originally proposed, and I still believe 
that in spite of listening to two very substantive presentations, that we are very much far 
apart. If we are, then I hope there is enough goodwill and sense of imagination for us to 
remove those differences and work out a draft that would as much as possible enable us to 
reach consensus.  
MR ANGULA: I just wanted to reflect a bit on the ideas which have been brought to the table 
in order to get a clear kind of picture. One is the idea of the parliamentary head of state which 
basically boils down that the head of state will be under control of the parliament, since he 
has to be elected by the parliament. My problem is that this idea seems to conflict with the 
democratic principles that the power is vested in the people themselves, the people of 
Namibia as a whole. If we have to take the power from the people and bring it to parliament, I 
am not quite sure whether we are doing justice to our own people, and I thought also that the 
unity of this country will actually come out of our own people. Parliament can contribute or 
can encourage their constituencies to have understanding for people in other constituencies 
and that sort of thing, but ultimately it is up to the people out there in the rural areas, on the 
farms, in the compounds, in the locations, in the beautiful townships to eventually decide 
where they want to be one nation and one people. So, I find therefore the idea of 
parliamentary head of state to seriously conflict with the basically needs in democracy, that 
power rests in the people, and I think it is from the position that we propose that the president 
shall be elected by nation-wide elections. In that way the people will be able to express 
themselves as a people. The other idea which has been brought about is the question of a 
chamber representing regions. I don‟t understand what this is supposed to achieve. The very 
people who are in the regions, and I don‟t know why they should be subjected to electing two 
types of animals one regional chamber, and why should it be central for the matter if it is 
within the region? A chamber representing the region should act within that region. It does 
not need to be central. So, I don‟t see the logic there. Perhaps the colleges in the DTA will be 
able to convince me on that, but I have serious problems. 
We ask our people to elect a parliament, to seek a mandate from them. Then you say you 
have no confidence in the parliament, they should also elect regional something and this 
regional something has to become a central body. That is asking too much from our people 
and then having a president elected on universal suffrage and all that. In addition it is made 
more complicated by my good friend and comrade, President Katjiuongua, who says that 
these people who are representing the regions or second chamber should be elected on the 
basis of single member constituency, while the parliament is elected on proportional 
representation. My problem is that will not change the distribution of …. In our country. 
Certainly not. The same result you got for the election of members of parliament you will get 
when you come to the second chamber of parliament. That is one thing for sure. 
Also I am surprised by the fact that while you are trying to foster unity – and I was very much 
encouraged by the proposal of our colleague in the DTA that in the preamble we must 
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emphasize reconciliation and unity – you must really mean it. Our people can only be united if 
they act as one, not as representatives for regions or tribal or ethnic groups. I do know that all 
these efforts are being suggested in order to strike some kind of balances in terms of 
checking and controlling the powers of the president. I am only trying to say, can‟t we 
consider some other means of doing that, than creating structures which will just not serve 
any purpose at all, which might even negate the very principles we are trying to enshrine in 
the constitution. I thought in this regard, my colleagues from SWAPO who were here last 
week and listened to your views, I think they even went too far to the constrain the power of 
the president, to the point that there are impeachment procedures that the president are 
impeached if he seems to be violating the constitution. That is very important. The second 
aspect of it is that certain decisions of the president can be overrules the president, that can 
create confusion in the running of the country. But I think these ideas have gone a long way 
to allay the fears that the president can become a runaway president. 
We are concerned with the creation of the executive presidency, and I think the things that he 
came up with and which are stated in the working document, of course we are concerned 
with the powers of the president, and I am glad that the people are saying that we are 
concerned with the institution-making, we are creating institutions for ourselves now and for 
generations to come. The individuals who go in them are dispensable, they will go in and get 
out, and it goes without saying that if we elect a president, the automatic requirement of 
course, is impeachment and I don‟t like the way that some passing comments in checks and 
balances of the president were referred to as an unnecessary condition. It is absolutely 
necessary, because it goes with the same methods that you bring about an elected officer 
into an office. There should be provision, a constitutional provision that would be allowed to 
remove the same elected official. 
About four areas are mentioned where both disagreement and questions of the methods 
have been referred to: the method in which the president is elected, the powers of the 
president, functions of the president and tenure of the president. I have also looked at the 
DTA-proposal, I had it here, and I think we should allay some of the fears by saying that the 
functions of the president with regards appoint of minister - that is given as a conventional 
function. So, I don‟t think that we are going to be arguing about that. But I think Mr Mudge did 
make a specific reference to the elected members outside by the president. I think that is an 
issue which should be brought in and be and be given the justification that it deserves, or the 
background that brought it into the proposal that is submitted as the working document. I 
think that is the pros and cons, we can discuss that. The thinking behind this, of course, is 
that a functional president would have to have some responsibilities and some individuals to 
work with other than the given, and the number6, I think there is nothing sacrosanct about 6, 
but 6 again talk about democracy. It should be looked into in terms of does it encroaches or 
does it negate the whole principle of the elected president. Does it tilt the balance in such a 
way that it negates the powers and functions and responsibilities of those who were elected, 
who have the mandate of the people? That is a question, w shall debate that, and I think the 
appointed members should be seen in that light. 
Again, powers of the president, as we see them here, Comrade Ruppel attempted of course 
to bring the necessary checks and balances. I do not know whether there was an 
overreaction to those checks and balances, but I think there are. They go hand in hand with 
an elected president.  
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDIG RULES AND ORDER INTERNAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
WINDHOEK 
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MR HAMUTENYA: Mr Chairman, I think this point is true, it is contained in the working 
document, but to be frank, it was also a bone of contention within the SWAPO-caucus itself 
before. Some tried to justify on the grounds that you may have a situation whereby the 
president is required to nominate his cabinet or to choose his cabinet from among the 
members of the National Assembly. In those instances the president should have the 
possibility to bring in some people of particular skills and experiences, or maybe for example  
businessman who does not want to go through the rigours of an election campaign, but is 
prepared to serve the nation . So far, so good, it sounded well, but since the working 
documents does not propose that the Cabinet should be only selected from the National 
Assembly, the argument did not really hold water for the appointment of the six people. So, I 
think it is something we can do without. We have strong position on this. 
MR RUKORO: I have a problem with conceptionalising the type of, or in what way the 
presidential power to appoint x-number of people to the National assembly, how that could be 
characterised as being contrary to democratic principles. If that can be done with you 
changing the balance of power within the Assembly, and at the same time serve a paramount 
national interest, like for instance the representation of distinct interest groups in this country, 
whether we talk of organized labour, whether we talk of organized commerce, or for instance, 
as I proposed in the House in my submission, the representation of traditional leaders. These 
are hopefully non-party political interests and concerns, they are of vital interest to all of us, 
and provided the president, acting on the advice of the cabinet, can make appropriate 
appointments of these people to the national assembly so that we can benefit from their 
direct input in terms of policy formulation, without themselves having the right to vote when it 
comes to the vote. That does not affect the balance of forces in the house and therefore I can 
only see it as really adding to the strength of the functional democracy, rather than running 
counter to the democratic principles. I would really urge reconsideration of retaining that 
principle.  
MR PRETORIOUS: If the president is acting in consultation with the cabinet and if we can 
keep in mind the idea of proportional basis and if it is without the right vote, I do not have very 
strong feelings about it. It can stay as it is. 
To prefer a number of individuals. I think the example that honourable Hamutenya gave, it 
could be very competent business but who does want to go through the rigours of elections, 
knowing very well that he may not have a constituency to be elected, but in terms of skills 
and competences that he or she may have, would be noted nationwide that - that should be 
the person in a given field. So, I think this is basically designed to meet those kinds of 
objectives in terms of spreading the skills, the competence without tilting the democratic 
balance of the elected representatives. But the objectives are on a competent basis. Then, of 
course, we are saying that the people would be in the assembly with or without a vote. That is 
the criterion, I think.  
MR MUDGE: I just want to make sure that I understood the honourable member Mr 
Hamutenya correctly, that he has no serious objections if we scrap this provision, because 
we from our side feel strongly that it goes against the principle of democracy if you are 
appoint people in your legislative body. I am not talking about the cabinet now I am not 
talking about executives, I talking about the legislative body and I just want to get clarity. I 
have listened to Mr Katjiuongua‟s proposal. It might be somehow a remedy if we do it on 
proportional basis, but I think it is too early for me to concede to that. I think at this stage to 
me it still a principle, but the reason why I think I asked for the floor is just to make sure did I 
understand Mr Hamutenya correctly. Let us just get absolute clarity on what he infect said, 
otherwise I might be a little confused.  
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MR RUPPEL: Two points: I think the honourable comrade Hamutenya made it clear that 
SWAPO is indeed prepared to be flexible on this point in the atmosphere of being eager to 
get on with the job and look at problems. What Mr Hamutenya said was, as I understand it, 
correctly understood by the honourable Mr Mudge, and I associate myself with the things said 
by Mr Hamutenya. I think want to point out to the DTA who raised this point as a serious 
principle problem, because of the undemocratic nature of it: It is quite clear that as matters 
are now there is provision made for the direct popular election of the president. He would be 
elected on his own tickets as it where. To implement as executive his policy he should, as 
part of his democratic mandate, also have a bit of clout and it is only good democratic 
principle if that is shown in the way which was envisaged originally by giving him the power to 
appoint another six persons who could usefully participate and enrich the proceedings in the 
legislature and also constitute a very useful contact point between executive and the 
legislature. So, it is not entirely undemocratic. There is an election, the people that they vote 
for the President plus six, so it is not something that is radically undemocratic in the end if 
you consider all these matters. But as I have said it is a flexible thing and I make a note of Mr. 
Mudge‟s cautious note that if it is done on a proportional basis, this principle - that it could be 
used meaningfully in another context later on. 
MR HAMUTENYA: For me the problem is not so much about the democratic nature of this 
exercise. My problem is criteria of choosing these six. I foresee problems down the road in 
any attempt to appoint these six individuals. I have listened to the various criteria advanced 
here, but I still foresee problems. If it is a question of proportion, what does it change? It will 
still leave the question the same. If we need more people, why don‟t we increase the number 
of the assembly from 72 to 78, then you solve the problem. If the number of the seats in the 
Assembly is the problem. Proportionality will simply get us back to where we are in the terms 
of the balance of forces in terms of parties. I cannot see very objective criteria which will be 
acceptable for all of us here to appoint the six people I have a problem with this clause 
myself. If it was left to me I would do without it.  
MR MUDGE: That is why I was surprised, because normally he is talking in his own interest. 
But in any case, if you feel that there is a great deal of consensus on this matter and that it 
might be influenced either way, depending on what we are going to decide later, then I will 
agree that we move on. 
CHAIRMAN: There is an agreement and the same principle is about co-opting people from 
heaven to come and sit here. Because of their expertise we want to bring in lawyers to sit in 
here to help us. It is the same principle. It doesn‟t derogate from our democratic right. So, 
there seems to be agreement. If it is controversial, we can discuss it but the majority favours 
that it be included.   
“Where a bill is passed by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members of the National 
Assembly, the president shall be obliged to give his assent thereto. So, he has no choice. 
The next point says in subparagraphs (3) and (4) of that annexure, which is point 10 of the 
covering note: “Where any bill is passed by a majority of members of the National Assembly, 
but such majority consist of less than two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly, 
and the president declines to give his assent to such bill, he shall communicate such dissent 
to the National Assembly”. And then we go on to subparagraph (4): Should the National 
Assembly thereafter elect to repass the same bill and the president again either declines to or 
fails to assent thereto with a period of 30 days, the National Assembly shall, from the expiry 
of the side period of 30 days, be deemed to have dissolved, notwithstanding the fact that its 
ordinary period of duration has not expired.” This proposal says that the president also will 
have to resign within a certain time and he will have to call elections for both a new 
legislature and a new president. That is how this constitutional deadlock is taken care of. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: I have two questions. I want clarity from honourable Mr Ruppel, what is 
this requirement in 4.9 and 4.10, whether it is a control on the executive power or whether it 
is a control on the president‟s capacity for law-making powers. The other is, this requirement 
of an election every time the president vetoes legislation  
MR RUKORO: I have a few problems with this provision as well, and I think it can be resolved 
by a redrafting or reformulation. For instance, I feel that we should state in simple terms that 
all legislation can be passed by a simple majority. Full stop. This is the case in all other 
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societies. Secondly, we must state also in simple terms that there will be no presidential veto 
of legislation passed by the house, except in one circumstance only, namely when the 
proposed bill is unconstitutional in the opinion of the president, unconstitutional in the sense 
that it violates or a provision thereof violates provisions of the bill of rights or is repugnant to 
one or other provisions of the constitution itself, even though it is not part of the bill of rights. It 
is the only ground for a presidential veto, and once the president has exercised that veto in 
those circumstances, then the matter should be referred to the constitutional court for the 
resolution for a final decision: “Yes, the president is right”, in which case the bill will lapse, “, 
the president is not right”, in which case he must sign and it will become law, pure and 
simple. I have a problem with the provision that allows the president to dissolve parliament in 
case there is a dispute between himself as president and the House. Ordinarily my 
understanding is that that provision whereby the president can dissolve parliament, that 
authority of power is given him, not to resolve the conflict between himself and the 
parliament, but usually is given to him in order to resolve the dreadlock between two houses 
of parliament. So, he comes in as the third check or a non-legislative participant in the 
process of law making. If the senate and the National Assembly are at loggerheads about a 
particular bill, and it is becoming a crisis nationally, that is when the president comes in, using 
his power to dissolve both houses. But I have never heard of a situation where in a dispute 
involving the president himself and the house, he can dissolve the house. That is a potential 
for blackmail and it is therefore politically unhealthy. That is why really feel that the only 
ground for a presidential veto should be that in defence of legally, i.e. the proposed bill in 
unconstitutional. Otherwise any measure passed by parliament, ordinary law-making by way 
of simple majority, he must sign, except those that require specifically two-thirds as is 
provided for in the constitution itself. What is important to us is, what action can he take 
should he not be prepared to sign the law? Dissolving the government, to my mind, is not the 
solution. Refer it back, yes, that is the normal procedure. That will also have to be the 
procedure to be followed by the Senate. Refer it back a second time. 
Mudge: That is why we have a serious problem, and I think if we can now discuss, now or at 
a later stage, only about what would be the action that he can take, and that it should not 
necessarily be anything that would lead to the dissolution of the government. I just wanted to 
make that point. I wish somebody could help me with the formulation. Mr Rukoro said a 
house of revision, was that the word? Court of revision. Can we say that in this case the 
president is the judge of revision, and we can‟t get away from that whatever we do?  
MR RUKORO: I think the solution is in the document itself. The only thing we have to do is to 
cut off that power which says the president can dissolve parliament. Otherwise it is the same 
thing as the American thing. You pass it by a simple majority, the president vetoes it, the 
house repasses it with a two-thirds majority, the president is forced to sign, but there will be 
no dissolution. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for solving the problem. 
DR TJIRIANGE: What if it goes back and comes back without a two thirds-majority? Then it 
has elapsed?  
MR RUKORO: Then it lapses, the presidential veto is sustained.  
MR MUDGE: MR Chairman, it is not possible for our delegation here to finally make a 
proposal, we have to discuss it with our caucus, but the feeling among us here is that we 
might agree to amend our proposals in so far as the position of the prime minister is 
concerned. We make provision for a cabinet with the prime minister as the chairman of the 
cabinet. In your case the president will preside the meetings of the cabinet. We do not have 
authority to as this point in time make concession there, but we have the feeling that there we 
might be able to make a concession. The main difference, I would say between our proposals 
and the working document, A.1, is the fact that we make provision for the prime minister and 
a cabinet which will have to be approved by parliament. It will not be in the sole discretion of 
the president to appoint the prime minister and the members of the cabinet. It will not be in 
his sole discretion, it will have to be approved by parliament. In other words, that will have to 
discuss and secondly, we make provision or we qualify the powers of the president by 
bringing in the word “on instruction”. It could also be “on advice”. That will not really make any 
difference, it is the same thing. We just have to keep that in mind. 
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CHAIRMAN: We have different perception of what executive office entails. On the other hand 
there is also the question of confusion or maybe leaning towards certain cases where there is 
a coalition government, where I am forced to co-opt other parties, but if you have a clear-cut 
majority like in the UK, and you can appoint the cabinet, people to help you to run the 
country, then I have never seen that you have to go and get permission for that. But on the 
other hand, if we are going to talk about where there is no absolute majority, where you have 
to co-opt and so on, it is slightly a different matter.  
MR RUKORO: I wanted to resolve it in a slightly different way. The president may dissolve 
the National Assembly in, instead of three, we say two ways. The first one is acting soloist, 
article 34(2) (a). My understanding of that is that he can do so in two ways. The first one is, 
for instance, to specify so that there can be no loopholes for abuse, that the president can 
resort to this power in order to resolve a major constitutional crisis which materially affects the 
ability of the government to govern effectively. It is deliberately phrased in a general way 
because we cannot foresee all the types of constitutional crises that may come up. That will 
exclude this thing whereby he can dissolve because it is a good year for him. Secondly, I 
think the president can act under this power for the ordinary dissolution of parliament after 
four, five years when the term of tenure is up. That is the only possibility for him to act under 
this article. The second and final authority under article 48(4) is stipulated in the DTA-draft, is 
what we talked about earlier on, namely the vote of no-confidence by parliament and the 
prime minister advises president accordingly. 
CHAIRMAN: I think that is a solution. There is a proposal that we take that.  
MR BIWA: If we really want to make the judiciary independent, I would suggest that we allow 
the president to nominate a judge, and this nomination should be done in consultation with 
the relevant bodies, the judicial Service Committee, and this must be subjected to the 
approval of parliament by a two-thirds majority. The reason why I am suggesting that this be 
done by a two-thirds majority. The reason why I am suggesting that this be done by a two-
thirds majority in parliament, and if we make it only approval by a simple majority, then that 
judge could be a favourite of one single party. Therefore we must make it by two-thirds 
majority. Only then we can guarantee that man is really independent.  
CHAIMAN: Yes. About honourable Biwa‟s concern, I think we shouldn‟t think about our own 
current situation only. We should also think of prosperity. Maybe another way is also to 
determine how long they are going to be appointed for that they have security. Is it for life, for 
so many years, so that they know? 
MR KATJIOUONGUA: For life they have got to be independent, so that they know they might 
be removed. 
DR TJITENDERO: I agree in principle with a life appointment of the judges and people in the 
court, however, I was going to make a proviso that for the first group of the who would be 
appointed, because we are all new, that there be a term, x-number of years, and upon 
conclusion of that, in case we find some ………, that there will be necessary and legitimate 
changes at a cycle of five years, the same time as the Assembly and thereafter life 
appointments for the supreme court judges.  
MR RUKORO: I differ a bit from my honourable comrade here. I think if you do not want to 
send the wrong signal at the wrong time to some important quarters of our population, then 
you will not talk about appointing judges for x-period of time, and have some kind of court to 
review this things and stuff like that. I think what you need really here is to make 
appointments on merit and the merit, of course, will be the subject matter of the confirmation 
hearing, and having made the appointments, make them for life. The only grant for removal is 
incompetence. The man or woman has become incompetence or is guilty of gross 
misconduct. These are accepted nations for removing judge, and I think that is what we 
should really agree to and not have trail period within which people will be vetted, because 
one can understand that ideologically, given our situation, we may run in too many problems.  
MR BARNES: I was listening again to my honourable colleague Mr Angula. Before replying to 
his teacher‟s life, I would like to make mention of the following: Normally the same way a 
person is appointed, the same way he can be removed and to maintain the independence of 
the judiciary, a trail period would not be the answer to the problem, because the trail period 
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he would act so favourably to the person that appointed him, that he will pass the test and 
that test needs not to be that he is independent. It will influence his independent judgment. 
DR KATJIVIVI: I am a bit worried about the way we are dealing with an important issue here. 
We are going to inherit judges who have been operating in this country, and I was just 
wondering whether there is a lesson to be learnt in terms of inheriting judges who might be 
seen as operating under conditions whereby they might have been deemed to be… 
MR BARNES: Brainwashed? 
MR RUPPEL: On the wrong side of the struggle. 
DR KATJIVIVI: Not only on the wrong side of the struggle, but are men who are bit older, but 
who have been allowed to continue indefinitely. These are the kind of things we need to 
reflect on so that we begin a clean slate, so that we do not have an individual who is perhaps 
redundant for various reasons.  
MR BARNES: Act in consultation with, subsection (4), “act on advice of the cabinet.” There is 
no other option. In accordance with the principle of the executive presidency, the president – 
and I think we have to in all sincerity think not in terms of the negative experiences from 
Africa and Third World – the principle in an executive head and I think if we go to the extent 
of saying “on the advice of”, as opposed to “in consultation with”, I don‟t know what we are 
doing to ourselves and the future institutions here. I strongly and very humbly oppose. I would 
think that “consultation with” is an executive, practical, conventional decision making 
procedure. I don‟t think, because we are bound by our negative experiences; take stereotypic 
examples from negative quarters. I think we have to be very frank, we are not making this for 
ourselves, quite obviously, and I also want to say that when we are making these decisions, 
we must know that we are not even in the position in which our comrades were in Zimbabwe, 
where our colleagues from Zimbabwe where pointing to Lancaster House. This is a historic 
opportunity we have been given as Namibians to write this constitution ourselves, either to 
mess it up to take in to account our actions that we are taking today, and I am inclined to 
think that we are thinking too much of the immediate environment. “In consultation with” is 
appropriate. 
MR BARNES: We feel that it is important that the president should act on the advice of his 
cabinet, because “in consultation” doesn‟t give a clear direction of cabinet which could 
promote cabinet-harmony, and also it is in line with the checks and balances that we said we 
said was important for the good government function. So, the “in consultation with”, I would 
strike a balance and say the following: “In consultation with and on the advice of”, if that could 
solve the problem. 
MR RUPPEL: Yes, I think the more crucial one, and we are getting bogged down on some 
technicality, the principle is stated in paragraph (2) which is clearly stating the joint exercise. 
It says: “The executive power vests in the Cabinet headed by the president”, and whether you 
say here at the bottom “in consultation with and on advise” doesn‟t make a big difference, 
because the executive function of the government vests in the cabinet headed by the 
president. So it is really splitting hairs, it is not going to make a difference at all. 
MR KATJIONGUA: I tend to agree with Dr Tjitendero here we shouldn‟t make our president 
look like a puppet. I think the word “obliged to in consultation” is important. It looks like he is 
going to take decision after consulting. When you are obliged to somebody, it means you 
must take their advice, and if you say “advice” it is not is not good for his dignity. 
MR RUPPEL: So, we leave it like it is. 
CHAIRMAN: “Except as maybe otherwise provided by law, the president shall, in the exercise 
of his functions, be obliged to act in consultation with the members of the Cabinet.”  
MR BIWA: For the sake of record I would also like to say the following: I would have liked to 
have an explicit requirement that the president is advised by the cabinet and he is obliged to 
follow that advice. Now, as it stands here he is obliged to consult, but he is not obliged to 
follow that advice. He is merely obliged to inform on his actions and he has the right to 
proceed with that action, even if that action is not approved by the cabinet, still he will remain 
within the frame work of the constitution does not say that he must be advised and should 
take that advice. It only says that he is obliged to consult. He can consult and proceed.  
niv
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
37 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: It is proposed that the president is elected by the legislature by way of a 
simple majority and that the president should not hold office for more than two periods in 
office, all in all ten years. 
MR RUPPEL: I think we should look at this. The president and his cabinet should go together 
because they work together. I think it is not good to have a five year life of a parliament and a 
six year life for a president. 
MR MUDGE: We will make this far reaching concession. Don‟t tell us that we are 
unreasonable. 
CHAIRMAN: That is not agreed. The debate is still open on that one, and I really hope you 
will make a far-reaching concession on that one. The other one reads that he will be elected 
directly, not by parliament. There is a suggestion that it must be by the legislature by simple 
majority, by honourable Katjiuongua. Any objections to his amendment? Is it accepted? 
MR GURIRAB: Yes, some of it, some of it not. The suggestion by election by parliament 
obviously should not be acceptable, but the tenure of office is acceptable. I would like to be 
informed as to what the disadvantages are of a president who is directly elected, which is a 
position that I strongly support. Therefore, in conclusion, I want to stick to the position that the 
president must be directly elected by the populace, leaving the doors open for convincing 
arguments for a president who is elected by parliament. 
MR HAMUTENYA: I would like to go back to my position of yesterday and tell a bit more. I do 
have a problem. I believe very firmly in the notion of separation of powers and for that reason 
I seriously have problems to agree to the proposition that the president should be elected by 
the legislature, whether it is single chamber or bicameral, because once you have done that 
you cannot talk about the president as being on par in terms of power-sharing with the 
legislature anymore, because he is an appointee of the legislature. That is my basic problem. 
If you say fine, you don‟t want a president who is directly elected by the whole nation, I would 
still propose the other alternative, d by the whole nation, I would still propose the other 
alternative, you simply has to accept that you are going to have him from the majority party or 
from a coalition of parties which agreed to it together. That way still makes him a ……… 
president and not just a figure-head, because the problem of figure-head, is what we are 
trying to avoid. We want a genuine balance of checks and balances or division of power. So, 
for that reason I am still saying that we had examples in South Africa here. The President of 
South Africa is president by virtue of being the leader of the majority party that won the 
election. I said yesterday if you look at the parliamentary democracies, Great Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada, their executive powers actually reside with the prime 
ministers and he comes into the position by virtue of being the leader of the majority party. So 
therefore I am saying we have two options here and as far as I am concerned these are the 
only options, either you take it that he becomes the presidents whoever leads the majority 
party, or you say he be elected by the electorate of the nation. I am not so strong insisting 
that he should be elected nation-wide. I will accept it if he is the leader of the majority party, 
but I have serious problems to have him elected by parliament. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: I think now we are coming closer to the problem raised by Mr Pretorius, 
because If the president is actually the leader of the majority party and the term of office of 
the president, the national parliament, concur, then it essence it means, and if the president 
also is elected by parliament, it simply means that when his party no longer enjoys the 
majority in parliament, he cannot be elected. I think it follows very clearly. Then, if we have 
the president elected directly, then we must also look into the question of either the president 
being allowed to appoint his own cabinet which might not necessarily be members of 
parliament, or otherwise, as they do in France, you may have the situation where the prime 
minister, who would be appointed by the president, does not come from the party of the 
president. There you have a division of power just like we had with Francois Mitterrand 
and………… in be the leader of the majority party in parliament, then the president may have 
to appoint a prime minister from a party that is not his own. Then it must mean, like in France, 
he cannot appoint another cabinet must be the cabinet of the opposition party that is there. 
That is the way it works, he cannot do anything else. If we are going to have a president 
elected separately, then I think the point by Mr Mudge also comes up, that right now after we 
have finished this constitution, we are going to have another election to elect the president. If 
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he is not elected by the legislature, if he is elected separately, then the implication is that we 
must have another election now to elect the president. So, if we follow the method that we 
talked about before, that the president is elected by the Assembly and this time it happens to 
coincide that the majority party and the president come from the same party, then this is a 
very smooth thing to say he must be elected by the legislature, of which right now the 
majority is SWAPO. So, it is very easy this time. But if we are writing this constitution forever 
then we must be careful to say we want the constitution and independence ready by the 
middle of January and to say the president must be elected directly I think those are the 
implications. 
MR STABY: My mind is orientated at some practical issues with regard to the president by 
the people directly. First of all it would appear to me that if he does receive his mandate 
directly from the people, then he is responsible to the people directly. So, the first question 
that I have is: what is the point of including in our suggestion here the machinery for the 
removal of the president from office? If the president is responsible to the people, then the 
legislature cannot interfere, can it? That seems to me to be the logic of it. If the president is 
responsible directly, having been elected by the people directly, what machinery does exist in 
order to enable the people to impeach him, other than the normal party-political process? I 
am looking for answers.  
MR BIWA: Mr Chairman, I am opposed to the direct election of the president, or I was 
opposed. When entered this chamber for the first time until this afternoon I was opposed to 
the election of the president directly. But after we have built in checks and balances, which I 
think would effectively, my mind has changed somewhat. The main reason why I opposed to 
the direct election of the president is because I don‟t believe that a president, directly elected 
by the electorate, can be controlled by the parliament. There is a serious need that the 
parliament must be controlled by the cabinet and the legislature. But after we have agreed on 
a number of checks and balances intended to keep the president in check, I can agree to the 
direct election of the president, provided I am assured that these checks and balances can 
keep the president in check although he is directly elected. Thank you.  
The question by Mr Hamutenya or his conception of the separation of powers, I think we must 
agree that there are different versions about the separation of powers. We have the American 
system about the separation of powers. The cabinet-system they have in Britain is one 
system about the separation of powers, in the sense that when you have executive 
government in that sense, you have an overlapping sort of powers between the legislature 
and the majority party. The same thing can apply to France. I think here in Namibia we are 
trying to find also our own version how separation of powers can look like, and I think we 
have a duty to look more innovative.  
MR KATJIONGUA: No, the system works this way – I think we have been discussing it from 
yesterday and we seem to be getting nowhere. The fact of the matter is that by election he is 
the leader of the majority party, but even if he alone had 50%, still he must be approved by 
parliament to become chancellor. 
MR KATJIONGUA: All I am saying is that we must have clarity about the method in which we 
elect our president - that is all. The situation we face now, is let‟s agree now, let‟s not argue 
anymore, that this parliament is going to elect the president of the majority party to be the 
president of Namibia. I think the rest of the sorry won‟t help us too much. If you put a 
provision in that after five years the president will be elected by direct vote, that is a different 
matter, then I think you must look in to that, because directly elected ipso facto means the 
president of the majority party and then we are talking about the same thing. 
The reality is that we are going to elect in this parliament within the next month or so the 
president of the majority party to become the president of Namibia, elected by this parliament 
by a simple majority. 
MR RUKORO: The final decision this morning was, and I almost recorded the Chairman 
verbatim, when he concluded the discussion he said “the majority favours acceptance, that is 
clear, but the whole question will be finalized later in view of Mr. Mudge‟s opposition to the 
idea of the nominated members.” So it was deferred. 
DR TJITENDERO: I propose that it be retained.  
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MR MUDGE: I want to record my vote against that for the simple reason, I just want to be 
clear on this one, not because I want to be difficult, but as you will remember, in our party‟s 
presentation in the Assembly we made it very clear even at that stage – and we were not 
even referring to your proposals – that we cannot accept, on principle grounds cannot accept 
appointed members to an elected body. I just want to record that.  
MR MUDGE: Who did that? 
MR RUKORO: I thought you supported it. 
MR MUDGE: No, I rejected it entirely and completely. 
MR RUKORO: My problem is, there are people out there who has certain expertise, 
especially in organized commerce and so on, who can make some sense in this house.  
MR MUDGE: And then must become candidates? 
MR RUKKORO: But the problem is that because we have that expertise, they are not good 
with politics, generally. How we are going to affect the balance in this House if they don‟t 
have the right to vote? Their only contribution is to bring their expertise to the benefit of the 
nation and the president is not going to appoint them because they belong to the ruling party. 
That is why I really urge you in the national in the national interest, MR to simply let this 
provision remain. 
KATJIOUNGUA: I am just wondering how the minority has become the majority all of a 
sudden, Mr Mudge and Mr Hamutenya, because we agreed this morning. I think we should 
retain this provision, as my colleague has just explained and on the basis of proportionality. I 
will have the choice, if I am alone, together with bigger numbers in the national interest.  
I think it will be an insult to 72 members, elected members in this House to go and look for a 
talent outside, to say we are not good enough, we don‟t have the expertise, we have to bring 
in somebody from outside who was not prepared to stand the democratic test. 
CHAIRMAN: The chairman‟s view is that technically none of us were elected, the parties 
were elected and the parties listed us, and some talents were even left out because they 
were no 72. It is a question of principle here. The majority seems to want retention. We must 
be democratic in our outlook. 
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STANDING COMMITTEE ON STANDING RULES AND ORDERS AND INTERNAL 
ARRENGEMENTS (CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS) 
 
WINDHOEK 
 
18 JANUARY 1990 
 
MR PRETORIUS: On a point of order, I just want to ask in general, what is the possibility for our 
legal advisors to sit in, to save time? 
MR RUPPEL: I think we should not have any legal advisors or any other teams here. It will just 
delay the discussions. We have very competent legal advisors here, and I think preparations 
between the parties and their legal advisors should have been concluded before they came in. 
That was the basis on which we working until now and seems to be successful until now. 
MR BARNES: I view this request in this light: If there is any way that any contribution can be 
made to assist any delegation to perhaps expedite the deliberations by his legal advisor being 
afforded observer status at this meeting I think that it could be to the advantage of us finishing 
this constitution possibly much faster than what we are doing now. There is the problem that 
delegations, after they have deliberated here for the day, have to go back to their legal advisors, 
discuss the whole process, even at times when we have to make a concession or something that 
we did not have the time to review. Your legal advisor, within striking distance, is not participating 
in any of the deliberations, it is only observer status he has and it is my considered opinion that it 
could be an advantage to speed up matters and we are all at times guilty that we are not going 
fast as we want to go without making a bad job of the responsibility. I would ask for favourable 
consideration, because the legal advisors are not going to participate, it affords the delegation 
opportunity to be in contact with his legal advisor and it will expedite the deliberation and we won‟t 
be losing anything, because whatever is discussed here is taken over to your legal advisor, 
because there is the confidentiality between the legal advisor and the caucus. I would ask for 
favourable consideration. 
MR ANGULA: I thought this issue was kind of closed. I do sympathize with the situation of ACN in 
the sense that they don‟t have somebody amongst the heavenly lawyers. But for the other 
parties, I do believe we have and I thought wisely – decided that we should take legal advisors 
who will be above our political programmes, who will be neutral and whose advise we should take 
in good faith, because they are not defending a particular political view point. If we are saying that 
the learned gentlemen we have asked to assist us in this task are not doing their job properly, 
then that is a different thing. Once we bring in our personal lawyers here, the lawyers we are 
paying ourselves, they are there to defend our positions. We will have arguments first among 
ourselves as politicians, after that the argument will shift to the lawyers and I don‟t know how far 
we are going to go. I would like to take note that those issues we failed to resolve, we didn‟t fail to 
resolve them because of lack of legal advice. It is basically because of the political nature of 
those issues. Then we can go to the legal opinion. Personally I am satisfied with the kind of 
advice we have been receiving from our learned colleagues whom we have resided to retain here 
in Windhoek. What we have to do as political leaders is to have political courage and political will 
to make decisions on those issues which are of a problematic nature. The interpretation in law 
could be provided to us by our heavenly lawyers. That will help us to make progress. 
MR GURIRAB: Mr Chairman, honourable Comrade Nahas has partly stated my case. I beg to 
differ with the idea of bringing in party lawyers in this committee. Lawyers are among my best 
friends, I myself being a Sotho-lawyer. If there are problematic areas, they do not require legal 
minds; they require political wisdom and courage of us as the substantive drafters of the 
constitution. We have made tremendous progress; I am certainly not dispirited in any way 
whatsoever by the snail-pace that we are now deploying. We just want to be absolutely certain 
that the words reflected on the papers, the decision we take are as much as possible final 
decision, so that we don‟t come back to them. The very fact that we have decided collectively to 
bring in there distinguished lawyers to participate in this committee work is a step in the right 
direction. But we need to flood this committee with additional lawyers who are basically our 
political extensions. I would very much therefore like the committee to continue with the business 
of going over the paper. 
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MR PRETORIOS: I don‟t want the house to be divided, so if there is no consensus I withdraw my 
request. 
MR PRETORIOS: We discussed the problem and is in the case of executive power where we are 
prepared to settle if the executive power is in the president in consultation with his cabinet and he 
should not necessarily be a member of the cabinet, we are also prepared to accept the idea of a 
president elected by the people. But it all depends now on the detail and that is why I am so 
serious to have legal opinion there. So, if we can settle as far as his functions are concerned, we 
are prepared to accept the idea that the president is not a member of the parliament as such; he 
can be elected by the people outside. But then it is very important to us, the whole question of 
impeaching, etc. 
DR TJITENDERO: I sit here and try to imagine the part that we are now to undertake. I venture to 
say, would it be helpful to us and the discussions if we draw a distinction, for the sake of clarity, 
that we say let‟s first address ourselves to the transitional provisions, because we have two 
issues that are not related but ought not to be discussed in the same function. First the given. The 
given is the present structure, and then maybe if we reach an agreement on that, which is 
transitional, then we can go on with the subsequent more standing and continuous constitutional 
provision. I was just trying to see whether we could make that distinction. If we could make that 
distinction it will be clearer, because we can discuss that and then proceed.  
MR PRETORIOUS: Just for clarity on that, otherwise all the members will now talk about it. I am 
talking about the eventual position now. For the transitional position we think there must be an 
electoral college. It cannot be the National Assembly, because the National Assembly also 
consists of the six members, although they have no vote. So there must be a defined electoral 
college. 
MR STABY: I think we ought to bear in mind, I have no problem with the suggestion, that the only 
difference between the transitional and the ultimate, final situation concerning the president is the 
question of electing him. That is the only difference. The functions and the powers of the 
president ought to be the same in the transitional period and the final period. Therefore I would 
suggest that we deal with the functions and powers of the president and leave aside – in 
compliance with Dr Tjitendero request – the question of election. Afterwards, having settled the 
powers and responsibilities of the president, the question of elections can be dealt with relatively 
easily as far as the first phase is concerned. The second phase is different story. But the key of 
the whole thing is his power, the checks and balances. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: Mr Chairman, I had an opportunity to reflect over this matter since we left 
here last night, and as far as possible to consult with my colleagues by hotline – whatever it 
means – and our feeling is simply the following I hope all of us will talk straight on these things: 
Firstly, we hope all of us will agree, establish totally, unambiguously, that we agreed up to the 19th 
about what stands in the report by the rapporteur as well as which was used as the basis by the 
lawyers to draft the constitution as it stands, that there was agreement to that effect. There is no 
ambiguity about it. Why I am saying so is that if we use that as a point of departure and then we 
want to change what we agreed upon, we must proceed from the proposition that we agreed on 
what the position was, because that is important for me. Point number two: We only have two 
oppositions in reality. One is to keep to the agreement that we made, that we talked about 
yesterday and we see how we go about to independence and, if possible, to the next five years. 
But then I think in considering whatever option, we must strictly keep ourselves within the ambit, 
the parameters of the 1982 Principles, and they say certain definite things and I will never agree 
to any deviation from those fundamental principles, because then I will be doing totally illegal. 
That is option one, we stick to that agreement to see how we handle it as we go forward, or if we 
change them we must say do and open a new debate with possibly agreements, new package 
understandings and things like that, around that particular agreement. In its present form it has 
certain problems and we must agree to change it and then we see how we handle it by having a 
debate on how do we handle that agreement. The second option is simply that we write a 
constitution and stop there. The constitution, as the principle says, Section 3, will determine the 
organization and powers of all levels of government. Then we simply do that in the constitution 
and then call for national election. Then one we had was simply to elect an assembly to write a 
constitution and then we finish that task and put a full stop, period, and have another national 
election to elect all the levels of government, or to elect the president, the parliament, the regional 
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and municipal councils in one election, not separate elections, on the clear understanding that the 
masses, the people be told that now we only agreed to write a constitution but the other matters 
will be taken to the people for discussion. I don‟t think we have any other options. Otherwise we 
will be sitting here waiting time. I know I fared very badly in the election, but I think when matters 
of this nature is at stake, there is no choice but to go to the people to decide the future of this 
country in a democratic order. That is where I stand. 
MR KATJIONGUA: The agreement is that the first president for the five years will be elected by 
parliament; he will be a member of parliament or will sit in parliament. This is what we agreed in 
these papers, that is the understanding of myself and if I am wrong you can tell me. I don‟t think 
we talked about the possibility of finding somebody else from outside parliament to elect him. If 
you want to change that you can do so. And then everything that stands in this paper here is, I 
think, the basis of what we have agreed upon, the powers of the president and the rest of the 
story. 
CHAIRMAN: It is true, agreement was reached, but Mr Mudge spoke about the practical situation. 
He said: “For practical reasons we have agreed for the first five years. Five years. Let us 
face it that unless we want to score points and I think we have passed that stage...” and he went 
on. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: How does that differ from what I am saying?  
CHAIRMAN: I deliberately asked what the agreement is. We seem to have misunderstanding that 
is why we are wasting time. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: No, I am not wasting time. Mr Chairman, don‟t say I am wasting time. 
CHAIRMAN: I said “we”. The chairman has the right to put the decision here. I asked what has 
been agreed upon, whether we all understand one another. I don‟t know whether we understand 
the agreement and it says that for practical reasons the first president will be elected by the 
legislature and that we are going to convert this constituent Assembly into the National Assembly 
- that the president will sit in the Assembly. Do I summarise it properly? 
MR ANGULA: I don‟t remember a discussion about whether the president should be part of the 
National Assembly. I don‟t remember it. You will remember that we adjourned I did actually state 
the same position that my understanding is that we don‟t have a problem with the election of the 
first president. The only thing we have to decide upon is whether this president should be part of 
the National Assembly, and then I said that in my view that would be contrary to what Mr Mudge 
was saying the other day, that the president must be guardian of the doctrine of separation 
powers. We have to separate powers. That is what I said. So, I don‟t remember at this stage that 
we talked about whether the president must be part of the National Assembly, but the election 
yes. 
MR MUDGE: I must guard against being quoted incorrectly, it has happened before and I don‟t 
want it to happen again. You have the minutes there, you read them yesterday and there could 
be no doubt whatsoever that what I suggested is that at least we have agreed that this body will 
become the government for the first five. As far as the president is concerned, I pointed out that it 
of no practical significance right now, whatever the position might be in the future, the first 
president will be elected by parliament and that because of that practical situation, we must 
provide in the constitution that the president will be elected by parliament, not as a temporary 
measure, as a provision in the constitution, and I said if during the five years we come to the 
conclusion that this is not really what we want, then we can amend the constitution by two-thirds 
majority. I think I made it abundantly clear that I did not suggest that this must be a temporary 
measure. If it works it can stay like that. I don‟t have the minutes here, but you have them there, 
and I remember that somebody suggested that it must be a temporary measure and I asked “why 
temporary?” Can I just have a copy of the minutes and I can read it to you. So, as far as I am 
concerned, we have decided that the president will be elected by parliament. There is no doubt 
about that. We can change it. I said yesterday if you think it is necessary, if you give good enough 
reasons we can reconsider the position, but I think the instructions, the briefing by our lawyers, Mr 
Ruppel and Mr Rukoro, to the lawyers who must draft the constitution was correct when they said 
it was agreed that the first president shall be elected by a simple majority of the legislature, 
constituted as an electoral college for that purpose. But it is not correct in the sense that it was 
not meant to be a temporary measure. It was a final decision which I suggested could be 
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amended in future should parliament decide to do so by a two-thirds majority. I don‟t want to be 
quoted incorrectly.  
CHAIRMAN: I never had any intention to misquote anybody. I was reading the minutes. If you say 
I left out some part, that is a point, but don‟t say I misquoted you because was reading. 
MR GURIRAB: We have to face up to what we are heading for. It is a matter on which we can 
beat our chest and differ. I seriously question the integrity of the minutes on this one, that there 
was an agreement. You can read it and read it. But they will not convince my recollection of 
SWAPO‟s position on the matter. In all our documents which we introduced, either in the 
Constituent Assembly, or at different stages here in this committee, our position, the most 
democratic position, is that head of state of the public of Namibia must be elected by the people 
by popular vote. That is the method. For all the things that we have ascribed to him, embodying 
as it does the national consensus, the will of all the people, that person, more than any other 
public official, must carry the will of the people. That remains the solid unquestionable position of 
SWAPO. So, there you have it on the table, honourable Chairman. If that would mean that we 
would reopen the discussion, so be it. If it means that we must vote on it, so be it. At this point I 
am not really, in this particular issue, interested in us going back, wasting time on what the minute 
said. SWAPO‟s position is that the president of the republic must be elected by popular vote and I 
shall come back to it for much as that will be required. Member of this House says you can read 
the minutes for as long as you want, but it will not convince me to change recollection, is it a point 
to take minutes, if whatever the minutes say will not change the subjective position of a member? 
Is it a point to take minutes? What we doing? 
MRS ITHANA: On a point of order. Comrade Chairman, the previous speaker did not raise a point 
of order, he is raising an argument.  
MR GURIRAB: The point is in response to my intervention. In proper democratic decision-making 
procedure minutes are taken and at some point the body has an opportunity to go over the 
minutes and correct them as being a true reflection of what was decided, and thereafter the body 
discusses matter arising from the minutes. We did not have that exercise in this body, so I believe 
that I am quite in order. If I have an opportunity to go through the minutes, I would have 
responded there and then, but they did not reflect the true meaning of the discussion that 
transpired. So we are perfectly in order. If there is place for appreciate our collective and 
individual contributions. 
MR KATJIONGUA: As far as I know, and I have also participated in many meetings, the minutes 
that are taken by hand come for discussion, read, corrected, amended and then they are signed 
as true reflection of the proceedings of the previous meeting. I am not so sure whether verbatim 
records taken by machine are also correct in that manner before they become true. 
CHAIRMAN: Honourable members, throughout the discussions we have been questioning 
decisions or misunderstanding of it. It is not the first time this happened. We have been coming 
back and saying “I don‟t think this is what I said”. Firstly, verbatim minutes are minutes, there are 
mistakes obviously, but they are verbatim. They reflect what has been discussed. One member is 
charging the secretariat here that SWAPO‟s aren‟t properly reflected. That is his opinion, because 
many people have been saying thing about what we have discussed previously. We changed the 
positions every time from that I thought was the understanding. We didn‟t challenge that. I have 
been shocked sometimes that even when we are talking about the lawyers we sent to South 
Africa we said things that were not professional and the minutes were there, but we disagree with 
the minutes. So we have been doing that throughout, and if we really have to continue in the spirit 
that we started with, let‟s allow democracy to prevail. We have been allowing everybody to talk 
what he wanted to say, and if we are going to limit the language-usage and so on, then we are 
limiting our time to establish this constitution. That is why I have been deliberately allowed people 
to talk. Some could been ruled out of order, but I said it is good if we talk. Can we continue in that 
same spirit and talk and change situations if need be. As honourable Katjiuongua said, we 
agreed, but if we to reopen it, reopen it. 
MR HAMUTENYA: The issue we are discussing is the procedure of electing the president which 
we want to inscribe in the constitution, and maybe there was a problem of confusing present 
situation and what we wanted the constitution to say in the long term. It is not correct that we 
agreed that the president will be elected by the National Assembly for ever, or in the constitution. 
I remind that we left this hanging in the air – and I want to say that again – before we agreed that 
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for the next five years for the president-to-be that will be the case. I want to repeat what I asked 
that we were not prepared to accept. I even offered an alternative position, it was not challenged. 
That if we have a problem with a president popular elected, then we have second-best, to 
automatically have the leader of the majority party as the president. That position was submitted. 
I was not ruled out of order by anybody, I don‟t remember that, and I sure the minutes will not say 
it was challenged and dismissed. It was not. 
So, because we have always had a problem with the president being elected by the parliament, a 
so-called parliamentary president, we gave examples and I said that I don‟t see how, to my 
recollection it is in Lebanon where the president is elected by the parliament. Otherwise 
parliament should simply confirm the obvious and I gave examples. I don‟t remember anybody 
coming back to refute that position. So, that was another position which was left hanging. So, 
many things were left hanging if others concluded that we agreed that the president now and in 
future will be elected by parliament, then we had a serious misunderstanding and we now have to 
correct those misunderstandings. Our position has been – and I think it is still – that he is either 
popular elected or he comes automatically, as a matter of fact, from the majority party. Again the 
example that it did not make any sense in the case of South Africa with the last elections that 
somebody was going to put up another candidate other than F W de Klerk. So, it was obvious the 
situation where there is no separate election for the president, but the mandate of the people was 
given to the National Party of South Africa and automatically its leader became the president, so 
why not take that option if we are so religiously opposed to a directly elected president. But about 
him being elected by the parliament, he is just a puppet of the parliament - that we had a problem 
with, and we had a problem then and now. So let‟s address this question now. If we are going to 
make a compromise, fine. Threats of a second election, fine. We can go back, nobody is afraid of 
elections. If this is the bottom-line for others, we can accept that too. 
DR TJIRIANGE: I want to endorse what comrade Hamutenya said. I just want to add that by 
saying that what the honourable Mudge is saying is true, he said so, and what Comrade Hidipo is 
saying is true, he said so. If we would have taken our position to be the agreement, it was going 
to be wrong. So it is wrong for the honourable to take his address to this body as the agreement. 
What we agreed on however, was the election of the president, that we did, and I left this 
honourable House clear in my mind that we have agreed on the election of president, and that we 
have stuck to our position that subsequent presidents should be elected by direct elections. I 
understood the arguments by others, but I don‟t remember us having said all the presidents, now 
and in the future, should be elected by parliament. That is simply not true, it is not correct. It was 
the position of people, but we agreed on the first president, and this is reflected in the reflecting 
given by our lawyers to the heavenly lawyers. I think our lawyers who went to Johannesburg 
understood us properly and they just did that. That actually underlines the correctness of my 
understanding. Because stood it properly to our lawyers. So, let us just go ahead and discuss 
now. 
MR MUDGE: I do not want to argue about the minutes, we have them here, and anybody reading 
the minutes will agree that the decision was taken and any neutral or impartial person will agree 
that we have reached consensus that this constitution will make provision for the election of the 
president by parliament. Of course it was left open, it was agreed that this provision may be 
amended in future. It was not the understanding that will be amended now, but it was left open. It 
was agreed, it was understood that any provision of this constitution can be amended by a two-
thirds majority in terms of the future constitution. I have no doubt about that. But Sir, I also agree 
that there could have been a misunderstanding, I don‟t know all I know is that we have discussed 
the whole constitution, the rest of the constitution on the understanding that the president will be 
elected by parliament. That was the understanding. In words, if we change this, then we start 
from scratch. Then we will have to discuss the constitution again article by article, because that 
was the understanding. Another thing that worries me a little, Mr Gurirab said that it SWAPO‟s 
position that the president must be elected by the people. If he had the opportunity to read the 
minutes he would have objected. I have a problem now. Is there a possibility that there might be 
many other agreements reached, that if members now read the minutes, they might come back 
and say they do not agree? When is an agreement an agreement? I just want to make that clear.   
But Sir, why are we here? We are here to reach an agreement on the constitution. Why then each 
other about technicalities? I think that we must ultimately reach an agreement, but let us only 
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accept that if we go through a whole constitution and then we find that we disagree on one point 
which is right at the beginning of the constitution, then we also have to accept the consequences, 
in other words, then we must also be free to say this is the DTA‟s position.  In other words, we 
disagree fundamentally and we have to start all over again and discuss the principles.  But Sir, 
we will have to report back and we are also responsible to report to our supporters and our 
people and we don‟t want to be blamed for the fact that we have to delay the process now.  I just 
want to make that clear and I am sure that you will also understand that we have informed our 
people that we are making progress, we have informed them that we have reached consensus on 
the position of the president, amongst others, and now we have to go and inform them that 
apparently there is a misunderstanding, apparently we haven‟t reached consensus.  We stand by 
the proposal as was apparently interpreted by the rapporteurs and by the lawyers who drafted the 
constitutions.  I must say I am a little confused now. 
CHAIRMAN:  Yes, the point is, the day that we started after a big argument about the instructions 
of the lawyers gave to the heavenly lawyers, I am the one who said we are going to paragraph by 
paragraph.  We seem to have agreed in the past and we deny.  Therefore, while the lawyers are 
sitting are sitting here we are going to go paragraph by paragraph so that we can agree in their 
presence and what have agreed to we will not come back to, because we have been coming 
back to things already agreed on. The preamble, for instance, we all agreed on it the first day.  
We have discussed it already three times over and over again.  We have been doing that with 
everything else.  I said we have to go point by point, so that in their presence we agree and they 
take it down and we don‟t come again.  But yesterday and today we have been doing that.  We 
went through the things already agreed upon over and over again, debating them afresh. 
MR KATJIUONGUA:  Only a question to Mr Mudge.  Could he just clear up, did we agree that the 
first president will be appointed or elected by parliament, and if that is the basis of his draft, then 
we are talking about the same thing.  About future presidents after five years, I think that is a 
different matter.  We can say, even in the constitution, that the first president elected by 
parliament, the next president by direct vote, but that is a matter after five years.  We are dealing 
with the constitution to finish it now, to declare the country independent. Can we divide those two 
things, a future president and a president now?  We want the president we have now to be taken 
out of being a member of parliament, out of sitting of parliament, out of this arrangement, to be 
something else also right now, because I think it is a point of material difference. 
CHAIRMAN:  That is a very concrete proposal. 
MR MUDGE:  Wasn‟t that the case only that the constitution makes provision for the election of a 
president by the parliament? 
MR KATJIUONGUA:  This one? 
MR MUDGE:  No, The president, but of course it can be amended.  Let me say this just to get 
clarity.  You say we must refer to the minutes let me just read two sentences: “Mr Rukoro:  The 
proposal is that the president shall be elected by the legislature acting as an electoral college.” 
That was the proposal by Mr Rukoro.  I repeat:  “The proposal is that he president shall be 
elected by the legislature acing as an electoral college.” Mr Ruppel:  For the first period and then 
we leave it open. Mr Mudge:  Why should we leave it open?”  
And then I explained and then a member said, yes, I second it” and then it was agreed that the 
constitution can be amended in future and it can still be amended, there is nothing preventing the 
government to amend the constitution. But the agreement was that in terms of this constitution, 
the president will be elected by parliament. Mr Chairman, if we want to amend that in future we 
could do that, but then one thing we must also accept, when we amend the constitution as far as 
the election of the president is concerned, there will be proposals to amend other provisions in 
the constitution, because we cannot divorce.  
CHAIRMAN: Honourable Mudge is using the wrong word to say “amend”. We didn‟t adopt it, we 
are amending it, we have doing that since yesterday from page 1. We have been discussing and 
changing things. So we aren‟t going to amend, but you are saying other things are going to 
affected in future when we go on to change. But we have a constitution, we are amending. 
MR MUDGE: So you want to amend it now. 
CHAIRMAN: No, what have we been doing since yesterday? Since yesterday we have been 
discussing from article 1 up to article 27, changing Things. We have been discussing throughout 
since yesterday, we changed things. Is that amending? 
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MR CHASKALSON: Mr Chairman, if you invite me to say something, there is something I would 
like to say, and that is we were not given any records when we prepared the draft constitution. 
We didn‟t have the record of the debate. We were given the written instructions, and the written 
instructions, when it deals with this, say: “To add paragraph (2), which contains the provision for 
the direct election, the first president shall be elected by the National Assembly.” That was the 
written instruction we got. I do not have my notes of my discussions and my colleagues may 
remember what had happened. I think we were told, but I do not have any notes of those 
discussion and my colleagues will have to recollect exactly what was said, was that there had 
been no other agreement reached, and if that is so, we could do nothing other provide on what 
had been agreed there, and I don‟t remember any other discussions, but I must ask my 
colleagues as to whether they have any notes or not. I do so only because it was mentioned that 
we were giving effect to agreements, and if you look at the written instructions, it is simply says 
the first shall be elected. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: Don‟t you think that in this case, what stands on page 26 is not accurate? 
Then you should have said the first president should be elected by the National Assembly 
ADV CHASKALSON: I agree with that absolutely, and how it emerged after that, my colleague. 
But we were not given the debate and the suggestion that we construed the debate or the written 
papers in a particular fashion is not correct, because we didn‟t have that. But I should ask my 
colleague to express their recollection of what happened. I do not have my own notes with me 
here. 
PROF WIECHERS: Yes, I agree with my colleague, it was Clearly understood by us, and we 
were instructed, this committee and the Assembly, or your committee decided that the first 
president be elected in this way, and then in drafting and discussing it, my problem was and our 
problem: do you write into a constitution the first president be elected in this way and leave it, and 
if it is not amended, then the whole executive will just fall into a black hole. So it was a question of 
drafting, unless there was a clear decision on how the second election will take place, and that 
wasn‟t there. So we did what we had been asked, this is your first constitution of the National 
Assembly this is your first president and we wrote in the margin in Afrikaans: “Huidige een.” 
MNR MUDGE: That the way you were briefed, that is correct, it is in here, but that is not the 
decision.  
CHAIRMAN: Honourable members, we have been changing things, why do we get bogged 
down? Why don‟t we go ahead as honourable Katjiuongua said that if we are going to change, we 
have been doing that throughout? 
MR BARNES: Listening to the discussions here, I come to the conclusion that the point in dispute 
is really: did we agree that the first president shall be elected by simple majority of the legislature, 
constituted as an electoral college for that purpose, as was drafted and reported by the 
rapporteurs and signed by the rapporteurs on the 20th December 1989?  If that is correct, if that is 
actually factually correct, grammatically correct, then we have to either accept that situation or 
accept that we made an agreement and we want to change the agreement.  My honourable 
colleague, Mr Gurirab, has placed this decision in dispute.  If he is still firm on the dispute that he 
does not accept that such a decision has been taken unanimously, I would very much like to 
hear.  It is absolutely correct, as you put it, that we have been changing as we went along.  I think 
that was the object of the exercise to draft a constitution.  If, as the honourable Mr Gurirab said, 
that SWAPO‟s bottom line is a president elected by the people, then I am sure the honourable 
member will concede that we are then changing the decision that we took about the first 
president.  This is the point that I feel is relative in solving the misunderstanding. I would clearly 
like to hear, if that is SWAPO‟s bottom line, then they accept something has been agreed, 
because it is on paper by the rapporteurs and also so reported and also so reported to the 
experts.  Let‟s first start and say that we want to change that.  It is absolutely in line with your 
ruling and what you have been trying to explain, that even the preamble has been changed, 
perhaps consistently.  If that is the case then we have a point of departure to discuss.   
CHAIRMAN:  Yes, that is the agreement. 
Mr BARNES:  If you will allow me the first president will be elected and that will be drafted into a 
constitution, and that all subsequent presidents will be elected on the change of the constitution 
that is decided by the National Assembly. 
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CHAIRMAN:  The confusion is there, that is where the difference comes. Some are saying they 
agreed that the first one will be elected by the Assembly; there is no question about that, no 
debate about that. They are now saying they didn‟t understand that to mean the subsequent ones 
are going to be elected the same way too.  That is where the dispute is and the lawyers are also 
saying they didn‟t get the instruction that way, but in drafting, according to Prof Wiechers, they 
took the subsequent ones instead of the present one. 
MR RUKORO:  I think we have a problem and we are really busy wasting a lot of time.  It is clear 
that we are entertaining divergent opinions as to our recollections of what really was decided on 
this particular question, and my own recollected is more or less as stated by Mr Mudge, that on 
the question of subsequent presidents, at best that question was left open; that the only thing on 
which we reached firm agreement was the election of the first president and that the question of 
subsequent presidents was not addressed.  At best it was left open, and I think that kind of 
construction is consistent with the fact that by saying the first president was to be elected by 
parliament, does not for instance rule out the possibility that subsequent presidents can equally 
be elected by parliament, and in the same breath it does not, by necessary implication, suggest 
that all subsequent presidents must be elected by a different mode.  That is why I feel that either 
way this question really was left open.  
Because of our disagreements on this question I think let‟s be practical in the sense that we 
agree to disagree on what we agreed upon last time, and in the spirit suggested by the Chairman 
here, to all intents and purposes what we have been doing from Tuesday was to reopen basically 
each and every article for discussion.  Therefore I really feel that on a practical level, continuing 
this debate on what was agreed will lead us nowhere.  Let us simply accept that we disagree on 
that point, our recollections on that point. 
CHAIRMAN:  The member is disputing, we must let people talk.  That is the only way to get 
somewhere and then we disagree tomorrow. 
MR RUKORO:  And that even if we are going to read the minutes, we are going to dispute the 
minutes.  That seems to be also clear now.  So, against that background I want to make a 
concrete motion, that simply close this discussion on trying to agree on what we agreed upon last 
time, and secondly, that we discussion this question and all other. 
Mr HAMUTENYA:  I think the truth of the matter has been summed up by honourable Rukoro, 
and I don‟t think anybody can say any more than what he has said.  He said that we are locked in 
a disagreement and no amount of repetition of one‟s position will change the fact that we are 
disagreeing. So, he is saying that we agree that we disagree. So, therefore, on procedural issues 
we have now to agree whether we are accepting what has been proposed by honourable Rukoro 
that we stop repeating and stating positions.  If need be, let‟s vote, let‟s vote on the proposal to 
continue repeating ourselves or to start afresh and make new proposal and resolve afresh the 
issue.  I am therefore seconding the motion of Mr Rukoro.  
Mr KATJIUONGUA:  I just want to add something to my idea, so that when you are going to 
adjourn you can take that into account.  First of all, I think the Mrs Ithana is right in a sense.  Out 
of all of us here two colleagues, Mr Gurirab and Mr Hamutenya, say that we did not agree that 
even the first president will be elected by parliament.   
CHAIRMAN:  they are not saying that. 
Mr KATJIUONGA:  You say for now or forever.  That is what you said. 
MR HAMUTENYA:  No, I never said that. 
MR KATJIUONGA:  The first one was agreed. 
MR HAMUTENYA:  yes, I said on the next score I agree with Mr Mudge. 
PROF KERINA:  I have been trying to trace the beginning of the discussions with regard to the 
constitutional draft before us up to the time when it was referred to the attorneys, and the product 
that we now have before us.  Mine is just a humble appeal.  We have travelled a road to be here, 
and I think as a newcomer to the discussions I am very honoured to be part of the spirit that has 
been demonstrated by all the parties and all the representatives of the various parties in this 
committee.  I have listened very carefully and sensitively to the reservations, to the 
disagreements, to the agreements and to the disagreements of the agreements, and I think finally 
we are at the point where we have to find a solution to what we have been discussing this 
morning.  I don‟t think there are serious differences.  I think the test relating to the president is 
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very clear and I would like to appeal to all of us to agree that the first president be elected the 
National Assembly as stated in this draft.   
CHAIRMAN:  The draft doesn‟t say “first”.  It says:  “the president shall be elected by the National 
Assembly. “ Do we therefore understand this refers to the first president?  That cannot be. 
Mr TJIRIANGE:  what if we can go about it this way. I would just like to amplify by adding that the 
first president will be elected by the National Assembly. However, all the subsequent presidents 
will be elected by direct election.  Then you stop there and continue.   
MR BIWA:  I am not taking the floor to offer a solution; I merely want to state our position in 
regard to this issue under discussion.  Unfortunately some of the things I wanted to state were 
overtaken by events; therefore I will confine myself to those things that keep within the framework 
of what we have agreed upon.  But I would like to state that it is the feeling of our caucus that we 
stick to the agreement which is reflected in the draft, namely that the president will be elected by 
the National Assembly and that he will be a member of the National Assembly.  But in the spirit of 
what we have decided to do now, I would like to state that we – and that is the feeling of 
everybody – are prepared to go along with an arrangement or a provision where the president is 
elected directly by popular vote, provided that the powers conferred upon the president and the 
limitations put to the exercise of this powers are not affected in any way.  Secondly, provided that 
parliament has the power to impeach the president and I think that is provided for in the 
constitution, and we would like to agree well in advance, while on this issue, that we will allow the 
parliament to impeach the president.  Thirdly, there should be a provision in the constitution 
empowering the president to address parliament and giving the members of parliament that 
power to question the president.   
Mr MUDGE:  I don‟t want to make a suggestion nor a proposal, I am not going to take that risk 
again, but before we take a decision this time, then I think there must be absolute clarity exactly 
what do we decided or what we have decided.  What I want to know, the honourable member Mr 
Tjiriange said that we amend this provision to say that the first president will be elected by 
parliament, subsequent presidents will be elected by the people.  Is that the only amendment?  
Will the rest of the agreements or the proposals or whatever remain the same or will it have 
consequences as far as the rest of the constitution is concerned?  In other words, does that mean 
that when I say yes and get to the next article, then the honourable member will say “but Mr 
Mudge you agreed that the president will be elected directly and because of that you will have to 
agree now that there be an amendment of this article as well, if that is the case, then I propose 
that we first discuss the whole chapter and then we can take a decision.  I just don‟t want any 
more misunderstandings to arise.  
CHAIRMAN:   Could I just also say since Tuesday we have been discussion every sentence. So, 
do you mean the same will apply even if you agree now?  When we are coming to article 9 we 
have to discuss it again and say yes or not.  We have been doing that throughout. 
MR MUDGE:  That means that we will now start from scratch and discuss the whole constitution.   
CHAIRMAN:  we have been doing that.  What have we been doing since Tuesday?  This is what 
we have been doing. That is my problem.  When I start the meeting I said now we are reopening 
the whole thing and since we are disagreeing on decisions I said:  let‟s go over it in the presence 
of these three gentlemen, so that when we decide on a thing, nobody is going to say “I didn‟t 
agree”: so that the minutes will take decisions properly this time, because I …blame for not 
recording things properly. 
CHAIRMAN:  Can we summaries the decision by one question? If we are going to do that, the 
concomitant other action is voting.  If I have to register a decision and there is a deadlock, I have 
to put it to the vote.  The decision now is that the first president will be elected by the National 
Assembly and that the subsequent President will be elected by direct vote, by the people. 
MR MUDGE: In all fairness, can you expect us to say yes without knowing what the powers of the 
directly elected president will be? 
CHAIRMAN: You asked me and I said we will go over it. 
MUDGE: No, it is not as easy as that. You will say: “Mr Mudge, you have agreed that the 
president will be elected directly” when I complain about the powers, and I said I would have 
supported this if the president was not elected by them. I think we must look at the president, we 
can take a decision, but at the end the whole chapter must be accepted as a chapter. You cannot 
discuss a constitution point by point, it is not possible. 
Un
ive
r i
ty 
of 
Ca
p
To
wn
49 
Persuasion as a Social Heuristic: A Rhetorical Analysis of the making of the Constitution of Namibia 
 
CHAIRMAN: Why are you doing it? So, there is no problem, we can accept it. The proposal is 
that before I can accept that other things are going to be affected, so he is proposing that we 
discuss the whole chapter on presidency. Fine. 
MR MUDGE: Because I want to put, for instance, a question at this point in time: The honourable 
member Dr Tjiriange proposed that the president be a member of parliament… 
CHAIRMAN: But I thought we are discussing the presidency now, the whole chapter including his 
participation. 
MR MUDGE: In that case again, I don‟t want to waste the time of the committee – we have now a 
ball-game, an entirely new ball-game, because we are now not properly prepared for a new ball-
game, and that again we take decisions before noon and come back tomorrow and say we do not 
agree with that. We might go back to our lawyers… 
CHAIRMAN: Wasn‟t there a decision that I must summaries so that we take it as a decision? 
MR MUDGE: No, Mr Chairman, we are not allowed to bring our lawyers in here. Whatever we 
discuss now will be a new ball-game and we have to properly consult and properly consider. 
CHAIRMAN: I have to propose that we adjourn indefinitely, because I do see there is filibustering 
going on. There is new information from lawyers, and I see there is filibustering, there is no 
goodwill and therefore I feel we must adjourn indefinitely. 
MR MUDGE: Mr Chairman, if there was no goodwill we would have insisted that we stick to the 
minutes. The goodwill on our side is proved by the fact that we say fine, let‟s re-discuss the thing. 
But now we are starting afresh, we are starting from the beginning unprepared. 
CHAIRMAN: Could I just ask a question, what have we been doing from Tuesday on? From 
Tuesday on we have been going through this paper afresh. 
MR KATJIONGUA: We are all entitled to our opinions, but the way I look at this thing, I don‟t want 
to take responsibility for any mess about this whole constitutional process and I think we must all 
be careful. Each party here should behave responsibly, that we don‟t try to throw the blame 
around should things go wrong. So, I think we have accepted, I don‟t see a fundamental problem 
if we say the decision we took previously have the first president elected by parliament. Then 
there were arguments whether future presidents will be elected by parliament. Some say it was 
not accepted that future presidents will be elected by parliament. Now we have a bit of a problem. 
I think my immediate concern is the election of the first president by parliament and there the 
feeling is the future presidents will be elected directly. Then I feel we must also add to that, that 
since we are now discussing a president elected by assembly this time and the powers of future 
presidents who will be elected directly, then you see there is a problem there. Therefore, when 
we are discussing the powers of the president here, I think we should take into account those two 
periods and decide how we define the powers here, because the president elected by parliament 
is accountable to parliament in so many ways, and there president elected directly is not 
accountable to parliament. There is that type of distinction. It means that when we discuss the 
powers of the other institution we are going to have two elections in future, for parliament and for 
the president. I think it is implied so and I think that falls within the ambit of section (3) and (4) of 
the 1982 principles. I feel we should discuss this thing, we agree in that fashion, and we discuss 
this paper one by one. Then you must understand that when I am going to discuss, I am going to 
discuss having in mind that this affects all issues across the bar. But you can start with section 1, 
the president; I don‟t think it makes a difference.  
MR ANGULA: Yes, I would like to get us out of the confusion, that as long as there are 
parliaments, and as long as you say that the power ultimately rests with the people, whatever 
president we are going to have will have to be accountable to parliament in one way or another. It 
is a question of degree we are talking about. I mean, how do you pass a budget? You control the 
president‟s power through the budget, for example. If you think that a certain arm of the 
government is performing badly, you can say “since we want to curtail their activities we must not 
give them much money.” So there are many ways to control the president. But I have no difficulty 
with what Mr Mudge is saying. Why don‟t we go article by article? I think what we are trying to do 
here is to establish in terms of the division of power and checks and balances, is to establish the 
distance of the…between the president and the cabinet, the president and the National 
Assembly, the president and the judiciary and all these kinds of things. These are the things we 
are trying to establish by way of creating the necessary balances among these powers. So, why 
can‟t we go article, then by article, then whatever fears you can bring. But I understood that we 
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are doing here, talking about the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, we are trying to 
establish the necessary balance. I thought this is the operating thing among these three things. If 
we can go article by article I think we should get somewhere. If we can go article by article I think 
we should get somewhere. When you have a concern you raise it, when you need to go and 
consult your lawyer. Let us agree to what honourable Tjiriange has suggested and let us go to the 
next articles until we come to the end of the president and see whether there are any problems. 
DR TJIRIANGE: I think we will need guidance. I thought that we have reached an agreement. If 
we are going to take the floor again to reopen the discussion, then I would inscribe my name to 
speak again. The threat is being issued that it is a new ball-game. What does it mean, the threat 
that even after we have agreed here some delegations are going back to their lawyers? Does it 
mean that then we have to come back again to things that we have discussed? So, if there is an 
agreement I propose that humbly, but in all earnestness that we get to the paper go through the 
work as we have been doing. If that is not what we are here for, then let us have a discussion, 
because we are going to continue asking for the floor and state the obvious. When we get to the 
right point dealing with powers of the president, we will look at it in relation to the assembly and 
the judiciary. We are just on the first page of the whole thing. So, if we are going to take the floor 
and issue threats, then I really want to make a substantive statement. I am in your hands, 
honourable chairman. 
CHAIRMAN: I have said it a hundred times now, that we have been doing what honourable 
Nahas is saying to go article by article. That is why we are now on page 26. Can we go ahead 
and do that? Article 28(2).  
MR RUKORO: I assume that the suggestion by honourable member Biwa is still on the floor, that 
the first president be elected by the National Assembly and subsequent ones…. 
DR TJIRIANGE: By me. 
MR RIKORO: By Dr Tjiriange. I was going to come up with a slightly different one, my motivation 
being that I think the discussion of the last two days clearly suggest that our democracy is very 
young one, very unsophisticated in some of these complicated constitutional devices, principles 
and that the implications, whether we can live with the implications of two elections, one for the 
president, one for the legislature, I am not so sure whether you fully appreciate some of these 
things. That is why I would rather propose that the leader of the majority party, in the event of a 
clear-cut majority, be the president of the republic of Namibia, and where there is no clear-cut 
majority party, then the leader of the coalition of parties, as determined by those parties, be 
declared the president of the Republic. So, we have only one election, just like we had now and 
that will take care of both our present situation as well as the subsequent elections. 
CHAIRMAN: There is a proposed amendment to the previous one. 
MR RUKORO: That was one of my key questions that I wanted to ask with reference to the 
proposal that the first president be elected by the assembly. Does that mean that he must be 
elected be elected from amongst the members of the Assembly and if so, does that mean he 
must forever remain a member of the Assembly, or can the president simply be elected by the 
assembly, maybe even from amongst the members, but that does not necessarily mean that for 
instance he cannot resign his assembly seat to effective separation of powers between the 
legislature and the executive. That is the key question. Accountability, as far as I am concerned 
whether he is directly elected or not directly elected, whether he is a member or whether he is not 
a member, ultimately, through his cabinet of ministers and the prime minister, he must be 
accountable to parliament, in particular through the overriding power in article 31(7) that says 
parliament can reverse, review, correct any action taken by the president in the exercise of any of 
his functions. So, to me there is no doubt that he is and must be responsible to parliament via his 
cabinet of ministers.  
MR ANGULA: Yes, honourable Mudge has asked very pertinent questions. Is about the mode of 
elections how are we going to conduct these elections. I think that is a quite important question. 
In my limited experience I have seen in Zambia that in general elections do take place at the 
same time as presidential elections, but there it is on the constituency basis. When you come to a 
particular constituency you are voting for a particular candidate, it is not a party list, so that makes 
a difference. But I don‟t see it as insurmountable arrangements, by way of saying that the same 
day people are electing the party list, they should also elect the president. I don‟t see any 
particular problem there, it can be arranged. If we can solve that problem of how to conduct the 
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elections as to the powers of the president, I think that is obvious. There are many mechanisms 
of controlling the executive through the assembly. I don‟t think, in my opinion that the president 
should be part of the Assembly, to be honest. This president should be above party-politics, 
especially in our country. Then he is there on the party thing. Then whatever I am doing there I 
will speak on behalf of my party. I will be there to defend my party and I don‟t think it will be 
appropriate for the head of state, who is supposed to represent everybody, to speak on behalf of 
a particular party in assembly. He should represent the interest of the country as a whole. 
The second aspect of it is the question of the balance of power, separation of powers. If the 
president is going to sign the laws and he has a right to veto them I don‟t see the reason that he 
sits there and debate the laws and he can then later say “I am not going to sign it because he or 
she has taken that position in the debate.” He should have independent judgment either following 
from the kind of submissions mad by people affected by this law and inform the Assembly 
accordingly, “gentlemen, the things you are proposing, there is strong opposition from the people 
who are affected and therefore I feel it is not in the best interest to sign it.” Let him approve of it 
independently, not as part of the assembly. 
MR KATJIUONGUA: I think the first president will have to be a member of the Assembly or in the 
Assembly, whatever you call it. We may have to decide between the powers of the president in 
the period of transition, the five years and how to relate that to the rest of the other powers, and 
then the powers of the president permanently, what they will be in relation to the other institutions 
as well. I am glad that Mr Angula raised the question of Zambia. If we say the president is elected 
by the people, the name of that person must be on a ballot box for election by the people. You 
can‟t turn the leader of the majority party ultimately into the president. So, therefore I think we 
should not have too many elections. I think if we have a national election and if you like. At the 
end of the day as long as we have a party-system – I think it will be very clear to the people. I 
don‟t think we will confuse people. Let‟s take the position today. If you say the party, SWAPO, 
wants its leader to be the president of Namibia, the candidate, then they put that name on the 
ballot and SWAPO, the same party wants members to the National Assembly and regional 
councils. In essence really people are voting for the same party, not different parties, and the 
same thing will apply to all the parties. So at least we minimize the number of elections. Which 
means the president is elected now directly by the people, whoever that might be, so it is not just 
to parliament. But if the government goes, I think the democracy, brother Tjiriange; sometimes it 
also happens like in France or America that the president and the majority of parliament may not 
be the same thing. So, they have to compromise, there is no choice. But supposing they all come 
from the same party, the majority and the president, then you can do what you have either in 
Britain or what you have in Germany. Let‟s say the government messes up and not the president, 
there are problems in parliament and the government will have to resign. What they do in 
Germany, if Mr Hamutenya is the prime minister and somehow he runs into problems in running 
his administration, let‟s say he is involved in scandal of some sort, he goes with me to Frankfurt 
and somehow he gets lost there, then he will have to go, you don‟t have to say the whole 
government must go. The entire parliament does, they ask the parties “could you try to form 
another government.” He may form a government out of his own party if he still has a majority, it‟s 
a different man but the same organization, or he can form a coalition with somebody else and he 
has a majority and until the next normal election they work this way. That is another possibility. 
The other possibility that if you say the government gets into trouble before its term ends and it 
must go, whether you should have a general election for parliament, I think that is another 
problem. In France, if that should happen, because the president is elected in a separate 
presidential election for seven years and the assembly for four or five years, if the government 
goes, everybody goes and they have a new election for the National Assembly, but that is a 
different thing if we want to have one national election. Then I think we have to do it this way. But 
all I am concerned about is the principle the institutions, all of them, re elected, the president is 
elected, the parliament is elected and all the other bodies are elected and hopefully at one go. 
But now the refined points, I think there is a lot of constitutional material that I don‟t think I am in 
the position right now to produce, but lawyers and knowledgeable people can look into that and 
say how that type of  model can work considered our circumstances.  
DR JITENDERO: I just wanted to make one point and that is in relation to present situation 
whether or not the president can be a member of the state, the presidency, legislature and 
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judiciary, and again, as honourable Rukoro has submitted, under the present circumstances, 
because, of the proclamation that has put us where we are, that would be a technical point and I 
think the distinguished lawyers could help us here. I do not see any reason why, if the law or the 
practicality of the situation requires, as I said, in the interest of separation of powers that the 
president is elected already on party list and therefore in the interest of separation of powers he 
steps down from being a member of parliament so as to facilitate the desire that we are trying to 
establish in terms of separation of powers, and as I see it this is a technical point. If there are any 
difficulties that are insurmountable, I think we can be advised on it. But the reason is not 
capricious why the submission is being made that he cannot be a member a member of the 
National Assembly under the present circumstances. Of course that has implications in terms of 
the institutions that we are trying to create here, and this is why I wanted us to be more 
systematic to go over the list and see the contradictions. When you say separation of powers, 
executive president, is it in line with what we are proposing here, so that the lawyers can take 
very accurate not as in relations to what we want to establish. It seems to me that the discussion 
is very general now. It isn‟t very helpful, we are not making progress and again, for the third time 
now, I want to ask that we specifically make our points in relation to what is stated, so we can 
eliminate the paragraphs and include relevant paragraphs in relation to the institutions that we are 
trying to establish.   
Mudge: Again agree with the honourable member Angula, the president must be above politics. 
That is why I wanted him to be above politics. That is why I wanted him to be ceremonial 
president. But Mr Chairman, I have a problem in combining a president who must be above 
politics and a president who has executive powers, exercising those powers in terms of the 
constitution and being led by a majority party, telling him what he should do. I don‟t think that is 
possible. I am only identifying problems at this stage. Are we now going to decide that for the first 
five years the president will be elected by parliament or are we deciding that the first president will 
be elected by the assembly? What happens if the president resigns because of ill health or he 
dies after six months, because we are all human beings? Does it mean that after six months we 
will have another election? That also stresses the point and emphasizes the point made by Mr 
Ruppel when he said that you can decide that the two elections must take simultaneously, but 
you don‟t have control over everything in life. Things do not always happen the way you plan it. 
But it must be taken into account. When you say that the leader of the majority party becomes the 
president, what happens if the party replaces its leader? Things like that happen and you have to 
take it into account when you make your decisions.  
A last point that I want us to properly consider is the question of the separation of powers. I think 
the honourable member Mr Tjitendero said, or one of the members mentioned the fact that in the 
separation of powers between the executive, meaning the president. Now the question is and 
there must be absolute clarity – is the cabinet part of the executive or not, and there must be no 
misunderstanding whether the cabinet is part of the executive or not. Powers in terms of the 
constitution and being led by a majority, telling him what he should do. I don‟t think that is 
possible. I am only identifying problems at this stage. Are we now going to? Powers in terms of 
the constitution and being led by a majority party, telling him what he should do. I don‟t think that 
is possible. I am only identifying problems at this stage. Are we now going to decide that for the 
first five years the president will be elected by parliament or are deciding that the first president 
will be elected by the assembly? What happens if the president resigns because of ill health or he 
dies after six months, because we are all human beings? Does it mean that after six months we 
will have another election? That also stresses the point and emphasis the point made by Mr. 
Ruppel when he said that you decide that the two elections must take simultaneously, but you 
don‟t have control over everything in life. Things do not always happen the way you plan it. But it 
must be taken into account. When you say that the leader of the majority party becomes the 
president, what happens if the party replaces its leader? Things like that happen and you have to 
take it into account when you make your decisions. 
A last point that I want us to properly consider is the question of the separation of powers. I think 
the honourable member Mr. Tjitendero said, or one of the members mentioned the fact that in the 
separation of powers between the executive, meaning the president. Now the question is and 
there must be absolute clarity – is the cabinet part of the executive or not, and there must be a 
misunderstanding whether cabinet is part of the executive or not.  
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Consulting cabinet does not necessarily make the cabinet part of the executive. 
CHAIRMAN: We decided on that yesterday. The executive power of the Republic of Namibia 
shall vest in the president and his cabinet. 
MR.MUDGE:  I hope that we all understand what that mean; I hope that there is no 
misunderstanding. There is nothing wrong if I want to be assured. You know, since yesterday 
things have changed a little and the understanding as well. So, let‟s just get absolute clarity on 
that. 
CHAIRMAN We must be consistent. Since yesterday I have been giving the floor to the lawyers. 
MR. MUDGE: Mr Chairman, if it worries you, forget about it. I don‟t want to make things difficult 
for you, let them talk. 
PROF WIECHERS: I am not going to influence principle decisions, but can I just answer 
honourable Hamutenya‟s questions on direct election of president. These electoral systems are 
very much involved, so you will have to go back. It is all for you to decide on subsequent 
elections. There are these interrelated problems with the dissolution of parliament as Mr. Ruppel 
has pointed out, but there is also the electoral system.  Most people generally think the American 
President is elected by the people directly, but it is an indirect election. People are elected to 
electoral colleges and then on the strength of their support you know who is going to be the 
president. But it is not a direct election in the sense that they vote for Mr. Busch. They vote Mr. A, 
B, C, all the members of the electoral colleges and then you know who they support and then 
they bring out a formal vote. In the French direct election there is another peculiarity. Are you 
going to have a direct elected president with a 51%? In France, if the president does not get 51%, 
then there is a second ballot and it must be within a certain time, because it could happen, 
depending again on your nomination system, that you have eleven candidates, ten or five, and 
that the winning candidate will have 20%. In France, if some are eliminated, you have a second 
ballot in order the president being directly elected must at least have 51% and there are also 
direct electoral systems. That is my first answer. 
The second one is on the membership of the Assembly or not. It makes sense in constitutional 
terms that if you have an executive president, how he is elected is for you to decide, whether by 
parliament, he is still elected. There is an election, although one could know under certain 
circumstances who would have the majority support. But it is an election, because you could in 
future have a coalition government where people will have to bargain about the election of the 
president. It is an election, it is not a rubberstamp. But there is a consistency once he is elected 
that if he is a member of parliament, he remains a member of parliament and you ask for that, 
then for whatever reason, as Mr. Ruppel pointed out, if he is dependent for his presidency on 
membership of the Assembly, then if the Assembly is not there or for some other reason he 
becomes disqualified or the Assembly is dissolves then the rug is pulled under his feet, he is not 
qualified to be a president which could lead to quite a lot of instability. It is one thing to dissolve a 
parliament; it is quite another thing for a state not to have a head of state.  There are also other 
implications.  
CHAIRMAN:  We have been going through articles. I mentioned article 28, but there was a crisis, 
a misunderstanding and that is why. Yesterday I thought we were going paragraph by paragraph. 
I think that there is a crisis and we are talking about decisions. If you look at our decision – 
making mechanism, that is how decisions are ending. The one says this, the other one says that 
and the other one contradicts it and I say we have decided on that. If I now have to summarise as 
I asked, what do I summarise? First I am going to ask questions and you are going to ask the 
floor and talk and I cannot stop you that is your democratic right. But I got the question of first 
president will be elected by the Assembly, the subsequent one direct. That is the decision I can 
summarise. But then questions were raised which seem to have negated that decision, because 
there is doubt about the election of the subsequent ones. One election only having two ballots, 
because it would be difficult, unless we stop and say “decided now. That we decided to elect the 
first president by Assembly, subsequent ones direct. Is that a decision, honourable House? I just 
want an indication, debate no. Can we vote? 
MR.  KATJIUONGUA: No, we aren‟t voting. 
MR. BARNES: What is the decision? 
SECRETARY: The first president will be elected by the Assembly and subsequent president is 
elected by direct vote. 
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MR. MUDGE: Even if that is within six months? 
MR. RUKORO: Just for the avoidance of any doubt, in relation to the first president, does that 
mean that he is part or that he is not part of the Assembly? 
CHAIRMAN: That is a separate issue. 
PROF WIECHERS: Just on a point of information, I pointed out the various direct electoral 
systems. Are you going to expect us to write first president elected in this way, subsequent by 
direct vote and then leave it for six or five years to work out this direct system, because as I have 
pointed out, it is difficult, you could have in six months time the necessity to have this direct 
election without a system in place. So, I must call on members to think about that, so that we can 
at least have the principles. The only way where a direct system works easily is in a one party 
system, where you have a few candidates, it is all in the family and you have the majority.  
MR. MUDGE: What was the decision? Is there a decision already? 
CHAIRMAN: We asked the secretary to read it. 
MR. RUKORO: That is his summary, we haven‟t agreed yet? We still have to say yes or no and I 
think we were in that process of saying yes, the summary is correct, no, it is not correct. 
MRS ITHANA: It is obvious we are not going to resolve this issue the way we are handling it now. 
Can I propose that maybe we employ another way of reaching decisions, voting? 
CHAIRMAN: According to the rules you cannot vote. 
CHAIRMAN: Could we adjourn the meeting, because you are reopening the debate again.  
MR. MUDGE: Mr. Chairman, I think it is necessary for us, if the meeting wants us to support the 
direct election of the president, then it will be necessary to spell out what we mean by direct 
election. According to the lawyers – and I agree with that – in most cases presidents are elected 
by an electoral college. It means that the National Assembly can also be such a body which can 
elect the president, which means that election by the Assembly does not actually mean indirect 
election, although it was not made clear beforehand that this Constituent Assembly is elected to 
act as an electoral college. But on the other hand, in spite of that we are now going to allow the 
National Assembly to elect the president. But I do believe that we must spell out what we mean 
by a direct election. Otherwise we leave it open and it might happen that in a year or two, or three 
or five, I don‟t know we have to have an election and there will again be confusion. I don‟t want a 
backtrack, but when we took a decision yesterday about the executive power, at that time we did 
not know what the decision would be when it comes to the election of the president. I would want 
to have more clarity on the exact meaning, the legal meaning of the words “the executive power 
of the Republic of Namibia shall vest in the president and his cabinet. “ Is there a difference, 
legally, between that wording or formulation and “a cabinet headed by the president?” Is it just a 
matter of wording or has it got different legal implications? I am not asking these to be difficult, I 
am asking these questions to make it easier for my party to take a decision. 
We also want to know whether the president will be a member of the Assembly or not. I think it is 
important for us to know whether he will be a member of the Assembly and whether he will be a 
member of the Assembly or not. I think it is important for us to know whether he will be a member 
of the Assembly and whether he is accountable to parliament or not, taking into account that we 
are discussing – let‟s hope – the first five years, because it differs. Somebody hare suggested 
that we should discuss the five years and then discuss the period after that. I think it was Mr. 
Angula, no, Mr. Tjitendero.  I think that can also be done, that we look at the first term and then 
look at the second term. But it is very difficult for us to just decide now the first president shall be 
elected by the National Assembly and all subsequent presidents will be elected by direct vote, 
without spelling out the implications or at least understanding all the implications of such a 
decision. But anybody can make a specific proposal and we can look at that. 
MR. ANGULA: I would like first to respond to the first query by honourable Mr. Dirk Mudge with 
regard to the formulation “executive power of the Republic of Namibia will be vested in the 
president and his cabinet” and I want to respond to that query and I want to also invite our 
learned colleagues to advise me whether my understanding is correct. In fact, I am the one who 
brought up this issue yesterday and I was guiding my mind by the concept of accountability. 
Somebody must be ultimately accountable for the actions or non- actions of the government. You 
cannot just say a collection of people called the cabinet are accountable, all of them. Yes, they 
are, but in my mind I want a differentiation between the accountability of the president as the 
head of state, he is accountable to the nation as a whole of course, he is accountable to the 
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executive itself, to the national Assembly and the other institutions of government. In mind I have 
no difficulty with that. Individual ministers, they are accountable to the president too as much as 
they are accountable to the people and the National Assembly. So, the reason why I raised this 
issue is actually on the principle of accountability, that ultimately somebody should take 
responsibility for the government. Ultimately. You cannot just say a collection of people, as much 
as we want to be democratic as possible. But I stand also to be advised by the learned 
colleagues here.  
Membership of the National Assembly, I think I have talked too much about that and don‟t want to 
repeat myself. I want only to emphasise the fact that if we are still going by the principle of 
division of power and authority and the necessary checks and balances, to me it is quite clear 
that the president should not be part of the National Assembly, should not be part of the law – 
making body because he does contribute in his own way to law – making. He can reject or accept 
and he has a group of lawyers who are advising him and he has the general feeling of the nation 
to judge about. Direct vote, I think the problem we have with the direct vote is actually that we 
trying to balance the cost against the practical possibilities. The cost today , if  the president 
should be elected alone, if we are going to have presidential elections this year, means those 
who want to be president – excluding myself – have to run all over the place campaigning, 
promise something. Then they are on the ticket. Of course, you get through the presidential 
elections, somebody is elected as president. Then you may follow that with parliamentary 
elections, party list, proportional. You are running two things, perhaps this year presidential 
elections, next year parliamentary elections and perhaps the other day we have regional elections 
or municipalities. Now we think of this in terms of cost. Then we came up with a formula, saying 
that in order to save on the cost, perhaps the direct election of the President can take place 
simultaneously with parliamentary elections, which simply means that the voters come there, they 
vote for their candidates, for their party and they go to vote for the president they want to vote for, 
because it is party list. So it is a simultaneous thing. When you finish voting for the party vote for 
the president, and I think it is where Prof Wiechers was talking about the American system 
whereby states, through caucuses, elect the president. I think for us that is too complicated, 
because you go through a system of primaries and what not. It just has to be something direct 
and you are through with it. So, from this point of view I don‟t see any difficulties by way of 
procedure. Of course, you will have to have two types of ballot papers. I don‟t know whether they 
are going to appear on the same ballot papers. I don‟t know whether they are going to appear on 
the same ballot paper. That is a practical thing. But I think for own purposes now we can say 
something general about direct elections, but there will an electoral law which will state how 
elections are going to be conducted, who is going to conduct them, what will happen , like in 
normal circumstances. I don‟t know whether we want to include the electoral law in the 
constitution, but I thought we are just clarifying our minds to see if this thing can work. That is 
what I assume, that we are asking these questions to clarify to ourselves that this thing can work. 
In case, my understandings as far as the electoral procedures are concerned, it is a question of 
costs. That is what we are talking about, in terms of money, in terms of time, to have two 
electricians, one for the president, one for the members of the Assembly. That is what I think the 
problem is. In terms of procedures I don‟t see that there are any insurmountable procedures. 
MR.BESSINGER: Mine is an appeal. We find ourselves now in the situation where in asking a 
question we make speeches. We have been coming along fine up till late yesterday because we 
had a procedure that we confine ourselves to the procedure that we are following. To come and 
ask now at this stage what is ceremonial president and what is an executive president, I have to 
answer Mr. Mudge in his words. The very first day this standing committee sat Mr. Mudge‟s words 
were, almost verbatim: “The words ceremonial president of executive president doesn‟t really 
mean anything.” 
MR. MUDGE: That is not the question I asked now. 
MR. BESSINGER: The issue was: what powers do we give to the man or to that position. So, that 
is what we want to do now. We want to give certain powers to that person or withhold certain 
powers from him in relation to the judiciary and the legislature. Now, let‟s do that, because 
otherwise you are going to sit and make speeches.  
DR. TJITENDERO: That is right; I am addressing myself to that. I propose the following wording: 
That the leader of the party which who the general election becomes the president, no 
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qualifications. That is to accommodate the membership in the National Assembly. So we are 
saying that the leader of the party that wins the general elections shall become the president.  
MR. RUKORO: I was also going to make a specific proposal. A part of it has been made by 
honourable Dr. Tjitendero, namely that the leader of the majority party automatically becomes the 
president of the republic. I was going to say that obviously that will take care of our first problem, 
namely the first president. I was going to add by way of amendment that in the event - that will 
apply to subsequent elections-there being no clear-cut majority party, that the person agreed to 
between or among a coalition of parties as the leader of the ruling coalition, automatically 
becomes the president of the republic. Thirdly, to add to his motivation why the president should 
not be part of the legislature, he referred to the separation of powers. I am not so much going to 
rely on that one; I was going to rely on the necessity to preserve the dignity of the office of head 
of state which he is concurrently holding with the office of head of government that therefore the 
president does not sit in parliament. And finally , that the president be- and is basically just an 
explanation or an understanding that should be reached –that the president at all times be 
accountable to parliament through his cabinet of ministers and in particular the prime minister. So 
that package will then replace 28(2) as we know it today. 
MR. GURIRAB: I continue to plead for the election of the president of the Republic by popular 
vote I find that procedure to be most democratic. It takes us back to the origin of democracy. The 
examples that were cited about indirect election, i.e. as it occurs in the United States or in France 
or elsewhere are some examples where the president is elected directly by popular vote and wins 
or loses on that mode, without any indirect election. 
MR. GURIRAB: I am disagreeing with it; I need to have time to elaborate. I also want support for 
my proposal. So, the concept of the president being either a member or not a member of the 
Assembly, if indeed we are…..to the decisions we took and accepted, i.e. the separation of 
powers, then it will be an executive president. The head of state to sit at the same time in the 
Assembly contradicts, negates that separation of powers and will not support that for the reasons 
mentioned. The president will, even in terms of the present draft, either directly or through the 
mechanism of the cabinet, the prime minister and individual ministers continue to be bound by 
this constitution to be accountable to the Assembly. 
Mr. Mudge: The proposal made by honourable member Dr. Tjitendero – I think that is the same, it 
was just better formulated maybe by Rukoro – is very interesting. It is maybe a new idea, 
altogether a new concept. What I find interesting is that the president will now be elected more or 
less in the manner in which a prime minister is normally elected the leader of a majority party and 
he puts together his cabinet, he has executive powers. What is, of course, also true, then he will 
not be above politics, as a head of state in the real sense. But personally, under present 
circumstances, this might be the solution, and I cannot at this stage bind our party – it is not 
possible, because it is now altogether a new proposal, but it is at least something that we can 
very seriously consider. 
CHAIRMAN: There was a private understanding to avoid taking matters up in the Assembly. But 
from my point of view that understanding is breaking down now and we must take matters to the 
Assembly and talk to the gallery. That is what we are waiting for, I thought. So it will be good that 
if there are disagreements, like honourable Mudge said, that we can put it down as a proposal not 
agreed to by everybody and take it to the Assembly.  
PROF WIECHERS: Can I just point out one legal point. If you say the leader of the majority party 
or the leader of a coalition party becomes head of state or president, then you are adding a 
qualification for the head of stateship. It means, what if the next he deposed of as the leader of 
his party?  Then you must tell us, does he lose his head state ship? Parties can do that. It is true, 
Pres de Klerk is the leader of his party, that is why he became president, but it is not virtue – that 
is a political fact- of his leadership that he is president, but by virtue of his election in an electoral 
college. So, if tomorrow Mr. de Klerk is not the head of the party; he won‟t be affected in his 
status as head of state. I just want to point out if you make a leadership party-political leadership 
the criterion, then you are complicating matters in the sense that that becomes a qualification and 
the day he isn‟t leader, are you going to say he loses head of state but he says on and there is 
another leader of the party. 
CHAIRMAN: I have a proposal to make to the House. We cannot vote here I am told by the rules. 
When a chairman sees the House divided like this and there are material differences – and we 
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are back at that question – it is for us to bring these matters to the Assembly as a whole. We told 
our people that we have an agreement in principle. We don‟t have that. We have now seriously 
deliberated on things we have already agree upon, as we thought and we told the Assembly we 
have agree upon, as we thought and we told the Assembly we have agreed in principle. There 
seems to be material differences which cannot be resolved. So, the only way is to take it to the 
House where we disagree and vote and let the public know we are not agreed. The idea of this 
committee was to discuss everything and agree and once we came to the House there will be no 
discussion. But I see that there is a fundamental difference between the parties.  
MR. MUDGE: When it is a fundamental difference. Between which parties do you see the 
fundamental difference? 
CHAIRMAN: I see SWAPO‟s position as saying the president must be elected directly by the 
population and they seem to say that is the bottom-line, although Tjitendero, who is a member of 
SWAPO, said something else and two members came back immediately and opposed that, and 
went back to the minutes of the meeting that they never compromised on that point that he must 
be elected direct. I heard honourable Rukoro and Katjiuongua saying that if the president, even 
the present one, is going to be elected by the National Assembly, that he has to be a member of 
that National Assembly, that he has to be a member of that again, they say as the head of state 
he must be above politics. There was also pointed out that he cannot be. So, seriously speaking, 
we will talk the whole week. 
MR. MUDGE: On a point of order, I cannot agree with you, we have been talking for weeks now 
and to now, after only a few hours, say that there is a point of material dispute, we had more 
serious problems in the past; we succeeded in overcoming most of those problems. I was asking 
a very simple question this morning. I was not even saying that I am going to vote against the 
proposal, I wanted information. I wanted to know clearly whether we are now deciding or will be 
the first president or for the first five years, I wanted to know whether the president will be a 
member of the Assembly or not and I did not get an answer.   
CHAIRMAN: When the answer was given by honourable Dr. Tjitendero that he is now providing a 
solution, honourable Mudge said it is a new proposal and he wants to take back for advice and so 
on. 
MR.MUDGE: I thought that when proposals come from SWAPO‟s side that is a SWAPO – 
proposal. 
CHAIRMAN: Yes, given that I am saying it was said we should take it out from here somewhere 
else and then we have to come back here again after we got advice. 
MR. BARNES: No, I think you misunderstand. The proposal was made by Dr. Tjitendero. We said 
it is something that we might consider. These were the exact word of my colleague, “but it is a 
new proposal. “ Immediately after that. So now we are waiting to find out where is the proposal 
that is opposed on this side, because we have specific ideas of support. 
MRS. ITHANA: It is really very difficult. I agree with you that we have reached a deadlock. We 
must talk about it frankly. 
MR. MUDGE: Between who and who? 
MRS.ITHANA: SWAPO, on its part, has been trying to propose ways of getting out, but I must say 
that our colleagues on the other side are not forthcoming. We propose this, they have objection, 
we propose that, they are not satisfied. They are not committed. If they were committed to 
something then we could follow it up and try to get solutions. 
CHAIRMAN: that is another problem really; when other members take the floor to talk you don‟t 
hear them. This is the problem, and it has been a continuous problem, with all due respect. When 
a member is talking you consult, so yes you don‟t follow. 
MRS.ITHANA: It is frustrating. I don‟t want to believe the argument that SWAPO seems to be 
divided on the issue, it is not true. We have a proposal, our original proposal by Mr. Hamutenya. 
We had two proposals, the president to be elected by the population or the president of the 
majority party. This is the solution that we are grabbling with because our colleagues are not 
satisfied in any way. 
MR. RUPPEL: I think we must realize that if we come to speak about material disputes it 
becomes very serious. I tried to understand and analyse the issues at stake and I find that what is 
beyond any dispute is that we have it in principle to have an executive president. I think there can 
be no doubt about that. What we have to talk about now, which has not been discussed with 
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sufficient clarity is how is the man be elected. That is the issue. I don‟t see that we have reached 
a deadlock. Where I have to agree partly with Mrs. Ithana is that we would like to hear some 
clarity formulated problems or queries or reservations from those who are against the proponents 
of a direct election of such an executive president. On the SWAPO-side we believe that it is a 
logical outflow of an executive president to be directly elected, and that he is then checked 
through various mechanisms provided for in the constitution. That is our principle point of 
departure and it has always been. Where are now standing is just the problem about how do we 
get him there and I think that is something where we must help each other to find a solution. I 
think Mr. Mudge this morning, in all fairness, before there was any ruling, asked what will be the 
consequences of a direct election with a view to the to the remaining provisions in the constitution 
which we have already discussed before, the checks and balances, what will it mean with the 
different mode of election now, from the indirect one by the parliament to a direct one? Would that 
have drastic effects on his powers vis-à-vis the other organs of state? Those were his questions. 
It was something which was, I thought, related to legal issues which our lawyers here could have 
answered. They could have told him the structure is not going to be drastically affected, or they 
could have told him then there are problems here and there, something like this and then we 
could have dealt with the issues. But as I understood it this morning there was no principle 
difference, we are now just getting bogged down in a lot of mud about how we get the president 
there, what it means to have direct elections. I am not agreeing that there is a breakdown; I don‟t 
see it like that and I think what we need is clarity so that we can deal with specific issues. There 
was a specific proposal this morning by Mr. Mudge to say “good, direct elections, what does it 
mean to the other issue?” That is where we stand and I think if the lawyers can tell us it is going 
to make a material difference, then it is not going to bog us down. On that point I would really 
move that we come back to that and ask the lawyers what the difference in mode in election, form 
the one provided now in subsection (2) to the one which we have proposed from the beginning, 
where there was this misunderstanding, the direct election, what that will mean. But it is for he 
lawyers to give us guidance in this regard. They are not going to decide any principles, but I think 
about clarifying issues, that is why we have them here. 
DR. TJITENDERO: I just want to clear a very serious misunderstanding here; I am not making 
any contribution. Honourable Barnes said that there are two proposals from SWAPO. I want to 
say that there are no two proposals and in fact I went back to say that the sequence was 
misunderstood by honourable Gurirab and he nodded. I said I wanted to see- and it is the 
wording that changed, and I was addressing myself specifically to the impasse. SWAPO‟s 
submission from the beginning has been that we are advancing and submitting for a president 
who is directly elected by popular vote, on a one person, one vote basis. That notwithstanding, I 
thought we will come to that when we talk about subsequent elections. I said during the 
transitional period, because it is given, can we change the wording from the first president, that 
instead of saying first president, if that creates a problem of membership in the National 
Assembly, can we therefore say he shall be the person who is the leader of the majority party. 
That position has been clarified, that it is not only by virtue of leadership of the majority party that 
one becomes the leader, and I think I conceded to that, that there are additional qualifications 
which, of course, if the proposal was acceptable we would have gone into. So, there is only one 
SWAPO proposal and it should not be interpreted or deemed to say because on SWAPO-
member is saying this, therefore we are stuck. No, far from that. We have submitted for the 
subsequent elections and I was trying to see whether we could find a way out f the transitional 
period. 
MR. GURIRAB: A bit of plain talk. The elections we had in November last year clarified a number 
of things. One clarity is the composition of the present Constituent Assembly, the different 
majorities or, if you will, the representation of the political parties in the Assembly. As a result of 
that reality in the Constituent, Assembly it is very clear to my mind that SWAPO is the majority 
party. So, we are not discussing for the purposes of the present Constituent Assembly a 
theoretical matter. The leader of that Party is Sam Nujoma. I have no difficulty whatsoever to 
deduce from that, given the present realities in the Constituent Assembly, that the first president 
of the Republic of Namibia will be Comrade Sam Nujoma. Why am I saying that? I take it, talking 
to, distinguish-wise, members of the Constituent Assembly, as represented in the Standing 
Committee, joined now by distinguished lawyers, that the Constituent Assembly, as it is 
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constituted now will be converted into the National Assembly of Namibia. So, every time that I talk 
I don‟t want to be misunderstood that I am not talking about that. That is the given, the public 
know that. Equally it is so clear to me that Sam Nujoma‟s reality as the leader of the majority 
party will be ratified by the converted Constituent Assembly. So, in the sense he will be elected by 
the National Assembly. So that issue to me is solved. So when I am intervening, I am talking 
about post 435-elections. My only problem is about membership of Sam Nujoma in the converted 
National Assembly and consequently as a member of the National Assembly, and as was the 
case with the Federal Convention; the next person in line will become the leader of the majority 
party in the Assembly. So, I have no problem with that aspect. My intervention has to do with post 
435 – elections. For that we would want the elections to be by popular vote, and with that I would 
then ask to consider the provisions for the president, as stipulated here, and weigh them against 
that position. 
MR. KATJIOUNGUA: Mr. Chairman I think you were right that we are deadlocked, and maybe 
what you said is right, we should ho to the Assembly and report that what we told them on the 
20th was simply a dream, we are now encountering problems. I think that is the easiest way to do 
it, because the way we are interpreting facts here differ materially. As far as I am concerned, the 
election we had in terms of 435 was to elect an assembly to write a constitution – period. Then, if 
we are going to convert this Assembly in on anything else, it must be by understanding between 
the parties writing the constitution that we cannot have another election to convert this Assembly 
on the following understanding: I do not take it that the first person on the list of a political party 
automatically, because that party is the majority, becomes the President of Namibia and that 
should be seen that that person was directly elected. I cannot accept that, because it is just 
against the spirit of the whole Resolution 435 as I understand it, especially the 1982 Principles. 
So, I think if we can make a separate understanding as a transitional arrangement about the 
relationship between a president permanently in future elections it is a separate matter. As things 
stand right now either we accept the fact, as I see it, that the president elected by the Assembly 
will be a member of the Assembly, will sit in the Assembly and be accountable in the manner that 
we have pointed out here. If that is not acceptable to other people, then we are deadlocked, then 
I think we must go to the Assembly and clarify our positions. 
MR. ANGULA: Yes, I have been listening very carefully and I have been reading the holy cow 
and I am proposing the following and I want you to listen very carefully: “The President of the 
Republic will be elected by universal and equal suffrage after every five years, save the first term 
of the president, who will be elected by the first National Assembly acting as an electoral college.” 
This is in conformity with the holy cow and hope this will solve all your problems. 
MR. STABY:  I tend to agree with honourable member Ruppel that there is no deadlock, I think it 
is a perceived deadlock. I say so because we are mandated by the Assembly to submit a draft 
constitution to them. We are not mandated to submit to the Assembly acceptable to everybody, 
perhaps not unanimously, certainly without any votes against it. To me the question of the interim 
president for the first term of office, is fairly clear, how he is to be elected. It is also to my mind 
reasonably clear that he should be subjected to the checks and balances that are devised for the 
subsequent presidents or the subsequent terms of offices, because we don‟t want to amend our 
constitution unnecessarily. 
To me the crux of the matter is whether there is any relationship between the elections of the 
president, hi accountability to those who have elected hand and to the organs of state and, 
incidentally, the methodology in which his accountability is brought about, what are the 
mechanisms. That to me is the crucial area, and I think also this is where perceived difference 
come about. I want to, by way of a direct question to our learned friends, ask to please enlighten 
us as to, first of all, what does the expression “by popular vote or by direct election” mean, and 
secondly, whether there is any relationship, direct of implied, between the way that a person is 
elected and his accountability, in other words whether the way of electing him does affect the 
checks and balances which are provided. 
Let me just add one more remark to this. The record of presidents of in independent with Bu… 
and ending with P W Botha, isn‟t one which I could describe as comforting, and I do agree that 
trust is something positive and good and it would be terrific if we could have trust in everybody 
that is elected to office. I say control is better, and therefore it is for me of prime importance to 
establish precisely not only how the president is elected, but also what the checks and balances 
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are. I am thinking in terms of, for instance the American President, powerful as he is, can be 
vetoed by one of the organs of the state. 
MR ANGULA: I think there is total confusion and I don‟t know why this confusion reappears and 
reappears. The election of the president in this article 28 (2) does not negate anything that follows 
subsequently contained in this document. We are still going to work with those sections and 
subsections. I don‟t see how that election negates checks and balances. What is the confusion? 
MR STABY: I am not saying it negates, I want to establish the relationship, because if I know that 
the way of electing the president has any effect on checks and balances, then obviously I know 
that in order to agree to how he is elected. If there are no complications we must weigh those and 
then we will be able to solve the problems afterwards very much quicker, if it clears the way. 
So this body, the Constituent Assembly, has to pay attention to basically three factors when you 
have to devise your constitution in order to provide for those, and I want to call those three 
factors, the first one deals with the powers of the president. The second one I call the structure 
factor. Where is he placed within the constitutional system, what is his relationship to the other 
branches of government, and the third one is, how does that particular president get into the 
constitutional position, in other words, his election, his powers and his relationship with the other 
branches of government. In principle you must remember you are writing what they call a…, a 
clean state, you can give your own content to this thing. The moment you have decided the 
mechanism that we are going to use in order to identify or to put into that position of president a 
particular president, you have dealt with one issue. Now you proceed and you say this powers of 
that office, will be the following, and devising the powers of that office, you take into account not 
only what the powers of the office will be in terms of what the office might do, but you also take 
into account control over the exercise of power. That is the essence of democracy as the other 
part of the coin, the control over the exercise of power to prevent abuse of power. One 
mechanism you prevent abuse of power you have already agreed to, a bill of rights. Another 
mechanism preventing abuse of power is the principle of separation of powers and the concurrent 
element of checks and balances, and you can go on and even the political process, regular 
elections, they are also control of the abuse of power. Now your job is how to get the office 
manned, the powers to be exercised by that office and in devising the controls and checks and 
balances over the exercise of power, the relationship with the other branches of government 
come into play. That is, if he wants to pass a certain budget, an executive president, and he 
wants to pay his officials and keep the country running, it is for the parliament to approve that 
budget and to tie to it certain constraints if it wishes to do so. He has to appoint people. Vice 
versa he also has a function when it comes to the policy that parliament through legislation could 
decide upon and which his executive will have to implement. The courts have a very important 
role to play. In principle, to be more correct and specifically to the point, you have got a very great 
advantage in the sense that there are no real conventions and unwritten rules apply here. You 
can give your own content in devising the office, the control over the exercise of power and the 
relationship to the other branches of government. There is no, as far as the technique of devising 
a constitution is concerned, no direct result flowing from the one to the other. In theory we can 
say - in terms of democratic theory you elect an executive president, he should be outside, in 
terms of the true separation of powers, there must be separation of powers as far as possible. 
Those are theoretical things. There is no immediate law, „n wet van Mede and Perse, that the 
moment you decide on this particular method to fill the office of the president, that the powers 
must be exercised in that way. To conclude with, Richard Nixon, when he abused his power in 
the Watergate Scandal, the very person that he had appointed as chief justice of that country had 
to decide on a legal argument by Richard Nixon that he was under no duty to submit his personal 
conversations, as recorded on tape-recordings, to a state public prosecutor, in other words an 
official part of administration, and the person who had to decide that issue was the very chief 
justice who was earlier appointed by Nixon and Nixon relied in his argument on executive 
privilege, in other words putting beyond control. He was overruled, he had to submit and you all 
know what the end of Richard Nixon was. 
MR CHASKALSON:  I would like to say I agree with what Mr Erasmus has said, and if I could 
very simply respond to the question raised by the honourable member Mr Staby, the question of 
accountability, in my opinion, has nothing whatever to do with the method of election of the 
president. The question of accountability has to do with the same provisions within the 
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constitution which require the president to be accountable in a particular way. That means that in 
my opinion you could have a president directly elected, who was under such constraints that he 
will be little more than a figure head and that all power would vest in parliament. Conversely you 
could have a president indirectly elected who will have such powers under the constitution that he 
would for practical purposes be what you refer to as a run-away president, and as my colleague 
Mr Erasmus says, the theory of what might be the better structure and what might be more 
appropriate has no application when you are when you are writing a constitution, because in 
theory, if you decide it is more logical to have A and more logical to have B, it doesn‟t hamper you 
if you are starting with a constitution. The powers and relationship between the different sections 
of the government will stem from the words you put down in your constitution, and there is no bar 
upon what you put down. That is my opinion; I don‟t know whether my colleagues agree with me. 
PROF WIECHERS: In principle I have nothing to disagree with my colleagues, but there is a sort 
of technique in government if you have a directly elected the president or a parliamentary head of 
state. In the case of a directly elected president, where he is elected directly, whether through 
electoral colleges or by double ballots, so that he has at least the majority support of the 
population, you find, as in America - France has a bit of a mixed system - that he appoints his 
ministers in cabinet and they are not members of parliament. He is independent, executive with 
his ministers. But in order to check that, parliament has more powers on this independent man 
and his ministries. That is why in America you find that the President of the Senate, the Chairman 
of the House of Representatives and their subcommittees have extreme veto powers on 
president and his cabinet, because only he can appoint ministers and that has got to be approved 
by senate, but senate cannot appoint a minister or anybody. It has got to be appointed by the 
President of America. So, the point I want to make, there is in technique - and there are very 
good reasons - your independent, executive president, directly elected is far stronger in his 
executive capacity, but also stronger tied to the legislature. So, you can say the method of 
election does not affect the accountability measures, but in practice there are differences, and 
you must just make out, if you go for the direct system, then you are going to have these checks 
and balances, your ministers appointed will not be members of the legislature under a direct 
system, it could hamper the president, because his poor ministries are then under divided 
loyalties. They could say yes to the president, but then they have to say yes to majority groups in 
the legislature. So, you must have these practical implications in mind. 
PROF ERASMUS: But it seems to be to your advantage that you can learn from what is 
happening in other system. So if you identify that certain things happen in other systems you do 
not want, you now have the opportunity and the advantage of history to directly address those 
issues in your constitution. 
CHAIRMAN: The questions are now answered. Are you happy with the answers? 
MR MUDGE: May I comment on this, please? Theoretically I agree. It is of course true that you 
can now decide on the method on which the president will be elected and then tomorrow we can 
discuss the powers and the checks and balances, but we must not forget, the people sitting 
around this table are not experts or constitutional lawyers, we are members of political parties 
who have been fighting each other until a month ago. We must take into account more than just 
rules or theories or academic solutions. We must take into account the realities of life, and I want 
to say that although I said just minutes ago - and I still insist - that we can come to an agreement, 
but I have no guarantee that if I agree on point one, that my colleagues will support me when it 
come to point two. I have no guarantee. I can say fine, it is true, we can decide what checks and 
balances there must be, but say for instance we agree now that the leader of the majority party 
becomes the president, then we have agreed. When we come to point two there might be a 
position where the one party wants to give more power to the president and the other party does 
not want to give more power to that president for political reasons. These are the realities and 
that is why when politicians discuss a constitution it is something completely different from 
professors discussing a constitution. It is something completely different. That is why I say we 
must discuss this thing as a package deal. We have to do it. I can‟t decide on point one without 
having the faintest idea what is going to happen when we get to point two and point three. Mr 
Chairman, I want to tell my colleagues from SWAPO, we are not that far apart. I want to be more 
honest and say, of course we are still battling with suspicion and we have all reason, because 
rumours are going around, which might be completely untrue, but there is no way we can prevent 
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that. Suspicions are being created by people, maybe deliberately. I have been in politics long 
enough to know that you cannot only rely on rules, you have to take into account that we live in 
this world, we have to deal with human beings, and first of all, when the president is elected by 
the people, you might find presidents who will say: “You government, you can go to hell with your 
constitution, I have been elected by the people, I have a mandate from the people and I am not 
going to bother about the constitution.” You can get a situation like this, Sir. I wish I had time to 
read you some of the remarks made by people who made a study of presidentialism, what they 
said about that. I am sure you have read some of those books. Let us, for God‟s sake, discuss 
this problem in a spirit of goodwill; let us make all of us feel confident about the future. I don‟t see 
any problems and I want to say this, our party will not object to a president being elected directly 
if we are sure and confident that there will be no abuse of power. To use my colleague‟s words, 
we don‟t want to throw him out of office; we want to make provision in the constitution to build 
enough checks and balances. I want to suggest that the parties here go back and draft a chapter 
on the president and see if we cannot marry those chapters, and we could do it away and we 
come back tomorrow. On the other hand, you can now say we must go back to the Assembly to 
report, go back to the Assembly to say we have failed in our responsibility. No, Sir, I cannot do 
that. 
MR HAMUTENYA: Mr Chairman, we can‟t read the minds of the people, what they will do 
tomorrow or the day thereafter, we can only draft a constitution which we hope will work. I think 
the advice given by the legal experts do provide grounds for us to move forward in terms of 
tackling the formulation of the constitution. Suspicion cannot be resolved here; it has nothing to 
do with what we are writing. If we are writing a constitution based on suspicion we will make no 
progress whatsoever. What is crucial is that I appeal that we proceed with article 28 with the 
proviso that wherever our colleague of the DTA would wish to refer back in this constitution to the 
power of the president and the relationship between legislature and the judiciary, even in relation 
to those clauses we have already agreed to, that they be allowed to refer back, as long as it only 
relates to the power of the president. I hope that we can go a long way to allay their fears. If we 
can allay their fears then I think we will progress, but can we please proceed with this article, go 
paragraph by paragraph as we have been doing and then, if there is cross-reference to things 
already agreed to which have to do with the powers of the president, we do so. If it is an 
acceptable proposition I think we can go somewhere, we can break the impasse where we are 
now stuck. 
MR HAMUTENYA: If Mr Mudge agrees to my procedure that we discuss this and they will have 
the freedom to cross-refer to anything to do with the powers of the president, including those 
sections we have already covered, inasmuch as they refer to president, we will have the freedom 
to come back to them if that satisfies you we will see the president in relationship to all the other 
branches. If you agree to that I will appeal to the chairman that he allows us to proceed. 
MR MUDGE: May I ask my first question? 
MR HAMUTENYA: That one is part of the package. If you agree to my procedure, then you can 
do so. 
MR BARNES: That one is part of the package. If you agree to my procedure, then you can do so. 
MR BARNES: Let‟s discuss it from the beginning. 
MR MUDGE: So, the interesting proposal then? 
CHAIRMAN: Article 28, election of the president... 
MR BARNES: No, the question is still…. 
CHAIRMAN: There is a proposal here now. 
MR BARNES: The proposal was that we discuss the president in Toto, powers and what not. 
CHAIRMAN: How do you do that? We have to start somewhere. 
MR BARNESS: We take them point by point from point 1. 
CHAIRMAN: That is what I am trying to do. As honourable Hamutenya said, we can refer to other 
places, but he is saying only dealing with the specific issue being discussed. We are on elections 
now honourable Mudge is saying that provided they can go and check there is no objection to 
direct elections. So we now take that we agreed that the president will be elected directly. 
MR BARNES: No. 
MR MUDGE: We want a proposal now and continue. We need a definite proposal. Is Mr Angula‟s 
proposal on the table now or whose proposal? We need a proposal now. 
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MR ANGULA: My proposal strictly follows the spirit and letter, the chapter and the verse of the 
holy cow. 
MR MUDGE: What is the holy cow? 
MR RUPPEL: The 1982 Principles. 
MR ANGULA: I am reading: “The President of the republic will be elected by universal and equal 
suffrage after every five years, save for the first term of the first president, who will be elected by 
the first National Assembly acting as an electoral college.” Ration of powers are such that we can 
be satisfied that we can have control over the administration without sabotaging the operations of 
the government; I want to introduce a proposal. But one last point. The way I understand 
democracy of the 19th Centaury where it was compared to a military victory, the vanquished and 
the con-queerer, but democracy based on the principle of the majority rights, that therefore we 
are all relevant in this process in various degrees, as a healthy democracy, to balance off things, 
to create a society, a system of government where we do not feel oppressed simply because we 
are minority, because the minority, because the minority, because the minority of today could 
possibility become the majority of tomorrow, and I don‟t think we want to put people in the 
position of revenging on the others tomorrow when they come to power. I want to regard the 
government of the day, even if I am the opposition, as my government or the government of 
Namibia. But then we create such a system. I am trying to say, I would be scared to go back, 
unless in total frustration, to the Assembly and say “we have failed.” I have said, we have raised 
the expectations too high on the 20th, let‟s not disappoint the expectations of our people later. If 
we go tomorrow and say we failed – when we were together over lunchtime with my brother 
Hamutenya, the people I was sitting with were saying “for heaven‟s sake, the world is seeing you 
as a special case in resolving your internal contradictions.” When you look at Angola, when you 
look at many African countries I also did know that a … and … whereas Muslims, if you die today, 
you must be buried the same day or tomorrow. I would not like to see things like that in this 
particular corner of our continent. So I am just trying to find out, as a matter of flexibility, whether 
we cannot ask our lawyers if we use the American model with maybe or two modifications, and 
see out of this discussion whether all these chapters relating to the executive and the legislature 
and the judiciary can be modelled along those lines with the modifications which are attentions 
are result of the debate Here, whether that cannot serve as a compromise, rather than discussing 
the president in the National Assembly or not, where he is going to be and that sort of thing. I am 
just thinking aloud, I am not making a proposal, just to find out whether something like that could 
not help us out of the deadlock. 
MR GURIRAB: The American Constitution was written in the 18th Century and they found it quite 
effective in some very key aspects. That is why they added on to it some 27 amendments, some 
very fundamental amendments. Some people in America, academics, public, even some 
legislature tried to change this, that exercise of indirect election of the American president, the 
Electoral College. A number was done on the American people that make them feel that they 
elect their president which they do not, and we know the reasons why that is not popular election. 
I like the flexibility, I like Nahas Angula‟s attempt, I associate myself with it to be specific by way 
of a concrete proposal, but I like the idea of a mixed bag, the president being able to draw 
members of his cabinet from the legislature, but also to have the flexibility to bring in people from 
outside. We were reminded that we are dealing with ……., I got the opportunity to look at other 
constitutions, other experiences, but with that in mind, to do something that makes sense for our 
Namibia. We are also not writing a constitution merely for ourselves, imprisoned as we are by our 
own political interests, suspicions, the recent past. We say that when it comes to making 
commitments in terms of agreeing to formulations, then we relive the recent past. But if it is 
possible for us to think not only in terms of who will be the first president of the Republic of 
Namibia, but to think further down, what kind of constitution would make sense for our country, 
even after the president is no longer there, we should think about it that way. We went through 
this time and again, we made package deals. We identified three areas of material dispute, the 
presidency, the voting method and the configuration of houses, whether unicameral or bicameral, 
and we have gone a long way in the exercise of giving and take. For a moment I thought too that 
we are deadly deadlocked. I no longer feel that way listening to quite a number of interventions 
around the table, and also in particular listening to the views expressed by the learned gentlemen 
that we have brought to help us to crystallize our own thinking. I think we reached a point where 
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we are trying to attempt a formulation that would get us out of this and in that sense I associate 
myself with the attempt the attempt made honourable Angula. 
MR ANGULA: Yes, I just wanted quickly to respond to the view of honourable Katjiuongua. I do 
recognize that Mr Katjiuongua has been making the whole of this morning some efforts to get us 
somewhere, and actually he missed an opportunity somewhere when he made a concrete 
proposal more or less along the lines I am making now. But we went on discussing and 
discussing. But what I want to respond to is the American model in the African context. When you 
are drawing up a constitution you should also see how possibly it can work. My fear with the 
American model is that it tends to distance the executive branch from other branches. It is too 
much distance. These guys just come to the congress when they are called to come and testify. I 
think that kind of distance in the American context is not healthy. You need members of cabinet 
with whom you can rub shoulders in the legislative body. You can even casually and informally 
ask them certain question or draw their attention to certain things. You meet them there; you 
need not make an appointment. Each day you rub shoulders with each other, you do whatever 
you want to do. If you create a cabinet of the president‟s men, these people are likely to put 
themselves somewhere in one building, everyone you want an appointment they are 
inaccessible. The possibility of that in this context is very high. However I think the best way to 
address all these concerns is really to go through this articles and sub articles and see what is 
missing, if anything, which needs to be improved to get consensus. That is the best way to go 
about it. So if we can go – and I am making a concrete proposal – and for the time-being suspend 
28(2), go to 28(3) and go through the presidency, then we can come back and say we have 
decided on the checks and balances.  
MR MUDGE: Just on a point of order, Mr Angula is now very helpful. What I wanted to ask, if we 
can accept that principle that the time we skip an article and go on, then I want to ask, if I invite 
applications for a position all I must decide what I expect from that person. In other words, I first 
have to determine his responsibilities and after I have done that, then I know exactly what sort of 
person I am looking for. Isn‟t it possible that we discuss functions and powers and duties of the 
state president and then we can discuss how we are going to appoint the president? If you think it 
is not acceptable I will not put up a fight for that, because I still have the right to come back and 
then we can go point by point. But I just suggested the possibility of taking about the 
responsibilities. 
MR PRETORIOUS: Against the background of what Mr Erasmus has said here about pres Nixon, 
my question is: Can president be above the law? 
MRS ITHANA: No ways. 
MR PRETORIOUS: That is not what is happening in this article now. 
PROF WIECHERS: What this really says, in his official capacity, he cannot be sued personally in 
civil proceedings. It doesn‟t mean to say that the state cannot be held liable for official acts, but 
not that the state cannot be held liable for official acts, but not the president. It is an immunity for 
him as persons. 
DR TJIRIANGE: The wording itself confuses me. If you look at (1) and (3) (a) I think there is a 
contradiction there. I think the one says exactly the opposite of what is intended. (3)(a) 
Contradicts (1). 
PROF WIECHERS: They are totally in conformity. (1) Says that the office of the president or the 
president, exercising official functions, can be sued and that is state liability, it is practice. If he is 
no longer president, just an ordinary human being, you can‟t then take him to court for official 
things, you will have to take his successor, and it also says while he is in official capacity you 
don‟t drag your head of state into suing him for R30 here or there, he is immune in that capacity, 
in his personal capacity, but not officially. You will always be able to take the president in his 
official capacity to court, as long as he is president. 
Mr Angula: Can he sue somebody? 
PROF ERASMUS: Yes. 
MR BARNES: If he steals my car, can I sue him? 
MR RUPPEL: If his wife wants to divorce him, she cannot sue him.  
PROF WIECHERS: The way I have always explained this to my students is that it is not that there 
is not a ground of action against him, that remains, but he cannot be taken to court. 
MR BARNES: But then he is above the law. 
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PROF WIECHERS: No, he is never above the law 
PROF CHASKALSON: I think what you do is that if you have a president who does something 
like steals your car, you ask for him to be impeached and parliament will remove him from office. 
The remedy is that if a person does something which dishonourable, you remove the person from 
office and then the person ceases to have the presidential immunity which attaches whilst he 
holds office. Then the official capacity he no longer holds, somebody else holds the office of 
president and then will be sued in the official capacity for that. In other words, what it is saying is 
that parliament must deal, the president mustn‟t be dragged through the courts, if there are 
complaints about the president, start an impeachment procedure in parliament. 
MR BARNES: The same with the criminal liability? 
PROF WIECHERS: The same. If there is criminal liability the court of parliament will deal with it. 
MR RUPPEL: I know its trivia, but is it assumed that the president never gets divorced? It is one 
thing if he steals cars, then therefore can be impeachment, but if his wife is perfectly happy with 
him anymore or falls in love with somebody else, she is tied to this man for the rest of his term. 
CHAIRMAN: I have a question to ask in my capacity as chairman. We keep on saying that the 
African presidents don‟t want to quit office. It is true, because the lives they have as presidents 
are so attractive and good, besides the power. But if a president in Africa, who may not have an 
education and so on, had to leave the office, there is nothing attractive for him there. He is going 
to be dumped in his little village, no income. So, is it not better to also make leaving the office 
attractive, that you will have pension or something like that, so that I can say even if I leave I will 
be dignified still? 
MEMBER: Parliament can do that. 
MR RUPPEL: If there is a problem if parliament does it if is not in the constitution, to make the 
office secure for the time after he has gone. If it is not in the constitution the next government, if it 
is a hostile government, will obviously not pass such an act, It will say you go to your village and 
be a poor man forever, unless you have accumulated enough cows during your presidency. But 
that is one of the incentives for corruption. So I think it is a very sound idea to have some 
provision that he will be protected. 
Adv Chaskalson: I think that that would be quite inappropriate. Apart from anything else, pensions 
are usually dealt with through acts of parliament, money changes its value from time to time, 
pensions have to be reviewed from time. To put into your constitution that your president shall be 
entitled to a particular pension, you will have to amend your constitution and there is something in 
dignified in that. 
PROF WIECHERS: The South African Constitution is really not a good example for many things, 
but it has provision that it only says “by act of parliament shall by act or by law provided for the 
salary and the pension of parliament”. Exactly for the reason which honourable Ruppel has 
stated. Then such a parliamentary act usually makes provision how it will be done in a more 
discreet way.  
MR RUPPEL: Then parliament is forced to deal with it. 
PROF WIECHERS: While we are there, this is one of the missing things as far as members of the 
cabinet and also members of the assembly are concerned. There must be provision for an act of 
parliament for parliamentary allowances. 
MR MUDGE: We are all freedom fighters; we are not interested in money. Is that what you have 
been fighting for?  
PROF WIECHERS: From our instructions there are basically two possibilities where one, the 
government that is the cabinet, then through the prime minister advises the president to dissolve. 
But as Mr Rukoro said, it comes from the Assembly itself. If there is a motion of no-confidence the 
prime minister advises him and says “we can‟t go on.” Then there is another possibility which 
have been included in our instructions and which has been debated here. That is where it is a 
general impossibility to carry on. Say for instance a budget is rejected and then the president, in 
consultation, will decide that effective government cannot go on; we must have a new general 
election. So there are two grounds and that is how we are instructed. One, the advice through the 
cabinet to the prime minister, the other one is consultation, discretion of the president himself that 
things cannot work. 
MR PRETOURIOS: Just to follow that up, can‟t we add “for major consultations?” 
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PROF WEIECHERS: It was in the wording, but if government is unable to govern effectively, then 
it must be a major one. It flows from there. 
MR KATJIONGUA: I want to ask the lawyers, if the president, not ceremonial one but the 
executive one in this case, is a product of the votes by parliament, accountable to parliament, 
where else does it derives the powers to dissolve that same parliament that it elected him without 
him moving anywhere else, moving out with the parliament? In addition to that question, where in 
the world as an example does this sort of thing happen? I have the French example in mind, but 
that is a separate thing, but in this way, if he is elected by parliament? 
PROF WEICHERS: One should never forget, and this is why it has been emphasized over and 
over again, the president is elected by parliament but once he is in that office, he is vested with 
the powers of the constitution as head of the executive. He is not a creature of parliament, he is 
invested through a certain election process, but then he assumes the powers and functions and 
duties under the constitution. His checks and balances is then on the level of his cabinet following 
advice, consultation. But he is not tied to the apron strings all the time. 
MR RUPPEL: He gets his powers from the constitution? 
ADV WIECHERS: That is right. 
ADV CHASKALSON: Can I add something to address the concern which I see implicit in some of 
these questions? If you will look at article 56, you will see that in effect the constitution may have 
to be changed, as formulated, in a different place, because when it was drafted it thought that the 
term of office of the president wouldn‟t necessarily be the same as the term of the office of 
parliament, That may have to be changed and that we can come back to. But what is 
contemplated by this constitution is that the parliament and the actually retain their function as 
such until the new elections have been held and so there can‟t be a power vacuum. In the same 
way as the president remains in office, the members of the Assembly can be summoned, that any 
time until the election, the day before the election, they will then be replaced. Since the president 
can‟t make laws himself, he can only deal with laws made by parliament. He can‟t do anything in 
that interim period. If he wants to change laws he has to summon parliament to do it and 
parliament is there to do it. So you don‟t have a vacuum and really what happens if you have 
bridging mechanisms, it is contemplated that parliament won‟t sit in that period, but if there is 
some need for parliament to sit, it will sit. If parliament needs anything, all that can be done in that 
period and then at the time of election there will be change-over a new parliament will come in to 
existence and now, as I understand the discussion probably also a new president will also come 
into existence and the constitution will have to be tailored to that. 
MR KATJIONGUA: How do you dissolve parliament, members have gone home and then you 
summon hem again to go on. Unless you explicitly say they are dissolved by the remaining office 
until Election Day? 
ADV CHAVSKLASON: That is what article 56 says.  
MR KATJIUONGUA: No, to summon means you get them from somewhere else where they are 
in the meantime.  
DR TJIRIANGE: Can we not, for the sake of clarity, put those things that honourable Rukoro 
says, the grounds, in this document. You said two grounds only. Why not put them in there so 
that these are the only circumstances? 
ADV. WIECHERS: They are there, if the honourable would look at article 31(2) (a). Article 31(2) 
(a) is the government is unable to govern effectively, that general discretion with his cabinet. 
Then 55(1) is then the second ground, the advice of the prime minister. 
DR TJIRIANGE: You say only two grounds and I don‟t see any of them mentioned here. 
ADV WECHERS: But there could be even more grounds. These are the two criteria. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: And the vote of no confidence, do you have... 
PROF WIECHERS: If the prime minister and his cabinet are appointed by the president, they are 
the president‟s men. When will they go up to the president and say “please dissolve the National 
Assembly?” It would be all those cases where they can see, the cabinet that they don‟t have the 
support of the majority in parliament, because they can‟t initiate legislation, they can‟t carry on 
governing. So, they will go to the president and say “we don‟t have the support of parliament, 
please dissolve, let‟s have a new election” and those could be various instance, rejection of an 
important vote, rejection of foreign policy, rejection by the house of a budget or formal motion of 
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non-confidence. There could be many, many things to make the cabinet and the prime minister 
assured of the fact that we cannot rely on support in the house. 
MR BARNES: The honourable learned gentleman is stating the explanation from a legal, 
professional point of view. We are thinking as politicians with cognizance of the past, the present 
and what can be in future. It is my submission that is wide open; it does leave grounds for abuse, 
because especially if the election is proportional representation on party list, your own president 
might want to get rid of the members that are there, he has other members on the new list for a 
new election. These are all possible abuses and this is why in view of the fact that nothing is... 
PROF WIECHERS: This is what stands here. Parliament is dissolved, but it could be very 
necessary to get that parliament in that 90 days after dissolution there must be a general election. 
It could be very important. Say for instance you have a president that says “I am dissolved 
parliament, I am calling out a state of emergency because there is no parliament” and then the 
constitution says it has to be ratified, this state of emergency. Then he must call parliament back, 
even after dissolution, or a budget or any important matter. 
DR TJIRIANGE: But the procedure of electing members to parliament is slightly different, it is not 
actually vested with the president. Once the parliament has been dissolved it has been dissolved 
until such a time that the procedure is followed. There must obviously be a provision which Prof 
Wiechers:  we are coming to the question of how the president is elected, and if he is elected 
directly by the population and take for instance that proposition that has been a proposal, that he 
is elected at the same time as the National Assembly and he feels now is the time to invade 
Walvis Bay, the island, and my popularity is very high with the population,  I am going to dissolve, 
I am going to be elected with a huge majority and my party is also going to get a two-thirds 
majority in parliament, now is the right time, how do you write such a thing which is political 
expediency?  Mrs. Thatcher does it; Pres de Klerk does it, anybody at a given point in time calls 
for a general election to strengthen their support, that it is reflected.  Can you prohibit that kind of 
dissolution for political expediency, and can you or do you want or may you prohibit that kind of 
political manoeuvres in your constitution?   
Mr MUDGE:  I think what pro Wiechers said right now, if I remember exactly what we wanted to 
prevent.  Rightly or wrongly, but I think was the argument.  We did not want the president to 
dissolve the government for any other reasons than those of time or when the country becomes 
ungovernable.  The problem that we have, I am not concerned with article 55 because you must 
always read the two articles together and it is a fact that he can only do it if the government is 
unable to govern effectively.  I remember the honourable member Mr Rukoro made a suggestion 
there that we should put that more clearly and not only say “become ungovernable”, but it should 
be because of a major constitution crisis.  How do you in any case define a major constitutional 
crisis?  I think it is a practical problem.  The question I want to ask, what is a government?  You 
know, you can have a problem because the cabinet cannot function properly and there might be 
nothing wrong with the Assembly.  In that case I suppose the Assembly can move a motion of no 
confidence in the cabinet, am I right? I think we have that provision.  Why should we allow any 
president to just dissolve a government just because he wants an election?  And if we must then 
in the case of a major constitutional crisis, then we must make sure that we can define that 
problem.  I am not sure we can.  A last point.  What happens to the president in case of the 
government being dissolved?  If he also must go it is another check that he wouldn‟t do it easily.  
But can we discuss that point now or must we discuss it when we come back to the point, the 
election of the president?  I think that is about the only provision that we can make for power not 
being abused.  
MR MUDGE:  May I ask, what about the possibility of the cabinet and the president resigning if 
they want to force an election?  I think provision is made for that in some constitution. 
PROF WEICHER: It doesn‟t work like that. The cabinet can go to the president and advise him to 
dissolve and he says “no, I don‟t want to dissolve, you must do better business” and they can 
then resign and he appoint another cabinet. If that cabinet is not working, “ nou het ek 
moeileikheid”, now I have to dissolve. 
MR MUDGE: I think after having listened to all the arguments, in my personal opinion there is not 
much we do about this. The only possibility is if we make it sort of compulsory that if the president 
dissolves government, he must go himself. He cannot get rid of the government and stay in 
power himself. I think if we do that we can forget about the rest.  
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MRS ITHANA: Is the member referring to parliament or government? 
MR RUKORO: As a matter of constitutional theory my understanding was that the moment the 
president says “I hereby dissolve parliament”, that in theory the parliament is dissolved and in 
theory his own office is dissolved, but that is reality the president continues to be the president for 
the next 90 days and that also in reality, similarly, the members of the Assembly remain 
competent. They were competent, they remain competent until the next election, and in the same 
manner, and in all other respects as if the dissolution has never occurred. In other words, we are 
dealing with constitutional theory in terms of the declaration of dissolution, but that for practical 
purposes…. 
PROF WEICHERS: If it is dissolved, yes, in 90 days there is a general election. So it has very 
strong consequences. It is just bridging for business. 
MR BARNES: I submit that the argument of the honourable Mr Rukoro would have been very 
logic if the president was elected by the Assembly, as a member of the assembly, then the 
consequences would have followed to its logical consequences that if parliament is dissolved, he 
is dissolved because he is there by virtue of parliament. Our problem lies in the concept or the 
suggestion of a president elected by the people and not sufficient checks and balances to control 
this possible unguided missile. 
MR BARNES: The people‟s president, viva. This is where our problem lies. What further 
complicates the matter and I appeal for your indulgence – is the mere fact that we are dealing 
with two different issues here. We are dealing with an issue where we want to use the democratic 
process to bring something that is not completely democratic by avoiding an election. It can be 
argued that the 1982 Principles does provide for that, but the electorate out there was under the 
explicit impression that they are voting for a constitute assembly that will draft a constitution. With 
these two things in mind I further submit that the conflict situation that we will have to resolve is to 
draft a constitution for an interim arrangement with a final solution to an independent state. 
MR HAMUTENYA: On a point of order. I think Mr Barnes is now out of order. He is now taking to 
other issues. What he has just said definitely is out of order. We are drafting the permanent 
constitution of Namibia. 
ADV WEICHERS: Just to elucidate. It is true, in direct presidential systems the president, being 
elected on his own, has no power of dissolution. You will never find a directly elected president 
dissolving the National Assembly. Then he can‟t touch it. 
MR BARNESS: I was out of order and I should be afforded the opportunity to prove that I was not 
out of order. That is democratic. The mere fact that I referred to a particular thing was under the 
assumption that you said cross reference we might be made and I assure you, that is what you 
have said. If I have then acted in good faith on the arrangement of ruling that you made, I was not 
out of order. 
CHAIRMAN: In good faith, you are out of order; because you are bringing something in we have 
already agreed upon. 
MR BARNES: To come to the point, the fact that this clause is extremely wide open we have 
another problem with this type of clause. It cannot be wished away that the president will also be 
the leader of the majority party, he will also by virtue of that power elect of nominate his own 
cabinet. There are those normal checks and balances that if we did follow the democratic process 
as prescribed by the 1982 Principles, we would have had a different situation here. It the idea of 
turning the constitution would have been much easier, because we would have then drafted a 
constitution... 
CHAIRMAN: We‟re now on a hypothetical question, “if we agreed to deal with articles here. It will 
be a ruling now, we are dealing with articles, not “if” situations. 
MR BARNES: I withdraw the word “if” and I am not finished. Unless we can clearly identify under 
the circumstances can the prime minister with the majority of the cabinet recommend to the 
president that he must dissolve, this matter leaves a lot of questions, because it does not provide 
sufficient mechanism to prevent abuse. I thank you. 
MR HAMUTENYA: Mr Chairman, I wanted to say earlier on, before we got some directions, 
exactly what honourable Rukoro has said, that as far as I am concerned, article  (2)(a) is only 
valid in the context of the original draft we are thinking about, the way to bring about the 
president. If he is going to be directly elected, I don‟t see how he can dissolve the parliament, 
because here now we are talking about strictly the separation of powers. That was my point. 
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Actually, if I had been allowed to talk then maybe we could have solved most of the problems. If 
indeed we accept the new proposition for a directly elected president, then he cannot have the 
power to dissolve parliament. 
MR MUDGE: Isn‟t that the answer? 
MR ANGULA: I would like to ask the members to read this in conjunction with the rest of the 
constitution. I think article 31(2) (a) actually refers to article 62 on page 48. There it is where I can 
see the National Assembly making it impossible for the government to function. If they refuse to 
approve the budget, if they refuse to provide revenue and taxation, it makes it impossible to rule. 
The source is still the National assembly. Article 55(1) should be read in connection with article 
28(6), that the prime minister and the members of cabinet can decide that the president is being 
impeached by the Assembly, and they are to advise him that “boss, you are in a bad shape 
because you have been impeached, therefore it is better for you to dissolve.” So, it is only under 
these kinds of powers I can see the president can dissolve the National Assembly. If the drafters 
of these articles can refer to these other articles for cross-reference… 
MR HAMUTENYA: If you are taking it from the American example, no American president can 
dissolve congress, so I am saying it is not applicable. 
MR RUPPEL: I would agree as a matter of theory with the honourable Mr Hamutenya about the 
strict separation of powers, but for the reasons raised by Mr Angula I think there is merits in 
considering it and if we consider it to have a president with such powers, I think one must 
consider that there is not only the courts to keep a check on any unauthorized actions, which Prof 
Erasmus was referring to, but there is also, if he goes on a tangent of his own without strictly 
complying with the fact that he must act on the on the majority of the cabinet and the prime 
minister, there is a review provision in subsection (7) of the same section we are dealing with, a 
review of action. I think having said this one should make specific provisions that for the purpose 
of conducting that kind of business as review function of legislation, dissolution should not affect 
the operation of the parliament. That is now if you refer to article 56(a), where it says that the 
members shall remain component to perform the function of a member I think that should 
perhaps specifically provide for the purpose of review. That would constitute an effective control 
as well on the president who goes too far and who does not comply fully with all requirements. 
So, I think there are all these checks and they look to me to be very real.  
MR MUDGE: Can I make a proposal? I have listened to all the members and I think the only thing 
that I want to ask be accepted, is that the lawyers look at the possibility that the president, 
whenever he dissolves the government, he will also have to be re-elected. I think that is about as 
far as we can go, Is it the case or is there a possibility? 
CHAIRMAN: The lawyers can look at that. It was in the former SWAPO-constitution. Agreed. Sub 
articles (2) (b). 
MR ANGULA: Are we agreed on (2) (a) that the lawyers will cross-reference some of these 
things? 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: These appointments will be made by the president, but I think they must be 
subject to parliament. They are very life of the stability of a nation. i.e. (cc), (dd) and (ee). That is 
my view.  
MR RUPPEL: I think as a matter of principle one should really not use parliament to okay every 
executive action which is necessary in the running of the country. It is really overburdening the 
functions of parliament. I think there are certain things which must be done by the president. He 
appoints, but he must not every time run back to the legislature. There is a separation of 
functions. The legislature has one kind of function, namely that is elected to make laws. That is its 
principle function and we must not use that body for all sorts of other work if it is really not 
essential. So I strongly move that this appointment is a clear appointment and not subject to any 
other person‟s approval. If somebody is desperately unhappy with it, they can always review that 
decision.  
MRS ITHANA: I want to say exactly what he said and in addition I would like to give a warning 
that if we are subjecting every appointment to the approval of the National Assembly, we may 
scare some of the people who would do a better job if they are given that opportunity, if we will 
subject their lives to be discussed in parliament. 
MR GURIRAB: I think honourable Ithana got my point. I hope that we will not be selecting and 
appointing criminals for any position in the state organs, but we want to ensure that the president 
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of the Republic of Namibia does not appear on the paper as a paper-tiger, a puppet president of 
parliament. We don‟t want to send such a message across the land or abroad for that matter. He 
will be a democratically president, popularly elected – I hope that what we will agree – and we 
should give him such flexibility and authority within the boundaries of this constitution to carry out 
his responsibilities for the life of his office and therefore every bit of appointment does not really 
have to be approved by parliament. We are not dealing with a person who installed himself, 
declared himself emperor. We have already gone a long way in emasculating the powers of the 
executive president. I think at some point we should be conscious about the kind of executive 
president that we would like to have as head of our state. 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: First of all I don‟t think goodwill alone is enough. They say the road to hell 
was paved with good intentions. So, number two, in a number of countries, US included, the chief 
of the joint chiefs are confirmed by the Senate and this is done in some other countries as well. 
So, that is also an opportunity to find out that the president is not employing criminals – and I 
don‟t want to use the word, but it was used by my colleague here- and also for the people of 
Namibia to establish that he is not doing that. Anyway, I want you to note that if the feeling of the 
House is that they should not, then differ with you, because I cannot agree to things here which I 
cannot explain outside to my people.  
MR HAMUTENYA: On the first (aa), it is the kind of thing we are talking about, to appoint on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and with the approval of The National 
Assembly the Chief Justice. Is it really to be on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission?  
DR TJIRIANGE: There is a problem there, because it is said that the Chief Justice is the 
chairman of the Judicial Service Commission. How can his own Commission recommend him? 
MR KATJIOUNGUA: No, I think the president should appoint all these people, but I will retain my 
position “subject to parliament approval.” I want to register that. 
DR TJIRIANGE: I also have a problem. Some of the positions here can and cannot. For instance, 
the judges, I don‟t think there is a need for the judges to be confirmed by the Assembly. No 
respectable person would like to come and be discussed in the Assembly, where you went to 
school, will you be a suitable judge or something like that. 
MR RUKORO: This question relates very seriously to the whole question of the independence of 
the judiciary who, in my opinion, really are the final defenders of this constitution. We can say that 
the president must protect the constitution, but in the final analysis it is the courts of law who are 
going to come in and say: “Mr President, you are going too far.” That is why I feel that apart from 
the approval by the National Assembly, which is subject to the changing majorities, you need an 
independent body of provisional with integrity to in the first place recommend, (a) both in terms of 
appointments and (b), in terms of dismissals and for the Assembly to debate these matters 
subsequently. But to leave them simply to political complexion of this House. I don‟t think that is 
too reassuring in terms of the independence of the judiciary in the long term. This is even 
reinforced if we take into consideration that we have agreed that the first appointees are only for 
the first five years. So, if you read these together, then I think we cannot really remove the 
necessity for some kind of professional body to make a recommendation to the president who will 
then appoint, subject to confirmation by the legislature.  
MR MUDGE: The point I want to raise, and I want to appeal to my colleagues, I am not opposing 
Mr Katjiuongua, I fully support the principle that the president must not be free to arbitrarily 
appoint people, but on the other hand I also support the view that it is not for a legislative body to 
discuss appointments. I am not very happy with that. The alternative is that we make sure – and 
think this also in line with what our learned friend said right now – that the Judicial Service 
Commission and the public Service Commission must be appointed in a very, very responsible 
manner. Those must not be lackeys of politicians; they must be professional people as far as 
possible. I reserve the right, when we come to the appointment of the Judicial Service 
Commission and the Public Commission also for the interim period, that we make sure that we 
have the right people there. Then the appointment by the president will in fact be a formality. I 
think this was always the case. I don‟t think presidents normally appoint people without having 
been assisted by professional committees and bodies, unless they want to make it a political 
appointment. I want to speak frankly about it, some of these appointments have already been 
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announced, and we don‟t even have a Public Service Commission or a judicial Service 
Commission at this stage. 
MR RUPPEL: I agree with the suggestion made by honourable Mr Mudge, but I think as a 
compromise one could perhaps say – if there is a strong feeling for having some sanction from 
the legislature for these offices – that appointments can be made and ratified but without debate. 
There can be informal discussions or in terms of the rules of the House some discussions, but not 
in the public and if the House feels this is not a good appointment, they vote him out with 51%, 
with a simple majority. If one looks at the dignity of the offices of a chief justice and he is 
appointed by somebody and the other party votes against it, he goes into office with a simple 
majority behind him, it is not a good start. A chief justice should have more clout and similar 
considerations apply to the other appointees like the ombudsman. The Attorney General I quite 
honestly don‟t know, because in the Commonwealth-system it is not quite clear whether that is a 
political appointment or what exactly the status is. There are some problems there with the 
Attorney General. There I must look at the lawyers.  
MR ANGULA: The reason why some of us are saying that some of these appointments, like chief 
Justice, should be done by the president directly is precisely to protect the integrity of the person. 
Once you do it through parliament I am inclined to ask for the CV and I am also inclined to make 
my private research. If what you found in private doesn‟t stand in the CV I will be inclined to ask 
questions and that in public. Then you are coming up with all sorts of difficulties for this important 
official. I think the idea is really to protect the integrity of that person; it is not really to hide 
anything. That is my point of view. But of course the Judicial Service Commission has to be 
involved; perhaps the president is entitled to also seek views from whomever he wants and that 
kind of thing. But once you subject it to parliamentary hearing, for sure you can prevent members 
from asking questions. That is the whole problem.  
MR GURIRAB: I want to add another consideration. We are perfectly entitled  to be idealistic 
about our society and to try to inspire our own constitution-making with a certain degree of 
idealism, but something are happening in some developed countries where very component 
people are now shying away from public offices, because of some standards that have been set 
and we do not want to be so … in our insistence on the need for parliamentary ratification of 
these appointments and thereby frighten away people who are otherwise very competent for 
some personal reasons might not want to be subjected to scrutiny. 
MR BARNES: I just want to cite a very, very recent example. Very recently the president of the 
United States wanted to appoint a certain secretary. If that secretary didn‟t appear before the 
senate Committee, and despite the findings of the Senate Committee this man was absolutely – I 
could use the word corrupt, He was an alcoholic, he was a womanizer, but the president of the 
United States insisted on appointing Brown and the Senate Committee turned it down. This saved 
the people of the United States a lot of embarrassment. The idea that a person would feel that he 
is being scrutinized,  If he has nothing to hide then he has nothing to hide and then – without due 
respect to honourable Ruppel, defending a position of appointment in here – that also grants a 
reason that there is a need for parliament to approve or ratify. 
MR BIWA: Honourable R Barnes touched on the point I wanted to touch. I would just like to add 
that there is a need that public officials meet the requirements and demands put by the public. 
Therefore there is a need for certain appointments, especially the high ones, to be confirmed by 
parliament. If we have reservations about allowing these people to appear in parliament and to 
answer questions, I will suggest that we give this task of confirming this person this person to a 
subcommittee to conduct some kind of confirmation.  
MR RUKORO: I feel that we have the categories right, but it is a question of who must be a 
subjected to some kind of ratification or confirmation process and who shouldn‟t. In my own 
opinion, I think, just to use a broad criterion, all political appointments and all quasi-political 
appointments can maybe left to the president to appoint. But when we are dealing with some 
professional categories, like judges and like the Auditor General, there I feel in addition to the 
presidential appointment, there should be some other steps as well, including recommendation 
from a professional body, including ratification by the legislature. Based on what I said, for 
instance I see that under 3(a), specifically (bb) we have the Attorney general. If the Attorney 
General is going to be a political animal of one kind of another, then I don‟t see why should be 
here, if he is going to be a member of Cabinet for instance. I don‟t think we need to subject to him 
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to some kind of ratification. There I think it is a straightforward political appointment by the 
president. The same thing applies to ambassadors. I don‟t think really at this stage of our 
development that we want to say ambassadors, who are by necessary definition political 
appointees just like ministers, should be subject to confirmation or approval by the legislature. I 
think we will reach the time when we have too many qualified people and therefore there are a 
wide range qualified people to choose from, like in America, that we can start saying, “wait a 
minute, because of possible corruption, maybe we need some kind of confirmation here.” 
Therefore, based on what I am saying, I feel that when we talk of the Judicial Service 
Commission, then I think all judges, including the chief justice – there I am clear in my own mind- 
to buttress the independence of the judiciary, which in the ultimate analysis must be the final 
defenders of the constitution, that the position must remain as it is there. The same thing with the 
ombudsman by virtue of his position. The Attorney General can get out of the list of people to be 
approved, that is if he is going to be some kind of political animal or a cabinet person. If he is 
going to remain what he is today, then I think the question for approval comes in. So, it is a 
question of what we want.  
Finally, the Director General, I see, must be appointed on the recommendation of the Public 
Service Commission and approved of the National Assembly. My understanding of the Direct 
General of Planning is that it is a political somebody who has some kind of cabinet status, and 
just like ambassadors I don‟t see why this person should be approved. He is almost like the 
person advisor to the cabinet on economic matters. Do we really need a parliament and the 
Public Service Commission to ratify these people? I would think we take those three people out – 
ambassadors, Attorney General and Director General. 
MR BARNES: This is the danger of the situation here. The situation here is that if the Attorney 
General is a senior member in a political party and he is appointed by that political party into a 
position where he is supposed to be absolutely neutral, professional in his actions. This is the 
question that arises in our mind. It is continuously said, political appointments. I would like to ask 
this question with due respect: Is the Attorney General, the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the 
Governor general, the Director of planning, are they part of the institutions administration or are 
they political figures, because the minute we politicize our departments and heads of 
departments, then we are heading for trouble, because obviously the person in that position will 
always know “I am only Justice, the judge President, the President of the Constitutional Court, are 
they political appointments? Because if they are political appointments, I can assume you we are 
in deep trouble. 
CAHIRMAN: I would have thought that they get competence from the parliament to do certain 
things as delegated members of the parliament. We must be careful, they were delegated 
authority too. So, if they are going to appear before parliament and be appointed, how can 
parliament sit and appoint people? 
ADV CHASKALSON: That means under (b) you want us to appoint on recommendation the 
Public Service Commission but nothing else. 
MR MUDGE: When it comes to political appoints, take the present position. SWAPO is in the 
majority in the National Assembly. They have caucus-meeting with their president; their president 
decides to appoint A as Auditor General. Then it goes to the Assembly, the Assembly will support 
it, the majority party will support the president, but if the Judicial Service Commission and the 
Public Service Commission is appointed in a proper manner and discussed in parliament so that 
the president will not appoint people in those bodies which are political lackeys, then I think we 
will all feel more comfortable. Whether they should also be individually discussed in parliament, I 
don‟t know what you have decided there.  
DR TJIRIANGE: I do understand the sentiments of the previous two speakers, but the question 
was asked: If you make the Public Service Commission subject to this approval of the Assembly, 
it means it has been given the mandate to appoint those people that they are supposed to 
appoint. Now whilst they appoint them, why should the people that have been given the mandate 
to appoint, go back again to the Assembly again for approval? That makes it twice. They have 
delegated powers to appoint. Once they have been appointed by Assembly, then they are 
carrying out the job which we have appointed them. Whoever they appoint is on the delegation of 
powers from the Assembly. 
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MR RUKORO: My point is, the final appointment cannot be made by the professional body itself. 
The final appointment must be by the executive, but on recommendation of that professional 
body. So, that being the case, once the Public Service Commission or the Judicial Services 
Commission was itself approved by parliament – as we are about to agree – then in that case the 
second approval by the National Assembly falls away. 
MR RUKORO: I was going to make the same point, that point (a) on 33, the two-thirds be 
changed to 52%, an ordinary majority and point (b) be deleted as meaningless, on page 33. 
My last point on point (7) is also on page 32 where it says “in terms of this article”. I want this to 
be “in terms of this constitution.” 
MR ANGULA: I think we have to be consistent. We cannot to have certain decision affecting the 
president determined by two-thirds and others by? We must be consistent in the constitution if we 
truly want checks and balances. Either all of them will be determined by 51% or all of them will be 
determined by two-thirds. 
MR RUKOO: I think we should see these things in the right perspective, Firstly; could honourable 
Angula give us one or two examples of where, in terms of the relationship between president and 
legislature, we are demanding that it should be resolved by a two-thirds majority? And Secondly, 
my understanding of this thing is that inasmuch as we are saying we don‟t have a crazy president 
who is going to kill babies and stuff like that, I don‟t think we have an irresponsible legislature 
which is going to say that simply because they would have come to a different conclusion, by that 
reason of that alone, every presidential action must be up for review. It is not possible that every 
action of the president is reviewed. This simply a fall-back position whereby we don‟t have to 
require positively the approval, confirmation or ratification of executive actions by the president. 
That is why we are saying, inasmuch as we are not going to say every action of the president 
must be ratified, we are saying there should be a mechanism in rare case in the exceptional case 
whereby it is a sufficiently serious question. The Assembly can have a way of asking what the 
policy considerations behind this particular action are. If the case can be made out that the 
president acted in good faith, correctly and so on, that is the end of the review. If, on the other 
hand, it becomes clear that maybe the president acted without sufficient thought on some 
questions that is where the review functions come in. And I think the question of a simple majority 
is a healthy requirement.  
MR ANGULA: We must understand the constitution as it is saying. What this paragraph is saying, 
once you review, reverse and correct an action of the president, you are actually expressing a 
vote of no confidence. That is what you are doing.  
MRS ITHANA: Yes, I wanted to say exactly that. This is a very embarrassing situation whereby 
an action taken by the president is being discussed in public and a vote is taken by a simple 
majority. It is embarrassing to the state and to a person as such and therefore the requirement 
must be high. He must do something really serious. 
MR RUKORO: Generally in any system a vote of confidence, is it not resolved a simple majority? 
MR MUDGE: A vote of confidence is normally a vote by majority, not a two-thirds majority.  
MR RUKORO: That is the point that I wanted to make. The second point is, does it mean that on 
each and every occasion that the government does not get its way in the Assembly, the 
government must fall? Yes or no? 
MR ANGULA: Yes, once you corrected and reversed it is up to the president. The president will 
say there is something terribly wrong.  
PROF ERASMUS: I would just like to add one two things in order to point out the seriousness of 
this decision. A vote of no confidence under the Westminster-tradition results in dissolution of the 
government. That is the one thing you have to keep in mind in determining for yourselves the 
effect of what you want to achieve here. I think you must also take in to account the two desires: 
One, that you want to control the exercise of powers of the president, but on the other hand, you 
said earlier there must be separation of powers. I f it must be separation of powers and it seems 
to me there must be some sort of area where the executive has primary functions and 
responsibility in some area where the legislature has the same functions, you have to balance 
these two things, separation of powers and checks and balances and in the end-result you must 
have effective government. The seriousness of the type of control must be taken into account.  
MR MUDGE: I think Mr Katjiuongua was not very happy when I did not come out strongly in 
favour of his proposal that certain appointments must be a ratified by parliament. That would have 
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been with a simple a majority. I was of the opinion, let the president make the appointments, let 
the president take the decisions instead of asking parliament to do that and discussing everyone 
of those appointments or decisions in parliament. But then, on the other hand, I thought as a sort 
of remedy, let the parliament then have the right to reverse some of those decisions if they really 
feel strongly about it. I don‟t think that should always be seen as a motion of no confidence. I 
don‟t think so. If your feel that must not be all decisions, let us then specify certain decisions. If 
you say it must be done by a two-thirds majority, then in case you give that right to parliament to 
reverse a decision. Then it affects the principle of division of powers in any case. All I am asking, 
let us decided that it should be at least 51%. I think it will seldom happened that all the members 
– the opposition will in any case never have 51%, so it can only happen with the support of the 
ruling party and a substantial number of the ruling party. But I just wanted to make it clear that 
instead of expecting government to approve, give them the right to reverse. 
MR HAMUTENYA: If we accept the proposition of a president being elected on his own merit, it is 
quite possible that he may be the leader of a very small minority. If Mr Katjiuongua has only two 
people in parliament but individually he is a person who is popular, he could indeed win the 
election. So therefore, if he was in the position where half of the Assembly come together and 
override his decision, it would be a mess. So, to protect that situation we should at least agree to 
a two-thirds majority. Let‟s not look at the strength in the parliament, it is not relevant. 
MR MUDGE: IF you would allow the president to be elected by the Assembly and to be sitting in 
the Assembly where we can criticize him for what he is going, it changes the situation. This is one 
of the arguments that I can use convincing my people that the president can be elected directly. 
That will be the only control we have him. If he is in parliament we can criticize him and he will 
have to reply. 
MR ANGULA: I wanted to answer first to the very relevant queries by Mr Barnes. Presidents are 
human beings. Human beings are fallible and it is precisely for that reason that we can provide 
mechanisms of impeachment and the very things we are talking about here of reviewing, 
reversing and correcting. Nobody questions that there is a need for review, correcting, but what 
we are saying, in making a decision about that, because you are going to constitute yourself in a 
kind of a court, that if you take a decision should really carry the weight of the House and that is 
why we are saying that decision requires a two-thirds. Any self respecting president, once you do 
that, will certainly resign. We are talking about appointments; we are talking about any action and 
precisely because you are likely to make mistakes. Any mistake you make, the parliament 
constitutes itself into a court, decide by simple majority and throw you out. You will have 
governments falling day in and day out, unless you ensure that every government that comes into 
power must have more than 51% of the votes, otherwise you are going to be in trouble. That is 
the reality. 
MRS ITHANA: We have tried to build in control mechanisms in this constitution. Firstly we said 
the president must do whatever he does in consultation with the cabinet. So, whatever he has 
gone through the cabinet and the cabinet did not realize that he is making a mistake, until this 
matter is taken to the… 
MRS ITHANA: I was saying there are enough control mechanism in this constitution and if all the 
control mechanisms that we have put here are capable to see the serious issue that the president 
is committing, then it is something that is a minute, other than to be taken to the parliament and 
even a decision to be to reverse. As I said before – Comrade Angula has put it in the right 
language – this really embarrassing and if we are deciding to embarrass our president, then we 
must really pay the cost and you‟re not embarrassing only one person, you are embarrassing the 
cabinet with which he is working. You are in fact embarrassing the whole nation. It must be taken 
by a two-thirds majority. 
MR HAMUTENYA: If he wrong he must be embarrassed.  
MRS ITHANA: If he is wrong he must be embarrassed, but then he must understand that he has 
caused his caused his nation an embarrassment. I say a two-thirds majority. 
MR TJIRIANGE: Yes, regard this as a serious erosion of the president. Once you have this will 
make the man completely impotent. So, I would really like the whole provision to be scrapped.  
MR ANGULA: Yes, honourable Ruppel has said very correctly that the function of the legislature 
is to make laws. However, I would also like to add another function which is important and which 
is reflected in this Part 2. I think what is supposed to be achieved is that the legislature, in relation 
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to the presidency, is also to be seen as a moral voice a way. It can express a moral view about 
the behaviour and the actions of the president. By the mere fact of reviewing the decisions of the 
president, you are making a statement about the competence and other things of the president. 
You are a judgment about the president and you should send a message to the president by that 
method. When you are taking a decision, the parliament is now acting as a correcting mechanism 
and that particular correction measure at least should be carried by a reasonable number or by a 
large composition o parliament if it is going to be meaningful. Otherwise the review and the 
correction, as it stands, can be abused by people. With due respect to the position of honourable 
Katjiuongua that he does not think anybody will use this thing, but actually it can happen. So if we 
are going to perform that corrective function, then you must do it in such a way that the decision 
was taken truly and really by the overwhelming majority of parliament. Otherwise you are creating 
confrontation and suspicion in the country, because once the parliament… itself that way, the 
nation will also take sides, the people outside. If you are not careful and take a decision by simple 
majority, you will find that the people who support the president will march and denounce 
parliament. So you are creating confrontation. But if it is taken by the overwhelming majority of 
the people, the people will think he is up to something. I want us to separate these three things: 
Parliament is a legislative body with a separate function. It has a moral expression on behalf of 
the nation to control the presidency and a correcting mechanism and that provided for in the 
impeachment article. So honourable members, as much as we as we want to control the run-
away, I think we should really control it in a responsible manner. 
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